ROLE OF ACPO
35. ACPO has two seats on the ACMD, reflecting the
key role played by the police in enforcing the Government's drug
strategy. We were concerned to discover a distinct lack of clarity
about their role on the Council. In oral evidence, Andy Hayman,
Chair of the ACPO Drugs Committee and member of the ACMD, told
us: "we have two seats on the ACMD and we will make a contribution
to it" but suggested that his contribution did not carry
the same weight as that of other Council members: "It has
to be said that the input from the police is going to be very
narrow compared with other colleagues on ACMD because the main
rationale as to why something goes into a different classification
is based on medical and scientific evidence, not necessarily on
what the police would bring to the party".[55]
Andy Hayman suggested that ACPO's role on the Council was essentially
passive, arguing that it was not for the police to comment on
the appropriateness of the classification of particular drugs:
"We do not have a view on what classification is; that is
not our job. It is for experts to determine what classification
drugs go into and once that is then linked to legislation and
police powers and priorities we would then implement that."[56]
36. By contrast, the Home Office has categorically
stated on more than one occasion that it expects ACPO to play
a full and active part in the ACMD's deliberations. The then Home
Office Minister Paul Goggins, for example, said that "Two
representatives of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)
are full members of the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs
and contribute their expertise and knowledge of policing issues
to the council".[57]
In evidence to this inquiry, the Home Office Minister Vernon Coaker
also told us: "You would expect and hope that the police
are bringing that knowledge and experience of dealing with these
issues to the committee. In my view, that would be why they are
there: to bring that experience, knowledge and understanding to
the committee".[58]
37. We have already highlighted the confusion over
whether the ACMD should consider social harms alongside clinical
and medical harm in its assessments. It is both worrying and perplexing
that, in light of the assertion of the ACMD Chairman that the
Council gives these two types of harm equal weight, the ACPO representativea
key member of the Councilshould still be under the impression
that this was not the case, despite having been on the Council
since January 2002. It is also extremely regrettable that this
apparent misunderstanding has caused the ACPO representatives
on the Council to play a less than full part in proceedings. Professor
Colin Blakemore, Chief Executive of the MRC and Professor of Physiology
at the University of Oxford, correctly pointed out that the police
were "in the best possible position" to provide evidence
about the relationship between drug use and its social impact.[59]
The police are also exceptionally well placed to gather data on,
and bring to the Council's attention, trends such that should
be informing the Council's work, such as the impact of a change
in classification on crime. There
is no point ACPO having a seat on the ACMD if its representatives
do not bring their expertise to bear on the problems under discussion.
The ACPO representatives have as much relevant experience as do
other practitioners and academics on the ACMD and they must play
a full and active role in developing the ACMD's position. It is
highly disconcerting that the Chair of the ACPO Drugs Committee
appears to be labouring under a misapprehension about his role
on the ACMD more than four years into his term of office.
ROLE OF HOME OFFICE
38. The ACMD has no staff or budget of its own and
its secretariat comprises four staff from the Drug Legislation
and Enforcement Unit of the Home Office's Drug Strategy Directorate.
One argument in favour of this arrangement is that it ensures
robust links between the Council and the Home Office, potentially
strengthening the role played by the Council's input in policy
development within the department. However, critics have suggested
that this arrangement also has the potential to compromise the
Council's independence. In oral evidence, Professor John Strang,
Director of the National Addiction Centre and former member of
the ACMD, expressed this very concern, suggesting to us that the
ACMD was not sufficiently independent of the Home Office.[60]
Whilst not necessarily supporting Professor Strang's view, Mr
Hayman, Chair of the ACPO Drugs Committee, did not enhance our
confidence by saying he did "not have a clue what the secretariat
[provided by] the Home Office does".[61]
Although we see the merits of the current arrangement whereby
the Home Office provides the secretariat to the ACMD, we acknowledge
concerns that this may pose a risk to the independence of the
Council. We also note that, in contravention of the Code of Practice
for Scientific Advisory Committees, the Home Office secretariat
does not possess any scientific or technical expertise of relevance
to the ACMD's work.[62]
39. Whilst we fully recognise the importance of preserving
the ACMD's independence, there must be mechanisms in place to
allow the Home Office to ensure that the Council is functioning
properly and providing advice of the highest quality. Rethink
has called for "the advice given by Government-appointed
bodies such as ACMD and Government policy to be regularly evaluated
by external organisations".[63]
Nevertheless, in response to a Parliamentary Question asking whether
the Home Secretary would make provision for independent testing
of the validity of the review process used by the ACMD, the then
Home Office Minister Caroline Flint stated that the Government
had "no intention" of doing so. Her explanation for
this was that the Government "believe in the integrity of
the council and its individual members, and are confident that
the advice we receive from them is of the highest quality".[64]
She also stated that she was "content that the range of professions,
and levels of expertise on the ACMD is suitable".[65]
It is difficult to understand
how the Government can be so confident in the composition and
workings of the Council without having sought any expert or independent
assessment, and disappointing that it takes such a dismissive
view of the need to do so.
40. The ACMD has a critical role to play in provision
of advice underpinning a key strand of Government policy. There
must be independent oversight of its workings. We
recommend that the Home Office commission independent reviews
to examine the operation of the ACMD not less than every five
years. The first such review should be commissioned as soon as
possible to enable the outcome to feed into the current re-examination
of the classification system. This review should also address
the relationship between the Home Office and ACMD and whether
the current secretariat arrangements are working in a satisfactory
manner. We will consider the broader issues
relating to best practice in scrutinising the work of scientific
advisory committees in our over-arching Report. In the meantime,
we propose that the Home Office Chief Scientific Adviser take
the lead in commissioning a review of the ACMD.
23 Ev 95 Back
24
Ev 55 Back
25
As above Back
26
Ev 65 Back
27
Ev 105 Back
28
Ev 65 Back
29
Q 459 Back
30
As above Back
31
Ev 95 Back
32
Ev 91 Back
33
HC Deb, 19 Jan 2006, col 988 Back
34
Q 388 Back
35
Q 260 Back
36
Qq 1241-45 Back
37
Q 137 Back
38
Q 137 Back
39
Ev 54 Back
40
HM Treasury, 2004 Spending Review Public Service Agreements
2005-2008 , 12 July 2004 Back
41
www.drugs.gov.uk/drug-strategy/psa-targets/ Back
42
Ev 54 Back
43
Ev 107 Back
44
Ev 106 Back
45
Ev 74 Back
46
As above Back
47
Not published Back
48
Q 164 Back
49
Q 158 Back
50
Chief Scientific Adviser, Office of Science and Innovation, Guidelines
on Scientific Analysis in Policy Making, October 2005, para
13 Back
51
HC Deb, 7 Apr 2005, col 1781W Back
52
As above Back
53
HC 900-xii, (to be published in HC 900-II, Session 2005-06). Back
54
House of Lords, Radioactive Waste Management: Government Response,
Second Report of the Select Committee on Science and Technology,
Session 2004-05, HL Paper 89, para 22 Back
55
Q 398 Back
56
Q 390 Back
57
HC Deb, 8 Feb 2006, col 1275W Back
58
Q 1249 Back
59
Q 400 Back
60
Q 413 Back
61
Q 415 Back
62
Office of Science and Technology, Code of Practice for Scientific
Advisory Committees, December 2001, para 38 Back
63
Ev 74 Back
64
HC Deb, 7 Apr 2005, col 1783W Back
65
HC Deb, 7 Apr 2005, col 1782W Back