2 Preparations for a future epidemic
7. In the Department's view an outbreak of foot and
mouth disease could not be entirely prevented as the risk of diseased
meat getting into the country could not be eliminated. Robust
animal health inspection regimes were critical to reducing the
risk of future outbreaks of serious contagious diseases and to
raising animal husbandry standards. Departmental inspectors require
a sound understanding of the technical and legislative environment
to underpin their risk assessments of farms and to adopt a more
rigorous approach to maintaining standards of public and animal
health. The Department was undertaking targeted inspections co-ordinated
between local government and the State Veterinary Service. The
risk based approach took account of the nature and scale of businesses,
local knowledge, animal density levels, and the number of animal
movements.[8]
8. The maximum penalty for breaches of biosecurity
is imprisonment for up to 2 years and/or an unlimited fine.[9]
Responsibility for prosecuting breaches of biosecurity lies with
local authorities. The Department did not routinely collect data
on the number of prosecutions or their outcomes. Outcomes for
two local authority areas, North Yorkshire (12 cases) and Cumbria
(3 cases), indicated, however, that the Courts had imposed modest
penalties (Figure 1).[10]Figure
1: Prosecutions for serious breaches of biosecurity procedures
in North Yorkshire and Cumbria from September 2001 to May 2002
| Outcome
| Number of prosecutions
|
| 12 month conditional discharge
| 2
|
| £100 fine plus costs
| 5 (6 offences)
|
| £200 fine plus costs
| 2 (3 offences)
|
| £225 fine plus costs
| 1 (2 offences)
|
| £250 fine plus costs
| 2
|
| £300 fine
| 1
|
| £300 fine plus costs
| 2 (3 offences)
|
Source: National Audit Office analysis of supplementary written
evidence (Ev 23)
9. Restrictions on sheep and cattle movements introduced
after the 2001 outbreak had reduced the spread of disease. Spot
checks on traffic to identify the illegal transportation of animals
had also been effective. The State Veterinary Service had access
to a web-based secure enforcement database used by trading standards
staff in 170 local authorities in England and Wales to record
enforcement action for breaches of livestock movements. The Department
was, however, only aware of the outcome in 69 of the 191 prosecutions
initiated in 2003, which comprised 58 convictions, 9 cases withdrawn
and 2 subject to appeal. It had no specific information on the
level of fines imposed by courts although it noted that the data
should be held by the prosecuting local authority.[11]
10. The Department considered that it was better
prepared for a future outbreak. It had appointed six senior civil
servants to take charge of the disease control operation as Regional
Operations Directors. Eight further staff had been appointed as
Divisional Operations Managers and a further seven as finance
managers. Military liaison officers would be appointed to each
National and Local disease control centre. The Department could
however do more to encourage the preparation of linked local authority,
emergency services, tourist industry and other rural stakeholder
plans, and to conduct joint exercises. Linking and joint testing
the contingency plans of all the parties involved in responding
to an outbreak would help facilitate a more immediate national
coordinated response.[12]
11. The Departments' contingency plan took account
of the risk of deliberate introduction of the disease, including
the risk that a number of different strains might be introduced.
Early diagnosis, laboratory facilities and vaccination antigens
would help tackle such a situation.[13]
Farm health plans were a major initiative in the Department's
Animal Health and Welfare strategy, and a working party had been
set up to look at sharing best practice. Poster and advertising
campaigns had been used to address, for example, biosecurity in
markets.[14]
12. The National Contingency plan included a communication
strategy which required daily engagement with stakeholders at
a local level. 24 hour phone numbers were in place, and senior
staff were being trained to deal with media questions. Exercise
Hornby had been carried out in the summer of 2004 to simulate
an outbreak and test plans. The Department had improved its information
systems since the outbreak of 2001. On the advice of its consultants,
however, it had delayed the introduction of its enhanced web-based
database system until underlying problems had been resolved. Work
to integrate the new database and the State Veterinary Service
Agency's information technology programme was continuing. In the
meantime, the Department's existing system was to be upgraded
to provide support.[15]
8 Qq 19-20, 29, 70-74 Back
9
Animal Health Act 1981 and related legislation Back
10
Ev 23 Back
11
Qq 76, 82-85; Ev 22-23 Back
12
C&AG's Report, para 3.4; Qq 9, 30-33 Back
13
Q 79 Back
14
Qq 10-11, 58, 61, 68, 186-187 Back
15
Qq 34-35, 80, 136 Back
| 
