Select Committee on Public Administration Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 76-79)

DR ROS ALTMANN, MR BOB DUNCAN AND MR ANDREW PARR

22 JUNE 2006

  Q76 Chairman: It is a great pleasure to welcome Dr Ros Altmann, Bob Duncan and Andrew Parr, the latter two who have been caught up directly, personally, in the occupational pension failures. We are very glad to have you along, although we are not glad about the reasons. You are here because you are helping us to respond to the Ombudsman's report and the Government's response to the Ombudsman's report. You have given us already some very useful information. Ros, would you like to say anything by way of a short introduction?

  Dr Altmann: Thank you, Chairman. Effectively, we are here today to explore how the Government can dispute the findings of maladministration by the Ombudsman. The evidence is clear. Firstly, the Government misled the public with its official information, information which it chose to issue in order to encourage people to join and which left out mention of the huge risk that the Government itself created by policy changes introduced from 1997 which have caused over 75,000 of your constituents—we know of at least 200 MPs who have constituents affected, and that is just the ones we know—to be stripped of their pension. Secondly, in its oversight and changes to the funding regime for pensions, even for the guaranteed minimum pension alternative to the State Pension, the Government failed to consider the security of workers pensions if their scheme were to wind up. They just ignored the risks it had created to members' pensions on wind-up. I have to try to understand the denial of the DWP on the clear evidence that it failed to meet its own guidelines and failed to stick to the assurances it has given to Parliament and this Committee that in future its implementation would be accurate, reliable and comprehensive. I think a number of the things we have heard this morning may partly go some way to helping us understand what is behind the Government's denial. I have, as you say, two people here who were misled by government information, who could have done something different. The belief the Government has expressed, that nobody read its material; even if they did they should not have believed what they read; and even if they did they would never have done anything to protect themselves anyway, suggests to me that we need to hear from people who can demonstrate that that is just not a correct assumption.

  Q77  Chairman: Thank you. I would like to ask you, Mr Duncan and Mr Parr, to tell us your own experience of the length of time you have been paying into your pension scheme and when and how you discovered you were not going to get the pension you thought you were going to get.

  Mr Duncan: I am Bob Duncan. I worked in the British United Shoe Machinery Company in Leicester for 36 years. It went into receivership in October 2000. When I first started there, there was a non-contributory pension scheme. The unions fought for it and in 1976 we went into a company paying-in scheme. I also started saving voluntary contributions. I paid in for nearly 30 years. When I got made redundant and the firm went into receivership, my pension fund, the day I finished, stood at £8,000 for the year, plus my AVCs which were about £25,000. I have been told now that I have completely lost the AVCs at the moment. They have gone. The State Pension, we have been contracted out and paying into a company pension scheme, and at the moment I do not believe I am going to get the full State Pension. I have been told by the independent trustees at the moment that we will be lucky to get 7% of the £8,000. It still has not wound up. It was October 2000 when the company went bust and we are in 2006 now and we still have not wound the scheme up. I believe that I read all the material from the Government over the years. I was a union man. I did recommend to people that the company pension scheme was a good scheme to be in because all the Government material I had read said it was a safe scheme. After the Maxwell report and everybody seeing the MFR, the minimum funding level, if that was all right we believed our scheme was all right. We just believed that. It has worked out that it is not and I feel like I have been really, really misled. The Government have put all these papers out, and, if I could not believe what the Government said, who do I believe?

  Q78  Chairman: You must feel that you misled other people because—

  Mr Duncan: I did mislead other people. I was the union man. I had all these pamphlets. If anybody went to the doctors, anybody went to social security, they would bring pamphlets back. If anybody went anywhere, there were always pamphlets on the union desk. I certainly misled apprentices when they started, because you get young lads, 15, 16, starting work, they go and they talk to the management and the management say "Join the pension," it is the last thing they want to do, is join the pension. They used to come down on the shop floor: "Where is the union man?" and talk to the union man. I used to recommend that they go back up and sign into the company pension because I had read all the material and all the material told me that company pensions were safe and guaranteed. I mean, I do not know what the definition of safe is and I do not know what the definition of guaranteed is, but it is certainly different from what the Government thinks. Okay, I may be a thick Geordie, but I am not a stupid one. I must have been thick to believe what the Government told us.

  Q79  Chairman: Mr Parr, do you want to add your experience.

  Mr Parr: Yes. I joined a company called Sheerness Steel, a steelworks on the Isle of Sheppey in Kent, in 1982. When I joined, joining a pension was a condition of the employment. If I wanted the job, I had to join the company pension scheme—and it was a very good pension scheme. All went well until the late 1990s, when the steelworks was put up for sale by its Canadian owners and was bought by a company called Allied Steel and Wire (ASW) in Cardiff. There were many issues about the purchase of the company that caused us great concern. The steelworks at Sheerness was profitable—very unusual in the steel industry—whereas Cardiff had not made any money for about eight years. At the time, I was on something called the Staff Consultative Committee (SCC). Sheerness was a non-union steelworks. It was a single status company. The SCC was the line of communication between the workforce and the management. When ASW bought Sheerness, the Sheerness pension fund was in considerable surplus. The management had not made any payments into it because it was over-funded, and even in two years in the 1990s the workforce got their contributions back. The retirement age had come down from 65 to 63 and then to 62, and the personnel director had said that the aim of the company was to get the retirement age down to 60 in the very near future. We believed that, at the time that ASW took us over, the pension fund was something like 110% funded to MFR, although at the time everyone did not really know what MFR meant. We did know that the pension fund at Cardiff was very different. It had a retirement age of 65 and also it was under-funded. One of the very first things that the management of ASW did when they acquired the Sheerness site was to talk about merging the two pension funds and, because of the very significant differences in the terms and conditions of the pension fund—the different retirement age, a different level of funding—the people at Sheerness were very uncertain and very apprehensive of this proposed merger. I have a little bit of a reputation for being somebody who likes digging in for research, and, at the time, I went and got as much material as I could about pensions. I went to the FSA website and got a list of what they had. I downloaded a lot of PDF files from them. I was in touch with the DWP department that you can get booklets from, and I had those sent to me; I did research on material from the NAPF; and I generally went through everything I could find about pensions to find out what the legal position was. In all of that there was nothing that suggested there was any risk. I must emphasise that the steel industry is a very, very risky business for its employees. In 1969, when I first started working in steel, this country was producing 30 million tonnes of steel a year. It is now producing less than 10 million tonnes of steel a year. There are steelworks that have closed all over the country and now we are really down to a little more than the basic steelworks provided by Corus. I have always known, working in the steel industry, that my job is at risk, but it is an industry I enjoy working in and it is an industry that is very interesting. When ASW took us over, I felt that the risk to my job had gone up because of ASW's previous performance, but there was nothing in any of the material that I had downloaded and acquired from DWP that suggested my pension was anything other than safe. The DWP booklets have a section in the middle of them: "How do I know my money is safe?" It mentions all the laws that protect pensions. Nowhere in that does it say: "Your pension is only as good as your employer." The ironic thing is that one of the leaflets I have here from the FSA has as its title, on the front page, "Asking the right questions" and the one most important question of all did not appear in here, which is "How safe is my pension?" When ASW went into receivership in June 2002, at first I told a lot of my colleagues that we were okay for the pension because our scheme was 104% funded. I assumed that, if a scheme was 104% funded, there was enough money in it to pay out the liabilities. I told people our pensions were safe because of what I had read. About two or three days later the employee nominated trustees were called down to Cardiff. They met with the independent trustee and came back with the news that we would probably get something like 40% of our pension and that would be un-indexed, and that was also if they managed to do a good deal on the wind-up. But the whole issue of what MFR means is something that has caused great confusion to lots of people. I have here a report that my MP Derek Wyatt sent to me. It is a research paper from the House of Commons and it is dated 2004 in relationship to the Pensions Act. It is called Pensions Bill, Bill 57, 2003-2004. The author of this Bill, from the general statistics sections, says "The minimum funding requirement was designed to protect accrued pension rights by ensuring schemes have sufficient assets to meet their liabilities should they be wound up." If a researcher with access to all the information that is available in the House of Commons Library can make a fundamental mistake like that, what chance do employees of companies have?


 
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