Quadripartite Select Committee First Report


7  International issues

Presidencies of the EU and G8

179. Our predecessor Committees in looking forward to the period when the UK held the Presidencies of the G8 and the EU considered that there would be considerable opportunities in high level world policy.[269] We therefore asked the Government what progress on arms control had been made during the UK's Presidencies and suggested a number of areas on which the Government could report.[270] The Government replied in its memorandum of 19 December 2005[271] and its responses are set at the bullet points below with our observations.

  • In line with its over-arching Presidency objectives, the Government said that its focus was on running an efficient Presidency which helped to increase the effectiveness of EU efforts to counter WMD proliferation. The Government noted that the EU had played a prominent and constructive role in the UNGA [United Nations General Assembly] First Committee, the NSG [Nuclear Suppliers Group] Consultative Group and the MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime] Plenary meeting among others. The Government initiated and led an internal debate to prepare EU ideas to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) at its Review Conference in 2006.
  • The UK used its Presidency to secure the support of EU members for proposals on action that MTCR members can take to counter regional proliferation; and on a strategy to secure the admission into the MTCR of the new EU Member States, including the candidate and acceding countries. The Government also used its chairmanship of the Technical Experts' Meeting and its role as co-chair of the Information Exchange Meeting to drive forward the MTCR's agenda in line with the EU WMD Action Plan.

We note the assessment in the SIPRI Yearbook 2006 "Armaments, Disarmament and International Security"[272] that in August 2005 the United States issued a report[273] on compliance with arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament agreements which included a separate section on compliance with missile-related undertakings and that it included two specific findings related to non-compliance with missile proliferation commitments by states.

While China does not participate in the MTCR—its application to join having been blocked by the USA—in November 2000 the Chinese Government gave the USA a specific undertaking on missile proliferation which included a commitment not to assist 'in any way, any country in the development of ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons'. The Non-compliance Report found that 'items transferred by Chinese entities contributed to Category I missile programs contrary to the Chinese Government's November 2000 missile non-proliferation commitments'. The report drew attention to transfers by China of controlled materials and technology to Iran, North Korea and Pakistan.

Russia has been a participant in the MTCR since 1995. The Non-compliance Report found that 'Russian entities have engaged in transfers that, although not directly precluded by Russia's commitments under the MTCR Guidelines, raise serious missile proliferation concerns and call into question Russia's ability to implement controls on missile-related technologies. To date, Russia's efforts to prevent further transfers have been inadequate'. The report drew particular attention to the supply of missile-applicable technologies to China, India and Iran by Russian entities.

SIPRI's assessment raises concerns and appears to show evidence that the MTCR's goal of preventing proliferation of unmanned delivery systems for NBC weapons is failing. We invite the Government to respond to the findings in the US Government report that China and Russia have breached undertakings and guidelines on missile proliferation and recommend that the Government explain what action it took during its Presidencies and subsequently to remedy these breaches.

  • As the EU Presidency, the UK spoke strongly in favour for the entry of the new EU Member States, the acceding and candidate countries, to the MTCR. As they have all adopted the same export controls as the EU member states which are already members of the MTCR, these countries would clearly improve its effectiveness. Unfortunately, despite its efforts the Government was not able to secure their entry at the MTCR Plenary in September.

We welcome the Government's efforts. We consider it important that all EU member states are admitted to all regimes, to ensure comprehensive and smooth exchange of information on denials of licences and the implementation of the dual-use regulation.

  • The revised text of the EU Code on Arms Exports has been agreed at technical level. It has also been agreed in principle that the revised text should be adopted as a Common Position under Article 18 of the Treaty of European Union.

As we have commented at paragraph 141, this is an achievement and we hope that a consensus can be achieved so that the Common Position can come into operation soon.

  • Best Practice guidance for the interpretation of Criterion 8 was agreed at the first UK Presidency COARM[274] meeting, then adopted by the Council. This has been published in the User's Guide.

We consider that the User's Guide is an important tool for developing the EU Code on Arms Exports and harmonising the interpretation and implementation of both criteria and operative provisions. We understand that it is updated regularly and that the latest edition was published in April 2006.[275]

  • COARM under UK Chairmanship established a drafting group to take forward work in parallel on formulating Best Practice guidance for both Criterion 2 and Criterion 7. Civil society was invited to submit views and suggestions as part of the consultation process.

We understand the best practice guidance has not been published yet.

  • The Government has been actively pursuing the initiative for an International Arms Trade Treaty during the UK's Presidencies of the G8 and of the EU.

We consider the treaty later in this chapter.

  • The EU adopted EC Regulation No. 1236/2005 concerning trade in certain goods that could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

As we have commented at paragraph 176, this is an achievement, although we are disappointed by the constraints on the UK to add items to the banned list.

  • The EU provided further financial support to strengthen the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] and the OPCW [Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons], and hoped to secure similar support by the end of the UK Presidency to assist the effective implementation of the BTWC. The Government drew up plans with the Council Secretariat and Commission for work with a wide range of third countries to enhance export control measures. It also worked with the Council Secretariat, Commission and Member States to revise the list of priorities for implementation of the EU WMD Strategy ahead of the European Council in December.

180. We conclude that the Government has used its Presidencies of the G8 and EU to achieve solid progress in a number of areas. We are disappointed that there were no significant breakthroughs but this was not the Government's fault; we recognise that progress at the international level in export controls takes time.

The prospects for an International Arms Trade Treaty

181. The campaign for an International Arms Trade Treaty was launched by Amnesty International and Oxfam in October 2003. In their final Report our predecessor Committees urged the UK Government to use its influence as President of the G8 in 2005 to lobby other countries, particularly fellow G8 members, to support the proposed International Arms Trade Treaty.[276] In its written evidence in December 2005 the Government stated:

[It] has been actively pursuing the initiative for an international Arms Trade Treaty during the UK's Presidencies of the G8 and of the EU. At Gleneagles in July [2005], Leaders of the G8 agreed that the 'development of international standards in arms transfers [...] would be an important step toward tackling the undesirable proliferation of conventional arms'. On 3 October European Union Foreign Ministers added the EU's voice to the growing support for an international treaty to establish common standards for the global trade in conventional arms, and called for the start of a formal negotiation process at the United Nations at the earliest opportunity. […O]n 27 November, Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Malta added their support to calls for work on such a treaty to commence in the UN. We are now working to generate further support for such a process among international partners in order to build momentum towards our objective of beginning initial discussions in the UN later in 2006.[277]

182. The UK Working Group on Arms were enthusiastic in their assessment of the Government's work. They described the former Foreign Secretary, Mr Jack Straw MP, as showing "admirable leadership in the area of international arms transfer control" and "in the last year he has been actively supporting the drive for an international ATT".[278] We endorse the Working Group's assessment of the former Foreign Secretary and wish to put on record our appreciation of the part Mr Straw played in promoting the International Arms Trade Treaty.

183. The UK Working Group noted that "considerable momentum has built up for international arms transfer controls"[279] and that "from where we were last year we have […] made considerable progress".[280] EGAD supported the principle behind an Arms Trade Treaty which they said "should establish a much greater degree of transparency within those signatory nations of the criteria we should use to assess licence applications".[281] Since the beginning of the year the Government has been able to show further progress. We note that the Government has been engaging with other countries which have included ministerial contacts, specific events, direct, expert-level talks and using its network of overseas posts. It has a dedicated cross-Whitehall team which visited Beijing on 14 March and Moscow on 20 February to discuss the initiative with their Chinese and Russian counterparts. The Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Dr Kim Howells MP, made a speech on 23 March while on a visit to the United Nations in Geneva putting the case for a treaty. The Government's stated aim is to build the consensus needed for the start of a formal process at the UN later this year.[282] The UK Working Group sounded a warning against complacency when it pointed out that "we have an awful lot of work to do" to get from the 43 governments that currently support the treaty up to nearer 100 governments[283] and that "there is a lot of lazy support in amongst" the 43.[284] We are also uneasy that the USA has doubts about how far the proposal for a treaty will reach.[285] We conclude that the Government has been successful in promoting and helping to build up momentum for an International Arms Trade Treaty and we give it credit for that. We recommend that the Government build on the impetus that has been achieved and give top priority to achieving a treaty under the auspicious of the UN as a matter of urgency.

184. As an indication of the improvement in the prospects for the treaty we received evidence on the provisions which the treaty should contain. The UK Working Group on Arms put forward the view that the treaty "should be based on existing principles of international humanitarian and human rights law" and explained:

There is quite a body of law out there that says thou shalt not transfer arms under certain very clear circumstances, so for example international arms embargoes, resolutions by the UN Security Council, treaties which countries might have signed up to, for example the 1980 Convention on certain conventional weapons and the Landmine Treaty. There is also an aiding and abetting-type principle in that you should not authorise arms transfers where it is likely that the use will be for serious crimes against humanity, genocide, et cetera. Then there is a whole category of norms that have been established on non-proliferation, things that we can see, for example, in things like the EU Code of Conduct, the Nairobi Protocol in Central Africa, and these are factors that should be taken into account, they are things like sustainable development, regional security, those types of issues. The importance here is that there is a positive duty on the State not to authorise transfers where there is a risk that those transfers could be used in such ways.[286]

185. The Government was able to flesh out its proposals. The Minister indicated that it was the Government's intention that the treaty would regulate the transfer of dual-use items as well as well as those on the Military List.[287] He indicated that the treaty would not be restricted to small arms and light weapons:

I have been a little worried and I know the Secretary of State has, that in the SALW [small arms and light weapons] negotiations there has been a limit, if you like, on the size of arms and the kinds of arms which really should not be there. We have to look right across the whole portfolio of arms that are used because there are some pieces of equipment that seem to be outside of that study at the moment and we think they ought to be in there, so we are very much in favour of a much more general approach to this.[288]

We note that in his speech on 23 March 2006 to the United Nations in Geneva the Minister stated that:

a treaty should include an effective mechanism for enforcement and monitoring decisions on transfers will be taken under the core principles laid down in the treaty, but taken by national authorities.

He also indicated in his speech that the UK was ready to help countries, where export control systems were at an early stage of development, to develop their capacity to deal in practical terms with the provisions of a new treaty.[289] We address the question of outreach at paragraphs 70 to 74.

186. To produce an International Arms Trade Treaty which will ensure a responsible trade in arms the Government needs, in our view, to promote a comprehensive treaty that sets high standards for the authorisation of the trade in, and transfer of, arms across the world. We conclude that the International Arms Trade Treaty must:

a)  be founded on the existing principles of international humanitarian and human rights law, if it is to achieve the objective of setting clear standards for the transfer of arms;

b)  cover the trade in all conventional arms, including dual-use goods and technologies; and

c)  include an effective and transparent mechanism for monitoring and enforcement, if decisions to authorise the transfer of arms are to be taken by national governments.

We conclude that the value of a treaty which does not meet these requirements is open to serious question. Indeed, a treaty based on the lowest common denominator that not only fails to meet some of these requirements but also weakens the export control system in the UK or EU will be of questionable value.

187. While fully endorsing the Government's support for an International Arms Trade Treaty, such a treaty is by no means a certainty. Nor can the Government rely on the treaty, no matter how comprehensive, to be the panacea for all illegal or irresponsible trading in arms. While the Government has to give top priority to the treaty, we consider that it cannot afford to take its eye of the ball in other areas. Two such areas are the regulation and control of the brokering and trafficking in arms and exports by the subsidiaries of British companies based overseas, both of which we discuss below.

The extension of extra-territoriality

188. Under the Export Control Act 2002 and the accompanying secondary legislation, actions by UK persons abroad are only regulated where they relate to trade in missiles with a range of more than 300 kilometres and torture equipment, or trade to an embargoed destination. For other trafficking and brokering to fall under the scope of the Act, part of the transaction has to take place in the United Kingdom.

189. Our predecessor Committees have recommended increasing extra-territorial controls on a number of occasions. In its penultimate and again in its final Report in the last Parliament the Committees recommended that:

the Government should reconsider which types of trafficking and brokering activity it subjects to extra-territorial control to identify more accurately those which are of most pressing and genuine concern—in particular those weapons most likely to be used by terrorists or in civil wars. We recommend that trade in such weapons, including MANPADS, rocket-propelled grenades and automatic light weapons, should be subject to extra-territorial control where they are intended for end-use by anyone other than a national government or its agent, and where the country from which the trade is being conducted or from which the export will take place does not itself have adequate trade or export controls consistent with the British Government's policy on arms exports.[290]

In their report last year the Committees also recommended that the Government should conduct a review of extra-territorial controls along the lines suggested in their previous report once the Export Control Act 2002 has been fully in force for a year and publish the outcome of the review.[291]

190. In July 2005 the Government again gave a flat refusal to the Committees' recommendations:

As the Government stated in its response to the Committee last year [i.e. the Report published in 2004] the Export Control Act has been a very significant step in helping to stop the United Kingdom being used as a base for undesirable arms transfers. The Act has introduced comprehensive and effective controls on the brokering of all equipment on the UK's Military List, which includes MANPADS, rocket propelled grenades and automatic weapons, where any part of the activity takes place in the UK.

The UK fully meets the commitments on MANPADS agreed in the G8 and the Wassenaar Arrangement in the context of their potential use in terrorist attacks (Hansard 29WS 18 May 2003). By adhering to these commitments, the Government will only licence the export of MANPADS to foreign governments, or agents specifically authorised to act on behalf of a government.

In addition, as our response last year stated, Section 57 of the Terrorism Act 2000 makes it an offence for a person to possess an article for a purpose connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism. Furthermore, there are UN sanctions in place to prevent brokering to Al-Qaida members and their associates. These measures apply to the activities of UK nationals abroad as well as any person in the UK.[292]

191. We do not accept the Government's response. We recommend that the Government produce the evidence to back up its claim that the Export Control Act 2002 is stopping the United Kingdom being used as a base for undesirable arms transfers. We recommend that the review of the legislation in 2007 examine, and report upon, the strength of this claim.

192. Since 2005 we have, however, detected movement in the Government's position. First, in the Government's memorandum in December 2005[293] and then in the debate on our predecessor Committees' Report in Westminster Hall on 16 March 2006 the then Minister for Trade, Ian Pearson MP, indicated that the Government shared some of the concerns raised during the debate "about conflicts of jurisdiction relating to extra-territorial controls". He undertook that "the scope for such controls, including the goods covered, will be reviewed as part of the three-year review" and gave an assurance that "we will look again into that issue".[294] During the debate the case where a company deliberately set out to flout the laws restricting arms exports by creating a subsidiary in another country for the express purpose of getting round the controls was also raised. The Minister expressed a "great deal of sympathy" for the concerns of Members and acknowledged that in this case "the issue of extra-territoriality needs to be addressed".[295] When the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Dr Kim Howells, gave us evidence on 25 April 2006 he was not, however, able to take the matter further:

We will certainly consider any evidence in this respect as part of the three-year review that is coming up. I would certainly like to look at [MANPADs, rocket-propelled grenades and light automatic weapons] because I would maintain that our primary tool in this respect is to look at end-use and to look at the whole panoply of intelligence and evidence that we have about the use of weapons. I am a little wary, and always have been, about trying to have a list of weapons which exclude others, but I will certainly look at it.[296]

193. In its evidence the UK Working Group on Arms highlighted the shortcomings of the existing controls for brokering and trafficking especially with small arms and Oliver Sprague said:

because of the way the arms trade works, these controls are needed and necessary and I still do not know why the Government has chosen not to do it for all cases. I know that there are issues around embargoes and that there are currently extraterritorial controls that apply to embargoes, but there is a only a handful of countries where that applies, there is an awful lot of other destinations where the supply of small arms and light weapons could do a great deal of damage but where there is no extraterritorial control. At least in that area, therefore, there does need to be an extraterritorial dimension to our controls. We are in discussion with our colleagues in industry […] and we hope there may well be some movement there, but we are not at a stage yet to see whether we have reached common agreement. We are intending to do so for the 2007 review of the current UK legislation that the DTI is going to start some time in 2007, and we are going to be pressing again very hard for extraterritorial controls in this area.[297]

Roy Isbister from the UK Working Group added:

if we can at least get small weapons and light weapons, that is a better situation than we have now, but we would still advocate that this should be applied across the board.[298]

194. EGAD also brought another perspective to the question of extending the UK's controls on extra-territoriality:

we are very sympathetic towards the arguments that [short-range missiles] should be covered but our view is that there should be three categories. Rather than 'controlled' and 'restricted', there should be a third category where the controls are the same controls on the same activities as for controlled goods but that they have an extra-territorial dimension. […] We would be very supportive of the inclusion of small arms and light weapons in another category of control which would be extra-territorial in dimension and would catch UK citizens overseas.[299]

The UK Working Group argued that extension of the controls on extra-territoriality would meet the Government's own criteria for extra-territoriality and Mr Isbister reminded us that during consideration of the Export Control Bill:

The Home Office had a set of rules or standards that it applied, hoops that you had to jump through, six of them, to qualify for extraterritorial control. We in the UK Working Group, working with lawyers, came to the conclusion that on five of these six counts the extraterritorial controls on arms brokering fit and I think it was, in theory, that you only needed to hit one or two of them to reach that level. That argument was never countered.[300]

CONCLUSIONS ON EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY

195. We are pleased that a possible extension to the controls on extra-territoriality is under active consideration and we accept that changes ahead of the Government's review of export control legislation in 2007 are now unrealistic. We recommend that the Government set out the terms under which the review of the extra-territorial controls on brokering and trafficking will be carried out in 2007. More specifically, we recommend that the Government detail:

a)  the criteria it will apply to consideration of the case for extending the extra-territorial controls on brokering and trafficking in controlled goods;

b)  the weapons that will be included in the review, in particular, confirm that it will examine the inclusion of MANPADs, rocket-propelled grenades and light automatic weapons as well as small arms; and

c)  whether the review will consider the need for registration of brokers.

We conclude that no logical case can be made for including some controlled goods within the Government's extra-territorial control on brokering and trafficking whilst excluding others. We therefore further recommend that all controlled goods should be included.

196. We also note that UN Security Council Resolution 1540 contains a requirement that UN member states:

take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials and to this end shall: […]

(c) Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in such items in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law.[301]

We also recommend that the Government detail how it intends to implement the requirements on brokering and trafficking in UN Security Council Resolution 1540.

Licensed production overseas and overseas subsidiaries of UK companies

197. The UK Working Group on Arms in its written evidence noted that:

There is an increasing trend for UK companies to be involved in arms production in other countries. This involvement can take several forms, for example: co-production and joint venture deals in which final assembly takes place elsewhere; the licensed production of arms by companies in overseas countries; or via subsidiary companies, based overseas, but owned by UK parent companies.

These arrangements tend to be both under-regulated and poorly reported by governments. In the case of overseas-based, UK-owned subsidiaries, it appears that UK controls do not apply at all—even to embargoed destinations. This is despite the fact that they may be owned, or controlled, by a UK-based parent company.[302]

The UK Working Group argued that improving the regulation of UK companies' efforts to move production offshore was one way of dealing with the challenges of increased globalisation of defence production overseas and proposed that UK companies proposing to license the production of weapons overseas should first have to apply to the UK Government for a licence and:

  • Licensed production agreements should contain specific re-export clauses to prevent the export of goods produced under licence to countries of concern. If the production company then wished to export to a destination not specified in the original licensed production deal, it would have to seek prior approval from the UK government.
  • Licensed production agreements should contain specific clauses relating to the duration of the agreement and what happens when the agreement reaches the end of the agreed time period.
  • The Government should re-examine the export licensing requirements for civilian components that are to be incorporated into military goods (irrespective of final destination).
  • Overseas subsidiary companies in which a majority shareholding is held by a UK parent or where UK beneficial ownership can be established should be subject to UK export controls. Secondary legislation for embargoed destinations must be modified to apply to all exports from overseas subsidiary companies.[303]

198. EGAD did not accept the UK Working Group's analysis and told us that "that the present licensing control regime discourages licensed production oversees" and explained that "it is the financial aspects which drive production overseas" and that "the licensing regime makes the transfer of technology to do that more difficult and imposes controls on it".[304] EGAD pointed out that "one of the things that the Export Control Organisation examines when asked to give a licence for overseas production is what the likely end-use is going to be of whatever it is that is produced overseas".[305]

199. We agree with the UK Working Group on Arms' assessment that "the defence industry, not just in the UK, is becoming more global".[306] There is a clear opportunity for the UK's defence industries to expand their exports and to create jobs here in the UK. If, as EGAD indicate, one of the consequences of an effective export control system is to keep work in the UK we regard that as an unintended benefit. The primary purpose of the controls on strategic exports is to stop what the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in his speech on 23 March 2006 described as the "irresponsible" transfer of arms.[307] Whilst we accept that the Export Control Organisation may exercise adequate control over the initial export of technology, design and even machinery from the UK to a subsidiary overseas, once an overseas facility is established we cannot see that it has much control over exports from that facility to countries which, although not under UN embargo, would not meet the criteria in the EU Code on Arms Exports. The International Arms Trade Treaty may in time provide a framework to curb such transfers but globalisation will not wait. We recommend that the Government bring forward proposals for consideration during the 2007 review of the legislation controls to regulate:

a)  British companies proposing to license the production of weapons overseas; and

b)  exports from overseas subsidiary companies in which a majority shareholding is held by a UK parent or where UK beneficial ownership can be established.

The ITAR waiver

200. Our predecessor Committees commented upon, and supported, the "ITAR waiver" in their reports. Terms for the waiver were agreed with the US Administration in May 2003 under which the UK would have a waiver from the US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Our predecessor Committees noted in their 2004 Report that:

such a waiver would permit the transfer without a US export licence of most unclassified defence items, technology, and services to the British Government and qualified companies in the United Kingdom. In the Government's view a waiver 'would make a significant contribution to transatlantic defence industry cooperation and promote Alliance interoperability. At the same time it would ensure that comparable export controls were maintained on US and UK defence items'.[308]

In the face of continued refusal of the US Congress to enact the ITAR waiver the Committees in their final Report of the last Parliament were of the view that "the only way forward we see is continued diplomacy, but there is no promise of success".[309]

201. Our predecessors' pessimism has proved, unfortunately, to be prescient. The US Congress has not enacted the waiver and we see little prospect that it will.

202. Faced with the obduracy of the US Congress we accept that the most sensible course is to explore alternative courses. Those who gave us evidence cast doubt on the value of the waiver and were examining alternative arrangements. EGAD told us when they appeared before the Quadripartite Committee on 31 January 2006:

whilst we fully [recognise] the political symbolism […] of the ITAR waiver, the reality is that the waiver was so limited in scope that it would actually have been of minimal benefit, particularly in the context of a high-technology programme like the Joint Strike Fighter. […]

as to what possible alternatives there may be to the ITAR waiver […] EGAD is working on that at the moment. There was a meeting this morning to kick off that piece of work so it is in its very early stages.[310]

David Hayes from EGAD did not consider "that the lack of an ITAR waiver in the form in which it is drafted is holding back the JSF programme".[311]

203. The evidence we received from EGAD begs the question: was the attempt to secure the ITAR waiver worth the effort invested by the Government and, we assume with Government encouragement, by UK industry[312] and parliamentarians?[313] From the evidence we heard the answer appears to be that the value of the waiver was of limited benefit for the JSF. If it has value, it may have been for smaller businesses for whom exports of unclassified defence items, technology, and services might have been of use and as a symbol of the close alliance between the US and the UK since the start of the Second Gulf War when in a phrase of the former Foreign Secretary "we have been [an ally] for the United States through thick and thin."[314] We conclude that there are grounds for deep concern about the protectionist tendencies of elements within the US Congress.

204. Where does the UK go from here? As noted, EGAD told us that alternatives are being examined and, in relation to the Joint Strike Aircraft programme, said, "we are having to deal with issues but we are dealing with the issues, and we are working within the existing licensing systems to make the programme work".[315] EGAD also considered "it is very important that we take a co-ordinated approach and that the Government, Parliament and the industry speaks with one voice and seeks the same thing".[316] With the loss of the ITAR waiver, we conclude that the Government's priorities should now be to put in place arrangements which will allow the transfer of goods and technologies from the US to ensure that not only the Joint Strike Aircraft programme is not impeded but also to assist those companies that would have benefited from the transfer of unclassified defence items, technology and services. We request that the Government explain its policy and approach to securing the expeditious transfer of goods and technologies from the US to the UK.


269   HC (2004-05) 145, para 173 Back

270   Ev 126, para 1 Back

271   Ibid. Back

272   Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2006: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford University Press, 2006, p 782 Back

273   US Department of State, Bureau of Verification and Compliance, 'Adherence to and compliance with arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments', Washington, DC, 30 Aug. 2005, pp 104-08 - http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/rpt/51977.htm. Back

274   The Council of Ministers' working group on conventional arms. Back

275   Council of the European Union, User's Guide to the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, Document 5179/1/06 (PESC 18 Rev1), 19 April 2006, COARM 1 - http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/st05/st05179-re01.en06.pdf.  Back

276   HC (2004-05) 145, para 163 Back

277   Ev 126, para 1 Back

278   Ev 88  Back

279   IbidBack

280   Q 52 (Mr Sprague) Back

281   Q 2 Back

282   HC Deb, 3 May 2006, col1653W, HC Deb, 6 June 2006, 550W and http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391647&a=KArticle&aid=1142705227449  Back

283   Q 52 (Mr Sprague) Back

284   Q 52 (Mr Isbister) Back

285   Q 298 Back

286   Q 52 (Mr Sprague) Back

287   Q 300 Back

288   Q 296. See also Dr Howells' speech to the UN in Geneva on 23 March 2006 which made it clear that the prospective treaty the trade in all conventional arms. http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391647&a=KArticle&aid=1142705227449 Back

289  http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391647&a=KArticle&aid=1142705227449  Back

290   HC (2004-05) 145, para 156 Back

291   Ibid. Back

292   Cm 6638, p 12 Back

293   Ev 126, para 11 Back

294   HC Deb, 16 March 2006, col 521WH Back

295   HC Deb, 16 March 2006 , cols 522-3WH Back

296   Q 255. See also Q 254. Back

297   Q 65 (Mr Sprague) Back

298   Q 81 (Mr Isbister) Back

299   Q 8 Back

300   Q 79 Back

301   United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/1540 (2004), 28 April 2004 Back

302   Ev 88 Back

303   Ev 88 Back

304   Q 15 Back

305   Q 16 Back

306   Q 55 (Mr Sprague) Back

307  http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391647&a=KArticle&aid=1142705227449  Back

308   HC (2003-04) 390, para 155 Back

309   HC (2004-05) 145, para 166 Back

310   Q 18 Back

311   Q 21 Back

312   Q 19 Back

313   Qq 19-20 Back

314   HC (2004-05) 145, Q 124 Back

315   Q 24 Back

316   Q 20 (Mr Marshall) Back


 
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