Examination of Witnesses (Questions 51-59
MR OLIVER
SPRAGUE, MR
ROY ISBISTER
AND MR
MARK THOMAS
31 JANUARY 2006
Q51 Chairman: Welcome, good afternoon,
Mr Isbister. Would you like for the record to introduce yourself
and your colleagues to introduce themselves?
Mr Isbister: I am Roy Isbister
and I work on export controls for the NGO Saferworld.
Mr Sprague: I am Oliver Sprague,
and I am Research and Policy Officer for Oxfam GB.
Mr Thomas: I am Mark Thomas. I
am a journalist, broadcaster and performer. Amnesty have asked
me to take their place today which I am very grateful for although
I do not represent Amnesty today. I would like to say thank you
very much to the Committee for inviting all of us in to speak
today.
Chairman: Thank you very much, you are
very welcome. We have got an hour for this session. I am going
to ask my colleagues to be brief and to the point in the questions
that they put to you. Similarly if you could be brief in responding.
Can I thank you, however, all of you, for your written submissions
which have been very, very helpful indeed and no doubt our questions
will be based on those submissions.
Q52 Mike Gapes: Can I begin with
questions about the international Arms Trade Treaty. Your memorandum
to us is quite helpful. It praises the Foreign Secretary for his
admirable leadership in the area, but if you look at the Gleneagles
G8 summit, it does not refer to that Treaty and also the UN Millennium
summit was disappointing in terms of disarmament questions. How
do you assess the progress that has been developing in the last
year and what would you like to see included in an International
Arms Trade Treaty.
Mr Sprague: I think I will kick
off on that one. From where we were last year we have again made
considerable progress. I think I spoke to the Committee last year
and we were up to 20 governments which had expressed support;
we are now up to 43 governments which have said they support an
Arms Trade Treaty. Obviously this year more than any other year
it is incredibly important. We have two big events that are happening.
We have the Small Arms Conference in June and then we have the
General Assembly in October, and we hope that a Resolution on
an Arms Trade Treaty will be tabled at that meeting. Obviously
we have an awful lot of work to do to get that 43 up to nearer
100 governments. In terms of content, I think we should be quite
clear, the Arms Trade Treaty is about all arms, it is not just
small arms, but there is an important Small Arms Conference happening
in June this year which I think is where some of the confusion
might have arisen on this issue. In terms of the content, I think
NGOs have been campaigning on this for a number of years. We are
very clear about what we think the Arms Trade Treaty should look
like. Obviously we are not yet at the stage where we have content
on the table and governments are going to spend a couple of years
looking at this, and we hope to be fully engaged in that process,
but we as NGOs are clear that it should be based on existing principles
of international humanitarian and human rights law. There is quite
a body of law out there that says thou shalt not transfer arms
under certain very clear circumstances, so for example international
arms embargoes, resolutions by the UN Security Council, treaties
which countries might have signed up to, for example the 1980
Convention on certain conventional weapons and the Landmine Treaty.
There is also an aiding and abetting-type principle in that you
should not authorise arms transfers where it is likely that the
use will be for serious crimes against humanity, genocide, et
cetera. Then there is a whole category of norms that have
been established on non-proliferation, things that we can see,
for example, in things like the EU Code of Conduct, the Nairobi
Protocol in Central Africa, and these are factors that should
be taken into account, they are things like sustainable development,
regional security, those types of issues. The importance here
is that there is a positive duty on the State not to authorise
transfers where there is a risk that those transfers could be
used in such ways.
Mr Isbister: Maybe I could just
follow up briefly on the process side of things. We have 43 states
that have expressed statements in support of the idea of having
a trade treaty, but it does have to be recognised that there is
a lot of lazy support in amongst that, where states have made
a statement and then they think they can put their feet up, their
job is done, time to move on. There have been disappointments;
for example, what happened at the G8 last year, I think we were
disappointed by what we got from that, and the Millennium Plus
5 summit was disappointing. On the other side there has been good
stuff, the EU statement in October, the statement from the Commonwealth
Heads of Government meeting, which was a very welcome surprise—you
had India and Pakistan, for example, putting their support behind
the idea of an Arms Trade Treaty, which has not happened before,
but looking forward there needs to be a lot more happening, there
needs to be a lot more activity. We have praised the Foreign Secretary;
there needs to be more support across Whitehall. DFID is starting
to make its presence felt but we have seen very little from the
Ministry of Defence so far, so we look for support from them.
There needs to be resources given to make this happen, it is not
just a case of making statements, there has to be money, time
and effort going into this and there needs to be work by the UK
government to encourage states which have made a statement of
support to actually go out and do something as well. If this is
just a UK game then it is going to fail. At the General Assembly
later this year we need something solid, we need something strong,
for example an open-ended working group that looks at how we can
take the process of an ATT forward, not a group of governmental
experts that will look at whether an ATT is a good idea and is
basically kicking this into the long grass. There is a lot that
has happened and there is a lot more that needs to happen.
Mike Gapes: Thank you.
Q53 Chairman: It might be worth saying
that Members of the Committee have been circulated with a copy
of a draft Framework Convention on International Arms Transfers,
which has Oxfam, Saferworld and Amnesty International's logos
stamped on the top, along with other organisations. I agree that
this is not the time to go through the detail of this draft framework,
but would it be fair to say that that is the direction in which
you feel we should be going in terms of the detail of the International
Arms Trade Treaty?
Mr Sprague: Yes.
Q54 Chairman: I assume the answer
is yes but, forgive me, I was just trying to say we have seen
the draft.
Mr Sprague: We need to be very
clear that this is what we as NGOs think should be in it and it
is going to be governments that negotiate what is going to be
in it. We are encouraged from the speech that the Foreign Secretary
gave—I think it was in March last year—that his thinking
does appear to be in line with the types of things that we want
to see in the Treaty and you can bet that we will be campaigning,
lobbying and negotiating hard in the next two years, hopefully
after October, to make sure that the Treaty is what we want it
to be, it is as close to what we have written on paper as we can
get.
Chairman: Thank you, that is helpful.
When we take evidence from the Foreign Secretary we will certainly
ask him questions along those lines.
Q55 Mr Borrow: I want to touch on
another area that you cover in your submission, which is that
in the same way as much of British industry has engaged in joint
ventures overseas or set up subsidiary companies overseas, the
defence industry is going in the same direction. There is this
issue that a loophole exists to circumvent UK arms export controls,
and I wondered to what extent you feel that it is realistic to
actually seek to extend the control to subsidiary companies and
joint ventures, and whether in the end it would be effective in
actually reducing the movement of arms to countries where we would
not want them to go, simply by affecting joint ventures of UK
companies. How effective do you think that would be?
Mr Sprague: It is certainly true
that the defence industry, not just in the UK, is becoming more
global. Our colleagues in the DMA in 1999 were addressing the
Defence Select Committee and said that there is hardly a Western
defence system that does not have a high degree of UK components
and technology within it. The best way of looking at this is through
case studies about where we think a potential problem might arise.
A qualification from earlier is that for subsidiary companies,
my understanding of the law is that the Broking and Trafficking
Regulations do not apply to embargoed destinations if subsidiaries
are involved, they only apply if a UK citizen or a UK-based company
is part of the deal; therefore, if any of the phone calls or paperwork
took place within the UK, that would be covered. We might want
to just clarify that that is the situation. That is clearly one
area that could be looked at immediately and I know Mark might
have an example that he wants to talk about where this did happen.
There are some examples in the military vehicles sphere, for example
BA Systems is now an owner of a South African company, Land Systems
OMC. Land Systems OMC has exported a range of vehicles to a variety
of destinations that I do not think would have received exports
from the UK of the same type of equipment. Those include, for
example, the Ivory Coast—which is currently under embargo—Nepal,
Uganda and India for use in Kashmir, so there is obviously a control
problem from here. It is an area that will need work but, as a
first step, things like the embargo legislation on broking and
trafficking could be looked at.
Mr Thomas: I would certainly agree
with that. I am not sure if you want me to go onto the subject
of Ashok Leyland at this stage.
Chairman: I would like to save Ashok
Leyland for a few more minutes if possible, because I know other
Members want to come in on this. Before we do, the South African
example, Mr Sprague, is mentioned in your written submission to
the Committee, which is very helpful. Some of the other examples
you have mentioned are actually not here and if there are any
other examples that you think the Committee ought to think about,
then please let us have them. Richard, you wanted to pursue this
production overseas point before we then go on to Ashok Leyland.
Q56 Richard Burden: One thing that
was in your submission was the Land Rovers, the Turkish made Land
Rover Defender 110 military vehicles which were used by Uzbek
troops during the massacre of 2005. What you have said about that
in your submission is that they were a gift from the Turkish government
to the Uzbek government, and you think it is likely that they
were produced under licence from the UK by Otokar, the Turkish
company, although 70% of the components were exported from the
UK and therefore you say there is a loophole. We actually put
this to the Government and said what do you say about this then,
and I would like to read out to you what the Government said in
response to that, and then perhaps you can give your response
to that. What the Government told us was: "We understand
that Land Rover sells flat-pack civilian Land Rover Defenders
to the Turkish company in question, which then assembles and re-badges
them for onward sale under its own name, using its own products
and components, and according to designs for which that company
holds the intellectual property rights. It is the Government's
understanding that these are not Land Rover approved products
and it is therefore inaccurate to describe the company concerned
as an overseas production facility for Land Rover. Under the EC
Dual-Use Regulations ... the UK has no power to control the export
of civilian specification Land Rovers. To the extent that the
buyer in Turkey converts the civilian vehicles using his own technology
and without UK involvement, this is a matter for the Turkish authorities
as regards any export from there." That is what the Government
said to us and I would be interested in your reaction to that.
Mr Sprague: The first thing to
say is that it is a situation that nobody can be very pleased
about. There were clearly pictures of Land Rover vehicles used
in a massacre of civilians; even the Turkish government voiced
its displeasure at Uzbekistan for using its Land Rovers in a way
that they were not donated for. I think it is a loophole that
70% of a vehicle can be sold that bypasses the licensing system
and that clearly needs to be looked at because these vehicles
are clearly what normal people would understand to be military
vehicles. The equivalent of DESO (Defence Exports Services Organisation)
in Turkey actually lists these vehicles as military specification;
it says the Land Rover Defender 110 of the type that was transferred
to Uzbekistan comes fitted with a NATO-style towing hook and rifle
clips, both of which to my understanding makes them ML6a under
the UK control list. We need to be very clear that these, under
the UK definition, would be military vehicles that were sold.
70% of the bits for those vehicles were supplied from the UK;
that no control is possible I do not think is entirely true because
there is now an EU arms embargo on Uzbekistan and it is my understanding
that in cases where there is an EU arms embargo, the EU Dual-Use
Regulation applies and civilian components for incorporation into
military systems become licensable under an end-use catch-all
clause. I am very sure that that is the case, so I do think now
that civilian components for vehicles supplied to Uzbekistan from
the UK would be subject to UK licensing.
Q57 Richard Burden: On the grounds
that there is an embargo.
Mr Sprague: Exactly.
Q58 Richard Burden: I understand
that. Let us assume that we were dealing with a situation where
there was no embargo. Getting your views about how far you feel
the regulations should be tightened, let us give another example
where something which would normally be regarded as for civilian
use is alleged to be for military use. Caterpillar bulldozers,
for instance, have been used for military use in the occupied
territories, JCBs are currently being used building the separation
wall outside Jerusalem which the Israelis say is a defensive mechanism;
would you say that those kinds of equipment should be covered
by these kinds of regulations?
Mr Sprague: I cannot talk on the
Caterpillar example in Israel, but a balance needs to be struck
between a single light bulb and a 70% flat-pack kit that gets
militarised. Somewhere between those two examples I think the
control system needs to kick in, and it is the use to which these
things could be put which should be the ultimate judge.
Mr Isbister: The case that you
give is a very good example of how, wherever you draw the line,
you are going to be able to come up with difficult cases that
sit pretty much on that line. I would argue that where it is drawn
at the moment—I cannot imagine that this is what the Government
wants to see, what happened in Uzbekistan with the Land Rovers,
I cannot imagine that the Government was happy with that situation
so somewhere in the Government someone must be saying "Actually,
we have not got it right", and I think we need to do more
to explore this. The idea of introducing a catch-all clause that
catches components that are designed for a system for military
end-use or for a military system, these are things that need to
be explored, I do not think the Government is right where it is.
The thing that kind of bothers me is that there is a lot of hands
thrown up in the air and there is an attitude that this is one
for the too hard basket. The transfer of production technology,
I do not think we should get too bogged down in talking about
licensed production overseas, for example, because then we can
miss out on a lot of other ways of transferring capacity, but
the transfer of production capacity is crucial. This is a bigger
deal than transfers of finished products on three counts. It is
a bigger deal because you cannot as readily control the level
of production, so with a simple export you know how much has gone,
but by transferring capacity you start to lose control over the
quantity. Tied into that is you lose the control of the eventual
end-use, because again as production goes up you can have additional
proliferation of the produced equipment. Even more importantly,
you lose control of the intellectual property itself, so the recipient
company of that technology can then export that technology. To
me, this makes this an area which is key to effective control
in an increasingly globalised world, and it feels like we are
not grasping the nettle at the moment. It is hard, but it is something
that I think we simply are not doing at the moment.
Mr Sprague: There was an inference
in the Government's response to you on this case that somehow
they were two totally separate companies and that what one did
was completely separate from the other. There are a couple of
things I just want to throw into the mix to challenge that. That
is a picture of the vehicle; it clearly has both Land Rover and
Otokar logos on it. Also, this is Land Rover's latest brochure
for its military sales; the vehicle that is pictured for sale,
because Land Rover in the UK do not make an armoured personnel
vehicle, is an Otokar vehicle[1],
so Otokar vehicles are in Land Rover's new brochure and they were
jointly exhibiting at DSEi[2]
this year. Here is a picture of this very same vehicle and you
can see the Otokar logo on the bonnet, so to imply that they are
two totally separate companies and there is no relationship between
the two I think is slightly misleading.
Q59 Richard Burden: Have you gone back
to the Government with that evidence?
Mr Sprague: We will.
Chairman: The Committee would be very
grateful for copies of that and we will certainly refer it to
the appropriate government department for explanation. It would
be very helpful indeed.
1 See memorandum submitted by Oxfam Back
2
Defence Systems and Equipment International exhibition Back
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