Examination of Witnesses (Questions 260-279)
DR KIM
HOWELLS MP, MR
TREVOR MOORE
AND MR
GRAHAM GLOVER
25 APRIL 2006
Q260 Chairman: That is true, Minister,
but when we took evidence from the Export Control Organisation
and we asked them precisely the same question about would not
the exports of Land Rovers be licensable under the Dual-Use Regulations,
the reply we received on the record was "that is a moot point".
I was wondering if by now the Government has clarified whether
that moot point was a good point or a bad point.
Dr Howells: I do not think it
is a moot point; if we do not have a right to control those exports
of what we might call civilian vehicles then there is no ambiguity
about it, especially for sale to a NATO country which has bought
a good deal of equipment in the past without any controversial
modifications, and then those products could be gifted on or sold
on to somebody else. Certainly we know now from this lesson that
we will have to be very careful in terms of looking at that kind
of export licence in the future.
Q261 Chairman: If today the Land
Rover flat-packs were to be exported to Turkey for precisely the
same purpose, to end up being used by the armed forces in Uzbekistan,
you are saying that they should be controlled.
Dr Howells: That would be a very
challenging situation for us and we would have to look at it very
carefully. I am not sure that we have any legal right to stop
Land Rover exporting civilian vehicles.
Q262 Chairman: Do you accept there
should be control under the Dual-Use Regulations or not?
Mr Moore: Of course, you cannot
control Land Rovers because that is a very difficult thing to
do, to control that just as a Land Rover. What we would do if
we got another application along these lines is we would take
it through the criteria, the consolidated criteria, making a risk
assessment of whether, among the criteria, there could be a diversion
issue, that they could be diverted in a direction which could—
Q263 Chairman: Land Rover would be
well-advised in future to seek advice before exporting without
considering applying for a licence?
Mr Moore: We have been in good
contact with Land Rover and I am sure they know what our regulations
are and they would talk to DTI.
Q264 Chairman: Thank you. Finally,
Turkey is obviously seeking EU membership and, therefore, adherence
to EU arms embargoes. Will these issues be raised in accession
negotiations with Turkey?
Dr Howells: They have already
come to see us about this and there have been discussions between
officials from Turkey and our officials at the Foreign Office,
and there is a whole range of issues which certainly Turkey has
to be aware of if its application to join the EU is to be a successful
one.
Chairman: Thank you. David.
Q265 Mr Borrow: If I can perhaps
continue on the dual-use theme, the current EU regulations were
reviewed in 2004 on a peer review basis to see how well they had
been implemented across the EU. I have a list here of discrepancies
that were found or things that were considered of concern, including
industrial awareness programmes, the technical capacities available
to national authorities to evaluate licence applications and classify
items, and as regards the intelligence infrastructure. The review
also found that the application of the dual-use regulations differed
with regard to the use of the catch-all clause, the implementation
of denial exchanges, intangible technology transfer controls,
and transit and trans-shipment controls. I would be interested
if you could tell the Committee whether there has been any follow-up
following that peer review, and whether any gaps have been identified
in the UK regulations as against those in other EU countries?
Dr Howells: Mr Borrow, as you
say, the peer review identified a number of recommendations for
further action, both at national and EU level, and work has focused
on the broad areas identified in the Council's statement of December
2004. The main achievements have been the following: improved
information exchange—which is very important of course—discussion
aimed at minimising divergent practices on textbook authorisation,
work towards a review of the regulation as regards dual-use goods
in transit or trans-shipment, the establishment of a pool of technical
experts on recognition of dual-use items subject to control, agreement
to establish an electronic database to record denial notices made
by Member States under the regulations—which would be very,
very helpful—a comprehensive review of licensing and customs
practices regarding control enforcement, an examination of the
administration, the catch-all control, which can be used to control
export of non-listed goods which are destined for use in a weapons
of mass destruction programme. As regards the further work that
you asked about, the recommendations produced by the peer review
certainly represent a very ambitious and challenging agenda, and
progress on a number of issues, including how to achieve greater
convergence in the use of the various kinds of authorisations
and of practices concerning the implementation of the catch-all
clause, or the most efficient way to carry out controls on transit
and trans-shipment, will be made in the light of an impact assessment
study being conducted on the Commission's behalf. These and other
outstanding issues will be addressed in the communication that
the Commission will present to the Council this year, 2006.
Q266 Mr Borrow: Are you able to give
a specifically UK approach to this as against, obviously, looking
at it across the EU, in particular aspects of UK communication
that were identified or have been identified as a result of the
peer review?
Dr Howells: We think that we can
learn from all of these and we are certainly very vigorous in
playing our part in ensuring that this review affects our own
policy on these issues as well as EU policy. We think there is
a very, very close connection between the two.
Chairman: Thank you, Lindsay.
Q267 Mr Hoyle: Obviously, there is
a little bit of concern because we were getting very worked up
about dual-use but the bottom line is it does not matter whether
it is dual-use or not. As we know from the other night in Nepal,
we could see ordinary Japanese flat-truck vehicles actually bringing
riot police in and doing exactly the same work, as the Uzbekistan
military did, in attacking its own people and suppressing them.
It does not matter whether it has a gun clip on or not, the bottom
line is that any four-wheel drive vehicle would have done the
job, or in this particular case in Nepal, any truck would do exactly
the same job. My worry is how do we deal with countries that are
going to suppress their people—and Nepal one minute was
supplying them helicopters to protect them from Maoists, for the
same equipment to now be used on its own people who are fighting
for democracy. There is a great worry here and we have this obsession
about dual-use. We ought not to be obsessed about dual-use because
the bottom line is any four-wheel drive vehicle will do it, whether
it has a gun-clip on or not.
Dr Howells: Mr Hoyle, I am not
quite sure how to answer this because of course there have been
periods when we have been very supportive of the Government and,
indeed, of the Royal Family in a country like Nepal, and there
are many other countries where we supported those governments
very closely, where we supplied four-wheel drive vehicles in countries
where the roads were extremely bad and communications were bad,
and sometimes those vehicles subsequently have been used. What
we have to do really is to try and use all of our intelligence
to best effect. It is very difficult, often, to second-guess what
is likely to happen in a country like Nepal, and Sir John Stanley
knows and has talked to me about the fact that not so very long
ago it was not a country which sought great repression, but seemed
to be a country where there was a good deal of satisfaction amongst
its inhabitants. I am not sure that any government department
or any government has the ability to try to second-guess what
is likely to happen in those circumstances, but we have to try
our best and we have to try and use our intelligence in the best
way possible in order that we do not supply this country with
equipment which could have this dual-use. I agree entirely with
you, I do not think there is a golden rule about dual-use which
gives us some magical insight into what is likely to happen in
a country.
Q268 Mr Hoyle: Just to pursue that
a little, the argument was that there was a problem with this
Land Rover, it had a towing hook on and it had a gun clip. The
bottom line is the vehicle was used to suppress people. My view
is that any four-wheel drive vehicle would have done that whether
it had a towing hook on or a gun clip or not, and the reality
is how do we try and ensure that any supplies to countries at
the moment such as Uzbekistan and Nepal, how do you actually stop
that, because any type of vehicle will do exactly what was done
to suppress the people and it is that that I do not think we can
get over. The argument about dual-use is immaterial, the bottom
line is that they could have bought a Land Rover to say it is
for disaster relief and it could have been turned on the people.
Dr Howells: Certainly. Criterion
2 of the consolidated EU and national arms export licensing criteria
is of course the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms
in the country of final destination, and I think we would fully
subscribe to that, but it is extremely difficult sometimes to
second-guess what is likely to happen in a situation like that.
Chairman: Thank you. Richard Burden.
Q269 Richard Burden: Has the Government's
policy on arms and military equipment exports to Israel changed
since 2002?
Dr Howells: The Government's policy
has not changed since 2002 and the letter that we sent to this
Committee on 4 April outlines this. If we believe there is a clear
risk that any items, whether lethal or non-lethal, would be used
in a manner inconsistent with criterion 2 which I have just referred
to, we would certainly not issue an export licence, and the decision
would be made about whether an export would be used aggressively
or in a manner of legitimate self-defence based on the record
of the proposed end-user, the equipment in the application and,
of course, the prevailing circumstances. When assessing an application
for components the Government assesses the use of the final project
against those criteria for them.
Q270 Richard Burden: In 2002 there
was the issue of an exchange of correspondence between our Government
and the Israeli Government regarding assurances that had been
given regarding armoured personnel carriers, which we had been
assured would not be deployed in the Occupied Territories, and
it was subsequently discovered that they were being so deployed.
The Foreign Secretary in 2002 said in adopting the criteria "We
will no longer take the Israeli assurances given on 29 November
2000 into account" and the assumption that I assume there
is the fact that Israel said it would not be used in one way would
not mean that you would necessarily believe them. Is that still
the case?
Dr Howells: Yes, that is very
much the case. The Committee sought confirmation about assurances
and the reply to a PQ on 15 April 2002, which you have referred
to, still holds true about the use of assurances; we do not use
them.
Q271 Richard Burden: Could you tell
me how the Government defines—as you have to make your own
judgments on this—equipment that would be being "deployed
aggressively in the Occupied Territories"? Given the fact
that Israel is in illegal occupation, what would be equipment
that would be being deployed defensively in the Occupied Territories?
Dr Howells: We would have to make
a judgment on that, or certainly we would and DTI would. I can
imagine, to return to the point that Mr Hoyle has made, almost
any piece of equipment, I suppose, could be used aggressively,
especially in occupied areas, there is no question about that,
and we have to be very, very sensitive and very careful in terms
of any licences that we would issue to applications for that kind
of equipment.
Q272 Richard Burden: How do you assess
it and how have you assessed it?
Dr Howells: The default position
is for us to say that there should not be troops in those occupied
areas anyway, and very often of course it is a difficult thing
to assess if the base for those troops and therefore for that
equipment is in the State of Israel itself and it is later deployed
in the Occupied Territories. These are assessments we have to
make and discussions we have to have on an on-going basis.
Q273 Richard Burden: If you think
the equipment could be being deployed in the Occupied Territories
you would consider that it would not be appropriate for export.
Dr Howells: We would have to look
very, very carefully.
Q274 Richard Burden: The reason I
ask these questions is that in early 2004 the then Secretary of
State for Trade and Industry was suggesting that Britain is very
diligent in rejecting applications from Israel, and the example
given was that in 2002 the Government refused 84 standard individual
export licences for Israel, the highest number of refusals for
any destination, which is quite impressive. I am just aware that
in the last Strategic Arms Export Controls annual report the number
of sales actually increased to 89, the number of refusals had
decreased to 13, that in a year when the number of deaths in the
Occupied Territories had gone up and not down. That, to me, sounds
a little odd.
Dr Howells: It may sound odd but
there may not be a very direct cause and effect on that, it depends
on all kinds of circumstances—what the behaviour of the
Israeli border police and army is, it could depend on many things.
It could depend on the aggressiveness or otherwise of Hamas or
of Islamic Jihad, it could depend on anything, and I could imagine
that after a very large number of denials of applications, turning
them down, rejecting them, perhaps the Israelis have learnt from
that.
Q275 Richard Burden: The number of
applications went up and the refusals went down.
Dr Howells: I have tried to explain
that, there may be all sorts of variables in that equation.
Mr Moore: Of course, there are
different kinds of export licence and you cannot do a direct comparison
between the different types.
Q276 Richard Burden: They all went
up.
Mr Moore: Yes, but one export
licence could be very different from another, we do look at things
case by case.
Q277 Chairman: Before I bring Quentin
in, what monitoring of end-use of these exports to Israel do you
undertake?
Dr Howells: We look very carefully
at the way in which any equipment that has been exported is used
and it is an area and two countries that are under very, very
intense observation. We have very good teams in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem
and we watch very, very carefully what is going on.
Q278 Richard Burden: Can you give
us any examples?
Dr Howells: Sorry, whose question
am I answering?
Chairman: I am sorry, Richard and then
Quentin. Richard, your last question.
Q279 Richard Burden: Can you give
us any examples of monitoring of end-use that has led to any kind
of change of approach?
Dr Howells: The key thing is the
risk assessment beforehand, that is the major point. In that risk
assessment we have to be looking at what happens on the ground,
so we will take that intelligence as part of our overall assessment
exercise of any application that is made. I was in Jerusalem myself
and I did not see any British equipment being used, to give you
a specific example, but I certainly saw signs of people's lives
being very severely disrupted by, for example, the construction
of a barrier.
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