|
This Report is the first of three case studies under the Committee's over-arching inquiry into how Government handles scientific advice, evidence and risk in policy making. We examined this subject to test the way in which scientific advice is used by the UK Government to influence policy at an EU level, and also in response to concerns from the medical research community about the potential impact of this Directive on the use of Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) equipment for diagnosis, treatment and research.
The Committee has discovered failings in the way that scientific advice was used to inform the EU Physical Agents (Electromagnetic Fields) Directive, both in Brussels and in the UK. We found that the Commission was heavily reliant on one source of advice, the International Commission on Non-Ionising Radiation Protection (ICNIRP), and was not sufficiently responsive to concerns raised by the magnetic resonance community. As a result, it is deeply regrettable that the research necessary to establish whether or not the Directive will inhibit the use of MRI scanners is only now being carried out, with a risk that it will not be complete in time to inform the implementation of the Directive, due by 2008. On the basis of the level of certainty in the available scientific evidence, we agree with the Government that there was not a strong enough case for a Directive covering MRI: existing guidelines are sufficient.
In the UK, we identify serious failings in the consultation process. In particular, we are critical of the highly disappointing response of the Health and Safety Executive and the Health Protection Agency to the concerns expressed by the magnetic resonance community about the potential impact of the Directive. This response was characterised by an instinctive and dismissive resistance rather than an attempt to engage and examine. We also find it extremely worrying that the Health and Safety Executive was giving information on its policy in the UK that was in flat contradiction to the line it had been pursuing in negotiations in Brussels.
The weaknesses of the consultation process were exacerbated by the slow reaction of the magnetic resonance community to the full potential impact of the Directive and by failings in the horizon scanning activities of Government and the Research Councils. We have suggested improvements to the way in which the Government and scientific communities can interact on European legislation.
Finally, we used this case study as an opportunity to examine how the precautionary principle is applied in practice. Unfortunately, we found no clear evidence as to how it was applied in the context of this Directive, nor any satisfactory definition of the principle or explanation of how it should be applied.
| 
