Conclusions and recommendations
1. The Department has tightened controls over
the payment of compensation to farmers for slaughtered animals
through appointing an approved list of valuers, remunerating valuers
on an hourly basis rather than a percentage of the valuation,
and using average price data from the Meat and Livestock Commission
to inform valuations.
2. For non-standard and pedigree animals,
however, the Department still relies on professional valuations,
even though experience from 2001 suggests some valuations were
two to three times the underlying worth of the animal.
The Department should seek to substantiate such valuations by
reference to other relevant data, for example original purchase
price or values for similar animals in different parts of the
country. It should challenge, and expect the farmer or valuer
to justify, any unusual movements.
3. Implementation of a levy scheme could transfer
part or all of the cost of future disease outbreaks from the taxpayer
to farmers, as is the case already for
arable farmers. A levy scheme could also provide incentives to
improve farm biosecurity, for example by linking the amount of
levy contribution to standards of biosecurity maintained on a
farm. The Department should make quick progress on consultation
on such a scheme, and should resolve quickly the question of transferring
to the industry the costs of secondary disinfection of farms.
4. Weak financial controls operated by the
Department during the 2001 outbreak have made it difficult for
the Department to substantiate and settle contractors' invoices,
some of which are now four years old.
The Department should set a deadline for completion of its detailed
forensic audit work and for settling all outstanding claims.
5. Targeting inspections increasingly on a
risk assessment basis would reduce risks of a future disease outbreak.
Inspectors having and applying a comprehensive and clear understanding
of all relevant legislation and regulations is also essential.
The Department should enhance the effectiveness of its inspection
regime by greater co-ordination, co-operation and information
sharing with local authority staff and through use of peer-review,
quality checks, and training to encourage strict application of
animal health regulations.
6. Good biosecurity should be encouraged through
effective deterrents for those farmers who fail to meet minimum
standards thereby putting at risk their own and others' livelihoods.
The Department has limited data on the outcome of local authority
prosecutions, or the size of fines imposed by courts. The Department
should identify and collect the necessary data and consider whether
it would be appropriate to ask the Sentencing Advisory Council
to frame a sentencing guideline on breaches of farm biosecurity.
7. The Department will need first class project
management skills to control a future outbreak effectively, ultimate
success being dependent on effective co-ordination with local
authorities, emergency services and other stakeholders.
The Department has put in place an enhanced contingency plan with
clear management responsibilities allocated for operations and
finance. The Department should establish a timetable for relevant
local bodies to produce contingency plans, and for testing such
plans alongside its central plan, in scenarios ranging from accidental
to deliberate introduction of diseases.
8. The Department has now clarified its policy
and approach to the use of vaccination and/or a contiguous cull
to eradicate future disease outbreaks.
This approach is being underpinned by a cost benefit analysis
of the effectiveness of different disease control options. The
Department should meet its commitment to put the report in the
public domain quickly.
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