2 IMPROVING DETECTION
9. Detection rates for vehicle crime are low and
lag behind those for all crime recorded by the police (9% against
23% overall). Only 6% of thefts from vehicles and 13% of thefts
of vehicles were resolved in 2003-04, which might suggest the
police gave relatively low priority to vehicle crime. The Home
Office agreed that detection rates were too low, with priority
having been given to reducing the overall number of vehicle crimes.
It nevertheless believed that the police were determined to tackle
such crimes, and did take them seriously. Vehicle crime was not
the easiest crime to detect, for example when a lock had been
forced, or a brick put through a window. There was, however, scope
to improve, by for example making use of the National Intelligence
Model and new technologies. Where members of the public invested
in security features such as tracker devices, the police would
assist if their car was stolen. And crime reduction projects funded
partly by the Home Office could reduce crime. The Autolock project
on an estate in Luton had incentivised people to fit steering
wheel locks to their cars.[11]
10. In September 2004, the Home Office established
its Prolific Offenders and Other Priority Offenders strategy to
focus on the 5,000 to 7,500 offenders thought to be responsible
for around 8% to 9% of all crime. The Home Office estimated that
10% of offenders committed 50% of all crime. The 370 Crime and
Disorder Reduction Partnerships in England and Wales had been
required to identify the 15 to 20 most prolific offenders and
focus attention on them.
11. Where a car had been broken into, many police
forces were beginning to use DNA technology, whereby DNA traces
on say, a cigarette or drinks could be compared to the DNA of
the 2 million people on the DNA database. By using other relatively
new technologies, such as the Automatic Number Plate Recognition
system, the police could compare vehicle number plates captured
by video cameras to the Police National Computer and Driver and
Vehicle Licensing Agency records, as well as to local intelligence
data. Interception and arrest rates by the 23 police forces piloting
the Automatic Number Plate Recognition system varied considerably
(Figure 4), in part due to the numbers of Police Officers
involved and time spent travelling to the targeted area.[12]
12. Few stoppages arising from use of the Automatic
Number Plate Recognition system result in arrests. Of the 28 million
number plates scanned, 1.1 million were identified as vehicles
of interest. Only around 100,000, however, were stopped and 13,000
people were arrested. The Home Office attributed this outcome
partly to the learning curve needed to use the technology to best
effect, and to the practicality of following up every vehicle
identified. The Police Standards Unit was working to provide guidelines
on how to exploit the technology to best effect. Nevertheless,
based on current data, the technology appears to utilise significant
amounts of police time with relatively few arrests arising.[13]
13. Inaccuracies in the Driver and Vehicle Licensing
Agency's driver and vehicle databases have hindered police efforts
to tackle vehicle crime (Figure 5). The Agency estimated
that there were some 950,000 vehicles in use for which its data
was not up to date and which have been unlicensed for more than
3 months. Around 70,000 vehicles were not on the Agency's database
at all. To meet its target to halve the number of unregistered
vehicles by 2007, the Agency had introduced continuous registration,
established a computer link with the insurance industry to identify
vehicles written off, and conducted a major data cleansing exercise
in May 2005.[14]
Figure 4: Pilot Automatic Number Plate
Recognition system arrest rates
Source: National Audit Office analysis of data from
PA Consulting Group
Figure 5: A significant minority of Driver
and Vehicle Licensing Agency records are inaccurate
Source: Operational Research Unit, Department for
Transport
14. Restricting access to number plates had reduced
vehicle crime. Number plate security could nevertheless be tightened
further, and measures under consideration included embedding computer
chips in number plates so that authorities could verify that the
plates were genuine, and making number plates physically more
difficult to remove. The theft of number plates was relatively
uncommon. Each month, however, the Driver and Vehicle Licensing
Agency issued between 10 and 20 new replacement registration numbers
where there was evidence that the details of a vehicle had been
stolen to clone other vehicles. Under the Vehicles (Crime) Act
2001, which came into force in September 2003, all number plate
suppliers in England and Wales must register with the Driver and
Vehicle Licensing Agency and verify vehicle ownership records
before issuing a number plate. The requirement to register had
not yet been extended to Scotland and Northern Ireland, although
action to do so was in hand.
15. Statutory regulation of motor salvage operators
was introduced in October 2002. Regulations make it more difficult
for criminals to dispose of stolen vehicles by replacing the vehicle's
true identity with that of a legitimate vehicle or by breaking
up the vehicle for spares. Under the Motor Salvage Operators'
Regulations 2002, every local authority in England and Wales is
required to establish a register of motor salvage operators so
that the police can inspect registered premises without a warrant
and take action against operators who do not register or who do
not maintain appropriate records of purchases and disposals.[15]
16. The Home Office acknowledged that there were
some local authorities which had yet to put in place a register
of motor salvage dealers but it was working with the Office of
the Deputy Prime Minister and the Local Government Association
to make the regulations more universally applied. Not everyone
who should be registered was registered, but they ought to be
known to local authorities and local police forces. 26% of the
200 local authorities with the highest vehicle crime rates had
no register but the Home Office planned to survey local authorities
in May 2005 to check progress.[16]
17. The Home Office agreed that if the police and
local authorities were aware of unregistered operators, prosecutions
ought to have been brought. Provisional data for 2003 indicated,
however, that there had been only four proceedings in total in
Magistrates' Courts under the Vehicles (Crime) Act 2001, of which
one had led to a conviction. The Home Office had no data as to
whether such proceedings related to motor salvage operators.[17]
11 Qq 5, 60, 64-68, 94-95 Back
12
Qq 5 ,13, 61 Back
13
Qq 13-14, 39-42, 115 Back
14
Qq 7, 16, 18 Back
15
Qq 97-99 Back
16
Qq 21-23, 34, 97-100 Back
17
Qq 97-99 Back
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