Select Committee on Office of the Deputy Prime Minister: Housing, Planning, Local Government and the Regions Written Evidence


Memorandum by the Retained Firefighters Union (RFU) (FRS 50)

REFORM—A MISSED OPPORTUNITY

SUMMARY

  (i)  The RFU is grateful for the opportunity to make this second submission to the Committee. Since the publication of the previous report of the Committee in 2004, there has been a failure to implement its recommendations in respect of the Retained Duty System (RDS). There has also been a failure by fire and rescue authorities to progress the findings of several other high profile reports on the RDS.

  (ii)  Annex A provides an Audit of the commitments made to reform of the Retained Duty System during the past three years, and the progress actually made.

  (iii)  This shows there is a continuing inability on the part of several stakeholders to recognise that RDS personnel are an essential part of fire and rescue cover in the UK. There are just over 18,000 RDS personnel covering 60% of fire stations, but they provide fire and rescue cover for over 95% of the landmass of the UK.

  (iv)  Despite publication of these various reports, RDS personnel are still second class members of the F&RS, which tends to focus on personnel on wholetime duty systems.

  (v)  RDS personnel are restricted from providing the best service to their local communities due to continuation of widespread restrictive practices and the domination of the Service by vested interests.

  (vi)  There is clear evidence from recent strikes by the FBU that RDS personnel could be the keystone of the drive for more effective, efficient and economic response in many parts of the UK, but this is not happening.

  (vii)  There is also a failure to develop personnel on the RDS through the Integrated Personnel Development System (IPDS), and to make effective use of personnel through the Integrated Risk Management Planning (IRMP) process.

  (viii)  Part of the reason for these failings is due to lack of advocacy for RDS, and a failure to progress many commitments to reform, including a new National Joint Council. There is also a need to tackle the wider reform of industrial relations to provide a more stable environment for modernisation of the Service.

  (ix)  RDS personnel have demonstrated throughout two national FBU strikes, when up to two-thirds of RDS personnel continued to respond, that they have more to offer the fire and rescue service by way of efficiency and effectiveness.

  (x)  The same lesson emerges from a number of local strikes, the latest being Suffolk, when RFU members provided cover for the whole of this large county during 22 strikes by FBU members, without recourse to armed forces support.

  (xi)  The RFU understands the dilemma for the Government; voluntary change by all partners in the fire and rescue service has to be given sufficient time to work. But, in the meantime opportunities are being lost, money is being wasted and those who embrace change are having their patience stretched. At the same time, policing of voluntary change is inadequate when the fire and rescue service knows that the Government are reluctant to enforce change. The RFU advocates the need for a more focused independent process of checks and balances than can be provided by the Audit Commission CPA process, even though this is to be strengthened by the addition of operational assessment of service delivery.

  (xii)  Our experience of events, especially during the industrial disputes of the past three years, and the needs of our members who have been subjected to massive harassment and unfair treatment, is that some form of independent "Ombudsman" or "Whistleblower" arrangements needs to be introduced for the fire and rescue service.

  (xiii)  This would promote achievement of the Government's determination for reform, without the need for their direct intervention, and would act as a control mechanism on other stakeholders who are not fully supporting reform.

  (xiv)  This should be coupled with urgent action to implement the recommendations in the official reports covered by Annex A. There are some excellent examples of good practice that could help to drive change, but these are relatively few and are uncoordinated.

1.   The implications for citizens and the Fire and Rescue Service of:

(a)  The introduction of Regional Control Centres

  1.1  The RFU is limiting its comments on regional controls as the location of the control rooms that mobilise our members to incidents is unlikely to affect their efficiency.

  1.2  The regrettable feature of this whole control centre restructuring is the failure of all partners to engage in the process. This has not been in the best interests of the personnel who serve in the present control structure.

(b)  The introduction of and implementation process for FireLink radio services

  1.3  We believe the Government has made the case for improved resilience and inter-operability through the development of the FireLink project. This will be beneficial for large-scale incidents and new dimension operations, and allows for new technology that individual F&RS would have struggled to resource on their own.

  1.4  We support the project if it promotes closer working with other agencies, many of which have already moved to a regional structure. However, there appears to be a flaw in the resilience strategy when FireLink will apply in Scotland and Wales, but the regional control centre change will not.

2.   The progress that has been made on Fire and Rescue Service reform since the publication of the Government's White Paper of June 2003, Our Fire and Rescue Service, and the Committee's own report on the topic, The Fire Service, of January 2004, with particular regard to:

(a)  Fire Prevention

  2.1  The latest Government statistics show a significant reduction in fire deaths, a fact that ought to motivate the priorities of all partners in the fire and rescue service. There is clearly a strong link between the recent increased commitment to Community Fire Safety (CFS) and the reduction in injuries and deaths.

  2.2  However, there has been only limited involvement of RDS personnel in CFS. Many F&RS's have yet to use RDS personnel to deliver the benefits of an integrated community focused approach to public safety. In some cases, the communities served by RDS personnel are missing out on the CFS message altogether; in other areas, the input is made by full-time personnel, which is not always an effective use of resources.

  2.3  RDS personnel have always been community-based firefighters, living and working in their local community, and have for many years successfully delivered the fire prevention message through local schools and community groups.

  2.4  The lack of funds is sometimes used to justify exclusion of RDS from CFS—yet in many F&RS the alternative is to send officers over relatively long distances—which is a waste of resources and opportunity.

    Halstead, a rural fire station in North Essex, repeatedly asked for the opportunity to become involved in CFS, and after many months they were sent a box of fire prevention leaflets to distribute to local homes, in their own time—hardly innovative CFS.

    Norfolk has advised RDS personnel there is no funding for their involvement in CFS, although they overspent £50k on senior officer selection tests, and instead of using local RDS personnel they send full time personnel long distances in a rural county to provide a service that could often be undertaken locally.

  2.5  We believe the concept of a local community fire station in rural and semi-rural areas has a significant part to play in developing CFS. The fire station is often the only public building resource remaining in many rural communities, and this could become the centre for all sorts of community-based initiatives. This would not only ensure greater utilisation of a public asset, but in making the fire station the central resource of the local community, this would be the cornerstone of CFS initiatives. This would also help RDS recruitment and retention.

    We understand there is possibly EU funding available to support the establishment of community fire stations in rural areas.

  2.6  There are some good examples of where RDS personnel are being used effectively to deliver the CFS message, but there is failure to develop this good practice elsewhere.

(b)  Institutional arrangements and reform, including transitional arrangements and finance

  2.7  There does seem to be a quiet optimism in many quarters that reform of the fire and rescue service is progressing and is on track. Clearly, there have been beneficial changes in respect of a number of issues, including:

    —  the reduction in fire deaths;

    —  legislative changes that provide for a reformed fire and rescue service;

    —  legislation that affects fire safety;

    —  a start on risk management planning;

    —  a commitment to diversity;

    —  a renaissance of the Fire Service College;

    —  reform of control rooms and radio communications;

    —  resilience through new dimensions;

    —  progress on regional management boards; and

    —  FiReBuy.

  2.8  However, these reforms have had a very limited effect, if any, on RDS personnel and the communities they serve. The attached Annex A is an audit of the commitments starting with the Bain Review, that RDS second-class status will end and they will be integrated into the fire and rescue service as valued and full participants.

  2.9  There have been three other significant reports since Bain that promised major reform of the RDS, starting with the White Paper, "Our Fire and Rescue Service" in June 2003, and including the report of your Committee's findings in January 2004, culminating in a major review of the RDS, and published by the Government in February 2005. All of these recognised that there were immense opportunities for developing the RDS and for this to provide for a more effective use of RDS personnel as part of a more efficient use of resources to meet the new emphasis on risk management and community safety.

    A particular fire station that is crewed by full time personnel on five days a week, and by RDS personnel at all other times (as well as the second appliance) has for some time been short of full time personnel. When a call comes in during the day cover, the first appliance is often delayed waiting for the RDS personnel to be called in to supplement the crew. In November 2005, a member of the RDS was sent on a driving course for week, but the full time instructor went sick after one day. As the RDS member had taken a week off work he could not return to his primary employment, and the fire and rescue service had to employ him for the rest of the week.

    He asked if he could make up the deficient crew at his home station, but was sent home on the second day, and then used for the rest of the week to chauffeur the station manager. He progressed his complaint up to Deputy Chief Officer level, but was told he would not be used to make up the deficient crew, because the DCFO "was more concerned about industrial relations with the FBU than running an efficient, effective fire service".

  2.10  The Audit shows that despite the bigger reforms referred to earlier there has been a failure to deliver as far as RDS personnel is concerned. The RFU's view is this failure arises from:

    —  a lack of leadership at fire and rescue service level;

    —  the continuing negative influence of the FBU;

    —  the failure of local authority organisations to fully engage in the reform process;

    —  the continuing focus on the full-time service—for example, all retained liaison officers are full time personnel;

    —  a lack of advocacy for RDS personnel; and

    —  the Government's unwillingness to intervene directly until CFOA and the local authority organisations have been given the chance to make reforms happen.

    A fundamental recommendation of the Retained Review is that RDS staff should be appointed to Retained Liaison Officer posts to provide advocacy and an input into brigade strategy.

So far, all Liaison officers have been appointed from full-time staff and their commitment to reform is sometimes questionable.

  2.11  The review of the NJC has not yet happened, despite the various commitments over the past three years—see Annex B. The RFU has now met with the national employers on a few occasions, and they have granted the RFU consultation rights, but this still excludes RDS personnel from the negotiating table. This will not happen until the RFU has full negotiating rights, and we do not see any signs of this occurring voluntarily, as predicted in the 2003 White Paper (Paragraph 7.13).

    In Devon the RFU has been supporting the development by the Service over the past year of a new flexible duty and contractual arrangement, only to have this undermined at the last minute by the FBU using their national bargaining and disputes procedure.

  2.12  The RFU believes the Government wants local authorities to either negotiate or impose reform on the NJC, but the local authorities find it difficult to impose the change on even their own members, let alone the FBU. Local authorities would rather this difficult decision was removed from their hands, by the Government using their reserve powers under Section 32 of the Act.

  2.13  RDS personnel are becoming increasingly frustrated at this lack of progress, not least because many see a shuffling of a few seats at the NJC as not resolving the bigger issue of the necessary reform of industrial relations in the F&RS. Continuing strikes, the pursuit of narrow self-interests and the failure of all partners to engage in the reform of the service, for the benefit of the public we serve, has to be tackled urgently.

  2.14  RDS personnel had high hopes of an urgent commitment to reform when the previous Minister set up the Retained Review in December 2002. The RFU played a prominent part as a member of the Review Team, and the report, published in February 2005, contains many recommendations that would:

    —  provide measures to deal with the 20% recruitment shortfall;

    —  engage with the private sector in support of the release of employees for RDS duties;

    —  develop IRMP's that made more effective use of RDS personnel;

    —  provide a wider role for RDS personnel;

    —  develop new flexible duty systems;

    —  make better use of RDS personnel in CFS;

    —  remove restrictive practices and introduce new flexible ways of working with appropriate reward arrangements;

    —  use IPDS to promote wider opportunities for the employment of RDS personnel;

    —  take the opportunity for these changes to attract a more diverse workforce in to the RDS; and

    —  provide for a RDS input into strategy at local and national level.

    The Retained Review recommended that there should be greater flexibility to appoint RDS personnel to higher management posts. This has not happened, despite the appointment of non-fire service personnel to a CFO and a Deputy post. A number of non-uniformed staff have also been appointed to principal officer posts.

  2.15  Committee members will see from the Government's response to their previous report that the Retained Review was expected to deliver many of the changes arising from the Committee's recommendations. So far, these have failed to materialise. The Practitioners' Forum accepted the final recommendation of the Review Report to implement its recommendations, but this has not happened. As far as we can ascertain, this seems to be because the issue of how the Review is progressed seems to have become bogged down in a dispute between CFOA and the ODPM, over funding of the former by the latter.

    Nottinghamshire has pioneered the temporary deployment of RDS personnel to fill short-term vacancies on the wholetime duty system and Leicestershire is working on a protocol for the transfer of RDS personnel onto the wholetime duty system.

  2.16  The continuing dissatisfaction of RDS personnel over the lack of reform centres on the following main issues:

    —  failure to reform the NJC and industrial relations;

    —  lack of progress on the recommendation of the Retained Review;

    —  IRMP's that fail to take advantage of the flexible working arrangements of the RDS;

    —  a concern that IRMP's have protected the (expensive) status quo, and reduced more efficient retained cover, and are inadequately policed;

    —  the expectation that the addition of operational assessment to the Audit Commission's CPA process will fail to provide for a RDS perspective;

    —  a failure to implement IPDS for RDS, and this is/will be used to downgrade RDS cover under IRMP's;

    —  downgrading of RDS, especially officers in charge under IPDS implementation of Rank to Role—see Annex D;

    —  lack of RDS input to local and national strategic development;

    —  continued bullying and harassment of RDS personnel, especially during industrial disputes—which is condoned by the employers in the end of dispute agreements; and

    —  delayed introduction of flexible pension arrangements.

    Many RDS appliances are "off the run" especially during the day, due to the continuing 20% shortfall in recruits and the 10% annual turnover. Failure to implement the Retained Review recommendations for dealing with these issues continues to allow IRMP's to preserve the status quo in respect of fire cover arrangements that could be made more efficient.

  2.17  These failings should be seen against a background of a continuing expectation that RDS personnel will step into the breach whenever the FBU decides to go on strike. In fact, events in recent industrial disputes in Suffolk and elsewhere prove conclusively that RDS personnel could be used much more effectively under risk management plans. There is clear proof that:

    —  RDS personnel can provide fire and rescue cover during periods of high risk—and not just during strikes.

    —  Flexible RDS crewing and duty arrangements can be an economic alternative to some more expensive cover.

    —  RDS personnel can be a more effective resource for crewing some special and New Dimension appliances.

    —  Restrictive practices continue to exist, for example, in mixed and minimum crewing arrangements.

    —  More effective deployment of RDS personnel would overcome availability constraints for IPDS development.

    —  More flexible crewing would promote opportunities for RDS involvement in CFS.

    —  The development of new contractual and remuneration arrangements would attract under-represented groups.

    —  RDS input to strategy would contribute to the more effective use of resources.

    RDS personnel on the Isle of Wight crew the turntable ladder, operate the sky lift hydraulic platform, the rescue tender and the instant response unit. In many other areas, these appliances continue to be crewed by full time personnel, often primary crewed by dedicated full time personnel. In Suffolk this prompted a strike by the FBU in defence of management proposals to end the arrangement. Although the dispute has been ended, with the turntable ladder no longer crewed permanently by full time personnel, the retained crew on the same station are not going to be trained on the appliance

  2.18  RDS personnel have little faith that future IRMP's will develop these options. Clearly, the events in recent months mean that the report of the Retained Review is already out of date, even though it has not yet been implemented. We would suggest that the Review should be reconvened, with a remit to:

    —  build in the flexible options arising from the experiences in Suffolk and elsewhere;

    —  to take advantage of good practice; and

    —  set up a process to ensure the revised Review is implemented as soon as possible.

(c)  Promoting diversity within the Fire and Rescue Service

  2.19  There has been some limited success in promoting diversity, largely on a planning level that has yet to see real progress. The fire and rescue service has still got a long way to go before it can claim to be an organisation that values every member of society, especially when it continues to treat one-third of its own staff as second class citizens, and fails to grasp the opportunities to remedy this situation.

  2.20  At the same time, bullying and harassment in the fire and rescue service is still rife—see the many examples in the RFU's Legal Report—see Annex C.

  2.21  The RFU believes the RDS could play a significant part in breaking down the barriers and promoting greater diversity as retained personnel operate in their own local communities. There are clearly opportunities for bringing in previously excluded groups to the RDS, by developing new duty and cover arrangements.

  A few fire and rescue services, led by South Wales, have developed new contractual and remuneration systems for RDS personnel which remove the uncertainty over the commitment expected of personnel, and the rewards they may expect. This is expected to make it easier to attract recruits from groups who have not been seen by the Service, or by the individuals concerned, as potential recruits.

3.   Joint Working between the Fire and Rescue Service and other emergency services

  3.1  There has been some progress in joint working, for example in the wider development of co-responder arrangements. However, these have been largely confined to RDS areas because of the failure of all stakeholders to engage in the development of what has conclusively been shown to be of benefit to local communities. Failure to expand co-responder schemes is very frustrating to many RDS personnel.

  3.2  At the time of submitting this memorandum it is unclear whether co-responder duties can be enforced under existing contractual arrangements, although many RDS personnel are happily undertaking these duties without worrying about such semantics.

  3.3  We believe there are possibilities for joint working options with many other emergency services and other agencies, for example, through the development of community fire stations in rural areas. The concept of the "community fire station" as the central resource for use by everyone in the community is one that has been shown to work in a few areas. It deserves to be more fully developed.

  3.4  On a more cautionary note, the RFU continues to be concerned about the extra resources that are required of every stakeholder in order to service the varying needs of the devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. This frequently requires separate responses to four consultation documents on the same subject. At the same time, allowing Wales to revert to the old time-based standards of fire cover are not helpful to fire authorities in other parts of the UK. There is also a less than joined up approach to regional controls.


 
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