Memorandum by the Retained Firefighters
Union (RFU) (FRS 50)
REFORMA MISSED OPPORTUNITY
SUMMARY
(i) The RFU is grateful for the opportunity
to make this second submission to the Committee. Since the publication
of the previous report of the Committee in 2004, there has been
a failure to implement its recommendations in respect of the Retained
Duty System (RDS). There has also been a failure by fire and rescue
authorities to progress the findings of several other high profile
reports on the RDS.
(ii) Annex A provides an Audit of the commitments
made to reform of the Retained Duty System during the past three
years, and the progress actually made.
(iii) This shows there is a continuing inability
on the part of several stakeholders to recognise that RDS personnel
are an essential part of fire and rescue cover in the UK. There
are just over 18,000 RDS personnel covering 60% of fire stations,
but they provide fire and rescue cover for over 95% of the landmass
of the UK.
(iv) Despite publication of these various
reports, RDS personnel are still second class members of the F&RS,
which tends to focus on personnel on wholetime duty systems.
(v) RDS personnel are restricted from providing
the best service to their local communities due to continuation
of widespread restrictive practices and the domination of the
Service by vested interests.
(vi) There is clear evidence from recent
strikes by the FBU that RDS personnel could be the keystone of
the drive for more effective, efficient and economic response
in many parts of the UK, but this is not happening.
(vii) There is also a failure to develop
personnel on the RDS through the Integrated Personnel Development
System (IPDS), and to make effective use of personnel through
the Integrated Risk Management Planning (IRMP) process.
(viii) Part of the reason for these failings
is due to lack of advocacy for RDS, and a failure to progress
many commitments to reform, including a new National Joint Council.
There is also a need to tackle the wider reform of industrial
relations to provide a more stable environment for modernisation
of the Service.
(ix) RDS personnel have demonstrated throughout
two national FBU strikes, when up to two-thirds of RDS personnel
continued to respond, that they have more to offer the fire and
rescue service by way of efficiency and effectiveness.
(x) The same lesson emerges from a number
of local strikes, the latest being Suffolk, when RFU members provided
cover for the whole of this large county during 22 strikes by
FBU members, without recourse to armed forces support.
(xi) The RFU understands the dilemma for
the Government; voluntary change by all partners in the fire and
rescue service has to be given sufficient time to work. But, in
the meantime opportunities are being lost, money is being wasted
and those who embrace change are having their patience stretched.
At the same time, policing of voluntary change is inadequate when
the fire and rescue service knows that the Government are reluctant
to enforce change. The RFU advocates the need for a more focused
independent process of checks and balances than can be provided
by the Audit Commission CPA process, even though this is to be
strengthened by the addition of operational assessment of service
delivery.
(xii) Our experience of events, especially
during the industrial disputes of the past three years, and the
needs of our members who have been subjected to massive harassment
and unfair treatment, is that some form of independent "Ombudsman"
or "Whistleblower" arrangements needs to be introduced
for the fire and rescue service.
(xiii) This would promote achievement of
the Government's determination for reform, without the need for
their direct intervention, and would act as a control mechanism
on other stakeholders who are not fully supporting reform.
(xiv) This should be coupled with urgent
action to implement the recommendations in the official reports
covered by Annex A. There are some excellent examples of good
practice that could help to drive change, but these are relatively
few and are uncoordinated.
1. The implications for citizens and the
Fire and Rescue Service of:
(a) The introduction of Regional Control Centres
1.1 The RFU is limiting its comments on
regional controls as the location of the control rooms that mobilise
our members to incidents is unlikely to affect their efficiency.
1.2 The regrettable feature of this whole
control centre restructuring is the failure of all partners to
engage in the process. This has not been in the best interests
of the personnel who serve in the present control structure.
(b) The introduction of and implementation process
for FireLink radio services
1.3 We believe the Government has made the
case for improved resilience and inter-operability through the
development of the FireLink project. This will be beneficial for
large-scale incidents and new dimension operations, and allows
for new technology that individual F&RS would have struggled
to resource on their own.
1.4 We support the project if it promotes
closer working with other agencies, many of which have already
moved to a regional structure. However, there appears to be a
flaw in the resilience strategy when FireLink will apply in Scotland
and Wales, but the regional control centre change will not.
2. The progress that has been made on Fire
and Rescue Service reform since the publication of the Government's
White Paper of June 2003, Our Fire and Rescue Service, and the
Committee's own report on the topic, The Fire Service, of January
2004, with particular regard to:
(a) Fire Prevention
2.1 The latest Government statistics show
a significant reduction in fire deaths, a fact that ought to motivate
the priorities of all partners in the fire and rescue service.
There is clearly a strong link between the recent increased commitment
to Community Fire Safety (CFS) and the reduction in injuries and
deaths.
2.2 However, there has been only limited
involvement of RDS personnel in CFS. Many F&RS's have yet
to use RDS personnel to deliver the benefits of an integrated
community focused approach to public safety. In some cases, the
communities served by RDS personnel are missing out on the CFS
message altogether; in other areas, the input is made by full-time
personnel, which is not always an effective use of resources.
2.3 RDS personnel have always been community-based
firefighters, living and working in their local community, and
have for many years successfully delivered the fire prevention
message through local schools and community groups.
2.4 The lack of funds is sometimes used
to justify exclusion of RDS from CFSyet in many F&RS
the alternative is to send officers over relatively long distanceswhich
is a waste of resources and opportunity.
Halstead, a rural fire station in North Essex,
repeatedly asked for the opportunity to become involved in CFS,
and after many months they were sent a box of fire prevention
leaflets to distribute to local homes, in their own timehardly
innovative CFS.
Norfolk has advised RDS personnel there is no
funding for their involvement in CFS, although they overspent
£50k on senior officer selection tests, and instead of using
local RDS personnel they send full time personnel long distances
in a rural county to provide a service that could often be undertaken
locally.
2.5 We believe the concept of a local community
fire station in rural and semi-rural areas has a significant part
to play in developing CFS. The fire station is often the only
public building resource remaining in many rural communities,
and this could become the centre for all sorts of community-based
initiatives. This would not only ensure greater utilisation of
a public asset, but in making the fire station the central resource
of the local community, this would be the cornerstone of CFS initiatives.
This would also help RDS recruitment and retention.
We understand there is possibly EU funding available
to support the establishment of community fire stations in rural
areas.
2.6 There are some good examples of where
RDS personnel are being used effectively to deliver the CFS message,
but there is failure to develop this good practice elsewhere.
(b) Institutional arrangements and reform, including
transitional arrangements and finance
2.7 There does seem to be a quiet optimism
in many quarters that reform of the fire and rescue service is
progressing and is on track. Clearly, there have been beneficial
changes in respect of a number of issues, including:
the reduction in fire deaths;
legislative changes that provide
for a reformed fire and rescue service;
legislation that affects fire safety;
a start on risk management planning;
a commitment to diversity;
a renaissance of the Fire Service
College;
reform of control rooms and radio
communications;
resilience through new dimensions;
progress on regional management boards;
and
2.8 However, these reforms have had a very
limited effect, if any, on RDS personnel and the communities they
serve. The attached Annex A is an audit of the commitments starting
with the Bain Review, that RDS second-class status will end and
they will be integrated into the fire and rescue service as valued
and full participants.
2.9 There have been three other significant
reports since Bain that promised major reform of the RDS, starting
with the White Paper, "Our Fire and Rescue Service"
in June 2003, and including the report of your Committee's findings
in January 2004, culminating in a major review of the RDS, and
published by the Government in February 2005. All of these recognised
that there were immense opportunities for developing the RDS and
for this to provide for a more effective use of RDS personnel
as part of a more efficient use of resources to meet the new emphasis
on risk management and community safety.
A particular fire station that is crewed by full
time personnel on five days a week, and by RDS personnel at all
other times (as well as the second appliance) has for some time
been short of full time personnel. When a call comes in during
the day cover, the first appliance is often delayed waiting for
the RDS personnel to be called in to supplement the crew. In November
2005, a member of the RDS was sent on a driving course for week,
but the full time instructor went sick after one day. As the RDS
member had taken a week off work he could not return to his primary
employment, and the fire and rescue service had to employ him
for the rest of the week.
He asked if he could make up the deficient crew
at his home station, but was sent home on the second day, and
then used for the rest of the week to chauffeur the station manager.
He progressed his complaint up to Deputy Chief Officer level,
but was told he would not be used to make up the deficient crew,
because the DCFO "was more concerned about industrial relations
with the FBU than running an efficient, effective fire service".
2.10 The Audit shows that despite the bigger
reforms referred to earlier there has been a failure to deliver
as far as RDS personnel is concerned. The RFU's view is this failure
arises from:
a lack of leadership at fire and
rescue service level;
the continuing negative influence
of the FBU;
the failure of local authority organisations
to fully engage in the reform process;
the continuing focus on the full-time
servicefor example, all retained liaison officers are full
time personnel;
a lack of advocacy for RDS personnel;
and
the Government's unwillingness to
intervene directly until CFOA and the local authority organisations
have been given the chance to make reforms happen.
A fundamental recommendation of the Retained
Review is that RDS staff should be appointed to Retained Liaison
Officer posts to provide advocacy and an input into brigade strategy.
So far, all Liaison officers have been appointed
from full-time staff and their commitment to reform is sometimes
questionable.
2.11 The review of the NJC has not yet happened,
despite the various commitments over the past three yearssee
Annex B. The RFU has now met with the national employers on a
few occasions, and they have granted the RFU consultation rights,
but this still excludes RDS personnel from the negotiating table.
This will not happen until the RFU has full negotiating rights,
and we do not see any signs of this occurring voluntarily, as
predicted in the 2003 White Paper (Paragraph 7.13).
In Devon the RFU has been supporting the development
by the Service over the past year of a new flexible duty and contractual
arrangement, only to have this undermined at the last minute by
the FBU using their national bargaining and disputes procedure.
2.12 The RFU believes the Government wants
local authorities to either negotiate or impose reform on the
NJC, but the local authorities find it difficult to impose the
change on even their own members, let alone the FBU. Local authorities
would rather this difficult decision was removed from their hands,
by the Government using their reserve powers under Section 32
of the Act.
2.13 RDS personnel are becoming increasingly
frustrated at this lack of progress, not least because many see
a shuffling of a few seats at the NJC as not resolving the bigger
issue of the necessary reform of industrial relations in the F&RS.
Continuing strikes, the pursuit of narrow self-interests and the
failure of all partners to engage in the reform of the service,
for the benefit of the public we serve, has to be tackled urgently.
2.14 RDS personnel had high hopes of an
urgent commitment to reform when the previous Minister set up
the Retained Review in December 2002. The RFU played a prominent
part as a member of the Review Team, and the report, published
in February 2005, contains many recommendations that would:
provide measures to deal with the
20% recruitment shortfall;
engage with the private sector in
support of the release of employees for RDS duties;
develop IRMP's that made more effective
use of RDS personnel;
provide a wider role for RDS personnel;
develop new flexible duty systems;
make better use of RDS personnel
in CFS;
remove restrictive practices and
introduce new flexible ways of working with appropriate reward
arrangements;
use IPDS to promote wider opportunities
for the employment of RDS personnel;
take the opportunity for these changes
to attract a more diverse workforce in to the RDS; and
provide for a RDS input into strategy
at local and national level.
The Retained Review recommended that there should
be greater flexibility to appoint RDS personnel to higher management
posts. This has not happened, despite the appointment of non-fire
service personnel to a CFO and a Deputy post. A number of non-uniformed
staff have also been appointed to principal officer posts.
2.15 Committee members will see from the
Government's response to their previous report that the Retained
Review was expected to deliver many of the changes arising from
the Committee's recommendations. So far, these have failed to
materialise. The Practitioners' Forum accepted the final recommendation
of the Review Report to implement its recommendations, but this
has not happened. As far as we can ascertain, this seems to be
because the issue of how the Review is progressed seems to have
become bogged down in a dispute between CFOA and the ODPM, over
funding of the former by the latter.
Nottinghamshire has pioneered the temporary deployment
of RDS personnel to fill short-term vacancies on the wholetime
duty system and Leicestershire is working on a protocol for the
transfer of RDS personnel onto the wholetime duty system.
2.16 The continuing dissatisfaction of RDS
personnel over the lack of reform centres on the following main
issues:
failure to reform the NJC and industrial
relations;
lack of progress on the recommendation
of the Retained Review;
IRMP's that fail to take advantage
of the flexible working arrangements of the RDS;
a concern that IRMP's have protected
the (expensive) status quo, and reduced more efficient retained
cover, and are inadequately policed;
the expectation that the addition
of operational assessment to the Audit Commission's CPA process
will fail to provide for a RDS perspective;
a failure to implement IPDS for RDS,
and this is/will be used to downgrade RDS cover under IRMP's;
downgrading of RDS, especially officers
in charge under IPDS implementation of Rank to Rolesee
Annex D;
lack of RDS input to local and national
strategic development;
continued bullying and harassment
of RDS personnel, especially during industrial disputeswhich
is condoned by the employers in the end of dispute agreements;
and
delayed introduction of flexible
pension arrangements.
Many RDS appliances are "off the run"
especially during the day, due to the continuing 20% shortfall
in recruits and the 10% annual turnover. Failure to implement
the Retained Review recommendations for dealing with these issues
continues to allow IRMP's to preserve the status quo in respect
of fire cover arrangements that could be made more efficient.
2.17 These failings should be seen against
a background of a continuing expectation that RDS personnel will
step into the breach whenever the FBU decides to go on strike.
In fact, events in recent industrial disputes in Suffolk and elsewhere
prove conclusively that RDS personnel could be used much more
effectively under risk management plans. There is clear proof
that:
RDS personnel can provide fire and
rescue cover during periods of high riskand not just during
strikes.
Flexible RDS crewing and duty arrangements
can be an economic alternative to some more expensive cover.
RDS personnel can be a more effective
resource for crewing some special and New Dimension appliances.
Restrictive practices continue to
exist, for example, in mixed and minimum crewing arrangements.
More effective deployment of RDS
personnel would overcome availability constraints for IPDS development.
More flexible crewing would promote
opportunities for RDS involvement in CFS.
The development of new contractual
and remuneration arrangements would attract under-represented
groups.
RDS input to strategy would contribute
to the more effective use of resources.
RDS personnel on the Isle of Wight crew the turntable
ladder, operate the sky lift hydraulic platform, the rescue tender
and the instant response unit. In many other areas, these appliances
continue to be crewed by full time personnel, often primary crewed
by dedicated full time personnel. In Suffolk this prompted a strike
by the FBU in defence of management proposals to end the arrangement.
Although the dispute has been ended, with the turntable ladder
no longer crewed permanently by full time personnel, the retained
crew on the same station are not going to be trained on the appliance
2.18 RDS personnel have little faith that
future IRMP's will develop these options. Clearly, the events
in recent months mean that the report of the Retained Review is
already out of date, even though it has not yet been implemented.
We would suggest that the Review should be reconvened, with a
remit to:
build in the flexible options arising
from the experiences in Suffolk and elsewhere;
to take advantage of good practice;
and
set up a process to ensure the revised
Review is implemented as soon as possible.
(c) Promoting diversity within the Fire and Rescue
Service
2.19 There has been some limited success
in promoting diversity, largely on a planning level that has yet
to see real progress. The fire and rescue service has still got
a long way to go before it can claim to be an organisation that
values every member of society, especially when it continues to
treat one-third of its own staff as second class citizens, and
fails to grasp the opportunities to remedy this situation.
2.20 At the same time, bullying and harassment
in the fire and rescue service is still rifesee the many
examples in the RFU's Legal Reportsee Annex C.
2.21 The RFU believes the RDS could play
a significant part in breaking down the barriers and promoting
greater diversity as retained personnel operate in their own local
communities. There are clearly opportunities for bringing in previously
excluded groups to the RDS, by developing new duty and cover arrangements.
A few fire and rescue services, led by South
Wales, have developed new contractual and remuneration systems
for RDS personnel which remove the uncertainty over the commitment
expected of personnel, and the rewards they may expect. This is
expected to make it easier to attract recruits from groups who
have not been seen by the Service, or by the individuals concerned,
as potential recruits.
3. Joint Working between the Fire and Rescue
Service and other emergency services
3.1 There has been some progress in joint
working, for example in the wider development of co-responder
arrangements. However, these have been largely confined to RDS
areas because of the failure of all stakeholders to engage in
the development of what has conclusively been shown to be of benefit
to local communities. Failure to expand co-responder schemes is
very frustrating to many RDS personnel.
3.2 At the time of submitting this memorandum
it is unclear whether co-responder duties can be enforced under
existing contractual arrangements, although many RDS personnel
are happily undertaking these duties without worrying about such
semantics.
3.3 We believe there are possibilities for
joint working options with many other emergency services and other
agencies, for example, through the development of community fire
stations in rural areas. The concept of the "community fire
station" as the central resource for use by everyone in the
community is one that has been shown to work in a few areas. It
deserves to be more fully developed.
3.4 On a more cautionary note, the RFU continues
to be concerned about the extra resources that are required of
every stakeholder in order to service the varying needs of the
devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
This frequently requires separate responses to four consultation
documents on the same subject. At the same time, allowing Wales
to revert to the old time-based standards of fire cover are not
helpful to fire authorities in other parts of the UK. There is
also a less than joined up approach to regional controls.
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