Select Committee on Northern Ireland Affairs Third Report


4  Measures taken by law enforcement agencies

The Organised Crime Task Force

127. The Organised Crime Task Force (OCTF) was set up in September 2000 by the Rt Hon Peter Mandelson MP, the then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Its purpose was "to provide strategic direction for a multi agency approach to tackling organised crime".[236] Following a review in 2005, the OCTF now operates at three levels: a stakeholder group chaired by the Policing and Security Minister, Mr Paul Goggins, MP; a smaller strategy group chaired by a senior Northern Ireland Office official and made up of senior representatives of the law enforcement agencies; and eight work "streams"[237] divided into two categories, enabling and coordination, and criminal enterprises.

128. We were told that the stakeholder group meets twice yearly "to advise and monitor progress in achieving cross cutting objectives to combat Northern Ireland organised crime".[238] It is made up of: the PSNI; HM Revenue and Customs; the Assets Recovery Agency; the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA); the Home Office; the Head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service; the Northern Ireland Office; the Northern Ireland Policing Board; the Confederation of British Industry (CBI); the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB); and the Northern Ireland Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The Minister was prepared to consider extending the membership of the OCTF's stakeholder group to include other key industries, including petrol retail and road haulage, and to increasing the regularity of the group's meetings.[239] He was also prepared to consider reviewing the membership of the stakeholder group, but was concerned that an extension of membership could make it unwieldy and could hamper progress.[240] He was also prepared to consider increasing the number of meetings of the stakeholder group.[241]

129. The strategy group, made up of senior representatives of the law enforcement agencies and chaired by a Northern Ireland Office official, meets bi-monthly and its aim is to "develop an improved shared understanding of the nature of organised crime in Northern Ireland" and to "identify the barriers to tackling organised crime and developing strategies to overcome them".[242]

130. The work of the "enabling and co-ordination stream" focuses on the public sector, identifying necessary policy and legislative changes, and improving public awareness of organised crime.[243] It is supported by the Head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service, who chairs an interdepartmental group with the aim of "promoting awareness in the Northern Ireland Departments and the wider public sector of the threat of organised crime" and "to maintain the momentum behind the current initiatives to tackle it", including examining how best legislation can be used to combat organised crime.[244] The "criminal enterprise stream" covers specific organised crime threats, including oils fraud, alcohol smuggling, drugs, armed robbery and criminal finance. Both "streams" are supported by "sub and expert" groups which examine certain aspects of organised crime.

131. A key role of the OCTF is to "raise awareness of the dangers of organised crime".[245] To this end, it publishes Annual Reports which set out its assessment of the nature and scale of organised crime, gives press briefings and publishes a quarterly magazine. Where appropriate, the Policing and Security Minister also makes public statements on operational successes.[246]

132. The strength of the OCTF lay in its multi agency approach which brought together "all the main agencies" responsible for tackling organised crime, facilitating increased coordination.[247] Sir Hugh Orde explained that the OCTF was "a unique structure" in the UK which regularly brought together the main agencies.[248] He argued that it had enabled the PSNI to identify a number of "serious organised criminal gangs" and to work with the other agencies in targeting those gangs.[249] He also pointed to the sophistication of people within the OCTF who were "very good at following money".[250] Ms Jane Earl, Director of the Assets Recovery Agency said that she was " very pleased" about the way the OCTF was developing and that the Agency was working hard with the other law enforcement agencies to examine ways of increasing the number and quality of referrals made to the Agency.[251] Mr Anthony Kennedy, Head of Legal Services, Assets Recovery Agency, told us that the OCTF was in the process of developing an asset recovery strategy which would "join up" the asset recovery work of the responsible agencies, including the public prosecution service.[252] The Minister was keen to stress that the strategy was extremely important because financial probing should be at the heart of every criminal investigation.[253] He said that the benefit of the strategy was that it brought together the key agencies, all of whom had expertise in financial investigations.[254]

133. Mr Glyn Roberts, Parliamentary Officer for the FSB, welcomed the fact that the FSB together with the CBI and Chamber of Commerce had recently been asked to become members of the OCTF's stakeholder group.[255] He acknowledged that the OCTF had had "initial successes", and had been "very successful in tackling the "godfathers"", but argued that it needed to concentrate its efforts on tackling paramilitary organisations.[256] Mr Wilfred Mitchell, Chairman of the FSB, was critical of the approach taken by Government, arguing that no serious attempt had been made by it to tackle the problem of extortion in the business community.[257] He suggested that this be made a priority of the OCTF.[258] Mrs Nicola Carruthers, Chief Executive of the Federation of the Retail Licensed Trade, told us that the OCTF did not have a high enough profile in Northern Ireland and that until recently, she had not been aware of its work.[259]

134. Mr Nigel Smyth, Director of CBI, considered that extra resources were required to ensure that enforcement agencies continued to give priority to combating organised crime. He believed that "educational campaigns", highlighting the damage caused by organised crime were necessary in order to change the perception that organised crime was victimless.[260]

135. We welcome the review of the Organised Crime Task Force structures undertaken by the Northern Ireland Office in 2005. All structures need to be overhauled from time to time and that is particularly so when the threat from organised crime constantly evolves and mutates. It is essential that the agencies of the OCTF remain as alert to the threat as organised crime gangs are to the opportunities.

136. We welcome the fact that the CBI and the Federation of Small Businesses are now represented on the OCTF's stakeholder group, but are concerned that its membership does not include representatives of specific key industries affected by organised crime, including road haulage, the licensed trade and construction industries. We recommend that membership of the stakeholder group is extended to include key specific industries; that it meets quarterly rather than twice a year; and that its work is given wider publicity within the community at large.

The Police Service of Northern Ireland

137. Sir Hugh Orde told us that in order to ensure that the PSNI was "fit for purpose", it had reorganised its organised crime structures in March 2004, creating a new Crime Operations Department with a dedicated Organised Crime Branch, 1,200 police officers, and a centralised intelligence function under the command of an Assistant Chief Constable, Mr Peter Sheridan.[261] Mr Philip Aiken, Detective Chief Superintendent and head of the Organised Crime Branch, said that the reorganisation had changed PSNI's approach to tackling organised crime and that it had led to "considerable success" and "impact".[262] He also indicated that PSNI had ensured that it had police officers with the expertise to deal with the full range of organised crime and that there had been particular success in the area of economic crime "leading to major criminals being arrested" and brought before the courts.[263]

138. The PSNI uses an assessment framework compliant with the National Intelligence model, "to provide a clear strategic focus" to its organised crime work.[264] The framework uses a nationally accredited problem solving model "to examine the attributes of organised crime gangs" which are then used to prioritise investigations and operations.[265] We were also told about "a joint intelligence cell" which allows the PSNI to make intelligence available to the Assets Recovery Agency so that it can "speedily process" its cases through the courts.[266] Sir Hugh considered that centralisation of intelligence had meant that the police had a "far better" intelligence picture and he was confident that it still had "a very good picture" of paramilitary activity.[267] However, he acknowledged that while intelligence was much better, the PSNI did not have the "whole picture".[268]

139. Sir Hugh was keen to stress that the PSNI had had "some substantial successes" against "highly organised and highly dangerous gangs".[269] Between April and December 2005, the PSNI's Drugs Squad seized illegal drugs with a street value of £6.5 million.[270] The number of cash seizures made by PSNI almost doubled between 2004 and 2005.

140. However, several witnesses told us of a reluctance to report incidents to the police because of a perception that no action would be taken. Mrs Nicola Carruthers, Chief Executive of the Federation of the Retail Licensed Trade, said that one of the Federation's members had claimed that "the police were not interested".[271] She believed that many people did not report organised crime incidents because of a belief that the perpetrators would "never get caught" and it would "take up their business time" waiting for a crime officer to reach the crime scene.[272] We also heard about the low level of confidence that the business community had in the police's ability to tackle the problem effectively.[273] Mr Nigel Smyth, Director of CBI, felt that greater priority should be given in the annual policing plan to how crime was affecting businesses.[274]

141. The PSNI explained that it had a "reassurance strategy" which aims to "raise public confidence by improving communications, managing public expectations and assuring local communities that crime is being addressed".[275] It was keen to stress that it would continue to consult with communities, and would "use community-focused policing to target crime and disorder".[276] Sir Hugh was also keen to stress that combating organised crime was not the sole responsibility of the PSNI, but rather the shared responsibility of the police, the business community and all communities in Northern Ireland.[277] He acknowledged that the PSNI could increase its partnerships with "agencies who are the victims of crime" who feel unable, because of paramilitary involvement in organised crime, to engage with the police.[278] The PSNI had a "substantial witness protection scheme" and Sir Hugh noted that he had no record of witnesses being attacked after having given information to the police about threats of extortion.[279]

142. Mr Sheridan, Assistant Chief Constable with responsibility for organised crime, considered that the shift in paramilitarism where the "strategic intention" was now money and not "bombings and murders", meant that PSNI's attention would have to shift to examining economic crime in depth.[280]

143. We welcome the measures taken by PSNI to strengthen its capacity to combat organised crime. We are in no doubt about the seriousness with which they treat their responsibilities in combating this problem. The pattern of paramilitary organised crime is changing and the potential for paramilitaries to use their expertise and skills to mutate into professional criminal enterprises is high. We welcome PSNI's commitment to adapt its approach in response to the changing pattern of organised criminal activity, and its assurance that its intelligence picture has strengthened.

144. Combating organised crime is not the sole responsibility of the PSNI, but the shared responsibility of the PSNI, the other law enforcement agencies and indeed all Government Departments. We strongly believe that a partnership approach, under which responsibility is accepted by all these bodies will have a much more direct and significant bearing on organised crime, particularly paramilitary crime.

145. We are under no illusions that gaining the community support that is essential in tackling organised crime and reducing the hold of the paramilitaries will require time, patience and strenuous effort. We therefore welcome the PSNI's commitment to assure local communities that organised crime is being addressed. This vital work must be given high priority.

146. We recognise, however, that the success of the police in tackling organised crime will be significantly limited so long as one of the major political parties, Sinn Fein, withholds its support for, and recognition of the legitimacy of, the PSNI—and continues to encourage its supporters to follow this lead. Comprehensive and thoroughly effective policing requires the recognition and support of all communities and particularly of the leaders of those communities.

147. The Committee has received conflicting reports in private on schemes for community restorative justice. While it is clear that there are schemes which act in the wider interests of the community and in constructive cooperation with the PSNI, there are other schemes that purport to be an alternative police force. Nothing must be done to give the latter further encouragement. We go further and urge that every possible step be taken to ensure that any future schemes are not infiltrated or controlled by paramilitaries. We recommend the adoption of clear and firm requirements which will apply to all such schemes. We further recommend that any community restorative justice group should only qualify for funding if it cooperates with the PSNI. We will therefore assess carefully the guidelines which the government has promised to issue to satisfy ourselves that they are adequate for their purpose.

HM Revenue and Customs

148. HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) informed us that since 2000 it had taken "a new strategic approach to tackling indirect tax fraud" across the UK.[281] It had a "developing strategy" to tackle oils fraud which involved increasing the number of its officers engaged in tackling oils fraud in Northern Ireland from 25 to 160, introducing a regulatory regime to control the sale of rebated fuel, setting up a central intelligence unit to direct all operational activity, and launching a publicity campaign to highlight the damage caused to motor engines by illegal fuel use.[282]

149. HMRC also told us that its strategy for tackling cigarette smuggling involved increasing the number of officers engaged in tackling the trade by almost 1000 in the UK and overseas, and introducing "a national network of x-ray scanners, working closely with tobacco manufacturers to suppress the availability of UK manufactured cigarettes to smugglers abroad".[283] The strategy now includes improved memoranda of understanding with UK manufacturers to restrict the availability of cigarettes to smugglers as well as the deployment of 200 staff to tackle the smuggling of hand-rolling tobacco. [284]

150. Mr Paul Gerrard, Deputy Head of Enforcement and Compliance Operations at HMRC, believed that the best measure of HMRC's success in tackling oils fraud was the fact that there had been a 22% increase in the sale of legitimate fuel over the last four years.[285] He attributed this increase to a range of interventions by HMRC, including fuel seizures, imposed assessments, and successful control of the supply chains of red diesel and kerosene. Mr Gerrard informed us that over the last two years, HMRC had carried out more roadside checks in Northern Ireland than it had "ever done before".[286] He was confident that HMRC could do more to make the legitimate market in Northern Ireland healthier.[287]

151. In terms of cigarette smuggling, HMRC told us that the supply chain for cigarettes had become stronger and "more heavily organised" in the last few years.[288] Mr Donald Toon, Deputy Director of Criminal Investigations, HMRC, informed us that the nature of organised criminal gangs dealing in illegal cigarettes had changed from mainly "smaller scale importers and distributors" to "very large, complicated and very organised networks of criminals".[289] In 2004-05 HMRC had seized 19.7 million cigarettes in Northern Ireland and that it had already seized more cigarettes in 2006 than it had in 2005 and 2004. [290]

152. Mr Tom Wilson, Manager of the Freight Transport Association, believed that HMRC were "only scraping the surface".[291] He said that people from the transport industry had provided HMRC with relevant information about illegal activity, but that this had not led to closures of illegal operations:

    "Customs have used their best endeavours with the resources available to them. They are frustrated with being unable to strike these people off the map. There is a combination in there of a lack of will and a lack of resource. The information is being fed through, businesses are being damaged and are very frustrated that the good information they are giving has not resulted in what they want to see".[292]

153. When we asked HMRC about suggestions that it was not acting on information it received about illegal operations, Mr Gerrard was emphatic that there was not a "lack of will" to tackle the problem. He acknowledged that the information HMRC received through its confidential hotline was still at "relatively small levels" and that more could be done to get more information.[293] He also accepted that information gathered on the ground by officers did not "always get through" to HMRC headquarters.[294] Mr Toon emphasised that HMRC was dealing with "very long term criminality" which required time and substantial effort.[295] He was also keen to emphasise the "very high" level of cooperation HMRC had with the PSNI, the Assets Recovery Agency, and the Criminal Assets Bureau and Revenue Commissioners in the Republic of Ireland.

154. Our inquiry has shown that oils fraud and tobacco fraud are significant and sophisticated areas of organised crime in Northern Ireland which require a vigorous law enforcement response. We welcome the steps taken by HMRC through its strategies to tackle both areas. We are encouraged by the increase in the sale of legitimate fuel in Northern Ireland, HMRC's commitment to ensure further growth in the legitimate market, and its determination to continue to bear down on tobacco fraud.

155. However, we are deeply concerned by the evidence that crucial information about illegal activity is not always reaching HMRC headquarters. This situation cannot be allowed to continue. Receiving reports of illegal activity is critical to HMRC's capacity to tackle the problem effectively and timeously. We recommend that it review its systems for receiving information, particularly from officers working on the ground, and takes every possible step to encourage reports of suspicious activity, including wider publicising of its confidential telephone service[296].

156. The HMRC has wide responsibilities none of which it can neglect. We welcome the particular attention it is giving to its customs and excise responsibilities in assisting the fight against organised crime. Nonetheless, diligent examination of individuals' tax affairs also has a very important role to play. It follows that the approach to thresholds adopted in the rest of the UK for examining an individual's tax affairs is not necessarily appropriate in Northern Ireland. There it is essential to target key members of organised crime gangs and those who may sponsor or protect them and such targeting inevitably necessitates a more flexible approach.

Assets Recovery Agency

157. The Assets Recovery Agency (ARA) was established by the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and became operational in February 2003. It was set up "to disrupt criminal enterprises through the recovery of criminal assets".[297] Its remit is to reduce crime by: initiating 'civil recovery' proceedings in the High Court to recover the proceeds of unlawful conduct; investigating cases leading to post-conviction confiscation orders, and enforcing confiscation orders; using powers of taxation where there is income, gains, or profits chargeable to the relevant tax and which have resulted from criminal conduct; and supporting police, customs and other agencies in financial investigations, by providing specialist training and advice. Although UK wide, the Assets Recovery Agency has an assistant director and an office in Belfast specific to Northern Ireland. It has a total staff complement of approximately 200 and a Home Office budget of £15.5 million. The Belfast office has 47 staff and a budget of £3.59 million. We are bound to question whether this is an adequate distribution of resources, bearing in mind the importance of the issues on which this Report focuses.

158. Ms Jane Earl, Director of the Agency, explained that the Agency did not initiate its own cases but acted on referrals from other law enforcement agencies, including the PSNI and HMRC. She said that, as awareness of the Agency's role had grown, so too had the number of referrals to the Agency.[298] She told us that the Agency worked "very hard" with the referring organisation to ensure the "best possible exchange" of information from initial referral to initiating proceedings.[299]

159. Mr Nigel Smyth, Director of the CBI, told us that there was an impression among members of the CBI that the Criminal Assets Bureau in the Republic of Ireland appeared to be more pro active and appeared to be having a greater effect than the Assets Recovery Agency. We were also told in informal meetings that the Agency was not being as pro active as it should be. When we asked about how the Agency's performance compared with the Criminal Assets Bureau (CAB), Ms Earl was keen to stress that the Bureau operated under a different statutory regime and had been functioning since 1996 whereas the Agency had only been established since 2003.[300] She acknowledged that the process for granting a recovery order by the High Court was a much longer process than she had imagined. She said that so far this year the Agency had achieved three recovery orders and in each case settlements had been reached and the total value of assets recovered was £350,000 in the 2006-07 financial year and a further £450,000 resulting from cases in the financial year 2005-06. Mr Anthony Kennedy, Head of Legal Services at the Belfast office, explained that 70% of the CAB's income was derived from the use of taxation powers while the majority of the Agency's cases go through civil recovery proceedings. He argued that the Bureau's taxation regime for criminal assets was "more efficient and effective" and that Part 6 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 should be amended to bring the Agency's taxation regime into line with that operated by the Bureau.[301]

160. Since taking evidence from the Assets Recovery Agency, it has published its Annual Report for 2005-06. The Agency acknowledges that it has experienced a number of delays in progressing cases through the civil legal aid system and that this has had an adverse impact on the total amount of assets realised in final recovery orders.[302] The Agency regrets that it did not meet its targets for final recovery orders and emphasises that the targets were set in "good faith and on the best available knowledge at the time of producing the Business Plan for 2005-06".[303] The Agency has worked with colleagues in the Home Office, the Department for Constitutional Affairs and the Attorney General's Office to identify what further steps can be taken to "speed up case progress".[304] The Agency did, however, disrupt 21 criminal enterprises during 2005-06 using its powers of early restraint and taxation. The assets involved come to some £15.9 million against a target of £6 million.[305]

161. Mr Paul Goggins, MP, the Minister for Policing and Security, was keen to stress that in the relatively short period since its creation, the Assets Recovery Agency had made significant progress.[306] He said that the Agency was governed by a different framework from the Criminal Assets Bureau, and that the Government was "looking very closely at asset recovery in general" and the Agency itself with a view to making further improvements.[307] He acknowledged that there were currently obstacles which were hampering the process of translating assets into cash and that the government was keen to examine the Agency's proposals to make the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 work more effectively.[308] He believed this was essential in building public confidence in the Agency.[309]

162. The Assets Recovery Agency also suggested that Part 5 of the 2002 Act required "a number of small amendments".[310] We agree that such amendments would improve the Agency's efficiency and effectiveness. We ask the Government to undertake an urgent review of the legislation. It told us that a change to the limitation period in Section 27A of the Limitation Act 1980, currently 12 years, would allow the recovery of properties purchased with the proceeds of drug trafficking in the early 1990s which are "currently beyond the reach of civil recovery proceedings".[311] It argued that "international mutual legal assistance" arrangements should be created for civil recovery investigations and proceedings; such arrangements apply only to criminal investigations, prosecutions, and related confiscation proceedings. It believed that such international assistance was vital "where assets have been moved through a number of jurisdictions in an attempt to make the money trail more difficult for investigators to follow".[312] The Agency suggested that provision could be made for such assistance in relevant domestic legislation or through agreements, multilateral or bilateral conventions that provide a legal basis for such assistance.[313] The Agency provided us with details of their proposals which we print in the appendices to this report.[314]

163. We were informed that of the 95 referrals received by the Agency between 2003-2006, 31 had "criminal" links, 29 had loyalist links, 16 had "organised crime group links, 14 had republican links, and 5 were not specified.[315] When we asked about the reason for the lower number of referrals with a republican link, we were told that the Agency would only designate a case as having a paramilitary link if they had been given "specific intelligence by law enforcement that there was a paramilitary link".[316] Mr Alan McQuillan, Assistant Director of the Assets Recovery Agency, stressed that the Agency had pursued every viable case and that the figures reflected "the products of the viable cases" referred to the Agency.[317] He said that a case ceased to be viable only where the Agency had insufficient evidence of criminality or there were insufficient assets. The ARA could encourage referrals by talking to other law enforcement agencies, but could not "control the process".[318] Ms Earl emphasised that the Agency acted on referrals and gave "an absolute assurance" that the Agency had not failed to act on any referral "because of the background of the body".[319] The disparity in referrals may reflect the greater sophistication of republican organisations.

164. The Agency explained that "issues surrounding the provision of legal aid" had led to "considerable delays in progressing the litigation of civil recovery proceedings in Northern Ireland".[320] We were told that following a recent amendment to legal aid legislation, defendants were now able to apply to the High Court for the release of frozen assets which can be used to "fund legal expenses reasonably incurred" in connection with the defence of proceedings[321] This means that the actual assets finally realised by the Agency may be significantly reduced once a portion of the assets have been used to fund a defendant's legal costs. When we asked the Minister about this development, he said that the amendment to the legal aid legislation had only been in force since January 2006 and the Government intended to keep the situation under review.[322] He said, however, that the Agency has power to challenge a decision by the High Court to release frozen assets to fund a defendant's legal costs and to reduce the amount of disbursement down to 65% of what was requested by the defendant.[323]

165. Ms Earl told us that the Agency had an active communications policy. She explained that when the Agency felt it could legitimately inform the public about the action it was taking on their behalf, it did so at the earliest opportunity.[324] The Agency's market research demonstrated that the Agency had a 80% recognition rate among the public in Northern Ireland.[325]

166. In February 2004, the Home Office announced a new police incentive scheme to be introduced in 2004-05 that would allow police forces in England and Wales and the PSNI to receive a share of the total criminal assets recovered in the year following their recovery. In February 2005, the Home Office announced that the scheme would be extended from 2006-07 to asset recovery agencies, including the ARA, HMRC, and the Serious Organised Crime Agency. The agencies and police forces will be able to receive 50% of the assets they recover.

167. Ms Earl told us that because the Assets Recovery Agency is dependent on organisations to refer cases, it had taken the policy decision when the incentive fund was extended to asset recovery bodies, to share the assets recovered by the Agency with the referring organisation, normally on a 50/50 basis.[326] She argued that this would help foster "goodwill and relationships", and demonstrate that assets recovery is "a partnership activity".[327] She hoped that the Agency would also be able to use its share of the assets to resource further investigations and lawyers so that the Agency could take on additional cases.[328]

168. The Assets Recovery Agency has been operating for only three years. We believe that within that relatively short period of time, the Agency has made a positive start towards recovering the very substantial proceeds of organised criminality in Northern Ireland. We welcome the growing number of referrals to the Agency, and the Agency's assurance that it pursues all viable cases referred to it, regardless of whether the cases have a loyalist or republican link. We cannot stress enough the importance of the law enforcement agencies in Northern Ireland continuing to refer cases they believe can be pursued by the Agency. We also note from the Agency's latest Annual Report that the costs of its operations to date far exceeds the value of assets it has recovered. We must express concern at this, particularly in light of the much greater financial success of the Criminal Assets Bureau in the Republic.

169. We welcome the Agency's decision to give 50% of the assets recovered in a particular case to the referring organisation. We share the view that this will help foster goodwill and strengthen joint working arrangements between the law enforcement agencies.

170. We also welcome the Minister's willingness to carry out a review of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. We heard strong evidence that the taxation powers of the Assets Recovery Agency would be more effective if they were equivalent to those of the Criminal Assets Bureau (CAB) in the Republic of Ireland. The CAB has the power to initiate cases without having to wait for a referral. We do of course recognise that the CAB is an integral part of An Garda Siochana. Whilst we advocate increased powers for the Assets Recovery Agency, we recognise that actions initiated by them must not prejudice wider police investigations.

171. We have also received disturbing reports that, as a result of changes in legal aid legislation, criminals have been able to use the proceeds of their crime to fund their defence costs. We hold firmly to the view that those accused of crimes are innocent in law until proven guilty, but anyone found guilty in these circumstances should receive a sentence that reflects the illicit use of ill-gotten gains. We recommend that the Government keep this matter under close review.

Cross border cooperation

172. During our visit to Dublin and in public evidence sessions, we heard evidence about the considerable cross border cooperation to tackle organised crime. During meetings in Dublin, we were told how the arrangements for joint cross border investigations between An Garda Siochana and the PSNI had become more formalised and how representatives of the Criminal Assets Bureau (which is an integral part of An Garda Siochana) met regularly with officers from both the PSNI and HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC), and the Assets Recovery Agency. There were effective exchanges of intelligence, and in cross border cases of organised crime, operational orders and manpower arrangements were agreed between the main law enforcement agencies.

173. We were also told that "systematic cooperation" between HMRC and the Revenue Commissioners in the Republic of Ireland had developed relatively recently and was proving to be effective. Co-operation was taking the form of exchanges of intelligence and joint working on cross border cases.

174. Mr Alan McQuillan, Assistant Director of the Assets Recovery Agency, believed that cross border relations had strengthened over the last three years.[329] He told us that in some cases, the Agency was running joint operations with An Garda Siochana, coordinating their approach on both sides of the border and sharing as much evidence as possible.[330] He also told us that 80% of the Agency's investigators had spent at least a week on secondment to the Criminal Assets Bureau which had been "hugely beneficial" during the Agency's first few years of operation and had helped establish "very strong personal relationships between investigators in the Agency and CAB".[331] Mr Paul Gerrard confirmed that HMRC had a good working relationship with the Revenue Commissioners in the Republic of Ireland. He also pointed out that HMRC had a fiscal liaison officer based in Dublin who worked with all the main law enforcement agencies, including the Criminal Assets Bureau.[332] The Assistant Chief Constable of the PSNI with responsibility for organised crime, Mr Peter Sheridan, told us that he had regular meetings with Garda officers in the Republic of Ireland during which joint work on targeting particular gangs was discussed, progress was recorded and information and intelligence were exchanged.[333]

175. The Northern Ireland Office informed us that there was regular liaison between the two jurisdictions at both ministerial and official level "to discuss policy and legislative issues relating to organised crime".[334] Since 2003, an annual cross border organised crime seminar has been organised jointly by the Northern Ireland Office and the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform in the Republic of Ireland.[335] The seminars were designed to allow representatives of law enforcement agencies and public sector bodies in both jurisdictions to improve "the existing shared understanding of cross border organised crime" and to evaluate progress made in tackling it. At the 2004 seminar, An Garda Siochana and PSNI published the first joint, cross border organised crime assessment to focus the efforts of the law enforcement agencies on both sides of the border. The 2004 assessment focused on key cross border areas of organised crime, including oils, tobacco and alcohol fraud, intellectual property crime, drugs and money laundering.

176. We welcome the growth in cross border cooperation in tackling organised crime and the establishment of more formal arrangements for joint operations. This cooperation is vital to the fight against organised crime.

177. We believe that if Northern Ireland is to complete its transition to a normal society, it is crucial that the main law enforcement agencies on both sides of the border continue to give priority to combating organised crime and that they have a clearly understood long term strategic approach. Given the association between some political parties and those engaged in organised crime, we welcome the Minister's recognition that the successful combating of organised crime is central to sustaining political progress in Northern Ireland.

The Serious Organised Crime Agency

178. The creation of a Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) was a key commitment in the Home Office white paper "One Step Ahead" published in March 2004. The Agency was formally established on 1 April 2006. Its remit covers the whole of the UK and brings together the functions of the National Criminal Intelligence Service, the National Crime Squad, elements of HM Revenue and Customs, including its investigative and intelligence work on serious drug trafficking and related criminal offences, and the UK Immigration Service's work on organised immigration crime. Its key functions are to prevent and detect serious organised crime, contribute to its reduction, and gather, store, analyse and disseminate information on crime. As we noted at paragraph 81, its core objective is reducing the harm caused to UK citizens by organised crime.

179. In its first Annual Plan (2006-07), the Agency notes that it has agreed to work in partnership with law enforcement agencies in Northern Ireland in order to secure an effective and coherent response to organised crime in Northern Ireland. The Agency has therefore become a member of the Organised Crime Task Force. During an informal meeting with officials of the Agency, we were told that memoranda of understanding between SOCA and the PSNI and the other law enforcement agencies were not yet in place, but would be prepared over the coming months. We expect these memoranda of understanding to be produced before the summer recess and trust that the Agency will find ways of working effectively with the law enforcement agencies in Northern Ireland and take every possible step to establish comprehensive systems for the efficient exchange of intelligence and operational information.


236   Northern Ireland Office, Statistics and Research Branch, Views on Organised Crime in Northern Ireland: Findings from the January Omnibus Survey, Research and Statistical Bulletin 11/2005 p 1 Back

237   A work stream can be defined as a team of staff working across a number of departments and organisations on a particular issue. Back

238   Ev 139 Back

239   Q 499 Back

240   Q 501 Back

241   Q 500 Back

242   Ev 140 Back

243   Ibid. Back

244   Ev 140 Back

245   Ibid. Back

246   Ibid. Back

247   Q 43 Back

248   Q 128 Back

249   Q 128 Back

250   Q 134 Back

251   Q 199 Back

252   Q 199 Back

253   Q 502 Back

254   Ibid. Back

255   Q 43 Back

256   Q 42 Back

257   Q 4 Back

258   Q 4 Back

259   Q 295 Back

260   Q 51  Back

261   Q 125 Back

262   Q 125 Back

263   Q 125 Back

264   Q 151 Back

265   Ev 94 Back

266   Q 155 Back

267   Q 132 Back

268   Q 133 Back

269   Q 133 Back

270   Ev 96 Back

271   Q 292 Back

272   Q 292 Back

273   Q 8 Back

274   Q 16 Back

275   Ev 106 Back

276   Ibid. Back

277   Q 124 Back

278   Q 129 Back

279   Q 129 Back

280   Q 135 Back

281   Ev 131 Back

282   Ev 132 Back

283   Ev 133 Back

284   Ibid. Back

285   Q 323 Back

286   Q 338 Back

287   Q 323 Back

288   Q 328 Back

289   Q 328 Back

290   Q 349 Back

291   Q 70 Back

292   Q 74 Back

293   Q 336 Back

294   Q 336 Back

295   Q 336 Back

296   This number is given at paragraph 216 Back

297   www.assetsrecovery.gov.uk Back

298   Q 177 Back

299   Q 179 Back

300   Q 180 Back

301   Q 182 Back

302   Assets Recovery Agency Annual Report 2005-06 p 3 and p 8 Back

303   Ibid. p 4 Back

304   Assets Recovery Agency Annual Report 2005-06 p 4 Back

305   Organised Crime Task Force Annual Report 2006, page 17. Back

306   Qq 503, 504 Back

307   Qq 503 Back

308   Qq 507, 509 Back

309   Q 507 Back

310   Ev 115 Back

311   Ibid. Back

312   Ibid. Back

313   Ibid. Back

314   Ibid. Back

315   Ev 110 Back

316   Q 191 Back

317   Q 193 Back

318   Q 196 Back

319   Q 185 Back

320   Ev 113 Back

321   Ibid. Back

322   Q 513 Back

323   Q 513 Back

324   Q 208 Back

325   Q 209 Back

326   Q 210 Back

327   Q 212 Back

328   Q 210 Back

329   Q 174 Back

330   Q 174 Back

331   Q 200 Back

332   Q 353 Back

333   Qq 144, 145 Back

334   Ev 141 Back

335   Ibid. Back


 
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