Select Committee on Public Administration First Report


3  The Rejected Recommendations

Review of the Administration of the Scheme

21. The Ombudsman recommended a review of the administration of the scheme because she was concerned that the MoD could not demonstrate that the early applications were decided in accordance with the blood link criterion. She noted:

I would expect a system designed in accordance with principles of good administration to be transparent, to produce consistent outcomes and not to be designed in such a way as to produce inconsistent outcomes. That this is the case should also be demonstrable.[17]

22. The MoD rejected that recommendation on the grounds that the first payments processed met criteria more stringent than the blood link criterion, and that the blood link criterion represented "a widening of the existing basis for payment".[18] The MoD's response to the Ombudsman notes:

You have included in your report statements made by the Chairman of ABCIFER on inconsistencies in payments made under the scheme of which apparently he gave you examples. We however have not had the opportunity to identify and comment on these cases, or on the other evidence which he apparently supplied to you. This puts me at a disadvantage in responding to your findings on this point, although insofar as we can guess which cases he may be referring to, we do not believe that they necessarily support your findings.[19]

23. In evidence, the Ombudsman told us that she had given the MoD examples of payments made to those who did not meet the birth link criterion. She had felt it appropriate to anonymise these examples, as those concerned feared they would have payment withdrawn, but the MoD would have been able to investigate if it wished to do so.[20]

24. The MoD told us that it was keen to investigate the cases, if they were put forward, and that "we thought, on the basis of what we know, that those were cases we understood which were not in breach of the birth link criteria, but the cases were not put forward, therefore we could not look at them".[21] But the Ombudsman had clearly stated that there was evidence of inconsistency; the onus was on the MoD to satisfy itself (and her) that she was wrong. We consider its assumption that it "understood" those cases were not in breach of the birth link criterion was both lazy and arrogant.

25. We are disturbed that the MoD refused to conduct a review of the administration of the scheme, even though the Ombudsman provided evidence of inconsistent decision making and that the Department sought to avoid such a review on the grounds that it had not had the opportunity to identify and comment on such cases, when it was custodian of the files which contained them.

Our Inquiry

26. The MoD's intransigence led to the Ombudsman's finding that she had "found injustice caused by maladministration which the Government does not intend to remedy".[22] We invited the Ombudsman, Professor Hayward, Mrs Moxley, and Mr Bridge, and the Minister to appear on 1 December 2005.

27. On 29 November 2005, the beginning of the week of the evidence session, the Minister telephoned the Chairman of the Committee, suggesting that new matter had come to light, and in consequence, he would not be able to give full answers to all the questions that the Committee might wish to ask. The Chairman considered that the meeting should continue, and the Minister wrote to explain that:

while preparing evidence for the session, my officials have brought to my attention certain matters previously unknown to me, and which may be central to the issue under scrutiny. I am of the view that these matters are sufficiently important to require further investigation but because of the amount of documentation which will need to be examined, this cannot be completed before the session on Thursday.[23]

At that session, he told the Committee:

While preparing evidence for this session, a provisional analysis of the eligibility rules applied before and after the introduction of the birth link criteria has suggested that the two may not have been entirely consistent. If that is the case, it conflicts with my understanding of the situation that we have been discussing. As a result, I have set in train an urgent investigation. … I believe that this exercise can be completed over the coming two to three weeks, at least to the point of allowing us to give, with reasonable confidence, some initial conclusions. I would therefore expect a statement to be made to Parliament before Parliament rises for the Christmas recess.[24]

28. The statement was made on 12 December. The Minister confirmed that the introduction of the birth link criterion had meant that "some 240 claims that were paid in the first period which, on the evidence available when the claim was decided, could not be identified as meeting the birth link criterion" and that "there may be some claimants who would have qualified before the birth link criterion was introduced… but who were rejected because they applied after March 2001".[25]

29. Subsequent events have shown the Ombudsman was right to recommend a review. The MoD should have accepted that recommendation at the outset.

The Scope of the Scheme

30. The MoD's difficulties appear to have been caused by the failure to consider how the scheme should be applied to former civilian internees from the outset. It was clear that at least some ex PoWs would have their eligibility determined by whether they were compensated in 1951 (see paragraph 8 above); there is no such clarity about civilian internees.

31. In his statement on 12 December, Mr Touhig said:

The scheme was intended for those British civilian internees who had a close link to the United Kingdom at the time and for whom the UK might therefore be regarded as being responsible.[26]

The MoD' s response to the Ombudsman refers to the birth link criterion as "widening the scheme" and claims that the first criterion was to be whether internees were born in the UK, or, in the case of children, those whose parents were born here.[27] The implication must be that that the 1950s scheme was used as a first validation of eligibility because it conformed to these rules. We are puzzled by this claim, and can find no documentary evidence to support the suggestion that clear eligibility rules for civilians had been established at the outset, before being "widened" by the introduction of the birth link criterion. In essence, the Ombudsman's report suggests that the reason the first claims paid were to those who had been compensated in the 1950s and their descendants was because such claims were easiest to process.[28]

32. Mr Bridge of ABCIFER told us:

A meeting was called on 15 November 2000 to discuss the detailed implementation of the scheme.

I asked what the Government meant by the term "British". The answer was not immediately forthcoming but the meeting was told that an answer would be obtained. The DSS Policy Branch communicated with the then ABCIFER chairman ten days later that British meant " British" by the regulations in force at the time, and that it did not matter where they now lived or what their nationality now was.

A month later it became evident that HMG had little if any records of British Civilians who had been interned. The WPA advised that they were going to use the list of beneficiaries of those who had received the £48.10s.0d Japanese Assets payment in the 1950s as authority.[29]

In answer to a written question from Mr Peter Bradley MP, Dr Moonie said: "While there is no specific record of contact with the Association of British Civilian Internees Far East Region on 24 November 2000, the advice being given at that time was that to be eligible for the ex-gratia payment civilian claimants must have been British at the time of internment".[30]

33. There is further documentary evidence to support the contention that the 1950s scheme was used for convenience rather than as a matter of principle. On 15 November the Chief Executive of the WPA wrote to Mr Bridge as follows:

I am very grateful for your offer of assistance and I welcome any help which would enable claims to be finalised as quickly as possible. We are keen to pursue all avenues to establish eligibility and we do not currently have the civilian lists prepared in some camps in 1944 which you mention. I would be grateful if we could arrange to have copies of any records you have which may help to establish eligibility.[31]

34. As the Ombudsman's report notes, the paper submitted to Ministers referred to "surviving civilians who are UK nationals (my emphasis) and who were interned by the Japanese in the Far East during the Second World War".[32] The 1950s scheme could never have been the sole basis for payment to civilians, since Dr Moonie made it clear on 7 November that those who had been interned as children would be compensated, and the scheme applied only to those over 21, and those who had been habitually resident in the United Kingdom before the war.

35. There is, on the other hand, a wealth of evidence to suggest that the Government simply had not thought through the potential problems that would arise from the diverse origins of the civilian internees:

  • when he announced the scheme to Parliament, Dr Moonie said, without qualification, those eligible would be "British civilians who were interned";[33]
  • while there is considerable qualification about the position of former PoWs, the application form simply notes that "you may be eligible for an ex gratia award if you are a surviving British civilian who was interned by the Japanese in the Far East during the Second World War"; it does not ask about place of birth;[34]
  • as the Ombudsman's Report notes, a meeting of officials on 22 November 2000 "decided that UK nationals should be defined as 'those civilian internees who were British at the time of their incarceration, those who became British citizens only subsequently would not be eligible for payment'".[35] There was no reference to the 1950s scheme, or to any requirement for a "close link" with the UK;
  • a minute of the meeting between officials and survivors' associations of 15 November 2000, supplied by Mr Bridge, notes "nationality—what constitutes 'British' and what is the impact of any change in nationality since imprisonment" as one of a number of issues concerning entitlement raised: if officials were aware that eligibility was to be determined by a "close link" as defined in the 1951 scheme it is surprising they did not make this clear, either at the meeting or when they later contacted the Chairman of ABCIFER.[36]

36. It is also clear that once the blood link criterion had been decided, the War Pensions Agency, which was responsible for administering the scheme, had doubts about its value. On 10 April 2001 Alan Burnham, the then Acting Chief Executive, wrote to the Cabinet Office. He noted:

… the expectation was that the proposed definition of eligibility would allow the bulk of outstanding cases to be paid. It now appears that if we apply the eligibility criteria we will be left with some 800 which do not qualify.

Not only will this result in a much larger number of rejections than expected but the individual circumstances of many of these cases will be hard to defend. Many of the individuals, now "fully naturalised British citizens" have lived in the UK for over 50 years and would be deemed by the general public to be wholly "British". Most importantly for presentational purposes, they were interned solely because the Japanese deemed them to be British.

Despite previous concerns at expansion of the eligibility we are now firmly of the belief that the evidence of individual cases suggests that the present stance will be impossible to defend on grounds of fairness and logic. It does not seem that the rejection of these cases will be in keeping with the original intent and spirit of the scheme.[37]

We particularly note the warning that "It does not seem that the rejection of these cases will be in keeping with the original intent and spirit of the scheme". Mr Burnham wrote to the Cabinet Office again on 4 May 2001, stating "The concerns I expressed [in the note of 10 April] are continually confirmed by the receipt of further information submitted in support of applications for the ex gratia payment".[38] The Minister told us that "this will figure in part of my better understanding in the work I have commissioned as to why, in this particular case, the matter was raised and no action taken".[39]

37. There is ample evidence to support the Ombudsman's finding of maladministration. If it had always been intended to make a payment only to those civilians with close links to the United Kingdom at the time of internment, regardless of their subsequent history, there appears to be no clear indication of it in any contemporary papers, and no Minister was asked to decide the matter until long after the first payment had been made.

38. In evidence, Mr Iremonger suggested that extending the criteria for civilian internees would necessarily mean extending it for former PoWs and "hundreds of millions of pounds is at stake".[40] We do not see why there would be automatic correlation between the criteria for former PoWs and for former civilian internees. If the MoD contends that is so, we expect it to explain the case far more fully than it has either in its response to the Ombudsman or to us.

Reconsideration of the Position of Professor Hayward

39. In December the Minister told the House:

It is … too early to say what effect our findings might have on the scheme's eligibility criteria. I can, however, again confirm that there is no question of seeking to recover payments already made to claimants who would not have met the birth-link criterion. I can also assure the House that no claimant will be disadvantaged if he or she would have qualified under the criteria based on the Japanese asset scheme but failed because the claim was considered under the birth-link criterion.[41]

40. This undertaking does not meet the case. Professor Hayward and others will still be excluded. The MoD's response to the Ombudsman says:

22.  … the scheme is not designed to recognise links or contributions to the UK made since the War; it is the link at the time of internment which counts and to include people because of a link now would be to change the basis of the scheme and destroy its coherence, which change could effect (sic) many more than a few hundred people.[42]

41. The link at the time of internment was simple: civilians were interned because they were British, regardless of the nature of their links with the United Kingdom. But by the time of the Peace Treaty in 1951 many former British subjects were citizens of other countries.

42. As Mrs Moxley, a former internee, told us:

… the British consul in Shanghai gave the Japanese the lists of people who were Britons. They were interned as enemy nationals. To turn round now and say, "Well, actually they weren't really enemy nationals", because something happened subsequently—I do not know what—that took their British nationality away—if it did—what the heck has that got to do with whether they should be reimbursed or not? I am lucky: I was reimbursed. I can show my grandparents' birth certificates back to about 1500, because I happen to be interested in genealogy. Does that make me more valuable therefore as a Brit?[43]

43. The Government's refusal to acknowledge this has outraged those who returned here after the war, and, until the introduction of this unfortunate scheme, considered themselves (as they are) fully British. As Professor Hayward said:

I have felt anger and outrage at the central question that it seems to me has come up in this matter and which is of cardinal importance. It is the question of what it means to be British and what it means to have an identity as someone who is British. I happen to regard it as having inestimable value for me personally. People who apparently do not have that view have decided that they can discriminate between different categories of the British.… I do not want to go round, showing wounds and bruises. That, to me, is not the central question. The central question is why the British Government is repudiating and casting a slur on some of its fellow citizens who were at the time British; who are now British; who feel British; may not be biologically British. The Japanese, as has been repeated on a number of occasions in this affair, did not enquire of my family, myself, and others like me what our blood links were with the United Kingdom.[44]

It is clear that the Government has come to an eventual definition of "Britishness" which, rightly, causes grave offence to former internees, whether or not they received the ex gratia payment.


17   'A Debt of Honour', para 186 Back

18   Ibid., Annex, para 19 Back

19   Ibid., Annex, para 20 Back

20   Qq 70-75 Back

21   Q 71 Back

22   'A Debt of Honour', para 8 Back

23   Letter from Don Touhig MP to Tony Wright MP, Ev 26 Back

24   Q 38 Back

25   HC Deb, 12 December 2005, col. 1119-1120 Back

26   Ibid., col. 1122 Back

27   'A Debt of Honour', Annex, paras 18-19 Back

28   Ibid., para 96 Back

29   DH 02, Ev 22 Back

30   HC Deb, 31 October 2001, col. 741W Back

31   Letter from War Pensions Agency to Ron Bridge, Ev 36 Back

32   'A Debt of Honour', para 81 Back

33   HC Deb, 7 November 2000, col. 160 Back

34   Not printed Back

35   'A Debt of Honour', para 92 Back

36   Not printed; see Ev 22 Back

37   'A Debt of Honour', para 109. See also Appendix 1 Back

38   Appendix 2 Back

39   Q 49 Back

40   Q 97. See also Qq 101-103 Back

41   HC Deb, 12 December 2005, col. 1120 Back

42   'A Debt of Honour', Annex, para 22 Back

43   Q 21 Back

44   Q 19 Back


 
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