UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To be published as HC 873-vi

House of COMMONS

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE

QUADRIPARTITE COMMITTEE

 

 

Strategic Export Controls

 

 

Tuesday 25 April 2006

DR KIM HOWELLS, MR TREVOR MOORE and MR GRAHAM GLOVER

Evidence heard in Public Questions 241 - 336

 

 

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Oral Evidence

Taken before the Quadripartite Committee

on Tuesday 25 April 2006

Members present

Roger Berry, in the Chair

John Barrett

Mr David S Borrow

Malcolm Bruce

Richard Burden

Mr David Crausby

Mr Quentin Davies

Mike Gapes

Linda Gilroy

Mr Lindsay Hoyle

Mr Paul Keetch

Robert Key

Peter Luff

Sir John Stanley

Richard Younger-Ross

________________

Memorandum submitted by the Government

Examination of Witnesses

 

Witnesses: Dr Kim Howells, a Member of the House, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Mr Trevor Moore, Deputy Head, and Mr Graham Glover, Head of Arms Trade Unit, Counter-Proliferation Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, gave evidence.

 

Chairman: At the outset there are three members of the Committee who need to just declare their relevant interests for the record. John, do you want to go first?

John Barrett: Yes, I have nothing to declare.

Chairman: Excellent. Richard?

Richard Younger-Ross: I have nothing to declare.

Chairman: Excellent. Quentin.

Mr Davies: My interests are set out in the Register, but none of them relate to the work of this Committee.

Q241 Chairman: Excellent. Minister, you are very welcome this afternoon. Again for the record, could I invite you to introduce your colleagues and then we will start?

Dr Howells: On my left, your right, is Trevor Moore; on my right, your left, is Graham Glover. I am Kim Howells.

Q242 Chairman: You are very welcome, Dr Howells, it is a pleasure to see you and your colleagues. You will be aware that the Committee have received evidence from Mark Thomas to show how easy it is for a group of school students to set themselves up in the arms business, to become arms brokers and to broker instruments of torture. Three items they were able to show the Committee were items that are not on the current list of instruments of torture, namely thumb cuffs, wall cuffs and sting sticks. Is the Government prepared to ban those three items immediately to bring them within the purview of the Government's existing policy?

Dr Howells: I did not know what they were when I read this, Mr Berry, I had to ask what thumb cuffs were and sting sticks; I assumed sting sticks were some sort of electrical equipment but turned out to be just a stick with prongs on it.

Q243 Chairman: Yes.

Dr Howells: We certainly want to work with other Member States and with the Commission to introduce additional equipment for control such as these sting sticks where necessary. We have led the world in this field in trying to identify equipment that is used for torture and we will continue to do so.

Q244 Chairman: Given the items that the Government has already banned because they are instruments of torture, is there any reason why thumb cuffs, wall cuffs and sting sticks cannot be immediately added to the list?

Dr Howells: I do not think so, unless my colleagues have any further information. As I understand it, the exports of sting sticks are not on the list of items to be controlled under the EU Torture Regulation; coverage of the list is a matter for negotiation at EU level, and we will work at that level, certainly, to introduce additional equipment for control such as sting sticks.

Q245 Chairman: I thought the UK had a derogation to extend the list of banned items at any time.

Mr Glover: Looking ahead to the rgulation, thumb cuffs will be on the regulation when it comes into force on 30 July, when the EU regulation comes into force, and those will be covered by the EU Torture Regulation. On wall cuffs, we think we do already control wall cuffs as we do other larger handcuffs; we would say that wall cuffs of a particular dimension are actually already covered by our legislation. They would be controlled not banned, but they would be controlled.

Q246 Chairman: And sting sticks?

Mr Glover: Sting sticks we would need to take up with the Commission when the regulation comes into force.

Q247 Chairman: I do not understand why we should wait, I thought the UK had a derogation to extend the list of banned items at any time; I thought that was the understanding of discussions with Europe.

Mr Glover: We have a derogation to maintain the standard that we have at present, yes, that is the case, but to add new items to the list, I would have to go back and look. Certainly, all the items that are currently on our banned list we have a derogation to maintain and that level of control at the moment.

Q248 Chairman: You say you are prevented from adding new items to the list; something as vicious as a sting stick, you are saying that the Government does not have the authority to do what it did in 1997 to add this to a list of items that would be banned for the purposes of manufacture or export.

Mr Glover: I am not aware of the precise legal definitions of where we have to go, but it does become a Community competence matter with the arrival of the EU torture regulation. These items are not on the military list, they are traded items and would have to be covered within the Torture Regulation when it comes into force like any other trade regulation, it is a Commission and EU competence matter.

Q249 Mr Keetch: Can I follow up on that. What you are saying is that the British Government cannot stop the export of these items if they believe they are potentially being used for torture, that is only something that the EU can do.

Mr Glover: It would be something that the Commission would have to regulate on is my understanding, I could go back and check for the Committee.

Dr Howells: We will certainly check on that.

Q250 Chairman: I would be grateful, because certainly it was my understanding that part of the discussions with the other Member States of the European Union was that the UK would have a derogation to extend the list of banned items at any time. I appreciate that until EU provisions come in you cannot have a derogation from them, but I do not understand what legally prevents you banning instruments of torture, given that they are so easily obtained by anybody who chooses to set themselves up as an arms broker, whether they are school students or anyone else. If, Minister, you could get back to us on that, we would be grateful.

Dr Howells: I certainly will.

Chairman: Thank you. Sir John.

Q251 Sir John Stanley: Minister, can we turn to trafficking, brokering and the issue of extraterritoriality? We have taken extensive evidence on this point and, having heard the evidence from NGOs and experts, the arms trade and arms manufacturers and their supporters, it appears that the Government is now in a minority of one in maintaining the position that extraterritoriality should be limited simply to items of torture and missiles with a range in excess of 300 kilometres. Can we press you, Minister, to adopt the view which is now being universally taken, not only in this Committee but by those outside, that at least the extraterritoriality provision should be extended to MANPADs, rocket-propelled grenades and light automatic weapons?

Dr Howells: I certainly take that point, Sir John. I am not entirely sure about those particular items; have they been identified by this Committee as the most pressing need?

Q252 Sir John Stanley: By this Committee and, indeed, by everybody who studies and understands this business outside the Committee as the most likely weapons in which this particular form of abuse could take place, in other words the UK resident who, knowing it would be a criminal offence to export these to a certain country from within this country, goes overseas to another country and makes their money that way. We have taken the view in this Committee that that is a wholly unacceptable statutory position to continue and we urge you very, very strongly to adopt the same position taken by this Committee and indeed universally outside.

Dr Howells: I shall certainly talk to my colleagues in detail about that.

Q253 Sir John Stanley: It is disappointing, if I might say so, Minister; you are coming in front of this Committee in place of the Cabinet Minister with the lead responsibility in this particular area, and we were hoping to get expressions of Government policy from you and not just undertakings to take it back.

Dr Howells: We will certainly consider any evidence in this respect as part of the three-year review that is coming up. I would certainly like to look at those particular items because I would maintain that our primary tool in this respect is to look at end use and to look at the whole panoply of intelligence and evidence that we have about the use of weapons. I am a little wary, and always have been, about trying to have a list of weapons which exclude others, but I will certainly look at it.

Q254 Sir John Stanley: Minister, could we put it to you that this is not an issue that, certainly so far as this Committee is concerned, could wait for a further review of an unknown length of time since the last secondary legislation was passed. All the departments concerned are fully aware of the evidence that has been put in front of this Committee, and the legislative change that we are seeking is one that is achievable by secondary legislation and it simply awaits a policy decision by ministers. Can you not take such a policy decision and do so in this session?

Mr Moore: The Committee are aware of the issue of extraterritoriality and the legal difficulties that are involved in extraterritoriality. When we get into that territory it has to be items of the most extreme concern in order for us to work through and be clear on which items are of the greatest concern, because extraterritoriality can get us into major problems with other countries. We would need to look at that very carefully and we have looked at it carefully up to now, but at this point we have not come to the conclusion that those particular items are the ones where we move into extraterritoriality and, as the Minister says, there is the three year review.

Q255 Sir John Stanley: Minister, can I just ask you to respond to this point? The issue has been raised about legal difficulties; is it not the case, Minister, that the Government has already extended, notwithstanding the legal difficulties, the principle of extraterritoriality to drug-trafficking and child abuse and if it can be done in those areas, in a much more defined area like the export of MANPADs, surely the legal difficulties are very much less than what the Government has already successfully surmounted in the two other areas I have just referred to.

Dr Howells: Point taken, Sir John, and I will certainly undertake to look at that.

Q256 Chairman: Can I turn to another issue that the Committee has been concerned about and raised when Malcolm Wicks gave evidence to the Committee in relation to the Export Control Organisation, and it is the policy issue about dual use. You will be aware that we have taken evidence concerning the exports of Land Rover flat-packs to Turkey that were then transformed into military vehicles that were then used by Uzbek troops during the Andijan massacre in May of last year. My question is, once the EU embargo was imposed on arms exports to Uzbekistan in December of last year, was it the intention then of the UK Government to prevent such an embargoed destination getting access to equipment of that kind that would support its security services?

Dr Howells: Land Rover of course - and I am sure you are aware of this, Mr Berry - supplied flat-pack civil Land Rover Defenders to a Turkish company which was called Otokar, who then assembled the cars, adding its own products and components before selling them to the Turkish Government under its own name. The Turkish Government then gifted these vehicles to the Uzbek Government under a joint counter-terrorism agreement. Those vehicles were not Land Rover approved products. Under the EC Dual-Use Regulation and our own domestic legislation the UK has no power to control the export of civilian specification Land Rovers. The export of civilian vehicles, converted by a Turkish company, using its own technology and without UK involvement is a matter for Turkish export controls. It is a difficult case, certainly, but I hope that that clarifies the situation.

Q257 Chairman: Do you not agree that under Article 4.2 of the Dual-Use Regulation there is a "catch-all" provision in relation to the supply of dual-use goods to embargoed destinations, and I quote: "An authorisation shall also be required for the export of dual-use items [intended for military end-use] not listed in Annex 1 if the purchasing country or country of destination is subject to an arms embargo ..." Do not the Dual-Use Regulations apply in precisely this case, after the embargo had been announced - clearly not before, but once the embargo had been announced?

Dr Howells: This is hindsight, of course, because when Land Rover sold those civilian flat-pack Land Rover Defenders to Turkey we had no way of knowing that the Turkish Government was going to gift considerably modified Land Rovers to the Uzbeks, and that is a very difficult situation in those circumstances.

Q258 Chairman: That is true, Minister, but when we took evidence from the Export Control Organisation and we asked them precisely the same question about would not the exports of Land Rovers be licensable under the Dual-Use Regulations, the reply we received on the record was "that is a moot point". I was wondering if by now the Government has clarified whether that moot point was a good point or a bad point.

Dr Howells: I do not think it is a moot point; if we do not have a right to control those exports of what we might call civilian vehicles then there is no ambiguity about it, especially for sale to a NATO country which has bought a good deal of equipment in the past without any controversial modifications, and then those products could be gifted on or sold on to somebody else. Certainly we know now from this lesson that we will have to be very careful in terms of looking at that kind of export licence in the future.

Q259 Chairman: If today the Land Rover flat-packs were to be exported to Turkey for precisely the same purpose, to end up being used by the armed forces in Uzbekistan, you are saying that they should be controlled.

Dr Howells: That would be a very challenging situation for us and we would have to look at it very carefully. I am not sure that we have any legal right to stop Land Rover exporting civilian vehicles.

Q260 Chairman: Do you accept there should be control under the Dual-Use Regulations or not?

Mr Moore: Of course, you cannot control Land Rovers because that is a very difficult thing to do, to control that just as a Land Rover. What we would do if we got another application along these lines is we would take it through the criteria, the consolidated criteria, making a risk assessment of whether, among the criteria, there could be a diversion issue, that they could be diverted in a direction which could ---

Q261 Chairman: Land Rover would be well-advised in future to seek advice before exporting without considering applying for a licence?

Mr Moore: We have been in good contact with Land Rover and I am sure they know what our regulations are and they would talk to DTI.

Q262 Chairman: Thank you. Finally, Turkey is obviously seeking EU membership and, therefore, adherence to EU arms embargoes. Will these issues be raised in accession negotiations with Turkey?

Dr Howells: They have already come to see us about this and there have been discussions between officials from Turkey and our officials at the Foreign Office, and there is a whole range of issues which certainly Turkey has to be aware of if its application to join the EU is to be a successful one.

Chairman: Thank you. David.

Q263 Mr Borrow: If I can perhaps continue on the dual-use theme, the current EU regulations were reviewed in 2004 on a peer review basis to see how well they had been implemented across the EU. I have a list here of discrepancies that were found or things that were considered of concern, including industrial awareness programmes, the technical capacities available to national authorities to evaluate licence applications and classify items, and as regards the intelligence infrastructure. The review also found that the application of the dual-use regulations differed with regard to the use of the catch-all clause, the implementation of denial exchanges, intangible technology transfer controls, and transit and trans-shipment controls. I would be interested if you could tell the Committee whether there has been any follow-up following that peer review, and whether any gaps have been identified in the UK regulations as against those in other EU countries?

Dr Howells: Mr Borrow, as you say, the peer review identified a number of recommendations for further action, both at national and EU level, and work has focused on the broad areas identified in the Council's statement of December 2004. The main achievements have been the following: improved information exchange - which is very important of course - discussion aimed at minimising divergent practices on textbook authorisation, work towards a review of the regulation as regards dual-use goods in transit or trans-shipment, the establishment of a pool of technical experts on recognition of dual-use items subject to control, agreement to establish an electronic database to record denial notices made by Member States under the regulations - which would be very, very helpful - a comprehensive review of licensing and customs practices regarding control enforcement, an examination of the administration, the catch-all control, which can be used to control export of non-listed goods which are destined for use in a weapons of mass destruction programme. As regards the further work that you asked about, the recommendations produced by the peer review certainly represent a very ambitious and challenging agenda, and progress on a number of issues, including how to achieve greater convergence in the use of the various kinds of authorisations and of practices concerning the implementation of the catch-all clause, or the most efficient way to carry out controls on transit and trans-shipment, will be made in the light of an impact assessment study being conducted on the Commission's behalf. These and other outstanding issues will be addressed in the communication that the Commission will present to the Council this year, 2006.

Q264 Mr Borrow: Are you able to give a specifically UK approach to this as against, obviously, looking at it across the EU, in particular aspects of UK communication that were identified or have been identified as a result of the peer review?

Dr Howells: We think that we can learn from all of these and we are certainly very vigorous in playing our part in ensuring that this review affects our own policy on these issues as well as EU policy. We think there is a very, very close connection between the two.

Chairman: Thank you, Lindsay.

Q265 Mr Hoyle: Obviously, there is a little bit of concern because we were getting very worked up about dual-use but the bottom line is it does not matter whether it is dual-use or not. As we know from the other night in Nepal, we could see ordinary Japanese flat-truck vehicles actually bringing riot police in and doing exactly the same work as what the Uzbekistan military did, in attacking its own people and suppressing them. It does not matter whether it has a gun clip on or not, the bottom line is that any four-wheel drive vehicle would have done the job, or in this particular case in Nepal, any truck would do exactly the same job. My worry is how do we deal with countries that are going to suppress their people - and Nepal one minute was supplying them helicopters to protect them from Maoists, for the same equipment to now be used on its own people who are fighting for democracy. There is a great worry here and we have this obsession about dual-use. We ought not to be obsessed about dual-use because the bottom line is any four-wheel drive vehicle will do it, whether it has a gun-clip on or not.

Dr Howells: Mr Hoyle, I am not quite sure how to answer this because of course there have been periods when we have been very supportive of the Government and, indeed, of the Royal Family in a country like Nepal, and there are many other countries where we supported those governments very closely, where we supplied four-wheel drive vehicles in countries where the roads were extremely bad and communications were bad, and sometimes those vehicles subsequently have been used. What we have to do really is to try and use all of our intelligence to best effect. It is very difficult, often, to second-guess what is likely to happen in a country like Nepal, and Sir John Stanley knows and has talked to me about the fact that not so very long ago it was not a country which sought great repression, but seemed to be a country where there was a good deal of satisfaction amongst its inhabitants. I am not sure that any government department or any government has the ability to try to second-guess what is likely to happen in those circumstances, but we have to try our best and we have to try and use our intelligence in the best way possible in order that we do not supply this country with equipment which could have this dual-use. I agree entirely with you, I do not think there is a golden rule about dual-use which gives us some magical insight into what is likely to happen in a country.

Q266 Mr Hoyle: Just to pursue that a little, the argument was that there was a problem with this Land Rover, it had a towing hook on and it had a gun clip. The bottom line is the vehicle was used to suppress people. My view is that any four-wheel drive vehicle would have done that whether it had a towing hook on or a gun clip or not, and the reality is how do we try and ensure that any supplies to countries at the moment such as Uzbekistan and Nepal, how do you actually stop that, because any type of vehicle will do exactly what was done to suppress the people and it is that that I do not think we can get over. The argument about dual-use is immaterial, the bottom line is that they could have bought a Land Rover to say it is for disaster relief and it could have been turned on the people.

Dr Howells: Certainly. Criterion 2 of the consolidated EU and national arms export licensing criteria is of course the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country of final destination, and I think we would fully subscribe to that, but it is extremely difficult sometimes to second-guess what is likely to happen in a situation like that.

Chairman: Thank you. Richard Burden.

Q267 Richard Burden: Has the Government's policy on arms and military equipment exports to Israel changed since 2002?

Dr Howells: The Government's policy has not changed since 2002 and the letter that we sent to this Committee on 4 April outlines this. If we believe there is a clear risk that any items, whether lethal or non-lethal, would be used in a manner inconsistent with criterion 2 which I have just referred to, we would certainly not issue an export licence, and the decision would be made about whether an export would be used aggressively or in a manner of legitimate self-defence based on the record of the proposed end user, the equipment in the application and, of course, the prevailing circumstances. When assessing an application for components the Government assesses the use of the final project against those criteria for them.

Q268 Richard Burden: In 2002 there was the issue of an exchange of correspondence between our Government and the Israeli Government regarding assurances that had been given regarding armoured personnel carriers, which we had been assured would not be deployed in the Occupied Territories, and it was subsequently discovered that they were being so deployed. The Foreign Secretary in 2002 said in adopting the criteria "We will no longer take the Israeli assurances given on 29 November 2000 into account" and the assumption that I assume there is the fact that Israel said it would not be used in one way would not mean that you would necessarily believe them. Is that still the case?

Dr Howells: Yes, that is very much the case. The Committee sought confirmation about assurances and the reply to a PQ on 15 April 2002, which you have referred to, still holds true about the use of assurances; we do not use them.

Q269 Richard Burden: Could you tell me how the Government defines - as you have to make your own judgments on this - equipment that would be being "deployed aggressively in the Occupied Territories"? Given the fact that Israel is in illegal occupation, what would be equipment that would be being deployed defensively in the Occupied Territories?

Dr Howells: We would have to make a judgment on that, or certainly we would and DTI would. I can imagine, to return to the point that Mr Hoyle has made, almost any piece of equipment, I suppose, could be used aggressively, especially in occupied areas, there is no question about that, and we have to be very, very sensitive and very careful in terms of any licences that we would issue to applications for that kind of equipment.

Q270 Richard Burden: How do you assess it and how have you assessed it?

Dr Howells: The default position is for us to say that there should not be troops in those occupied areas anyway, and very often of course it is a difficult thing to assess if the base for those troops and therefore for that equipment is in the State of Israel itself and it is later deployed in the Occupied Territories. These are assessments we have to make and discussions we have to have on an on-going basis.

Q271 Richard Burden: If you think the equipment could be being deployed in the Occupied Territories you would consider that it would not be appropriate for export.

Dr Howells: We would have to look very, very carefully.

Q272 Richard Burden: The reason I ask these questions is that in early 2004 the then Secretary of State for Trade and Industry was suggesting that Britain is very diligent in rejecting applications from Israel, and the example given was that in 2002 the Government refused 84 standard individual export licences for Israel, the highest number of refusals for any destination, which is quite impressive. I am just aware that in the last Strategic Arms Export Controls annual report the number of sales actually increased to 89, the number of refusals had decreased to 13, that in a year when the number of deaths in the Occupied Territories had gone up and not down. That, to me, sounds a little odd.

Dr Howells: It may sound odd but there may not be a very direct cause and effect on that, it depends on all kinds of circumstances - what the behaviour of the Israeli border police and army is, it could depend on many things. It could depend on the aggressiveness or otherwise of Hamas or of Islamic jihad, it could depend on anything, and I could imagine that after a very large number of denials of applications, turning them down, rejecting them, perhaps the Israelis have learnt from that.

Q273 Richard Burden: The number of applications went up and the refusals went down.

Dr Howells: I have tried to explain that, there may be all sorts of variables in that equation.

Mr Moore: Of course, there are different kinds of export licence and you cannot do a direct comparison between the different types.

Q274 Richard Burden: They all went up.

Mr Moore: Yes, but one export licence could be very different from another, we do look at things case by case.

Q275 Chairman: Before I bring Quentin in, what monitoring of end use of these exports to Israel do you undertake?

Dr Howells: We look very carefully at the way in which any equipment that has been exported is used and it is an area and two countries that are under very, very intense observation. We have very good teams in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem and we watch very, very carefully what is going on.

Q276 Richard Burden: Can you give us any examples?

Dr Howells: Sorry, whose question am I answering?

Chairman: I am sorry, Richard and then Quentin. Richard, your last question.

Q277 Richard Burden: Can you give us any examples of monitoring of end use that has led to any kind of change of approach?

Dr Howells: The key thing is the risk assessment beforehand, that is the major point. In that risk assessment we have to be looking at what happens on the ground, so we will take that intelligence as part of our overall assessment exercise of any application that is made. I was in Jerusalem myself and I did not see any British equipment being used, to give you a specific example, but I certainly saw signs of people's lives being very severely disrupted by, for example, the construction of a barrier.

Q278 Richard Burden: Is British equipment being used on that?

Dr Howells: I am sure there is British equipment and we would look very, very carefully at such equipment applications and we do look very carefully.

Chairman: We had better move on. Quentin.

Q279 Mr Davies: Dr Howells, can I just express the view that, of course, where conditions have been imposed for an export licence or assurances given, they must be enforced, in this case the condition that we did impose or the assurance that we did seek, that the APCs would not be deployed in several Occupied Territories, was misconceived because one can seriously imagine a situation in which a terrorist incident occurs in the territories, or indeed an attack on Israel through artillery or other means made from the territories, and the Israeli defence forces have to respond defensively not offensively. If their nearest troops are deployed in British-made APCs it would be absurd if they could not use them for that purpose, to respond to that incident defensively, to save the lives of people, Palestinians or Israelis. I just want to put that thought to you.

Dr Howells: Yes, indeed, I accept it and Mr Burden alluded to it when he put his question forward, which was how on earth do we differentiate between an aggressive use of a piece of machinery, a vehicle, or whatever, and a perfectly understandable, defensive response. It is not easy, it is probably the most difficult part of the world in which to make those decisions.

Q280 Mr Keetch: Can I move to something, Minister, that is not a Land Rover or a piece of equipment for building a wall, but is in fact a Beretta 92S semi-automatic pistil, which probably only has one use. Are you aware of the report in The Observer of 19 March 2005 that said that 20,318 of these weapons - which, if I remember my Ian Fleming correctly, was actually James Bond's original choice of weapon - were flown via Stansted with a DTI licence to the Coalition Provisional Authority and then were distributed to the Iraqi police. Iraqi officers have subsequently said that these have been "passed on to the friends of al-Zarqawi" insurgency organisation, and both the British arms companies involved in this sale admit that some of the weapons, possibly thousands of these weapons, found their way into the hands of insurgents. Are these reports correct? If so, what are we doing to ensure that the end use of semi-automatic pistols exported by British companies into Iraq, where there is a situation of, I am sure we would all agree, unfortunate uncertainty, is correctly applied?

Dr Howells: We look very carefully at anything that is exported to Iraq, as you might imagine, and certainly we made a decision that the Iraqi police face very, very difficult circumstances. I am old enough to remember, Mr Keetch, the way in which the IRA got a lot of its arms in Northern Ireland; they sometimes took them from our dead soldiers and policemen, and that happens in difficult situations like this one. Yes, the guns were certainly bought from the Italians, as far as I know - we are looking at this one very carefully - they were exported to Iraq for distribution to the police forces. The most difficult problem would be if there are sectarian groups within that police force that have got very direct and worrying links to insurgent militias or to other people who basically are trying to kill our troops, our development workers and other people out there, and that is something we have to be extremely sensitive about, and I believe that we were. I have no doubt that in some of the attacks on police stations, some of the murders of policemen out there, some of these weapons probably did get into the hands of enemies of the Iraqi Government and enemies of ours.

Q281 Mr Keetch: It is a terrible question to ask, Minister, but is there any evidence that any of these weapons or other weapons supplied from Britain have actually been used in attacks against British troops or British forces?

Dr Howells: We are certainly not aware of that and we have looked very carefully at that.

Q282 Richard Younger-Ross: Dr Howells, it is fairly well-known that not all the police are loyal to the new government. We had an incident not that long ago where the police handed over British soldiers to insurgents and had to be rescued, we have statements from the chief of police in Basra that he can still only rely on about half of his forces. Do you not think that there is a duty to ensure that the end use and the final destination of these weapons is checked on a regular basis, and that maybe your comment about extracting weapons from dead bodies is slightly misleading when the most likely source for supplying these weapons is actually via the soldiers within the Iraqi police force?

Dr Howells: I was in Basra a few weeks ago myself and I spoke to the commander of police there, who is a very honourable man and is burdened with a great many difficulties, not the least of which is that he does not believe that he needs half the policemen that he has got. He has got them there, they have been appointed as part of a job creation scheme, and he is very worried that there are corrupt policemen and there are certainly people I met down there who are convinced that the greatest problem in that area is of criminality. There are gangs, death squads, there is a lot of smuggling going on and at one point he told me that 25 per cent of murders in the area are probably committed by men wearing police uniforms. We are not sure if they are policemen or whatever, but we look very carefully at this and we try to assess the impact of any licensed distribution of weapons like this one and we try to learn from it. I would have to turn the question around and say do we arm some policemen and not other policemen, how do we tell? As we try to build capacity, try to build a good police force, help build a good force with others working in that area we have to make a judgment on who should be armed and who should not be armed, we try to do that and we have tried to do it in this instance.

Q283 Mr Keetch: On a slightly different but associated subject, Dr Howells, you said that you were in Basra, and members of this Committee have been there also recently. You would have been protected, as we were, not by British troops but by members of private security companies.

Dr Howells: No, I was protected by British troops.

Q284 Mr Keetch: As a Minister of the Crown I am very glad you were.

Dr Howells: I was very glad too I might say.

Q285 Mr Keetch: Some of us were protected by private security companies; are they allowed to take any weapon they choose into Iraq and what controls are given on them for the use and control of their weapons when they go into Iraq?

Dr Howells: We receive all applications from private security companies and any other agencies operating there, and anything that comes to this Government, to DTI in the first instance, for an application for a licence to export any weapon has to be assessed on the same basis as any other export that is going to Iraq. We are very, very careful.

Q286 Richard Younger-Ross: What controls are put on fairly common building materials like laser lights used to open and close lift doors, but which can also be used to trigger roadside bombs?

Dr Howells: We are very much aware of Hezbollah bomb technology which has got down there - we are not sure how it has got down there, but I am sure you have got views on this and I have got views on it. We understand very well the potency of infrared, remote detonation devices that have killed some of our troops down there and we are very, very careful about the way in which any technology like that is sold and distributed in the southern Iraq area or anywhere else in Iraq.

Q287 Mike Gapes: Can I take you a little bit further south to Saudi Arabia? In an earlier answer that you gave to Lindsay Hoyle you said that the Government fully subscribed to criterion 2 in the EU code on arms exports which requires respect for human rights in the country of foreign destination. As you are aware, as a Foreign Office minister, the annual human rights report of your own department is rather critical of human rights in Saudi Arabia, to put it mildly, and it talks about continued violations of human rights in a number of states. How therefore can you justify arms exports to Saudi Arabia?

Dr Howells: Every export licence application is certainly considered against criterion 2 on a case by case basis, we pay particularly close attention to criterion 2 for Saudi Arabia, and we would certainly recommend refusal if there was concern or a clear risk that the equipment might be used contrary to the conditions of criterion 2. There have been small but we think very significant improvements in the human rights situation in Saudi Arabia, and decisions on export licences are certainly always made on a case by case basis in the light of an up to date assessment of the way in which the specific equipment would be used by the specific end user.

Q288 Mike Gapes: You refer to "small improvements"; would it be accurate to say that our Government is prepared to ease the application of criterion 2 where there are small improvements, even though there are still abuses of human rights?

Dr Howells: It would be strictly on a case by case basis, we would have to look at it very specifically. There is no general rule of thumb or anything of that sort.

Q289 Mike Gapes: Would that be because you want to take account of our strategic interests?

Dr Howells: Certainly we sell a lot of equipment to the Saudis, but that would not nudge aside our prime consideration which is criterion 2.

Mr Moore: You will be aware, I am sure, that we have the criteria and then we have the other factors which are in the list and appear after the criteria. The criteria come first and then we look at the other factors.

Q290 Mike Gapes: Can I just be specific then? The annual human rights report refers to violations including "restricting freedoms of expression and press, assembly, association, religion and movement". The Quarterly Report April to June 2005 lists the following as being exported to Saudi Arabia: armoured all wheel drive vehicles, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for general purpose machine guns, general purpose machine guns, general purpose machine guns maintenance equipment, gun silencers, smoke hand grenades, and the July to September Report 2005 talks about tear gas and riot control agents. Would you agree that all of those could be used, either directly or indirectly, to perpetrate human rights abuses in Saudi Arabia?

Dr Howells: Yes, of course they could all be used, but we have to make a judgment on whether they will be used. I can also say to you, Mr Gapes, that Saudi Arabia has been very concerned since the invasion of its neighbour, Kuwait, by Iraq and they sought to improve the capability and capacity of their own armed forces and they have a perfect right to do that. We would judge each of these export licences on a case by case basis.

Q291 Mike Gapes: How many export licences have you refused to Saudi Arabia recently?

Dr Howells: I do not know. We will find those figures for you.

Q292 Mike Gapes: Will you let us have them in writing?

Dr Howells: Yes.

Q293 Chairman: Is it not right, regarding Mr Moore's comment that of course the Government looks not only at criterion 2 but at the other criteria, the Government's critics would simply say we all know perfectly well why Saudi Arabia is a major recipient of UK arms exports, despite the human rights record, and it is that there are massive business opportunities there for UK defence manufacturers and that strategically Saudi is seen to be "on our side". Is not the nub of the matter that the human rights aspects can be quietly ignored in those circumstances?

Dr Howells: No, we certainly do not ignore human rights aspects and we press the Saudis as we press anybody else to try to advance human rights in that country, and we will continue to do so.

Q294 Robert Key: Minister, sadly I was not able to make it to Geneva on 23 March of this year to listen to your speech, but it was a very good speech, if I may say so. You said in the course of that speech that an arms trade treaty should cover all conventional arms, not just small arms, and you said it could be based on a listing system; this might be a completely new piece of work or it might be based on something that has already happened. Could you just flesh out a little what you envisage the process being now that you have signed up to this?

Dr Howells: In a sense it comes back to Sir John Stanley's first question about what kinds of weapons are the ones causing the most harm, for example, at any time, and I have been a little worried and I know the secretary of state has, that in the SALW negotiations there has been a limit, if you like, on the size of arms and the kinds of arms which really should not be there. We have to look right across the whole portfolio of arms that are used because there are some pieces of equipment that seem to be outside of that study at the moment and we think they ought to be in there, so we are very much in favour of a much more general approach to this.

Q295 Robert Key: This is really because the arms trade treaty is not about ending the arms trade, it is about responsible use of the trade in arms.

Dr Howells: Precisely, and we are also committed of course to securing a UN-based process on that. We think that that approach offers more chance of success than previous approaches because it is not telling countries that they cannot buy arms and it is not telling countries that they cannot sell arms, it is looking for a much more responsible use of those and an assessment of the ways in which they are likely to be used.

Q296 Robert Key: What is the attitude of the United States to this?

Dr Howells: The United States, to be very candid, are very worried that we will not get very far with this. In a sense it is a kind of council of despair; if we do not try we do not know and in my discussions with the Americans they are very keen that there ought to be an arms trade treaty which can bite, which can begin to modify this situation, but we have to convince them that they ought to be spending time, effort and energy on this programme.

Q297 Robert Key: On 6 May the campaign for an arms trade treaty of course is having a high street nationwide day of action. A lot of people will be surprised that somebody like me will be supporting that, on the basis, as you point out, of responsible arms trade. Is it in your experience true that a responsible arms trade is actually beneficial for the peacekeeping operations, for example, of the British? The British are up against a lot of small arms or, for that matter, weapons that have been supplied irresponsibly and that is dangerous for our forces.

Dr Howells: I could not agree with you more that the more legitimate we can make that trade and recognise and regulate it, the more the UN realises that it can do something about this, then the more it will be to the benefit of everyone. By the way, Mr Key, it was ironic really that on the day that I delivered this speech in Geneva the NGOs active in and around Pontypridd were condemning me for not being with them in their protest on that day - somebody had not checked.

Q298 Robert Key: Will the list for a treaty include dual-use items?

Dr Howells: Hopefully it will include all items that could be used as weapons. We are very, very keen to see that there is not the kind of modification and reconfiguration of what at the moment look like civilian products for military uses, and I would see that as part of a much wider dialogue about how we approach this whole subject.

Q299 Mr Borrow: Minister, in that same speech you mentioned the capacity-building requirements of other countries in terms of arms control and that the work that the UK was doing in terms of outreach work had moved beyond simply popping over somewhere to have a little chat and back again and that you are doing more targeted work. Could you explain what sort of detailed outreach work the UK is doing in countries in terms of the prospective treaty, how many countries are likely to need support and whether countries other than the UK will need to contribute to that support if internationally the treaty is going to work as it should work?

Dr Howells: This is a very, very important point. We know that if this treaty is going to mean anything and if it is going to be effective then we have to help those countries to build up their own capacity to make it happen, so we have held extensive discussions with our allies, with China, with Russia, with the US to try and understand how best this could come about. I am due to go to Moscow very shortly, for example, where there will be quite extensive discussions about how we might take this forward. Probably the most optimistic signal is that the UN General Assembly is interested in it and they seem to agree with us that the best way to secure an arms trade treaty that is going to work is through a UN-based process. We looked at other ways in which we might do it - the Ottawa way and there were a number of suggestions - and we think that this is the proper way to do it, but it does involve painstaking work, it involves a lot of diplomacy, and we have to try to convince some very big arms manufacturers that they are best served by this as well as, if you like, those countries that suffer most as a consequence of the proliferation of arms. It is a big diplomatic offensive that we have undertaken, but we are determined to press on with it. It is something which the Foreign Secretary first aired about a year ago, I have taken it on a little now and we are determined to press on with it.

Q300 Mr Borrow: Have we got any practical details in terms of the cost of doing an effective programme in this area and the numbers of experts in these areas that will be required in order to give the support to capacity building in other countries and whether that pool of expertise actually exists in the first place?

Dr Howells: The outreach work to promote effective export control is certainly, as you say, Mr Borrow, extremely important in the fight against proliferation. EU outreach activities include seminars, visits, covering topics such as industry awareness, capacity building, customs procedures and assistance with drafting legislation, which is also very important, and a good current example of EU outreach work is the EU's €1.5 million pilot project running from 2005 to 2007 on the export control of dual-use items. We have four nations identified as key partners in this pilot project: China, the UAE, Serbia and Montenegro and the Ukraine, and that is proceeding.

Q301 Robert Key: Minister, there was a lot of progress made during our recent Presidency of the EU on the Code of Conduct on Arms Exports; in fact, at working level the EU Code was agreed, then it ran into the sand. What went wrong?

Dr Howells: Mr Key, the revised code is certainly agreed, as you say, at a technical level and the Council has agreed to adopt the new arrangements at an appropriate juncture. The new arrangements should see a legally binding common position which will further enrich and entrench Member States' strong commitment to common standards. The main changes envisaged are these: an increase in the scope of the code so that its criteria cover all applications from brokering, transit, trans-shipment and intangible technology transfer licences - which have been very difficult as you know - in addition to physical exports that can be uncovered, and I can remember from my own time in DTI the difficulty that we had with issues like intellectual property rights - those intangibles are extremely difficult to control in so many ways - and an obligation on Member States to refuse export licences if they consider that there is a clear risk that the items covered by the licence will be used to commit serious violations of international humanitarian law. This amendment was suggested by the international committee of the Red Cross which I think is pretty clear evidence that the EU is open to suggestions from external parties.

Q302 Robert Key: Forgive me, but what do you mean by that, pressure from external parties?

Dr Howells: The Red Cross, NGOs, they are listening to non-governmental organisations in a way which I at least - I do not know about you, Mr Key - find very refreshing.

Q303 Robert Key: Sure.

Dr Howells: It brings experience on the ground in areas where weapons have been used to bear on the deliberations.

Q304 Robert Key: Which nation is blocking it then?

Dr Howells: Trevor, you have had long experience of this one.

Mr Moore: I was the chairman of COARM ---

Q305 Robert Key: Congratulations on your success; what a pity the politicians could not live up to it.

Mr Moore: We are hoping that consensus can be reached, but we do not think it is particularly constructive to point fingers. Consensus has not yet been reached but we hope that that can be achieved ---

Robert Key: Mr Moore, I am not asking you to point fingers, I am asking you, within these four walls, to just tell us - come on now, in the spirit of friendship ---

Mr Keetch: Write it down.

Q306 Robert Key: Next time we visit these countries perhaps we can suggest they should mend their ways. Minister, can you help us? A shrug of the shoulders will do.

Dr Howells: I cannot help you.

Q307 Chairman: The broadcasting sign is up there, in fairness ---

Dr Howells: Trevor is quite right, Mr Key, I do not think it would be constructive to point fingers at this stage. We are negotiating very hard on this and we are convinced we can make progress.

Chairman: It was a very good try, if I might say so, Robert. Shall we move on?

Q308 Robert Key: One final point. Will this EU code actually be applied to dual-use items again?

Dr Howells: As far as I am aware, yes. All countries will certainly have to take particular account of the final use of any products which they know are being exported for the purposes of licensed production in third countries.

Q309 Mr Davies: I think a very important constitutional point just came out of the exchange you have had, Dr Howells, with Mr Key. Am I not right that if the provision which was, of course, included in the proposed draft European Constitution last year under which meetings of the Council of Ministers in legislative mode would be in public, we would know who it was who was opposing this particular code of conduct or this particular set of agreed restrictions? That is a concrete difference, is it not, between the present regime in the European Union and the one that would have been brought about had we had the European Constitution in place?

Dr Howells: I am sure you are absolutely right, Mr Davies.

Q310 Mr Davies: Thank you, Dr Howells. We have an arms embargo with China, do we not?

Dr Howells: Yes.

Q311 Mr Davies: That is something many of us feel should not be relaxed in the present circumstances. It was therefore with very considerable surprise that I learned that export licences had been granted for engines for combat aircraft, specifically the Rolls-Royce 140 Spey engine for the JGH-7 combat aircraft in China. How can that be?

Dr Howells: The China arms embargo prohibits the export of military aircraft and helicopters, vessels of war, armoured fighting vehicles and other such weapons platforms. However, the UK interpretation of the embargo does not extend to components of these weapons. Aircraft engines and radar therefore are not caught by our interpretation of the embargo. However, export licence applications for this type of equipment are assessed very rigorously on a case-by-case basis against the consolidated EU and national arms export licensing criteria. The criterion, Mr Davies, sets out clearly our commitment to assess the risk that exports might be diverted under undesirable conditions and used for internal repression, external aggression or the risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer, which is also very serious. Where we judge the proposed export might be used in contravention of the criteria those export licence applications are refused.

Q312 Mr Davies: Yes, but, Dr Howells, the fact is in this case that the export licence has been granted and an aero engine for a combat aircraft is a key part of a combat aircraft, so this is a gaping hole, is it not, in the arms embargo with China?

Dr Howells: Mr Davies, we look very carefully at each one of those on a case-by-case basis and, if we consider that it would be used for internal repression, or any of the other -----

Q313 Mr Davies: I am not suggesting combat aircraft are going to be used for internal repression, but it does build up the offensive capability of China and the whole point of the arms embargo is that we should not build up the offensive capability of China. I put it to you that our policy has been completely incoherent and we are simply standing idly by and allowing the Chinese to make a mockery of the system. They cannot purchase from us a complete combat aircraft but they are perfectly capable of producing their own air frames anyway, and we kindly supply the aero engines. We are in fact deciding to provide the Chinese with an additional offensive air capability. You cannot really be much more in breach of the purpose of the arms embargo than that, can you?

Dr Howells: I certainly do not believe that (a) we are standing idly by, Mr Davies, and (b) we are enhancing their capability.

Q314 Mr Davies: I am sorry, Dr Howells: are you telling the committee that supplying an engine for a combat aircraft is not enhancing the capability? Are you seriously telling the committee that?

Dr Howells: I would have thought that a spare engine or any other part of an aircraft allows them to maintain that capability. It does not extend that capability, I would have thought.

Q315 Mr Davies: No, but the engines are being fitted to new aircraft as they are coming off the production line. No doubt spares are being supplied as well. That is increasing capability, is it not, and spares are also increasing capability? Surely, Dr Howells, you will not disagree with me about that. The capability of an air force is the capability to fly and if you supply spares you enhance their capability to fly; they can fly more hours. What you are doing, I think, is just trying to wheedle out of a very embarrassing situation which the Government has got itself into in which you have been declaring that the Government is signed up to the EU arms embargo for China, that the Government supports the objectives of the arms embargo, and then you have been, as I say, allowing a coach and horses to be driven through that by granting these licences for these aero engines. The Chinese must be laughing all the way from Harbin to Chungking, I should think.

Dr Howells: I would not describe my answer as trying to wheedle out of anything. I thought I was quite candid with you about it, and I am certainly not trying to apologise for it in any way, nor trying to rationalise it as some kind of means of making money out of China. I would say this to you, Mr Davies, -----

Q316 Mr Davies: What is the objective then?

Dr Howells: Let me say. We have certainly got a developing dialogue with China on export controls and we have taken a lead on the China leg of the EU Export Control Outreach Pilot project, which I have just described. We have gained knowledge of Chinese export controls in the Government's very serious approach to export controls and we have tried to clarify that to them, and we think we understand China as well as any country does now. We are working to foster China's emergence as a responsible global player and to encourage it to define its interests more broadly in somewhere like Africa, for instance.

Q317 Mr Davies: Dr Howells, I think you have let the cat out of the bag by saying that you are leading the way when it is quite clear that what the Government is actually doing is that the Government wants to relax this embargo without daring to say so, and you are trying to push things as far as possible and even breach blatantly the spirit of the embargo by granting this kind of export licence.

Dr Howells: No, we certainly do not want to do that and we do not want to lift the embargo before there is agreement throughout the EU on this -----

Mr Davies: You are trying to push in that direction and you are leading the way.

Q318 Chairman: Quentin, let the Minister reply.

Mr Moore: Can I at least tell you the systems we have in place to look at export licences. I can say that I chaired a meeting three or four weeks ago where we were checking our systems with regard to China, and we had input from the Ministry of Defence, from the Department of Trade and Industry and from the Foreign Office. We look at each of these applications with great care, taking the criteria into account. We look at human rights, we look at creating stability and we look at potential aggression, so the systems we have in place are quite substantial and very careful.

Mr Davies: It is not an embargo.

Robert Key: It looks like pilots for fridges.

Q319 Linda Gilroy: Just to set that in the wider context, are you saying that the Government has carried out thorough systematic analysis of China's behaviour in importing and exporting military equipment of strategic items?

Dr Howells: Yes, we look very carefully at that.

Q320 Linda Gilroy: What are your conclusions about where they may be straying away from where you would prefer to see them not going?

Dr Howells: We have had a great many worries about that over the past 30 years, there is no question about it, and we are looking at the moment at trying to persuade China that, for example, its activities to skewer resources in Africa should not be motivated by narrow, short-term economic interests. That is something one would have thought we ought to have a dialogue with China about.

Q321 Linda Gilroy: Are you having that dialogue?

Dr Howells: Absolutely, yes, we do.

Q322 Linda Gilroy: Do you agree with the recent article in the Financial Times that China is pursuing in Africa a "hard-nosed and value-free" policy to acquire oil, resources and markets in countries such as Zimbabwe, and that it will undermine hard choices of political and economic reform?

Dr Howells: Yes, we are worried about that, and we have tried to persuade them otherwise.

Q323 Linda Gilroy: What do you think the consequences are for arms control if China steps up arms sales to countries such as Zimbabwe?

Dr Howells: Very serious, which is why we seek to maintain our influence on decision-making in China.

Q324 Linda Gilroy: So is there a justification for lifting the embargo while China is prepared to increase arms sales that fuel conflicts in Africa?

Dr Howells: Mrs Gilroy, it is a subject of very serious debate within the EU at the moment. We are taking part in that debate and we watch the situation in China very carefully and we judge each application for an export to China on a case-by-case basis and on the basis of the criteria that I have already mentioned.

Q325 Mike Gapes: Can I take you back to your answer earlier to Quentin Davies? The Foreign Secretary came before our committee on 12 January 2005, and in an answer to a question there he said, "If you go back to the China arms embargo there is quite a lot of room for interpretation about the scope. As it happens, the UK interpreted the China arms embargo in a narrower way than some other Member States." Can I put it to you that your answer just now would imply that in fact we are no longer interpreting it in a narrower way but are in effect taking a looser interpretation as a precursor to the fact, as we were told during the evidence when we produced this report, that in practice the arms embargo on China and the EU code of conduct will in practice be no change, that in fact you are already loosening up the interpretation from a narrow definition as of 2005 to a wider definition now, and that is what we are seeing? Can I bluntly put that to you?

Dr Howells: And I will answer you very bluntly: absolutely not.

Linda Gilroy: Do you mean broader rather than loosening?

Mike Gapes: I am saying that -----

Chairman: The questions go to the Minister.

Q326 Mike Gapes: What I want to be clear on is, would you have been exporting engines for fighter aircraft in 2004 to China, whereas now we are doing so?

Dr Howells: Yes, we have exported spare engines in the past.

Q327 Mike Gapes: There is no change, no loosening up of the interpretation?

Dr Howells: No: no change, no loosening up, no subterfuge or hidden agenda.

Q328 Malcolm Bruce: In the context of Darfur, as I understand it, it is China that has been blocking the attempts to get embargoes and has actually put pressure on the Sudanese Government. Would it not be an effective counter to the Chinese pressure to stop selling engines unless they were prepared to work with the international community to apply those sanctions?

Dr Howells: Mr Bruce, that is certainly a proposition that is worth looking at and it is the kind of proposition that is considered. We have to make those decisions and they are not very easy decisions to make. We are certainly very worried, as I said in answer to Mrs Gilroy's question, about the way in which China is looking, for example, at obtaining its raw materials from Africa as they are becoming more and more difficult to get at prices that a country like China can afford. It is a serious matter and we certainly look on a case-by-case basis at each of these applications.

Q329 Mike Gapes: Is there not another problem with the way that China is behaving in Africa, and I quote the specific example of Angola to you? I visited Angola in 2004 and at that time the Angolan Government was not under any kind of constraint in terms of its attitude to its revenue from oil sales. It had not signed up to the transparency initiatives to do with anti-corruption.

Dr Howells: When was this?

Q330 Mike Gapes: In 2004, and it was clearly, because of its debts, facing some serious problems. The Chinese came in and a deal for a former Shell area for exploration off the coast was up for sale. It was going to be bought by an Indian company but at the last minute a Chinese company came in and got it. As a result of that, as I understand it, the Angolan Government was given some financial help by the Chinese and therefore was not signing up to the criteria which the International Monetary Fund and the other international institutions wanted. Can I put it to you that there is a real danger that China's approach in Africa is undermining moves towards good governance and transparency and the kinds of things that we in our general policy wish to encourage, and it is linked into this question of arms sales as well, which was touched on earlier?

Dr Howells: Certainly, Mr Gapes, I did not know about that example of that oil exploration block and the various shenanigans that went on to enable the Chinese to obtain the right to explore for that oil and presumably to tap it. There is no doubt, and I want to make it clear to this committee, that we want to see China's engagement in Africa support democratic and accountable governance and we work very closely with China to achieve that end. It is no good us backing off and trying to say that, well, they are going to do it anyway. If that is the case there is no point in trying to maintain these diplomatic links with China. We do not believe that it is a hopeless case. We think that China can be persuaded to adopt a different attitude.

Q331 Mike Gapes: I am not arguing against diplomatic links. There is an issue here that international standards are being undermined by the way in which the Chinese are operating whereby they make no demands on governments about whether they are corrupt or despotic or whether they carry out genocide against some of their own people. As long as they can get the resources, that is what they are interested in getting.

Dr Howells: Mr Gapes, we have to try, hard as it is, to persuade them otherwise and we have to try to maintain what links we have, good links, with the Chinese, whether it is politicians or companies, and we have to try to persuade them that if we are to have a sustainable future for all of us then China has got to play its part in trying to improve governance and not undermine it, whether it is in Africa or anywhere else.

Q332 Peter Luff: At least there are prospects for success in engagement with China and for world resources, and there are some grounds sometimes for hope and optimism in the world. There is evil in the world but sometimes good things happen and countries come out of arms embargoes because there is an improvement in those countries. Obviously, it is important that the EU takes a consistent approach. The approach I understand is characterised as the toolbox, for what reasons I do not quite know. How is the toolbox coming along? How many tools has it got in it?

Dr Howells: I have to tell you, Mr Luff, that I hate that expression as much as you clearly do. Nevertheless, it is the kind of garbage language that we use these days. The toolbox will be a set of measures that the Member States will use with post-embargo destinations. Crucially, it will oblige Member States to share information in detail and on a frequent basis about the licences that they have recently granted for any country emerging from an EU arms embargo, and this document is not yet agreed. We hope it will be soon, and certainly before any question of that embargo against China is lifted.

Q333 Peter Luff: It is more than a year since the committee was first told about the progress of the toolbox. In your memorandum in December you talked about final details still emerging. It is dragging on a bit, is it not?

Dr Howells: It is dragging on a bit, yes, not for want of effort from us though, I may add.

Q334 Peter Luff: Thank you for that. How did we, for example, when Libya came out of its own embargo, ensure a consistent approach applied there?

Mr Glover: It is fair to say that the toolbox is an extra element in the debate that other members of the committee have already raised, so the two things have got caught up in the same nexus. For Libya the toolbox obviously does not apply because it is not agreed, but there has been discussion of Libya within COARM which Trevor chaired during our Presidency and which I attend now we have not got the Presidency. We share information about the kinds of licence applications we are getting for a country like Libya, and there is a tour de table when Member States say what they have received, what they have approved and what they have not, so we have internal transparency on that basis but it is not as systematic as is nailed down in the toolbox because it is not agreed yet.

Q335 Peter Luff: It has got the odd screwdriver or two but not yet a full set?

Mr Glover: We have got the tools we had at the start but we have not got the new tools yet.

Q336 Malcolm Bruce: Some of us are somewhat alarmed to see what a clever and purposeful group of scientists can do to transfer the technologies that we do not want to get into the wrong hands, and Abdul Qadeer Khan appears to have done it comprehensively over a period of 30 years, possibly being the prime source for Iran, Libya and North Korea. I want to ask you what lessons we can learn, and in particular the extent to which they are able to use front organisations so that over a period of 30 years we did not know it was going on. We did not have any intelligence. What have we learned from that and how can we be sure that it is not going on and will not go on again?

Dr Howells: I am sure, Mr Bruce, that it still is going on and it worries me enormously. I heard, for example, when I was in Islamabad recently that A Q Khan is perhaps under some kind of house arrest or detention but there are reports that he is seen at some receptions in some parts of the city and so on, but the guy is a sort of national hero, the father of the Pakistan bomb. Certainly the damage that he perpetrated for a whole range of reasons we are still discovering the extent of, and the connections with Iran, for example, are almost certainly very strong and very serious ones. What do we do about it? I mentioned a little earlier the two-year pilot project that is trying to promote export control co-operation. We are trying through that pilot project to work out how it might be possible to exert much greater influence and control on the way in which these scientific secrets, if you like, are disseminated and passed around. I think we can make progress on that. I think we have learned a lot from the A Q Khan affair about the way in which these things happen, and hopefully we can make the defences against that kind of leakage much stronger in the future.

Chairman: Minister, there were two or three other questions that we wanted to pursue, but I am mindful of the fact that, with a division and coming back, what the pressures on your time are, so if you are agreeable perhaps we could write to you on the remaining three questions rather than reconvene the whole meeting. Colleagues are agreeable, so, Minister, can I say formally thank you very much indeed to yourself and your two colleagues for coming this afternoon. It has been very helpful indeed and we really appreciate it.