3 The unsatisfactory monitoring of
the Centre
25. We have already referred to the Centre having
direct funding relationships with ten organisations including
four government departments. There was no clear lead responsibility
on the part of those departments and, in our view, the monitoring
of the operation of the Navan Centre was poor.
26. We see from the C&AG's Report that there
was no formally agreed protocol between government departments
on Accounting Officer responsibility for the Navan Centre.[39]
We are astonished when this amount of money was being expended
that nobody believed it necessary to have such a protocol in place.
We welcome the Department's assurance that this is something
which would not happen now as a Memorandum of Understanding would
be set up between the Departments concerned at the outset. The
Department told us that while there were financial guidelines
in place there were, at that time, no guidelines about joint working.[40]
We regard the absence of guidance on joint working as a very weak
argument. Putting together a Memorandum of Understanding is not
rocket science and this should have been in place from the start.
27. We agree with the C&AG's Report that clear
understandings between Departments should be reached right at
the beginning of cross-cutting projects such as this and responsibility
for accountability and monitoring arrangements established from
the outset. There should have been a clear and formal understanding
of the business relationship between the lead department and the
organisation concerned, especially where there was to be a continued
commitment of financial assistance.[41]
28. We were surprised to find that the committee
charged with monitoring the rescue package met only three times
in a period of two years. Whilst the Department told us that a
considerable number of other meetings were held at this stage
we note these were not formal monitoring committee meetings and
that no record exists of what was discussed or decided at these
meetings.[42]
29. The record of the formal monitoring meetings
which were held suggests that they were rarely used by officials
to probe present and future trading.[43]
The Department admitted that its record keeping should have been
more reflective of the actual discussions that took place.[44]
We believe that there should always be a formal record of discussions
and of any decisions taken otherwise it is impossible to ensure
that any agreed measures have been adopted.
30. We welcome the Accounting Officer's acceptance
of the importance of making sure that there is a clear accountability
trail in place and that financial guidelines are followed.[45]
Although the Department told us that a project of this scale and
size was unique at the time we consider that when this Centre
was launched, in the mid 1990s, there was already a lot known,
throughout the public sector, about project management and how
to deliver a project successfully.[46]
31. The C&AG's Report found that unrealistic
expectations were placed on the Local Museums and Heritage Review
as a means of providing a long-term funding solution for Navan
and that it was surprising that decisions on the future of funding
for the Navan Centre were postponed for several years pending
the review's completion.[47]
32. We asked the Department how many other visitor
attractions under its remit were not viable and were being propped
up without knowing the full financial implications.[48]
The Department told the Committee that a survey was done as part
of the local Museums and Heritage Review which looked at over
400 facilities in Northern Ireland. The main facilities for which
the Department is responsible are the national galleries and museums
which comprise four sites and these are recognised as requiring
continuing public support. The C&AG's report informs us that
the Department has in the past supported the Somme Heritage Centre
in County Down and in this case a shortfall of visitor numbers
has also been the main cause of difficult trading conditions.[49]
The Committee expects the Department to adopt a more realistic
view towards that Centre and that support will not be open ended
if there is no prospect of viability. Indeed, the Committee would
urge all Departments, who fund such centres, to reflect on current
funding arrangements and the long term viability of the centres.
33. Following closure of the Navan Centre in June
2001 the Department worked with various organisations in an attempt
to reopen it. The Department told us that the Centre has now been
taken over by Armagh City and District Council and we understand
that it reopened for both educational and tourism purposes on
1 June 2005.[50] Under
the terms of the agreement, ownership of the land and buildings
has passed to the Council and they have taken over as trustees
of the Centre. In order to facilitate the transfer the former
trustees' liabilities of £200,000 were paid off by the Council.[51]
34. The Department told us that the Council have
two other tourism facilities and are rationalising their tourism
services so that they can operate all three sites within their
existing budget of half a million pounds and with no extra cost
to the public purse.[52]
We understand that they intend to use their own tourism staff
to run the Centre and that there have been no approaches to the
Department for financial support.[53]
35. We note the credit given to the Navan Board by
the Department who acknowledged their very firm conviction and
commitment to delivering the project. We feel very strongly, for
the sake of all the people involved with the Centre, that there
is a need to learn from the mistakes which were made so that they
are not repeated elsewhere.[54]
General conclusion
36. This case is a classic example of how not to
manage a cultural/tourism project. It shows the importance of
ensuring that projections provided by consultants on visitor numbers
are subject to robust scrutiny and that allowance is made for
the bias arising from optimism in such cases. It also demonstrates
the problems of channelling funds in from different bodies if
no one assumes overall responsibility. Care needs to be exercised
to ensure that there is a designated accounting officer and procedures
in place for monitoring such projects.
37. We asked the Department what lessons it had learned
from its experience with the Navan Centre which could be applied
to future projects. The Department told us that it accepted that
costly lessons had been learned.[55]
It acknowledged the need, in future, for clarity at the outset
of projects; clarity in terms of the roles and responsibilities
of all parties; and the setting of appropriate targets.[56]
38. Although £5 million is a relatively small
amount of money when compared with some of the expenditure this
Committee examines, the Navan case, nonetheless, was an important
matter for us to review. It is not so much the sum of money involved.
It was that this money was dripped in, in penny packets, and there
appeared to be a lack of joined-up thinking between Government
Departments. Northern Ireland has fewer departments and operates
on a much smaller and more intimate scale than Whitehall and it
is disappointing that there is not more evidence of effective
joined-up government in this case. We expect the Department of
Culture, Arts and Leisure to ensure that the handling of any future
projects in this sector fully reflects the experience of this
expensive failure.
39 C&AG's Report, para 5.10c; Q 12 Back
40
Q 13 Back
41
C&AG's Report, para 1.14 Back
42
Qq 52-55 Back
43
C&AG's Report, para 5.4 Back
44
Qq 28-29 Back
45
Q 45 Back
46
Q 46 Back
47
C&AG's Report, para 6.5 Back
48
Q 80 Back
49
C&AG's Report, para 6.3 Back
50
Qq 2-5 Back
51
Qq 4, 32-35 Back
52
Qq 113-114 Back
53
Qq 31, 35 Back
54
Qq 72-73 Back
55
Qq 105-106 Back
56
Q 72 Back
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