3 Previous reports
8. This Committee's predecessor and the Committee
on Standards in Public (CSPL) have both, in the past, considered
the functioning of the Ministerial Code and, in particular, whether
it was desirable or necessary to appoint an independent figure
to investigate allegations of breaches of the Ministerial Code.
CSPL's position has changed. When the Committee, then chaired
by Lord Neill, first considered the matter in its sixth report
in 2000, it concluded firmly that "no new office for the
investigation of ministerial conduct should be established".[3]
However, in a subsequent report in 2003, the Committee, by then
chaired by Sir Nigel Wicks, recommended that the Cabinet Secretary
and permanent secretaries should have no responsibility for giving
advice to Ministers on conflicts of interest arising from the
Ministerial Code. Instead, an independent office holder, the Adviser
on Ministerial Interests, should advise ministers on appropriate
compliance with the Ministerial Code.[4]
9. It also recommended that, at the beginning of
each Parliament, the Prime Minister should nominate "two
or three individuals of senior standing" who could be asked
by him to investigate any alleged breaches of the Ministerial
Code.[5] The Government
accepted the case for a ministerial adviser but had no wish to
be constrained by the appointment of a panel of investigators.[6]
10. This Committee has consistently voiced its concern
that Parliament lacks an effective investigatory capacity to act
on its behalf where there are allegations of ministerial failure
or misconduct. This applies both to major questions about the
conduct of the Government which may on occasion result in public
inquiries, and to concerns about the behaviour of individual ministers.[7]
The various proposals over the years for some form of independent
and parliamentary investigation into ministerial conduct have
been rejected by governments of both main parties on the grounds
that "it would be undesirable to fetter the Prime Minister's
freedom to decide how individual cases should be handled".[8]
But, as we explore below, the track record for such (departmental)
inquiries has not been good and it is arguable that different
machinery might have yielded better outcomes for all concerned.
3 Sixth Report of the Committee on Standards in Public
Life, Reinforcing Standards: Review of the First Report of
the Committee on Standards in Public Life, Cm 4557, January
2000, recommendation 12, p. 53 Back
4
Ninth Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, Defining
the Boundaries within the Executive: Ministers, Special Advisers
and the permanent Civil Service, Cm 5775, April 2003, Recommendation
3, p. 27 Back
5
Ibid., Recommendation 4, p. 29 Back
6
The Government's Response to the Ninth Report of the Committee
on Standards in Public Life, Cm 5964, September 2003, pp. 1-4 Back
7
HC (2000-01) 235 and Public Administration Select Committee, First
Report of Session 2004-05, Government by Inquiry, HC 51 Back
8
Public Administration Select Committee, Second Report of Session
2001-02, The Ministerial Code: Improving the Rule Book: Government
Response to the Committee Third Report of Session 2000-01,
HC 439 Back
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