Annex A
EXTRACTS FROM THE FUTURE FIRECREST BUSINESS CASE,
JANUARY 2005
STRATEGIC FIT
Introduction
This section describes the reasons why the FCO
needs the Future Firecrest Project. It sets the Project in its
wider strategic context and describes the potential benefits the
Project is designed to deliver. It describes how the Project meets
a defined business need in the context of the FCO's wider Strategy.
It describes how Firecrest is currently managed and supported,
and why this needs to change. It sets investment objectives for
the Future Firecrest Project. It describes why this Project is
right, and why it is right now.
Strategic context and business need
The FCO is critically dependent on its ICT infrastructure.
Firecrest is already business critical to the FCO. The challenges
of change inherent in the FCO Strategy, the Organisation Project,
in implementing the Efficiency Programme, in our aspiration to
be the leading global Diplomatic Service, mean that the requirement
for an effective, secure and reliable infrastructure will increase
significantly over the coming years. The new FCO Strategy foresees
a very significant need for improved communications as a key enabler
of a more responsive, flexible FCO working in a more demanding
world. Central to this will be the reliable, flexible and resilient
infrastructure delivered by Future Firecrest.
The FCO Strategy is implemented through the FCO organisational
change process under four key themes—focusing resources
on priorities, diversity, flexibility and responsiveness and meeting
customer needs. Progress against these themes is co-ordinated
by the Departmental Change Programme and measured through six
key change strategies, including e-Diplomacy.
The e-Diplomacy Strategy was launched in January
2004 to develop the ICT component of the wider FCO Strategy. The
e-Diplomacy Strategy seeks to transform the FCO into a single
on-line global organisation delivering high quality services to
the public and other key stakeholders through a common ICT infrastructure
and standard web-based applications accessible through the departmental
Intranet.
E-Diplomacy implements the ICT requirements of the
FCO Strategy by building a global IT desktop, providing flexible
structures that enable remote and mobile working at classified
levels, streamlining business processes so people can work faster,
more efficiently and more flexibly, and improving the connections
between our IT systems and the rest of Whitehall. The delivery
machinery for these objectives is the six Programmes in e-Diplomacy;
Knowledge, Prism, i-Visas, i-Con, UKTI e-Business and Infrastructure.
Future Firecrest is the underpinning architecture for all of these
programmes, and in the key component of the FCO's ICT infrastructure.
It is central to e-Diplomacy, and therefore to the FCO Strategy.
Existing arrangements for Firecrest provision and
support
In August 2003 the FCO completed roll out of
the sixth major upgrade to the Firecrest infrastructure since
1997—known as "Confidential Firecrest". Currently
FCO Services is "Prime Contractor" for Firecrest. Firecrest
employs around 175 FCON Services FTEs, plus 150 full and part-time
System Administrators and 17 FTE Technical Management Officers
overseas. This effort has historically been supplemented by additional
private sector capacity through a number of individual "source
and supply" contracts from IT contractors (about 95 FTEs
at the peaks of implementation). These arrangements are described
in detail in Annex 1.
IT Strategy Unit (ITSU) is the FCO's ICT "intelligent
client" and has the lead client responsibility for defining
the FCO's ICT strategy and business requirements and ensuring
that these requirements are met. ITSU also draws on the support
of FCO Services to fulfil their intelligent customer remit.
There are some 14,600 Firecrest users based in the
UK and in 282 overseas sites.
Why do we need to change our Firecrest technology
and services, and why now?
There are three reasons why we need to do this now.
The first reason is that the FCO Services Firecrest
contract with Computacenter has expired. We are legally required
to re-tender it.
The second reason is that the use we can make
of our computers is increasingly constrained by our outdated operating
system. NT4 is eight years old (and has now been replaced by Windows
2000, XP and Windows 2003). It is increasingly difficult to source
replacement equipment to run on our operating system. And NT4
is costing us £1 million a year in extended support costs
from Microsoft.
The third reason is that our ageing infrastructure
is struggling to provide an acceptable level of performance for
new applications such as Prism, UKTI's web-based systems and the
electronic delivery of visas and passports. Planned developments,
such as the implementation of biometric visas and passports, intranet-based
knowledge systems, and full remote-working capabilities cannot
be supported without a major upgrade to the infrastructure.
Strategic benefits and investment objectives
Benefits are the strategic justification for
any project. Firecrest is an infrastructure project and, as such,
delivers its benefits partly through the maintenance of the existing
global IT network, and partly through providing the basis against
which other programme applications realise their benefits. But
there are self-standing benefits associated with the project.
The Project Director launched the Future Firecrest Business Review
in April 2003. The Review, working with stakeholders from across
the FCO and Whitehall, concluded that the Project was justified
alone by the requirement to maintain the benefits of the existing
secure, global, multi-tier Firecrest. It should also enable a
raft of additional benefits, including higher levels of business
efficiency from a faster, better IT desktop, improved support
services to users, better financial management through contractual
control, more flexible forms of working, higher benefits return
for the other programme applications resident on Firecrest and
better access to new technologies as challenges change over the
life of the contract.
Strategic risks
The Future Firecrest Project has managed risks
aggressively throughout the life of the procurement. The Project
Board has regularly reviewed key risks as part of a risk management
strategy. We have built risk mitigations into both Optimism Bias
and project affordability assessments. And we have shared registers
with the final two bidders. We are comfortable that we have a
framework in place to continue that management policy. The key
strategic risks defined by the Project Board include affordability,
the need for major business change in FCO Services, security constraints,
an inability on the part of the project to deliver the benefits
the project defined, and complexities in relation to the technical
aspects of the project. These risks are currently well managed,
and dealt with in greater detail in Section 7.10 and in Annex
1. We have separately required bidders to provide costed proposals
as to how they would adapt their designs to reflect changes in
HMG Security Policy currently under discussion in Whitehall. We
will submit separately an analysis of these proposals that demonstrates
that the bidders have technically feasible options meeting new
security risk levels at a range of acceptable cost to the FCO.
Main stakeholders
Future Firecrest will have a significant impact
on users and business managers across the whole of the FCO, which
means all staff, from the most senior to the most junior level.
Other Government Department (OGDs) Firecrest user population is
approximately 750, 65% of whom are UK based and the rest overseas.
They are drawn from at least 22 government departments or agencies,
the most significant being Ministry of Defence, UK Trade &
Investment, Department for International Development, Home Office
and HM Customs & Excise.
Sustained effort has been made to engage with key
stakeholders from FCO and OGDs over the life of the project. The
Project Board has a standing User Representative. Besides communicating
project progress to a wide stakeholder grouping and maintaining
senior level sponsorship from all important stakeholders, a number
of workshops and presentations have been held to secure input
and obtain feedback on service requirements and the proposed solution
from stakeholders at different levels within FCO and OGDs. OGDs
have attended regular meetings with the Project Director and SRO.
Key departments have been represented on the Project Team. And
most have contributed to the requirements process. The Project
recognises that its success depends crucially on its users, and
defining that user need in the context of the project's Strategic
Fit has been one of the notable successes of the Project Board.
THE COMMERCIAL
CASE
Introduction
This section outlines the procurement process that
has been implemented since the OBC was approved, provides key
features of the commercial terms included in the BAFO contract
and describes details of the proposed sourcing arrangements, in
particular the approach to Partnering.
Procurement strategy and process
The Future Firecrest procurement process has
taken 18 months following the publication of the Future Firecrest
OJEU Notice on 3 July 2003. The procurement has been undertaken
in accordance with the European Union's negotiated procedure and
has to date involved the following five stages:
Pre-qualification (Long-listing) —this
involved selecting a longlist of five companies from nine companies
that had completed a Pre-Qualification Questionnaire;
Short-listing (to three companies) —this
involved reducing the list of five to a shortlist of three companies
based upon an evaluation of their indicative priced responses
to a Preliminary Invitation to Negotiate (PITN). The PITN comprised
the FCO's detailed and comprehensive Statement of Requirements
(SoR);
Three to two down-selection—this
involved down-selecting the shortlist from three to two companies
based upon an evaluation of their priced responses to an Interim
Invitation to Negotiate (IITN). The IITN comprised the FCO's draft
contractual Terms and Conditions and the updated SoR;
Pre-Negotiation activities and Negotiations—this
involved the conversion of the bidders' updated IITN proposals
(solutions and plans) and the FCO SoR into contract schedules
and the subsequent negotiation of these and the FCO's Terms and
Conditions. This phase was launched with the issue of the Final
Invitation to Negotiate (FITN) to the two remaining bidders. The
negotiations were undertaken in parallel with both bidders;
Best and Final Offers (BAFOs) —this
involved bringing negotiations to a close by inviting bidders
to submit their Best and Final Offers (BAFOs). These comprised
a marked up version of the full contract (Terms and Conditions
and Schedules) together with a number of items of supplementary
information to facilitate the BAFO evaluation process. The BAFO
evaluation forms a key part of this FBC, the outcome of which
is will be the selection of a Preferred Bidder.
The final stage of the process—Contract
Finalisation and Award—will take place following approval
and endorsement of this FBC and any requirement for a short preferred
bidder period to finalise contractual issues arising from the
BAFO evaluation and approval process. The contract will be awarded
on the basis of the most economically advantageous bid. The PUS
and Ministers will base this decision upon the submission of this
FBC to the FCO's Departmental Investment Strategy Group (DISG),
together with subsequent approvals and endorsement.
In addition to the FCO's SoR and Terms and Conditions
and the draft contract schedules, the key inputs and activities
throughout the process were:
— Continuous clarification meetings
and questions, due diligence and discovery activities;
— Regular meetings between the Project's
Senior Responsible Owner (SRO), other members of the FCO's senior
management and the Bidders' Senior Responsible Executives (SRIEs)
at the various stages of the procurement;
— Visits to Bidders' Reference Sites
and their Corporate HQs;
— Continuous bidder commercial assessment
using the OGC's Supplier Intelligence Service;
— Formal evaluations of bidders' submissions
at each stage against pre-determined evaluation criteria and frameworks;
— Approvals and endorsements by the
FFEB, other members of the senior FCO management and Ministers.
Although this procurement process has been undertaken
broadly in line with the original procurement strategy (June 2003),
the strategy has been kept under constant review to secure the
best possible outcome for the FCO. This has resulted in a number
of revisions to the original strategy to take into account the
procurement outcome at each of the stages above. The key changes/additional
activities, which were designed to exert greater price pressure
and improve the innovation, quality and commercial fit in bidders'
proposals, were endorsed by the Project Board and are set out
below:
At the IITN stage
— securing bidders' responses to a
targeted set of supplementary questions in key areas (to focus
bidders' attention on the weaknesses in their PITN bids);
— an expanded and extended period of
dialogue, due diligence and discovery with bidders was introduced,
allowing the FCO to discuss their bids and help them to improve.
This included all three short listed organisations participating
in a major overseas due diligence and familiarisation exercise
(visits to Singapore and Dhaka), and in the Regional System Administrator
conference in Singapore.
At the FITN stage
— giving bidders a further opportunity
to improve their bids through an additional pre-negotiation engagement
and discovery period with bidders consisting of (for each bidder)
further visits to three overseas Posts (Rome, Brussels, Tirana),
a three day structured interaction with FCO Services and a three
day visit to FCO London sites;
— giving bidders the opportunity to
improve their readiness for negotiations by giving them the opportunity
to convert their solution and plans, including those elements
delivered jointly (such as the partnering and governance arrangements)
into contract schedules using detailed FCO product descriptions.
These were designed to drive up the quality of bidders' solutions
and plans, taking into account the outcome from the IITN stage
and to provide for an efficient negotiation and evaluation process.
The high quality of the bidders' BAFOs described
elsewhere in this FBC and the successful outcome from the negotiation
phase can be attributed in part to these revisions to the procurement
strategy.
The Future Firecrest Executive Board (FFEB)
has taken all necessary internal project level decisions on procurement
during this procurement process. The FFEB is chaired by the head
of the IT Strategy Unit, who acts as the Project's SRO. Where
appropriate, project recommendations have also been escalated
to senior FCO management and Ministers for review and endorsement.
Key features of commercial arrangements
The FCO intends to enter into an Agreement with
a SP to:
— provide the future global desktop
infrastructure and other functionality to the users and SAs, as
required. The new system will be called Future Firecrest;
— provide a set of design, build, operate
and related services, to high levels of resilience, performance
and security, for the Future Firecrest infrastructure;
— operate and maintain the existing
Firecrest infrastructure, on a transitional basis until the new
system is implemented;
— provide associated services to other
government departments.
The service and technology will be provided
by the SP in partnership with FCO Services and the FCO (who will
continue to deliver certain services), but the SP will have overall
service management responsibility.
The commercial arrangements for Future Firecrest
will therefore comprise three key elements as follows:
— The strategic partnering contract
between the FCO and the Strategic Partner (SP) for the provision
of Firecrest and Future Firecrest services and technology;
— Operating Level Agreements (OLAs) between
the SP and FCO/FCO Services governing the operational relationships
between these parties for the Firecrest and Future Firecrest services
that will continue to be provided by the FCO and FCO Services;
— A Financial Agreement between the
FCO and FCO Services governing the basis on which FCO Services
will charge the FCO for services rendered on Firecrest and Future
Firecrest.
Each of these elements are described below.
The Strategic Partnering Contract
The terms and conditions have been compiled using
OGC best practice guidance, a number of OGC standard clauses and
other best practice advice. The Agreement will be for an initial
term of seven years with possibilities of one-year extensions
up to 10 years.
Set out below is a brief description of the pricing
mechanism set out in the Agreement. Schedule 5 sets out the basis
of payment for each of the Services. There are three broad types
of payment:
— milestone payments for (i) Service
Handover; (ii) Project Services (the Design, Build and Installation
of Future Firecrest); and (iii) Technology Refresh (the renewal
and installation of Future Firecrest assets);
— monthly payments for (i) Operational
Services; and (ii) Business Continuity Services; and
— ad hoc payments for (i) Catalogue Services:
(ii) Future Services (services that are currently unknown but
which the FCO may ask the Strategic Partner to deliver at some
future date); and (iii) Termination Assistance.
The prices relating to Mobilisation, Design and Build
and to the operation of Future Firecrest are all fixed. Other
prices may vary but only up to a cap agreed at the outset (the
Maximum Price). Incentives have been provided to encourage the
Strategic Partner to reduce prices and to earn additional profit
from doing so. Trinity has not accepted the principle of Target
and Maximum Price, but has submitted a Firm Price bid for all
priced payment streams.
Further incentives apply to the delivery of the required
Service Levels through the service credit regime. If the Strategic
Partner fails to deliver the required Service Levels, price deductions
will apply. The scale of deductions is ramped such that the worse
the level of performance the more severe (exponentially) the level
of deduction. In extreme cases of poor performance the FCO can
withhold the relevant Service Charges in full.
A Balanced Scorecard also applies, which incentivises
the Strategic Partner to behave in a suitably partnerial manner
by rewarding behaviours that the FCO wishes to encourage through
a mix of financial and non-financial performance measures. The
schedule also gives the FCO the right to scrutinise the Strategic
Partner's costs through open book account provisions, and to cap
profitability through gainshare provisions.
Operating Level Agreements
The FCO also intends to implement Operating Level
Agreements between the SP and FCO/FCO Services. There will be
a consolidated Operating Level Agreement (OLA) for the SP/FCO
relationship (covering the operational arrangements for overseas
SAs) and a consolidated OLA for the SP/FCO Services relationship
(covering the operational arrangements for FCO Services staff
in the UK and TMOs). These will set out the basis on which the
FCO and FCO Services will meet their operational obligations under
the Agreement. This will include the level of service and resources
to be provided by the FCO and FCO Services for each of the service
lines. Further details on the type, number and content of the
OLAs are set out at Annex 7.
Financial Agreement between the FCO and FCO Services
The FCO also intends to put in place an overarching
financial and resource agreement with FCO Services governing the
basis on which FCO Services will meet the terms of the OLA and
be paid for the service rendered.
SOURCING ARRANGEMENTS
Introduction
The OBC set out the rationale for delivery of services
by a Strategic Partner (SP), with retention of certain services
in-house, and proposed a division of responsibilities. Since then
considerable work has been undertaken in the development of a
partnering approach to the delivery of services through a joint
service delivery team of SP and FCOS resources under the overall
service management of the SP. This partnership also engages established
relationships with other service providers, such as Global Crossing
for the FCO Telecommunications Network (FTN). The newly restructured
IT Strategy Unit, incorporating the Future Firecrest Intelligent
Client (FFIC), has responsibility for management of the operational
and contractual relationship with the SP, the internal service
providers (including FCOS) and Overseas System Administrators.
The following paragraphs describe:
— The service scope and delivery responsibilities;
— The governance and service delivery model;
— Arrangements to develop a "cultural
fit" between the parties to the contract.
Partnering: Services scope and delivery responsibilities
Full details of the services required to provide
and support the Firecrest infrastructure are contained in Schedule
2 of the contract. The service delivery model has been developed
taking into consideration the FCO's requirement to retain some
responsibility for providing services, including:
— Security constraints;
— Physical access constraints;
— Fulfilling its client-side responsibilities;
— Specialist knowledge of the FCO environment;
and
— Value for money (vfm), including risk
allocation.
Services are delivered through joint SP/FCO Services
service delivery teams where one of the two organisation takes
lead responsibility for delivery of the service, taking into account
the resources, capabilities and skills base of the SP and the
factors above. The SP will however take overall responsibility
for all the front and back office services and performance against
the SP's contracted Service Level Agreements and the OLAs to the
FFIC.
In line with FCO's requirement to retain appropriate
responsibility for service delivery, for both bidders FCO Services
will lead on delivery of almost all overseas services through
the TMOs, supported by local SAs.
Partnering: Governance and service delivery model
A set of strategic, commercial and operational governance
structures and mechanisms have been developed to ensure the Partnering
approach works effectively. Governance and service delivery arrangements
are set out in Schedule 9 (Partnering and Governance) and Schedule
3.2. The arrangements are summarised in the diagram below.
The role and responsibilities of each of these
governance bodies is as follows:
Strategic Partnering Committee
This committee is tasked with developing the
broader strategic relationship, ensuring that the partnership
is evolving to meet the FCO's business needs and is delivering
overall value and the expected business benefits. It will provide
a forum for strategic discussions between the senior executives
of both the FCO and the Strategic Partner.
Operating Committee
This body will govern the overall performance
and delivery of Firecrest and Future Firecrest services. This
committee will comprise the Joint Management Team and representatives
from the ITSU Intelligent Client.
Joint Management Team
(JMT)
The primary objective of this body is to own
and control the overall service and outcomes and it is responsible
for ensuring that service delivery and projects are achieving
goals, milestones, the obligations set out in OLAs and contracted
service levels. Management of the contract and the relationship
between the FCO and Strategic Partner will occur at the JMT and
executive level. FCO Services plays a leading role in the JMT.
Joint Service Delivery Team (JSDT)
The Joint Service Delivery Team (JSDT) is where
the day-to-day service and project management activity takes place.
Managers at this level are responsible for ensuring that operational
service delivery within each Service Line (see Table above), projects
and interfaces are effectively controlled and are being managed
in accordance with Service Line and service level requirements.
The roles, responsibilities and activities for the JSDTs supporting
each service line have been specified in detail in the Schedules
3 and 9 of the contract. FCO Services plays a leading role in
the JSDT.
| |
| | | |
| | |
| schedule | (All) |
| | | |
| | | |
| source | (All) |
| | | |
| | | |
| |
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| | | |
| | |
| Sum of value in £'000s | period
| (year of contract)
|
| | | |
|
| Cost Description | 0
| 1 | 2 | 3
| 4 | 5 | 6
| 7 | Total |
| | |
| | | |
| | |
| Accomodation—preparation and refurbishments
| 1,250 | 2,700 |
| | | |
| | 3,950 |
| Audit | | 100
| | | 100 |
| | 100 | 300
|
| Balanced scorecard | | 400
| 400 | 400 | 400
| 400 | 400 | 400
| 2,800 |
| Cabling | | 100
| 200 | 100 | 400
| | | | 800
|
| Data Migration | | 200
| | | |
| | | 200 |
| Data Prep | 80 |
| | | |
| | | 80 |
| FTN | | 352 |
340 | 340 | 340 |
340 | 340 | 340 |
2,392 |
| IT DISPOSAL | | 30
| 30 | 30 | 15 |
30 | 30 | 30 | 195
|
| IT Maint Contracts | | 1,400
| 1,400 | 1,400 | 1,400
| 700 | 700 | 700
| 7,700 |
| MS Licenses | | 1,250
| 3,450 | 3,450 | 3,450
| 3,450 | 3,450 | 3,450
| 21,950 |
| Security Accreditors | | 64
| | | |
| | | 63.6 |
| Security Assurance | | 40
| | | |
| | | 40 |
| Security Vetting | | 126
| 20 | 20 | 126
| 12 | 19 | 63 |
386 |
| Shipping (Despatch Costs) | |
0 | 0 | 0 | 0
| 0 | 375 | 375
| 750 |
| Test Environ | 120 |
| | | |
| | | 120 |
| Training Travel/subs | | 380
| 380 | 380 | 320
| 320 | 320 | 320
| 2,420 |
| Travel/Subs (For installation) |
| 672 | 1,717 | 1,353
| 364 | 504 | 643
| 364 | 5,617 |
| User Representative | | 50
| | | |
| | | 50 |
| Hardware Refresh | |
| | | | 0
| 0 | 0 | 0 |
| FCOS Logistics Staff | | 50
| 300 | 300 | 0
| 0 | 300 | 300
| 1,250 |
| Intelligent Client | 0 | 0
| 0 | 0 | 0 |
0 | 0 | 0 | 0
|
| Additional Hardware | | 0
| 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | | 0
|
| BC Warehousing | | 75
| 75 | 75 | 75 |
75 | 75 | 75 | 525
|
| IT DISPOSAL(Shipping) | |
90 | 130 | 130 |
50 | 110 | 70 |
50 | 630 |
| FCOS LOGISTICS | |
| 40 | 40 | 100
| 100 | 40 | 40
| 360 |
| Grand Total | 1,450 | 5,378.6
| 8,482 | 8,018 | 7,140
| 6,041 | 6,762 | 6,607
| 52,578.6 |
| | |
| | | |
| | |
| Total Overseas System Admin |
| | | |
|
GT | |
| 29,100
81,678.6 |
| | |
| | |
| | | |
Question 58 (Mr Richard Bacon): GENIE and OMNIBASE
The Committee asked for clarification of costs for GenIE (passport
issuing) and Omnibase (passport database) systems. These are as
follows:
| | |
| | | |
| | |
| 2003-04
| | 2004-05
| | 2005-06(*) |
| Admin
£
| Int Market
£ | Capital
£
| Admin
£ | Int Market
£ Capital
£
Admin
£
Int Market
£
Capital
£
|
| GenIE WorldWide | 0 | 618,000
| 2,861,000 | 532,000 | 1,015,000
| 220,000 | 532,000 | 750,000
| 110,000 |
| Omnibase | 0 | 15,000
| 90,000 | 0 | 30,000
| 0 | 0 | 20,000
| 0 |
| Totals | 40,399 | 799,712
| 3,197,073 | 1,338,000 | 1,445,000
| 1,303,000 | 658,000 | 1,165,000
| 2,860,000 |
| | |
| | | |
| | |
(*) estimated
Notes:
1. OMNIBASE is owned and operated by the UK Passport Service.
Other government departments and agencies (eg DVLA, Met Police)
pay a fixed rate to UKPS per user and per search on OMNIBASE,
but the FCO is not charged by UKPS for access to the system. The
capital costs in the table above are for the initial installation
of the system. The internal market costs represent the cost of
Help Desk first line support provided by FCO Services.
2. The then Consular Division was restructured into a Directorate
in early 2003, to provide a better framework for delivering consular
services. As part of this the Resources Group was established
with a qualified accountant as its head. Since then, we have been
able to put the financial breakdown of costs for projects such
as these on a firmer footing. This is why we have provided figures
from 2003-04 but have been unable to provide earlier figures in
the time available.
Question 78 (Mr Ian Davidson): Cases where the traveller is
at fault
The Committee asked for information on the proportion of consular
assistance cases where the traveller is at fault, for example
through intoxication, insufficient preparation before travelling
or ignoring basic safety advice.
Our policy is to provide consular assistance based on need, and
takes no account of whether people's behaviour may have contributed
to their predicament. Judgements about intoxication, fault or
lack of preparation can be difficult to make, and we do not ask
staff to record what proportion of the assistance they provide
is to people whose personal behaviour at the time may have contributed
to their hospitalisation, detention or worse. Equally, neither
we nor the insurance industry have exact figures for those who
travel overseas without appropriate insurance, but the Association
of British Insurers (ABI) estimates that insurance is taken out
for only around 50% of overseas trips.
However, despite the difficulties of obtaining precise information,
experience does show that lack of adequate insurance, drinking
more alcohol than normal or taking drugs frequently exacerbate
the difficulties people experience when they run into problems
overseas. We have therefore made these issues a focus of our Know
Before You Go campaign. Our TV Filler, Wasted, highlighted
the dangers of drink and drugs abroad: for a total production
and marketing cost of £89,830 it received play-time across
57 different channels, including all terrestrial channels (BBC1,
BBC2, ITV, Channel 4, Channel 5) and others including BBC3, Bravo,
British Eurosport, Discovery, ITV2 and Men & Motors. Had we
paid for this airtime it would have cost £1,052,713, so the
return on investment for this hard-hitting advert was 11.7 to
1 (figures from the Central Office of Information). Our new Filler
"Can you afford it?", on the high costs of failing to
take out insurance, was launched in December and is already appearing
across major TV networks. Other recent activity includes, for
example, a full page in the Sun's first-ever travel supplement
on 20 January—a mixture of editorial/article and an advert—to
get across our messages about basic preparations for a safe holiday.
The particular circumstances of our post in Bratislava and hen
or stag nights abroad were raised by the Committee. Bratislava
report that they have not yet had an arrest for incidents related
to hen or stag parties; some of the companies which handle such
groups may ensure problems are smoothed out. In contrast, Prague
have noticed an increase in their workload: although their management
information does not differentiate between types of customer,
they estimate that roughly 15% of lost passport cases are for
British nationals on stag trips.
On the whole, considering the high numbers of British visitors
to the Czech Republic and the popularity of Prague as a Stag destination,
the vast majority of Stags do not pose a problem. However, some
do get into serious difficulties, and a few into tragic accidents.
Many partygoers turn up at the Embassy out-of-hours, drunk, incoherent
and lost. They are looked after by the 24-hour Security Guards,
who try to glean as much information from them as possible. It
has been known for the Guards to phone 40 hotels, to eventually
be successful in finding the Stag's hotel and sending them on
their way or arranging for accompanying Stags to come and collect
their wayward friend. The majority of Stags reported "missing"
by their friends usually turn up within the next day or two but
this still impacts on the Embassy workload, as they need to take
full details, enter details onto their computer and then phone
hospitals etc for elimination purposes. Most of the Stags that
arrive into consular section are there because they have got drunk
and have got separated from friends and have been wondering around
the city all night trying to find their party.
Some case studies from our Embassy in Prague are given below:
— Stag lost in Prague turns up at the Embassy.
He's been walking around Prague all night after losing his friends.
We eventually make contact with the friends who refuse to come
to the embassy because they are having such a good time in the
pub but say they will meet him on the Charles Bridge, which in
the summer has about 3,000 people on it. It took him five hours
to find the embassy.
— The embassy got a call from the airport police
to say that a distressed British national (DBN) had been detained
in the police station. They ask a member of consular staff to
come down to the station. When we arrive the DBN was still a little
drunk. We asked the police officers why he had been detained,
the response was that he was caught wandering around the airport
hangars. When we ask the DBN about what had happened he said that
he was separated from his party and ended up in a taxi drunk,
he then fell a sleep, the taxi driver drove him to the airport,
stole all his money and kicked him out. Because he was so drunk
he thought that he was going home and tried to get on any plane
leaving the airport. Nobody knows how he got into the hangar.
After he had sobered up he could not apologise enough.
The Embassy report that it is very rare to encounter a Hen in
trouble.
Question 86 (Mr Ian Davidson): Call-out fees
The Committee asked for information on how often call out fees
are charged by consular staff world-wide and specifically in Bratislava.
In the financial year 2004-05, a call-out fee for attendance
by consular staff was charged 323 times, including 222 times out
of hours (a full table of fees is on the FCO website at: http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/Consular%20Fees%20Dec%2005%20A4,0.pdf
)
The out-of-hours fee was charged twice in Bratislava; in
contrast, it was charged 40 times in Prague (see separate note
on cases where the traveller may be at fault). Consuls have discretion
on whether to charge the out-of-hours fee: for example, they would
not charge it if called out to deal with an emergency or trauma
such as rape or assault, but would be more likely to charge it
if asked to issue a replacement passport out of hours by someone
who had, say, left this to the last minute before travelling.
In some cases, explaining that a fee will be charged can act as
a deterrent in such cases, so that those who can really wait return
during the normal working week.
However, we agree with the Committee's implication that the
fee is charged far less frequently than it might be, and will
be looking at this area in follow-up to the NAO's Report.
Question 107 (Mr Alan Williams): Biometric passports
The Committee asked for further information on the FCO's
emerging ideas for dealing with the technical challenges inherent
in Phase 2 of biometric passports, including the number of characteristics
required for full document security.
The EU requirements for second generation biometrics in passports
have not yet been finalised, but it is likely that the UK will
mirror these requirements.
The FCO is planning to collect the Facial Image (as per current
practice for Phase 1) and all 10 fingerprints. The passport chip
will hold both sets of biometrics, together with the data on the
bio data page, although it is not yet decided whether this will
be restricted to three biometric identifiers (facial and two fingerprints)
or whether 10 fingerprints will be stored along with the facial
image on the chip. The 10 fingerprints will have additional protection
to only allow those authorised (by the UK authorities) to read
them. The protection technology will be embedded on the passport
chip, and drive the need to update the chip and the encoding process
for Biometrics Phase 2.
We expect to change our overseas passport-issuing arrangements
for biometrics Phase 2, moving physical production and printing
of passports to a few (3-5) regional centres while the remainder
of posts enrol the biometric data, enter that data and undertake
nationality determination. The current passport issuing system
will have to be changed to support the new working practices.
Work is well advanced on this; it will now, given the Committee's
interest in this issue, include analysis of the relationship between
the number of biometric indicators collected and document security.
Question 114 (Mr Alan Williams): Child abduction
1. The Committee raised several matters on child abduction.
Sir Michael Jay has written directly to Kitty Ussher MP about
a constituency case she raised.
STATISTICS
2. Below are the most recent set of statistics from the
Child Abduction Section (CAS) at the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (FCO) (Fig 1, Ev 30). They reflect figures for the 4th
quarter of 2005 received since the evidence session on 11 January.
CAS was set up in early 2003, with statistics being collected
from the 3rd quarter of 2003. Our statistics are cumulative from
that point.
3. At the close of the 4th quarter 2005, we were working
on 89 active cases out of 476 cases in total. During 2005, we
were made aware of 110 new cases and assisted in the resolution
of 34 cases. These statistics are a guide, rather than a definitive
assessment of the full scale of child abduction issues, trends,
or the number of cases that are resolved. In some cases parents
do not contact CAS, or make only brief enquiries. Equally, CAS
may not always hear that cases have been resolved.
4. CAS statistics are broken down into cases involving
countries contracted to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction (Hague Convention) and
those that are not. The Department for Constitutional Affairs
(DCA) takes the lead on Hague Convention cases, but we may become
involved in providing Consular assistance to parents pursuing
custody or access outside of the Hague Convention or may assist
the DCA in difficult cases.
5. A case is defined as filed if there has been no action
for the past six months. This does not mean that the cases have
been resolved and therefore the figures for filed cases are not
indicative of the number of children that have been returned after
abduction. Numbers for actual returns of which we are aware are
included in the statistics and absorbed into figures for filed
cases. Figures for children returned to the UK are not broken
down by country.
6. Statistics on child abduction are also held by the
DCA and reunite, a charity providing practical advice and
information to parents and guardians whose children have been,
or might be, abducted overseas.
MIDDLE EAST
AND FAR
EAST
7. The Committee raised the specific issue of child abduction
cases in the Middle East and Far East. In 2005 the CAS was made
aware of eight new cases in Middle Eastern countries and 10 new
cases in Far Eastern countries. We do not keep statistics on which
parent abducted the child(ren). Experience suggests that fathers
have abducted children in the majority of cases in the Middle
East, but the split between abduction by the mother or father
is more balanced for cases in the Far East. Members of Parliament
or constituents are encouraged to contact the CAS if they have
concerns about potential abductions.
GERMANY
8. The DCA has provided information on child abduction
to and from Germany from 2000-05, including the various outcomes
possible (Fig 2, Ev 33).
9. The "incoming" cases statistics show how
many applications have been made by parents from Germany and how
many judicial orders (successful outcomes) for return our courts
have made, 32 in all between 2000 and 2005. On three occasions
in that same time period the English courts have not made an order
for return.
10. As with the CAS statistics, these should not be seen as
a definitive assessment of the problem of child abduction, or
successful resolution of cases. As shown in the table, there are
many possible outcomes in these cases.
11. In the case of Germany, the DCA and FCO take a view
that the international framework and co-operation established
by the Hague Convention has improved the handling of child abduction
cases between the UK and Germany in recent years.
Figure 1
CHILD ABDUCTION SECTION STATISTICS, AS OF 4th QUARTER,
2005
| Region | Country | Hague/Non Hague
| Active | Filed | Total since
3rd Quarter,
2003
| Change Over
Last Quarter |
| Africa | Angola | Non Hague
| 0 | 1 | 1 |
|
| Botswana | Non Hague
| 0 | 1 | 1 |
|
| Ethiopia | Non Hague
| 0 | 1 | 1 |
|
| Ghana | Non Hague
| 2 | 5 | 7 |
+1 |
| Guyana | Non Hague
| 1 | 1 | 2 |
+1 |
| Kenya | Non Hague
| 2 | 0 | 2 |
|
| Malawi | Non Hague
| 1 | 2 | 3 |
|
| Nigeria | Non Hague
| 2 | 9 | 11 |
|
| Sierra Leone | Non Hague
| 0 | 2 | 2 |
|
| Somalia | Non Hague
| 0 | 6 | 6 |
|
| South Africa | Hague
| 0 | 1 | 1 |
|
| Tanzania | Non Hague
| 3 | 0 | 3 |
|
| Uganda | Non Hague
| 0 | 3 | 3 |
|
| Zambia | Non Hague
| 0 | 1 | 1 |
|
| Zimbabwe | Hague
| 0 | 4 | 4 |
|
Middle East/
| Algeria
| Non Hague | 0 | 5
| 5 | |
| Africa | Egypt | Non Hague
| 2 | 4 | 6 |
+1 |
| Iran | Non Hague
| 1 | 5 | 6 |
|
| Iraq | Non Hague
| 1 | 1 | 2 |
|
| Israel | Hague
| 1 | 1 | 2 |
|
| Jordan | Non Hague
| 0 | 3 | 3 |
|
| Kuwait | Non Hague
| 1 | 0 | 1 |
+1 |
| Lebanon | Non Hague
| 1 | 2 | 3 |
|
| Libya | Non Hague
| 0 | 4 | 4 |
|
| Morocco | Non Hague
| 0 | 5 | 5 |
+1 |
| Oman | Non Hague
| 0 | 2 | 2 |
|
| Palestine | Non Hague
| 0 | 1 | 1 |
|
| Qatar | Non Hague
| 0 | 1 | 1 |
|
| Saudi Arabia | Non Hague
| 1 | 2 | 3 |
|
| Sudan | Non Hague
| 0 | 5 | 5 |
|
| Syria | Non Hague
| 0 | 2 | 2 |
|
| Tunisia | Non Hague
| 0 | 8 | 8 |
+1 |
| UAE | Non Hague
| 2 | 2 | 4 |
|
| Europe | Cyprus (South)
| Hague | 0 | 6
| 6 | |
| Cyprus (North) | Non Hague
| 4 | 0 | 4 |
+1 |
| Czech Republic | Hague
| 0 | 3 | 3 |
|
| Denmark | Hague
| 0 | 1 | 1 |
|
| France | Hague
| 2 | 9 | 11 |
-1 |
| Germany | Hague
| 0 | 5 | 5 |
|
| Greece | Hague
| 1 | 4 | 5 |
|
| Ireland | Hague
| 0 | 1 | 1 |
|
| Italy | Hague
| 1 | 5 | 6 |
|
| Lithuania | Hague
| 0 | 1 | 1 |
|
| Malta | Hague
| 0 | 3 | 3 |
+1 |
| Netherlands | Hague
| 0 | 3 | 3 |
|
| Norway | Hague
| 1 | 0 | 1 |
|
| Poland | Hague
| 1 | 2 | 3 |
|
| Portugal | Hague
| 6 | 1 | 7 |
+4 |
| Romania | Hague
| 0 | 1 | 1 |
|
| Slovakia | Hague
| 1 | 1 | 2 |
|
| Spain | Hague
| 5 | 13 | 18 |
|
| Switzerland | Hague
| 0 | 1 | 1 |
|
| Turkey | Hague
| 1 | 8 | 9 |
|
| Eastern | Kazakhstan |
Non Hague | 0 | 1 |
1 | +1 |
| Kyrgyz Republic | Non Hague
| 0 | 1 | 1 |
|
| Russia | Non Hague
| 2 | 5 | 7 |
+2 |
| Ukraine | Non Hague
| 0 | 3 | 3 |
|
| South East Asia | Bangladesh
| Non Hague | 2 | 18
| 20 | +1 |
| India | Non Hague
| 5 | 26 | 31 |
+1 |
| Pakistan | Non Hague
| 13 | 82 | 95 |
+7 |
| Sri Lanka | Non Hague
| 1 | 2 | 3 |
|
| Asia Pacific | Australia
| Hague | 4 | 14
| 18 | +3 |
| Brunei | Non Hague
| 1 | 0 | 1 |
+1 |
| Cambodia | Non Hague
| 0 | 1 | 1 |
|
| China | Non Hague
| 2 | 1 | 3 |
+1 |
| Hong Kong (SAR) | Hague
| 0 | 2 | 2 |
|
| Indonesia | Non Hague
| 0 | 1 | 1 |
|
| Japan | Non Hague
| 2 | 7 | 9 |
|
| Malaysia | Non Hague
| 0 | 3 | 3 |
|
| New Zealand | Hague
| 0 | 1 | 1 |
|
| Philippines | Non Hague
| 1 | 1 | 2 |
|
| Singapore | Non Hague
| 1 | 1 | 2 |
|
| Taiwan | Non Hague
| 0 | 2 | 2 |
|
| Thailand | Non Hague
| 1 | 8 | 9 |
+1 |
| Americas | Antigua & Barbuda
| Non Hague | 1 | 0
| 1 | |
| Bahamas | Hague
| 0 | 1 | 1 |
+1 |
| Barbados | Non Hague
| 0 | 2 | 2 |
|
| Brazil | Hague
| 0 | 1 | 1 |
+1 |
| British Virgin Islands |
Hague | 0 | 1 |
1 | |
| Canada | Hague
| 0 | 5 | 5 |
|
| Chile | Hague
| 0 | 1 | 1 |
|
| Ecuador | Hague
| 1 | 0 | 1 |
|
| Honduras | Hague
| 1 | 0 | 1 |
|
| Jamaica | Non Hague
| 1 | 4 | 5 |
|
| Nicaragua | Non Hague
| 0 | 1 | 1 |
|
| Paraguay | Hague
| 0 | 1 | 1 |
|
| Peru | Hague
| 0 | 1 | 1 |
|
| Saint Lucia | Non Hague
| 0 | 1 | 1 |
|
| Saint Vincent | Non Hague
| 0 | 2 | 2 |
|
| Trinidad & Tobago |
Non Hague | 0 | 2 |
2 | |
| United States | Hague
| 5 | 26 | 31 |
+4 |
| Venezuela | Hague
| 1 | 0 | 1 |
|
| Total | |
| 89 | 387 | 476
| +35 |
| Total Non Hague Cases |
| 316 | | |
|
| Total Hague Cases | |
| 160 | | |
|
| Total Active Non Hague Cases |
| 57 | |
| |
| Total Active Hague Cases |
| 32 | | |
|
| Total Filed Non Hague Cases |
| 259 | | |
|
| Total Filed Hague Cases |
| 128 | | |
|
| Resolved | 1st qtr
| 7 | |
| | |
| 2nd qtr | 8
| | | |
|
| 3rd qtr | 7
| | | |
|
| 4th qtr | 12
| | | |
|
| | |
| | | |
| Top 5 countries by ACTIVE cases
| | | |
|
| Location | Hague/Non Hague
| No of cases | |
| | |
| Pakistan | Non Hague | 13
| | | |
|
| Portugal | Hague | 6
| | | |
|
| India | Non Hague | 5
| | | |
|
| United States | Hague | 5
| | | |
|
| Spain | Hague | 5
| | | |
|
| Top 10 countries by ALL cases
| | | |
|
| Location | Hague/Non Hague
| No of cases | |
| | |
| Pakistan | Non Hague | 95
| | | |
|
| India | Non Hague | 31
| | | |
|
| United States | Hague | 31
| | | |
|
| Bangladesh | Non Hague | 20
| | | |
|
| Spain | Hague | 18
| | | |
|
| Australia | Hague | 18
| | | |
|
| Nigeria | Non Hague | 11
| | | |
|
| France | Hague | 11
| | | |
|
| Thailand | Non Hague | 9
| | | |
|
| Turkey | Hague | 9
| | | |
|
| 
