Select Committee on Public Accounts Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 20-39)

MS SUE STREET, MS CAROLE SOUTER AND MR STEPHEN DUNMORE

12 JANUARY 2005

  Q20  Mrs Browning: How do you differentiate between those longer term projects where there is a legitimate reason for a slow drawdown or a delayed start, which are quite legitimate, and those where they have not got their act together in the end? What monitoring do you do to ensure that you draw stumps when there is something which is not going to get off the ground?

  Ms Souter: Obviously we use different approaches depending on the scale of the grant. Grants under £50,000 are delegated to staff decision making and we have tried to take a much lighter touch approach there. As part of our efforts to move money out of the balances more quickly with those low risk projects we pay half the grant upfront and we have been working very hard on making that possible. It is particularly helpful for small community groups which tend not to have much cash. With the larger grants, if they are coming in at over a million pounds, we have a two stage process where we will give an initial approval and then they may take up to 12 months to work out the further detail knowing that they have got the money if they get things right, and then they come back to us. We will ask for forecasts of drawdown of funds and our systems now identify when people are not coming to us and asking for money at the time that we expected them to do so. Our grant officers will then be back in touch with them, asking them what is happening and making sure there is a reason and they understand what is happening. As you said, very often there is a perfectly good reason, they may not be able to find the right hedger or thatcher or whatever it may be, but it is an issue which needs to be kept under close attention. The other balance of judgment for us is we want to see the projects happen because they are important. We want them to take place on the ground and there is a very fine judgment about whether to stick with the project and help them through or whether to withdraw money when they might be half way through delivering a project.

  Mrs Browning: Thank you. My time is up. Could I just make a plea to you. I am totally supportive of the decision making about how Lottery funds are distributed and spend being quite separate from political influence, and I hope that will always be the case. However, in my experience as an MP representing a large rural constituency, and also a Lottery player myself, part of our culture seems to be developing in a way that worries me, and it is this: very often funds, not just Lottery funds but funds that people can apply for in their local communities, seem to have an emphasis on anything which has the prefix "new". If they have an idea that is "new" they seem to be able to channel funds into it whereas actually maintaining and sustaining something that is of value and ongoing value to communities is somehow denigrated in preference to "new". Could I say to you that conservatism, with a small "c", should receive equal treatment as to anything with a "new" prefix added to it? I will leave you with that thought, if I may.

  Q21  Jon Trickett: There seems to be one word which is riddled through this Report and that is variable or variations, is it not, between the different operations doling out Lottery money. Why is there so much variation?

  Ms Street: There are 15 different distributors and they are involved in very different kinds of businesses. If you think at one end of the Heritage Lottery Fund there are very large capital projects, long drawdown times—actually so far no major capital project has failed under the HLF arrangements so it is quite a heavy long term business—and at the other end we have the Community Fund awards which are intentionally very small, fast moving—maybe to paint a hall—and then you have got things like the UK Film Council where if they fund a blockbuster they return the money to the Lottery pot and, therefore, keep more in their balances, there are genuinely different kinds of businesses. I think there are three big imponderables. One is what will Lottery sales do? Is it going to be a good year or a bad year? Those trends are now steady but you never know exactly how many people are going to buy tickets. You then do not know how many applications are going to be made to each distributor and you do not know the way to drawdown from the grants made. I do not want to give a glib phrase but there is not a one-size-fits-all.

  Q22  Jon Trickett: No, I accept that. There seem to be variations in policy, for example, about the maximum grant which they will allocate relative to resources available. Some are saying they will go over, some are saying they will not, and then of those some break their own policies and some do not break their own policies, most of them do in different ways. Some spend more than the maximum, some spend less than the maximum. Surely there ought not to be those kinds of variations between, firstly, policies and, secondly, implementation of policies. Would you not expect them all to have a policy but the policies to be more or less the same and to be implemented in the same way?

  Ms Street: I think it is very helpful that the report draws out the fact that if boards simply implemented their own policies that would have a very good effect on reducing the balances. I am clear from the Department's point of view that I would like to see the boards implement their own policies.

  Q23  Jon Trickett: Even after you have said what you want the policy to be it seems to me that they may agree a policy but then break it almost immediately, do they not, or they fail to achieve it?

  Ms Street: My view is they should implement their own policies, that is what I think boards should do.

  Q24  Jon Trickett: I will tell you what I am driving these questions to. I think I read somewhere, but I cannot spot it, each chief executive—or whatever title they have—is an accounting officer in their own right. That is quite striking really because they do not employ huge amounts of staff and, by comparison with the permanent secretary in a large department such as Defence or Health or something like that, they are not managing huge amounts of staff or money either. Why are each of the heads of each of these organisations accounting officers in their own rights?

  Ms Street: Why are they?

  Q25  Jon Trickett: Yes, because it seems to me once you have that then you have this unilateral declaration of independence almost by each of the funds, do you not?

  Ms Street: Obviously Lottery money is different from taxpayers' money and it is the taxpayers' money that goes through departmental accounting officers.

  Q26  Jon Trickett: They are each accounting officers, are they?

  Ms Street: They are each accounting officers. I am responsible for the overall framework and ensuring they have proper financial directions and there is a longer or shorter arm depending on which body. You are right, in the end the board has to decide—and I would like to see this even more rigorously done—on their appetite for risk for their kind of business.

  Q27  Jon Trickett: Is that 15 separate boards?

  Ms Street: That is 15 different distributors.

  Q28  Jon Trickett: Why though? Why not have one single accounting officer who has 15 people reporting to them operating the same policies accepting the difference between the kind of market place? It seems to me you can have a policy which allows a heterogeneous application, why not have one accounting officer and them all reporting to him? That would allow you to have a greater input, would it not, on behalf of the public?

  Ms Street: It would. I do not know if that would give confidence that all those different kinds of businesses were really pushing their expertise out to the front line. I think the kind of expertise we get in the HLF, for example, would not be found in the department.

  Q29  Jon Trickett: Who decided they should all be separate accounting officers?

  Ms Street: This stems from the 1993 Act, the framework which is very clearly set out.

  Q30  Jon Trickett: It is a statutory requirement that each one has a separate accounting officer? That is on the face of the Bill presumably?

  Ms Street: I would need to check the face of the Bill but the position is they are all set up as non-departmental public bodies.

  Q31  Jon Trickett: Yes, I understand that.

  Ms Street: Each of those has to have an accounting officer.

  Q32  Jon Trickett: There is another note being passed to you which might be helpful.

  Ms Street: This is very helpful. We did consult on this and there was no support for a one-size-fits-all.

  Q33  Jon Trickett: I am not suggesting that. That might be regarded as a caricature of what I have said because I am only asking questions to try to help you to manage this process and achieve your objectives. Are there alternative management arrangements which might help you to achieve what you would want which we might be able to recommend to strengthen your arm in relation to these 15 separate independent entities? Can I tempt you into commenting.

  Ms Street: What I would like to see—and this is where the Report helpfully gets us, and indeed the deliberations of the Committee and its conclusion could help us—is a very clear signal that the boards of the different distribution bodies need to position themselves very, very accurately on that difficult line between excessive caution and recklessness and waste, decide exactly where they are going to be and implement that and set targets and meet them.

  Q34  Jon Trickett: Probably for diplomatic reasons you are ducking the answer to my question. When we come to write the report I hope the report might reflect on the future of management arrangements if you are able to secure the objective which you have just set out. I want to ask you one other question which is about the management of the surplus fund which the Report says the Treasury decided should be handled by this body—which I have never heard of   before—called the Commissioners for the Management of the National Debt. Is that the right title?

  Ms Street: Yes, it is.

  Q35  Jon Trickett: At 1.5 ". . . the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt . . ." manage the surplus, do they not?

  Ms Street: They do.

  Q36  Jon Trickett: Are you satisfied with their management of it or is it something you do not have to deal with?

  Ms Street: I have looked at the table with interest. It is clear that gilts fluctuate almost inversely to the market, so if shares drop gilts go up. I have a colleague from the Treasury here who could answer.

  Q37  Jon Trickett: I am going to ask her.

  Ms Street: I do think it is important that we do not think that this money is just sitting about doing nothing, it is actively managed and it does earn interest.

  Q38  Jon Trickett: We do not want the public to form the view that the Lottery is being used to reduce the National Debt by producing a continuing surplus, do we, because that would be entirely inappropriate. You might conclude if you did the figures carefully that was what was happening.

  Ms Street: Would it be helpful for my colleague from the Treasury to answer?

  Q39  Jon Trickett: Yes. I want to ask why the Treasury decided to nominate.

  Ms Diggle: I think it was seen as a very safe haven for the funds. You have to think how fast the funds would need to be used. As Carole Souter said a few minutes ago, the typical time horizon is something like five years, on average. It may be less than that for some funds. Putting the funds into a mix of instruments that would be subject to fluctuations might not yield a good return on the time horizon required for the monies which are being held for the various funds. Therefore one needs to think about using just debt instruments. I do not think there is sufficient volume of corporate debt instruments in safe form available to manage the size of balances we have here.


 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2005
Prepared 18 October 2005