13. Written evidence from the Metropolitan
Police Special Branch
STRATEGY FOR TACKLING NORTHERN IRELAND LINKED
ORGANISED CRIME IN GREAT BRITAIN
INTRODUCTION
Organised crime is seen as a serious threat
to the society and economy in Northern Ireland (NI). Although
not a new phenomena, the gradual decline of terrorist activity
since the signing of the Belfast Agreement in 1998, has meant
that serious criminality has become more visible for what it is—crime.
Much organised crime committed throughout the period referred
to as "the troubles" was labelled, at least by those
performing it, as political and not criminal activity. Whereas
previously headlines were made by bombings and shootings, the
changing political climate in Northern Ireland has allowed for
criminality such as armed robberies and extortion to take the
limelight.
Historically, crime within NI has been "territorial"
with particular paramilitary groups controlling extortion and
racketeering in their own areas, and benefiting from the proceeds
of crime committed by them or on behalf of "the cause".
Crime is now more of a free enterprise with many groups (often
retaining some paramilitary links through current or ex-members)
competing against each other and benefiting personal gain from
the proceeds of crime.
The situation regarding organised crime in NI
does not however, affect the "province" alone. Four
of the six counties that form Northern Ireland share a land border
with the Republic of Ireland. Although not exclusive, the main
air and sea links into NI are from Great Britain. With such strong
communication and demographic links between NI and the rest of
the British Isles, it is clear that the affairs of one region,
whether they are legal, political or social, will have an impact
on other regions. This is particularly the case with crime.
HOW NI BASED
CRIME IMPACTS
ON GREAT
BRITAIN
With organised crime in Northern Ireland so
prevalent there are many factors that will have a knock-on effect
in Great Britain. One such factor is market trends; this has been
evidenced through fuel laundering and smuggling. At one time fuel
was smuggled from north to south when prices were more expensive
in the Republic. This was subsequently reversed by economic factors.
To increase profitability, criminals began laundering fuel to
remove markers from rebated oils. This process allowed criminal
groups to sell their illicit product cheaper than major oil companies
sold legitimate fuel. The prolific sale of laundered fuel in NI
has impacted on the ability of legitimate filling stations to
operate. With the local market saturated with laundered fuel,
there is evidence that the criminal networks have turned to the
larger and more lucrative market in areas of Great Britain.
Another factor that will influence the impact
of NI based criminality on the UK in general is law enforcement
action. Co-operation, particularly in tackling cross border organised
crime on the island of Ireland, exists between the Northern Ireland
Organised Crime Task Force and law enforcement agencies in the
Republic of Ireland. This enables criminals operating in both
jurisdictions to be targeted and networks to be disrupted. However,
success in this area is likely to displace the criminals and Great
Britain is an obvious area for the criminals to re-locate to.
The effective targeting of organised criminal
groups alone will not necessarily impact on the level of criminality
within NI Even where convictions are secured, the number of organised
crime gangs operating in NI means that another group is likely
to fill the gap with the level of criminality largely unchanged.
The huge amount of resources required to gather sufficient evidence
to gain a conviction against an individual, let alone the entire
criminal network, often means that many criminal groups can consolidate
their position within the underworld, while police target their
rivals. Where police activity is effective, criminal groups can
simply move their operations to a neighbouring jurisdiction. This
displacement does little to reduce the level or effects of organised
crime and in many cases strengthens the criminality through associations
with like-minded criminals, based in Britain or further afield,
with access to diverse distribution networks.
HOW CAN
POLICE IN
GREAT BRITAIN
TACKLE NI BASED
CRIMINALITY?
It is clear that the effective combating of
organised crime within NI must involve targeting those involved
and the available markets beyond the boundaries of the Province.
Broadly speaking, the effects of organised crime on the economy
and wider community could be seen as an insurgency against the
rule of law. If viewed in this way, the same principles can be
employed to tackle it:
— Winning hearts and minds.
How the above principles can be employed by
law enforcement agencies to combat criminality is described thus:
Winning hearts and minds—community based
intelligence
The most effective way of tackling any form
of criminality is with support from the local community. Where
organised crime is concerned, this refers as much to business
as residential communities. Certain business communities will
know a lot about criminality in their industry but will not inform
the authorities, even though the criminality is in direct competition
with their legitimate business. Efforts must therefore be made
to gain the confidence of the business community and encourage
them to divulge information on criminality to the authorities.
Generally, the public gains confidence in the
police if they perceive that they themselves are being treated
fairly by the police, and by seeing criminality dealt with in
a robust manner. This can be achieved by adopting a policy of
"selective zero tolerance" (SZT), whereby persons involved
in organised crime are prosecuted for every indiscretion, even
if the average person would receive a degree of leniency in similar
circumstances. This assures the public that such criminals are
not above or beyond the law.
Defence in depth—utilising British police
forces to target NI criminals
The major flaw in policing organised crime is
when the criminals operate outside their usual locality. Police
criminal intelligence indexes hold information on criminals resident
within, or known to operate in, the said jurisdiction—often
defined by county boundaries. Whereas certain police units monitor
cross-border criminality, intelligence on offenders is limited
or difficult to access often with no central point of reference.
The Police National Computer is readily accessed by all police
forces, but largely only list convictions as opposed to current
intelligence relevant to investigating crime. This is compounded
by the fact that Northern Ireland has different databases to the
remainder of the UK. Therefore, if an individual has no previous
convictions, or has been convicted in a different jurisdiction,
their involvement in crime may not be immediately apparent.
As a large amount of criminals engaged in organised
crime within NI travel to other parts of the UK, either for criminal
purposes or otherwise, opportunities are lost if police in those
other areas are not aware of their links to organised crime. Were
interest in the criminals from NI to be overtly flagged in Great
Britain, further crime could be detected and/or intelligence gained.
Project Focus, explained below, utilises such a flagging system
to counter criminality linked to terrorist fundraising.
Overtly flagging organised criminals allows
for passive intelligence gathering at times when covert resources
are not deployed against them. The process is reliant on the criminal
coming to the attention of police, which invariably happens. Police
officers are immediately aware that they are dealing with a major
criminal and can exploit any intelligence gathering opportunity
that presents itself. This process also provides an immediate
point of contact for further information on the subject.
Denial of ground—make ports and main transport
routes hostile areas for criminals
Ground is denied to criminals by effective patrolling
making it difficult for them to operate freely. The majority of
organised crime is not only a national problem, but also international
due to the origins of various commodities ie drugs, cigarettes
and weapons. The status of the United Kingdom as a series of islands
provides a very clear first line of defence against crime—ports.
Much contraband entering UK markets must first transit a port
of some description. The larger ports are already set up to tackle
security and criminality with law enforcement agencies in place.
Law enforcement agencies at port use advanced passenger information
and vehicle manifest lists to monitor criminals entering or leaving
the country, with Automatic Number Plate Readers (ANPR) as a backup.
To exploit this fully it is essential that an individual's involvement
in organised crime is immediately apparent to law enforcement
agencies at port.
Another major line of defence in the fight against
organised crime is the national road network, particularly motorways.
Criminals must regularly use the road network, either to conduct
their criminal business, transport their illicit goods or even
more innocuous activities. With the increased proliferation of
"traffic cameras' of one form or another on the nation's
motorways this makes the criminal vulnerable to law enforcement
action. Roads Policing Units and other agencies such as VOSA,
can make life difficult for criminals traversing the country.
Seemingly minor road traffic offences can accumulate, resulting
in a driving disqualification. This in turn can lead to a custodial
sentence for driving while disqualified, disrupting other criminal
activity. Each encounter a criminal has with the police increases
the risk of offences being detected. Additionally, intelligence
is a by-product of any contact with, or investigation of, a criminal
with routines, associations and antecedent details becoming apparent.
The above principles can be put into practice,
to tackle NI linked organised crime within Great Britain, in the
following two ways:
— Overt flagging of major criminals,
combined with selective zero tolerance.
— Partnership with the UK haulage industry.
OVERT FLAGGING
OF CRIMINALS
& SELECTIVE ZERO
TOLERANCE
This is a simple but effective way of both tracking
and targeting criminals without the use of major covert resources
and techniques. Special Branch already uses overt flagging, of
criminals and their vehicles, for Project Focus, which monitors
and tackles the overlap between organised crime and Irish related
terrorism. This method can be used in the absence of, or in conjunction
with, covert resources and techniques, and in fact compliments
the use of the same by filling intelligence gaps.
Where past convictions or current intelligence,
suitable for wider dissemination, exist to link an individual
to organised crime they are flagged overtly on the PNC. This ensures
that if a flagged individual comes to the attention of police
anywhere in the UK for any reason, they immediately become aware
that the person is of interest and there is a requirement for
further action. A single point of contact can direct that a full
intelligence report of the contact be forwarded to the officer
in the case, or where offences are apparent they are dealt with
robustly. Even if the offence is simply a road traffic offence,
the cumulative effect of minor prosecutions will chip away at
the criminality and present opportunities to gather and exploit
intelligence.
A similar initiative to the Special Branch Project
Focus, effectively run, would enable NI based criminals to be
targeted should they venture into GB. This method would also have
the potential to expose links into similar criminality within
GB. A central co-ordination unit, along the lines of the Northern
Ireland Organised Crime Task Force, could ensure that, where appropriate,
resources and intelligence from all agencies are pooled or shared
to focus the full weight of the law against organised criminals.
PARTNERSHIP WITH
THE UK HAULAGE
INDUSTRY
Much criminality in Northern Ireland has historically
revolved around smuggling. Ever since the border was established,
a black economy has thrived around communities, families and trade
routes that all pre-date the symbolic boundary. The haulage industry
plays an integral, if sometimes unwitting, role in this form of
criminality. Areas of criminality concerned involve the transporting
of stolen or counterfeit goods, smuggling and revenue evasion
and immigration crime. It therefore, stands to reason that the
Government and law enforcement agencies must engage with the haulage
industry in an effort to reduce the amount of criminality exploiting
the industry.
Understanding the problem
Why do drivers and owners of haulage firms become
involved in organised crime? No doubt some are genuinely dishonest
and exploit the industry. However, it is likely others fall foul
of the law due to economic pressures. Like many industries, the
profitability of a haulage firm relies on very narrow margins.
Many factors effect whether a haulier can break even on a contract—wages
and fuel costs to name but two. The increased use of Eastern European
drivers by Irish based hauliers, an area not short of HGV licence
holders, suggests an attempt by some firms to cut overheads.
With illicit fuel readily available in many
parts of Northern Ireland, another method of reducing costs is
apparent. A reduction in running costs and wages would enable
one firm to undercut others on the price for a contract. This
advantage can mean some firms going out of business. This prospect
is clearly sufficient to persuade someone to use illicit fuel
or even smuggle contraband, the proceeds of which can render fuel
duty and employers' national insurance contributions insignificant.
Proposal
— The first step necessary is to gain
the confidence of the haulage industry and encourage drivers and
hauliers to pass intelligence to law enforcement agencies. This
would best be achieved initially at governmental level with engagement
of industry bodies such as the Road Haulage Association. To rely
on public spirit and moral values to achieve this is perhaps somewhat
naive. In short, some form of incentive may be necessary. What
incentive might be available is clearly best left to the Government
to decide. However, a suggested incentive may involve a concession
on fuel duty or alike. Obviously this would only apply to the
haulage industry and then only upon certain conditions. This could
perhaps be achieved as some form of tax relief.
A haulier would be obliged to complete
tax returns in a timely fashion and ensure that all employees
are registered with the Inland Revenue and declare their earnings
etc. Transgressions would be penalised. The benefit to the haulier
would need to be sufficient to outweigh the temptation to not
declare earnings or use illicit fuel etc—equally the same
applies to the penalty for any illegal activity. Of course, as
discussed above legitimate haulage companies would be at a disadvantage
to firms that still chose to avoid paying revenue or transport
contraband. Any arrangement between the government and haulage
industry could be on condition that crime within the industry
is significantly reduced, providing added incentive for legitimate
hauliers to pass information gleaned from truckstops, roadside
cafés and other areas usually inaccessible to law enforcement
authorities. It may also be possible to include in any such agreement
for haulage firms signed up a similar arrangement to display an
advertisement for Crimestoppers on the rear of all trailers, providing
almost subliminal reminders to HGV drivers on long motorway routes,
and increasing the possible impact beyond just the haulage industry.
— Law enforcement action can be largely,
but not exclusively, targeted at those companies identified by
intelligence. Drivers and haulage firms found to be involved in
or assisting organised crime could then be subjected to closer
scrutiny by a multi-agency approach, utilising SZT to impact upon
any further criminality irrespective of thresholds. An indiscretion
by one driver within a firm could result in the entire fleet being
flagged and examined further. This may encourage individual drivers
to inform police of criminality by fellow drivers. The onus would
be on the owner of a haulage firm to ensure that everything within
their company is correct and above board. Drivers convicted of
smuggling may find it difficult to find future employment.
— With greater intelligence-led policing
of the nations roads and ports, organised criminality across the
UK would be severely disrupted and displaced criminality would
be tracked from region to region. The chances of finding contraband
would be drastically increased based on firm intelligence with
better prospects for prosecutions, as well as preventing illicit
goods reaching their markets. The benefits would also become apparent
to legitimate hauliers who would not have to factor in additional
time into contracts, based on time lost at port controls and alike.
Any governmental concession to the haulage industry
to facilitate the reduction of organised crime would need to be
balanced by expenditure or revenue gains elsewhere. This is likely
to be achieved by preventing revenue evasion through smuggling
goods, as well as asset recovery from criminals. More effective
deployment of law enforcement resources will also be achieved,
although the savings made in this area are harder to quantify
and less tangible. In addition, a suitable concession to the running
costs of haulage companies, may effectively remove the haulage
industry from the fuel-lobby, giving the government an easier
ride in this area and saving costs on policing future fuel protests.
The above proposal regarding the haulage industry
would address similar issues across the UK and not solely in NI
Similarly, tackling N.I based criminality within Great Britain
will also result in domestic criminality being disrupted and displaced,
providing justification for the use of law enforcement resources
outside NI to address the issue.
12 December 2005
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