Select Committee on Public Administration Third Report


1  Introduction


1. The Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill was presented on 11 January 2006.[1] It had been preceded by a consultation document, which had proposed a far more limited reform of the Regulatory Reform Act 2001 than has in fact emerged.[2] Even at that stage the responsible committees considered that the Government's proposals were highly significant. The Regulatory Reform Committee and the Procedure Committee both made it clear they would scrutinise the matter, and the Regulatory Reform Committee pressed for pre­legislative scrutiny of the forthcoming Bill. Since this was not available, the Committee ensured that its report was produced before Second Reading.[3] Similarly, the Procedure Committee has produced its report in time to be available before the Bill is considered by the House as a whole.[4]

2. We too have an interest in the Bill. The Minister in charge, Mr Jim Murphy MP, is the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Cabinet Office, over which we keep a watching brief. We have long been concerned with the balance of power between state and citizen, and between government and legislature.[5] This Bill, as our sister committees have said, is of major constitutional significance. It will inevitably affect that balance. Given the concerns expressed by many of our colleagues, and the cogent criticisms from the Regulatory Reform Committee, we had expected that significant changes would be made in Committee. In fact, although the Government has given several undertakings which we welcome, the major amendments will now need to be made at Report stage, the last opportunity Members have to consider the detail of the Bill. Given that this is the situation, we thought it timely to put our concerns on record, and to reinforce the work already done by other committees. Their recommendations would do a great deal to improve this legislation.

3. We will not attempt to give a detailed history of the measure, or a close analysis of its provisions, as that has already been done by our colleagues. But we need to explain why we think the Bill is, as they have said, "of major constitutional significance". As currently drafted, the Bill gives ministers a wide ranging power to "reform legislation" or implement recommendations of one or more of the United Kingdom Law Commissions (with or without changes) by order, and to propose the degree of Parliamentary scrutiny which is to be given to that order.

4. There are some restrictions on these powers, in that the Minister must consider that the preconditions in the Bill are met. The powers cannot be used to impose or increase taxation, to make new provision allowing forcible entry or compelling the giving of evidence, or to impose penalties heavier than those specified in the Bill. This limit on penalties does not apply to orders which implement Law Commission recommendations.

5. The Government has said that the sweeping powers in the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill will be used to:

provide a more proportionate way of delivering better regulation reforms to legislation. It will help to promote a real change in the culture of regulation and inspection and enable the implementation of valuable and non-contentious Law Commission proposals.[6]

Those aims appear to be universally supported; and we also commend them. For that reason, second reading of this Bill was approved without division. The argument is over the proportionality of the legislation to those ends.

6. The Regulatory Reform Act 2001 provides that its procedures can be used to reform law which imposes burdens. There is nothing on the face of this Bill to limit its use to the stated aims set out by the Government. The Government rests its claims that the Bill is proportionate on two factors: the safeguards contained in preconditions set down by Clause 3, and the Government's own undertakings not to use the powers to implement highly controversial proposals.

7. As has been widely noted, it will be hard to sustain a legal case that a Minister has misused his powers by reference to the preconditions in Clause 3. They will be justiciable, but the barrier will only be that the Minister is acting within the range of what might be reasonable in considering that the preconditions have been met. In any event, relying on recourse to the courts to ensure that powers granted by the Bill are used as expected is itself problematic. Parliament is the legislature of this country, and should ensure that it has the powers and processes needed to scrutinise primary or secondary legislation adequately. Judicial review will always be needed as an additional safeguard, in case a defective instrument slips through our procedures for scrutinising secondary legislation, but the primary task must be to ensure that the powers on the face of this Bill are proportionate to the Government's aims, and the procedures for scrutinising orders brought forward using those powers are proportionate to the constitutional importance of what is proposed.

8. The Government has rested much of its case on repeated undertakings that the power will be used to further its deregulatory policies, and will not be used in unexpected or controversial ways. Whitehall has a liking for such undertakings and in fact records them carefully and takes them seriously. The undertakings given during the passage of the Regulatory Reform Act 2001 have not, so far, been breached. But Parliament has no means of enforcing those undertakings. We are not satisfied by the emphasis on Government undertakings as a means of limiting the use of powers given by the Bill. Over the long term, it is all too easy for absolute undertakings to be broken, first because circumstances are exceptional, then because they are unusual, and finally because the undertaking itself has become obsolete. There are similar disadvantages to relying too much on Parliamentary procedure—for example, all prayers against negative statutory instruments used to be debated on the Floor of the House; but it then became routine for them to be referred to Committee (although Members could force debate on to the Floor of the House). Last session, 660 negative statutory instruments were laid—8 of the 13 prayers against them were debated in time for the House to take effective action.

9. The Regulatory Reform Committee and the Procedure Committee have provided comprehensive surveys of the provisions of the Bill, and of the procedures which might be needed to ensure those provisions are operated in a balanced way. They have put forward many valuable recommendations, which we believe the Government and the House should consider extremely carefully. This report concentrates on what we consider to be the key defects in the Bill, and the absolute minimum that needs to be done to make it proportionate to its aims.


1   Bill 111 (2005-06) Back

2   A Bill for Better Regulation: Consultation Document Back

3   Regulatory Reform Committee, First Special Report of Session 2005-06, Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill, HC 878 Back

4   Procedure Committee, First Report of Session 2005-06, Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill, HC 894 Back

5   The Committee reports regularly on Ministerial Accountability and Parliamentary Questions. We have also considered the use of the royal prerogative by the Executive (Fourth Report of Session 2003-04, Taming the Prerogative: Strengthening Ministerial Accountability to Parliament, HC 422). Back

6   HC Deb, 9 February 2006, col 1048 Back


 
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