Examination of Witnesses (Questions 350
- 359)
THURSDAY 19 JANUARY 2006
LORD LAWSON
OF BLABY,
LORD OWEN
CH AND CLARE
SHORT
Q350 Chairman: We are delighted to
welcome Lord Lawson, Lord Owen and Clare Short. You have in common
the fact that you are all former distinguished Cabinet Ministers
but also the fact that you have produced distinguished memoirs
and it is the latter that we are particularly interested in. You
know what we are about. We are very interested in drawing upon
your experiences of being memoirists. Would you like to say anything
by way of introduction briefly or shall we just launch in with
our questions?
Lord Lawson of Blaby: You can
launch in, as far as I am concerned.
Clare Short: I did not set off
intending so quickly to write a book. Normally, more distinguished
people have taken a number of offices a bit later and then will
write a memoir, but there was a very sharp attempt to muzzle me
that came from a letter threatening prosecution under official
secrets and being ejected from the Privy Council and then the
Chief Whip threatening me with the withdrawal of the whip, which
would mean I could not stand as a Labour candidate, which was
a very serious matter. The threats were very crude and, I thought,
inappropriate so I then decided to very quickly write a book.
I needed to get in quick because I did not want it to coincide
with the General Election. Mine was not a reflective, later memoir;
it was a determination to not be muzzled, to get the truth on
the page and get it out.
Q351 Chairman: Lord Owen, you have
given us the detailed correspondence with Lord Butler as the Cabinet
Secretary of the day, where you are absolutely playing by the
rules, submitting material to the Cabinet Secretary who responds.
You respond to him, correspondence goes on, you take some of the
points; you do not take others. It is the negotiating process
that goes on and it is fascinating to have observed it from the
inside which you have given us. Clare, I am not sure whether you
did that or not. Did you send your text in and did you go through
a process?
Clare Short: Absolutely, I did.
I had no intention of not going through the process but the minute
Amazon puts out that your book is coming you get a letter saying
that you have to go through this process. The manuscript is duly
submitted. I dealt with a civil servant from the Cabinet Office,
a very pleasant and reasonable woman, who brought a series of
requests on behalf of the Head of the Civil Service `C' and, one
tiny one on behalf of the Department for International Development,
and they wanted changes in words that I had written down in my
diary at the time. We negotiated and I gave a bit but I resisted
a bit—a similar sort of process, but we did it verbally.
I did ask in the course of that what would happen if I did not
agree and she said, "I am not sure but we would have a stand
off." We did agree. Interestingly, there was none from Number
10. The bit about Tony giving a message to Gordon that he would
let him take over if he let him join the euro was leaked to the
media from the Treasury. The Independent had arranged to
publish some of it and the money for that goes to the publisher,
not to me, so that was in the contract I had. The Independent
immediately chopped 10,000 off the price because of the Treasury
leak, which I think is interesting. What are the mechanisms for
controlling the book? The Treasury did not try to get a change
or whatever but they did a leak to get the story out.
Q352 Chairman: I would like to ask
all of you whether you think this process works, whether you think
the existing rules as described in the Ministerial Code, drawing
on Radcliffe, work well to handle memoirs now or whether in some
ways the world has changed and we need to revise the whole system.
Lord Lawson of Blaby: Maybe the
world has changed since my time. I did not submit any written
evidence to you. I have read Lord Owen's and I agree with every
word he has written, which does suggest that there have been some
changes since my time. I resigned from government in 1989. I can
tell you about my own experience in this area which might shed
some light on what you are talking about. There is first of all
an understanding, a quid pro quo, when a former minister
wishes to write his or her memoirs. The quid pro quo is
that you are given full access to any document that you may have
seen when you were a minister. Obviously you do not retain all
these in your head but if you can remember that there were these
documents you can see them. If you are an ordinary minister, you
have to go into the Treasury or to the Cabinet Office but you
are shown the documents you ask for. They will not allow you to
go on a fishing expedition but if you say, "I think there
is a minute of this meeting I would like to see to refresh my
memory" or, "I think there was a submission on this
I would like to see", anything you have seen when you were
a minister you are allowed to see. If you are a former Prime Minister,
the documents are sent to your home but if you are just an ordinary
ex-Chancellor or ex-Foreign Secretary you have to go to the Cabinet
Office or the Treasury. It is worth the detour. The understanding
is that in return for this facilitation you will at the end of
the day submit your manuscript or typescript to the Cabinet Secretary.
Then the Cabinet Secretary makes a whole raft of comments. He
will also discuss with the permanent secretaries who are relevant
to the positions you have held and the story you are telling.
I got from Robin Butler this huge raft: "You cannot say this.
You cannot say that" and Terry Burns, who was Permanent Secretary
at the Treasury at the time that I submitted my manuscript, said
this, that and the other, quoting authorities for what I could
or should not say. I had to exercise my own judgment. I read very,
very carefully everything that Robin Butler had written. Where
I thought he was making a good point, I took it. Where I thought
he was making a bad point, I ignored it. The main changes I made
were things which he was unhappy about but which were, I thought,
not very important points to the story I was trying to tell and
the sort of economic and political history I was trying to put
on the record. If it was not really part of the main story, I
was prepared to take it out. If it was something which I felt
was important, I was not prepared to take it out except in one
specific area. A lot of the remarks that came from Robin Butler
were about protecting civil servants, protecting officials. That
was the thing that seemed to concern him and Terry Burns, that
officials cannot answer back and therefore they should remain
in the background. Politicians are in the foreground. I had not
intended anyhow to finger officials particularly but nevertheless
in telling the story you know that Sir Humphrey Appleby is not
a total cipher, so you do give him a role in your plot. But I
did cut out a lot of that because there was considerable upset
on Robin Butler's part. I used my judgment. When my memoirs were
published, that caused a certain amount of consternation. It was
during the Major Government and John Major, I believe, set up—I
do not know whether it was at Robin Butler's behest or whether
it was his own idea but I know that John Wakeham, Lord Wakeham,
was involved—a small committee of senior ministers and officials
inside government (it was never announced) to decide in the light
of the Lawson memoirs what changes in the Radcliffe rules ought
to come about. Although the Radcliffe rules are very sensible
in many ways, they are clearly obsolete. The other thing that
had caused problems for them was that the government of which
I was a member had a few years previously liberalised the Official
Secrets Act. If you avoid breaches of national security or anything
of that kind there are very few things which are now a criminal
offence under the Official Secrets Act, which used not to be the
case. They felt a bit naked. They decided to have this inquiry
and the inquiry strove for some time to decide how the Radcliffe
rules should be rewritten but they were unable to decide and nothing
happened.
Q353 Chairman: That is extremely
interesting and no doubt we shall get access to those non-conclusions.
Lord Owen, would you like to add your own experiences to this?
Lord Owen: I think it is self-explanatory
in the submission I gave to you. It was perfectly amicable. He
was right to criticise some of my references to civil servants
and I took them out. On the question of whether it would injure
the country's international relations, that is a judgment. I took
account of it. On national security, I think you are pretty much
bound to go along with their views even if you disagree. Finally,
on the question of the overall nature of government, politicians
have to make up their own minds.
Q354 Chairman: Most of the comments
that appear in the correspondence that you had and that you describe,
Lord Lawson, are to protect civil servants by name. If Sir Jeremy
Greenstock is right in what he has been telling us this morning
and which Christopher Meyer has told us as well, which is that
they want a level playing field now between civil servants and
politicians, surely those kinds of protections would fall away?
Lord Owen: That is dangerous if
it happens. I think the most important thing is the underlying
problem of what has happened. If all foreign and defence policy
is to be decided by a Prime Minister, if the Prime Minister gets
the feeling that his discussions when he goes to embassies or
anywhere else are going to be revealed, he will just shut them
out. They are shut out enough already as it is. I think that would
be very damaging. There is enough concentration and personalisation
of all these issues. There is a marked reduction in Cabinet discussion
and circulation of papers. If we go even further into a narrow
cabal, that would be very dangerous. If the price is the old system,
broadly speaking, where civil servants do not criticise politicians
and politicians do not criticise civil servants in their memoirs,
call me old fashioned but I think it makes for better government
and I strongly uphold that.
Q355 Chairman: The Meyer charge—some
people say this is the reason that he wrote the book—is
that it was precisely because he was a diplomat in Washington
and felt he was being excluded from the relationship that now
existed between Number 10 and the White House, cutting out the
embassy; and that this was an act of revenge to tell the world
that this is how things now were. In a sense, he is agreeing with
your analysis and he might argue that provides justification for
the book.
Lord Owen: I have no doubt you
are right.
Q356 Chairman: Does it?
Lord Owen: Initially there was
a great love affair. He was chosen by the Prime Minister effectively,
pulled out of Germany and made American ambassador. Clearly, there
was a breakdown in relationships. You see that personal breakdown
in relationships in the book. That is unfortunate. If you are
going to get at this issue, you have to go to some of the points
which I tried to make. There has been a very dramatic change in
the way foreign and defence policy is conducted. Most people will
not focus on it. In 2001, the Cabinet secretariat that served
the whole Cabinet on defence and foreign policy was totally destroyed.
A secretariat was established on European affairs and particularly
now in relation to Iraq on defence and security affairs inside
Number 10. That is very different machinery to what we have ever
had since the creation of the Cabinet during the First World War.
Clare Short: The proprieties that
Lord Owen describes relate to a situation that is dead. When I
was a private secretary in the Home Office in 1974 those rules
were still there. The Civil Service had its role. Ministers were
in their roles; the Cabinet worked. That is broken to a very considerable
extent. We now have these mighty special advisers. When I was
in the Home Office there were the first Rowntree chocolate soldiers,
quite small scale special advisers with a political role. From
that to Alastair Campbell having a role that was mightier than
most Cabinet ministers and yet no accountability to Parliament.
In the specific case of Iraq, there was the complete capturing
of power and decision making into Number 10. The Foreign Office
was marginalised and all those Arabists were not in it. The system
is broken. There was a lot of deceit, as we now know. It is now
a matter of record. Parliament absolutely failed to deal with
the deceit and that is meant to be the core of the whole code
of ministerial responsibility to Parliament. The rules are broken
and it is very important for the truth to come out. The position
that Lord Owen is taking is the respectable, old position but
we are in a broken position. The rules break; books are needed
and we need to get it all out so people can discuss and decide
what is happening to our constitutional arrangements, how decisions
are being made, where the flaws are and what we ought to do about
it.
Lord Owen: I did not criticise
the publication of these books. Personally, I hope Jeremy Greenstock
publishes as soon as possible.
Q357 Chairman: You say in your memorandum,
"I have never known a time in the last 40 years when there
has been so much disillusionment, bordering on contempt, for politicians
by civil servants and diplomats and vice-versa." Is the argument
that is being made that the old conventions are so breached, the
old boundary lines are so down, that now anything is possible?
People rushing into print, including senior diplomats and senior
civil servants are part of this new order of things.
Lord Owen: It has been happening
over quite a long time. It started with politicians. I remember
a great moment in Cabinet when Denis Healey was talking. Tony
Benn was writing away and Denis slowed down and said, "Tony,
am I going too fast for you?" We knew he was writing his
biography, but that was between politicians. If I had known that
the Cabinet Secretary or the Prime Minister's Tom McNally or somebody
like that was also writing his memoirs, I would have objected.
I think the situation has broken down. I agree with Clare. I think
personally it is damaging. To go back I do not think is ruled
out and I would like that to happen but it would require some
changes. The Prime Minister would have to get rid of the secretariats
that he has established and go back to Cabinet government. He
would have to remove a chief of staff who he has appointed—it
is a political appointment—able to make executive commands
to civil servants. We would have to go back to the power of the
Cabinet Office. The Cabinet Secretary would also be in charge
of intelligence. At the moment, the Cabinet Secretary is neutered.
He does not have control over a very substantial part of government.
The old Cabinet Secretaries were very much involved in relations
with MI6 and MI5. That is no longer the case. Any of this can
only happen if the Prime Minister decides to do it. Personally,
I think he should. Then there would be a consequential movement
back to the older system, but that should not stop civil servants
writing memoirs. Anthony Parsons wrote about Iran. I have no objection
to any of it. It was a serious contribution to understanding about
the fall of the Shah. Sir David Scott who was ambassador to South
Africa wrote about his period there and again it was a serious
contribution to how we were dealing with apartheid, Namibia, Rhodesia
and Zimbabwe but I think they write in a slightly different way.
Politicians are used to the rough and tumble. There is going to
be more personality stuff in political memoirs and as long as
they keep it to their own political colleagues I have no objection.
If they go into civil servants I do object.
Lord Lawson of Blaby: Things can
change in different directions because it is the Prime Minister
of the day who determines the way in which the government is to
be run. Because Mr Blair runs it in a particular way which is
quite harshly criticised by Lord Butler in his report of the intelligence
leading up to the Iraq war, it does not mean that the next Prime
Minister or the one after will. I do not take Clare Short's view
that the genie is now out of the bottle and nothing can be done.
There should be no question of a so-called level playing field
between politicians and officials. As David Owen said, they are
very different. It is quite obvious that it is ministers who are,
very properly, held responsible for decisions. It is ministers
who the House of Commons calls to account day in day out, year
in year out. It is not officials; nor should it be. Because it
is ministers who are responsible and exposed, ministers who have
to take the rap and defend their policies, ministers after they
have retired from office should be able to say exactly what they
were seeking to do, why they were seeking to do it, how it worked
out and so on. Officials have that protection. They are behind
the screen. So they should be. Therefore, the standards for officials'
memoirs have to be quite different. In return for that, the minister
will refrain, as David Owen and I did, from fingering particular
officials. That is one important point. Another thing which has
not been mentioned which I think is complicating the matter—I
am not quite sure what the answer is—is the Freedom of Information
Act. David Owen said he would have been very concerned if he thought
that officials were writing diaries and so on which were going
to be published later. What happens, as this Committee well knows,
is that in Whitehall it is customary after every disaster, whether
it is the Millennium Dome, the foot and mouth outbreak or Iraq,
that the Permanent Secretary or the Permanent Under-Secretary
of the department concerned will ask a senior official to write
a post mortem purely for internal purposes so that they
can draw the lessons and so that they might do better in the future.
Why did it go wrong? What mistakes were made? That is regularly
done. That was entirely confidential. Now, under the Freedom of
Information Act, this is a public document. It is almost like
the officials writing their memoirs while they are still officials.
Knowing that this is now public and no longer private, the officials
will tend to write it in a way that shows that the mistakes were
all made by the politicians and not by the officials. That is
human nature. Knowing that this is now going on, ministers today,
following the Freedom of Information Act, are going to trust their
officials far less than we used to trust them and they will certainly
be anxious to get their memoirs out first.
Q358 Mr Prentice: Clare, I cannot
remember if you said in your book or whether it was subsequently
that Sir Andrew Turnbull allowed decision making to crumble in
the run-up to the decision to go to war. Do you think Andrew Turnbull,
now Lord Turnbull, should feel free to publish his own book on
what happened and who said what, a kind of mirror image of the
sort of book you published?
Clare Short: I personally believe
there should be a pretty level playing field. I disagree with
what Lord Lawson has just said. The appointment of permanent secretaries
has been politicised. People are being told not to apply. People
like Jeremy Greenstock are put on Newsnight and The
Today Programme. The old rules that only politicians front
are also breaking down. Therefore, to get the truth out, we need
both to publish. There might be some rules about personal attack
to protect civil servants who are not in the public domain but
that is what I believe. On Andrew Turnbull, yes, I think a book
from him would be very interesting. The crumbling of the authority
of the Cabinet has been happening under the Blair Government since
1997. The two previous heads of the Civil Service did try to resist
and use the old machinery. Defence and Overseas Policy never met.
It was a stunning thing. I do not think Andrew resisted but I
did change one quote in the book because he asked for it. Iraq
in itself is a massive issue but if it is true that our constitutional
arrangements are changing in such a big way and, I think, leading
to very poor decision making in a whole series of areas, not just
Iraq, this is monumentally serious and we have to have the books
and the commentary to judge whether our system is breaking down
and what we are going to do about it.
Q359 Mr Prentice: The internal wiring
of the government is now bare after Butler and so on. We know
who said what. We know you kept a diary because you told us but
we have had evidence from Geoff Mulgan, who was the former head
of the Strategy Unit at Number 10 and he said that all this diary
keeping—I cannot remember the exact word he used—is
something like corrosive to good government. If you know that
the person sitting next to you is keeping a diary, that influences
the quality of the decision that is made. You obviously do not
subscribe to that view.
Clare Short: No. Let me tell you
my Tony Benn story because he also used to be writing his diary
at the National Executive Committee and we reached the point where
he would write it in the diary and then say it. I kept a diary
only in the crucial, last part.
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