The balance of enquiry workloads
10. In planning the number and mix of enquiries by Areas, the
Department takes account of the number and grade-mix of Area staff
and their company caseloads. It seeks to cover the spectrum of
companies submitting returns - both large and small companies.
The Department plans this coverage, however, without a
detailed assessment of the relative compliance risk of different
sizes of business, and without a clear view of what marginal changes
in the enquiry mix might produce in terms of yield and cost.[11]
11. With an underlying error rate in returns of 40%,
it is likely that higher yields could be achieved if additional
resources were deployed to increase the number of Corporation
Tax enquiries. But whether a 4% level of coverage is appropriate
depends not just on the marginal yields and costs of such work
but also on wider considerations about the deployment of enquiry
effort and resources across the different taxes, and the demands
they place on business. The Department is developing a risk strategy
for business taxes, to help it reassess its levels of enquiry
coverage.[12]
12. The risks posed by a particular company for Corporation
Tax may also be indicative of its risk on other taxes, for example
VAT, PAYE and Income Tax. Some of the more common errors found
in Corporation Tax returns may also affect the personal tax affairs
of the directors. 9% of Corporation Tax full enquiries also covered
other taxes in 2004-05.[13]
Penalties
13. Penalties for negligently inaccurate returns,
geared to the tax at stake, can discourage non-compliance. Of
the 19,000 enquiries which produced an increased tax assessment,
only 13% were penalised. Legislation allows the Department to
impose penalties of up to 100% of the additional tax payable but,
as with other taxes, it applies abatements for voluntary disclosure
of errors, the seriousness of the offence and the co-operation
the company gives the Department in the enquiry. The Department
does not record centrally the types of cases that are penalised
and those which are not, or the scale of the abatements applied,
to assess whether penalties are being used effectively to deter
non-compliant behaviour. Without such analysis, it is also unable
to show that it applies penalties equitably across Areas and for
companies of different size and type.[14]
14. The Department applies fewer penalties on aspect
enquiries than full enquiries. It imposed penalties in half of
the full enquiries where it identified an additional tax liability,
compared with only 5% in aspect cases. In imposing
penalties, the Department has to establish that the return is
incorrect and understates the tax due, and that the error arises
from the negligence of the company. Aspect enquiries often involve
questions of interpretation of accounting and tax rules. If a
company makes an error having relied in good faith on external
professional advice, the Department cannot apply a penalty.[15]
15. If the Department considers that advisers and
agents are in breach of their professional ethics, it can refer
them to their professional bodies. But it has done so only five
times in the last five years. Yet in response to our predecessor
Committee's Report on Tackling VAT fraud in 2004, HM Customs and
Excise, having previously referred only four cases, had expected
to increase the numbers reported to professional bodies.[16]
16. The Department can impose a penalty if companies
do not provide information it requests for its enquiry. But the
Department acknowledges that a rate of £30 a day is only
a minor inconvenience for many companies.[17]
1 C&AG's Report, Corporation Tax: companies
managed by HM Revenue and Customs' Area Offices (HC 678, Session
2005-06), para 1.1; Q 31; Budget 2006 (HC 968, Session
2005-06), Table C8 Back
2
C&AG's Report, paras 1.5, 2.1 Back
3
ibid, para 2.7 and Figure 3; Qq 3, 18 Back
4
C&AG's Report, para 2.11; Qq 21, 37, 44 Back
5
Qq 2, 49, 71, 83, 85, 87, 105; Ev 14-15 Back
6
Qq 2-3 Back
7
C&AG's Report, paras 2.18, 4.9; Qq 8, 50, 109 Back
8
Qq 3, 39 Back
9
C&AG's Report, paras 2.7-2.8, 4.4-4.5, Figure 5 Back
10
C&AG's Report, para 3.7; Qq 3, 71 Back
11
C&AG's Report, paras 2.15, 2.20; Q 16 Back
12
Qq 16-17 Back
13
C&AG's Report, paras 2.24-2.25; Qq 26, 45 Back
14
C&AG's Report, paras 2.9-2.10; Q 94 Back
15
Q 80 Back
16
Q 99; Ev 14-15; 36th Report from the Committee of Public
Accounts, Tackling VAT fraud (HC 512, Session 2003-04),
para 23 and conclusions and recommendations para 7; Treasury Minute,
Cm 6304, September 2004, paras 15-17 Back
17
Q 82 Back