Conclusions and recommendations
1. We
agree that, ultimately, the Prime Minister must judge what the
right course of action is and account for it to Parliament. However,
we remain convinced that an independent investigatory capacity
can be created which does not undermine the Prime Minister's right
to decide whether a minister has breached the Ministerial Code
and what the consequences might be. It would also promote public
confidence in the Ministerial Code as a handbook on propriety.
(Paragraph 21)
2. Whatever the final
form for such an investigatory machinery it should:
- be manifestly independent of the Executive;
- not involve the creation of yet a further regulatory
office and, ideally, should be undertaken by an official connected
to the House;
- concern itself only with establishing the facts
of the case;
- make its findings available to Parliament and
the public;
- reserve to the Prime Minister the right to judge
whether the facts amount to a breach of the Ministerial Code and
what the consequences should be;
- avoid the proliferation of frivolous or vexatious
complaints. (Paragraph 25)
3. In our view an
independent investigation would make it easier for Prime Ministers
to take more balanced decisions about the fate of colleagues.
It would inject a sense of proportionality and indeed common sense
into what is often a political and media frenzy and would ensure
that ministers are held to account for their actions rather than
for what is alleged about them in the media and elsewhere. (Paragraph
32)
4. Instead of being
"advised" to declare their interests as at present,
ministers should be under an obligation to do so. Ministers coming
into a department should be required to provide their permanent
secretaries with a full list in writing of interests which might
be thought to give rise to a conflict. Paragraph 5.3 of the Ministerial
Code should be amended accordingly. (Paragraph 35)
5. A procedure similar
to that of an accounting officer's letter of direction, referring
matters to the Cabinet Secretary and Prime Minister, could be
devised for ministerial interests in the event that a permanent
secretary's advice is disregarded. (Paragraph 36)
6. We welcome the
appointment of Sir John Bourn as Independent Adviser on Ministerial
Interests as a small step towards adequate investigation of breaches
of the Ministerial Code. We particularly welcome the principle
that an Officer of the House should be asked to undertake this
role, albeit in an independent capacity. This is consistent with
our original proposals for the Parliamentary Ombudsman to undertake
a similar role. However, we remain concerned that Sir John's role
is limited; inappropriately weighted in favour of an additional
layer of advice over that of Permanent Secretary; and lacks a
genuine investigatory dimension. (Paragraph 41)
7. Making provision
for an independent investigatory mechanism for alleged breaches
of the Ministerial Code is long overdue. Its establishment would
benefit not just public confidence but also the interests of the
Prime Minister, the government and especially those at the centre
of allegations who deserve a fair hearing. (Paragraph 42)
| 
