The appointment of a ministerial
adviser
37. Although the Government had agreed in principle
to CSPL's recommendation to appoint an adviser on ministerial
interests, the Prime Minister finally felt moved to act by the
confluence of events and bad headlines which surrounded not only
the Blunkett and Jowell cases but also allegations surrounding
propriety, party funding and the honours system. We have reported
separately on that.[30]
On 23 March 2006, the Prime Minister announced the appointment
of Sir John Bourn as the 'independent adviser on ministerial interests'.[31]
In evidence to us Sir Gus O'Donnell was positive about the move
and his role in bringing it about:
I certainly strongly advised him that I thought
this was the right thing to do, in that I think what we really
need is someone who is involved right from the start of the process.
So when ministers fill in their replies to the letters their permanent
secretaries will give them, laying out their financial interests
and any potential conflicts, there is one person who has all that
information and has time to look at that, assess it carefully,
and then have a relationship which is not the same as the relationship
the Cabinet Secretary has with Cabinet members.[32]
38. Sir Alistair Graham, current Chairman of CSPL,
was unsure about the role of the new ministerial adviser and how
far it met CSPL's original recommendation.[33]
In fact the full terms of reference were not deposited in the
Library of the House until 16 May, when the Cabinet Secretary
gave evidence to this Committee. These clarify his role to an
extent and are more specific in suggesting that the Prime Minister
"may ask the Independent Adviser to establish the facts in
certain cases concerning the Ministerial Code and to provide private
advice to him". The Prime Minister would "take account
of the facts established by Sir John as appropriate". It
would also be up to the Prime Minister to decide whether to make
public Sir John Bourn's findings. Subsequent newspaper reports,
however, have suggested this role may be more limited. In reference
to investigations on whether the Deputy Prime Minister had breached
the Ministerial Code, Sir John Bourn's spokesman was reported
as saying that he was only mandated to advise the Prime Minister
on the financial interests of ministers.[34]
39. Sir Gus O'Donnell sought to clarify the role
when he came before us by explaining that "Sir John Bourn
will look at all of those [matters] covered by his terms of reference,
which is essentially section 5 of the Code [Ministers' Private
Interests]"; adding "He will be a wide-ranging investigator,
yes, but not all issues covered by the Ministerial Code will be
appropriate for him to investigate, I think".[35]
40. The terms of reference given to Sir John Bourn
are, at best, a half way house which recognise the existence of
a problem but fail to provide a clear answer to it. A certain
amount of confusion surrounds the role. For example, it is unclear
whether its remit is restricted to ministerial financial interests
or whether it can cover other aspects of the Ministerial Code.
Similarly, it seems that any active investigation by the adviser
will require an invitation from the Prime Minister and he does
not appear to have the capacity to follow up any problems he may
uncover. This appointment interposes a further layer of advice
between ministers and their most senior officials but does not
provide any of the additional powers necessary for discharging
this task effectively.
41. We welcome the appointment of Sir John Bourn
as Independent Adviser on Ministerial Interests as a small step
towards adequate investigation of breaches of the Ministerial
Code. We particularly welcome the principle that an Officer of
the House should be asked to undertake this role, albeit in an
independent capacity. This is consistent with our original proposals
for the Parliamentary Ombudsman to undertake a similar role. However,
we remain concerned that Sir John's role is limited; inappropriately
weighted in favour of an additional layer of advice over that
of Permanent Secretary; and lacks a genuine investigatory dimension.
42. Despite the rhetoric which usually surrounds
the issue, objective evidence dispels any charge that ministerial
conduct has fallen away from some imagined golden age of propriety.
Standards of ministerial behaviour are higher, the rules much
tighter, the regulation more extensive, the surveillance much
closer, than they were in the past. All parties have contributed
to bringing that about and making improvements to the Ministerial
Code. Public expectations are consequently higher. Yet we cannot
become complacent. Making provision for an independent investigatory
mechanism for alleged breaches of the Ministerial Code is long
overdue. Its establishment would benefit not just public confidence
but also the interests of the Prime Minister, the government and
especially those at the centre of allegations who deserve a fair
hearing.
43. The Ministerial Code is now established as the
public framework of rules against which ministerial conduct is
judged. That is a positive development. However, it also means
that it is regularly invoked, by opposition politicians and the
media, to sustain attacks on ministers, without there being any
mechanism to investigate whether such attacks are justified. This
is why it is puzzling that governments have resisted attempts
to establish an independent investigatory mechanism for the Ministerial
Code, to which allegations can be taken. Those making such allegations
would then have to put up or shut up. It would not interfere with
the political accountability of ministers, or with the political
responsibility of the Prime Minister for the fate of ministers;
but it would reduce the regular frenzy and provide a more informed
basis upon which political judgements can be made.
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