Conclusions and recommendations
Background
International comparisons
1. We
conclude that the UN drug control treaties do not pose a major
barrier to reform of the UK system of drug classification. (Paragraph
16)
Sources of advice
Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs
2. The
Government's total reliance on the ACMD for provision of scientific
advice on drugs policy gives the Council a critical role to play
in ensuring that policy in this area is evidence based. It is,
therefore, vital that the Council is fit for purpose and functioning
effectively. (Paragraph 20)
3. The apparent confusion
in the drug policy community over the remit of the ACMD suggests
that the Council needs to give more attention to communicating
with its external stakeholders. (Paragraph 22)
4. The fact that the
Chairman of the ACMD and the Home Secretary have publicly expressed
contradictory views about the remit of the Council is perturbing.
(Paragraph 24)
5. The ACMD must look
at social harm in its considerations—it is impossible to
assess accurately the harm associated with a drug without taking
into account the social dimensions of harm arising from its misuse.
(Paragraph 24)
6. We acknowledge
that some provision has been made to enable departments other
than the Home Office to benefit from the ACMD's expertise but
the current levels of coordination appear to be entirely inadequate.
(Paragraph 27)
7. The ACMD must
be much more proactive in ensuring that it provides and promotes
scientific advice to underpin drugs policy in the Department for
Education and Skills and Department for Health. (Paragraph 27)
8. We are not in a
position to judge whether the current membership is appropriately
balanced but emphasise the importance of having a diversity of
views represented amongst the experts appointed to reflect the
range of views typically held by experts in the wider community.
(Paragraph 30)
9. The ACMD's current
policy of co-opting experts onto working groups and sub-committees
in order to expand access to specific areas of expertise seems
eminently sensible. (Paragraph 30)
10. We recommend that
the term of office for the Chairman of the ACMD be limited to
a maximum of five years. (Paragraph 32)
11. The Home Office
Chief Scientific Adviser should be tasked with overseeing the
appointment of members to the Council. (Paragraph 34)
12. We also recommend
that the Chairman always be accompanied by another member of the
Council—preferably the Chair of the Technical Committee
or the relevant working group—in meetings with Ministers.
(Paragraph 34)
13. There is no point
ACPO having a seat on the ACMD if its representatives do not bring
their expertise to bear on the problems under discussion. The
ACPO representatives have as much relevant experience as do other
practitioners and academics on the ACMD and they must play a full
and active role in developing the ACMD's position. It is highly
disconcerting that the Chair of the ACPO Drugs Committee appears
to be labouring under a misapprehension about his role on the
ACMD more than four years into his term of office. (Paragraph
37)
14. It is difficult
to understand how the Government can be so confident in the composition
and workings of the Council without having sought any expert or
independent assessment, and disappointing that it takes such a
dismissive view of the need to do so. (Paragraph 39)
15. We recommend that
the Home Office commission independent reviews to examine the
operation of the ACMD not less than every five years. The first
such review should be commissioned as soon as possible to enable
the outcome to feed into the current re-examination of the classification
system. This review should also address the relationship between
the Home Office and ACMD and whether the current secretariat arrangements
are working in a satisfactory manner. (Paragraph 40)
Incorporation of advice into policy
Cannabis
16. Changes
in drug policy, especially classification decisions, must be accompanied
by a comprehensive information campaign. We recognise that the
Government did undertake a campaign when the reclassification
of cannabis came into effect but in view of the subsequent confusion,
which was publicly acknowledged by the Home Secretary, we can
only conclude that these efforts were insufficient. (Paragraph
46)
17. We recognise that
the Home Secretary followed due process in asking the ACMD to
review the classification of cannabis in response to concerns
about the link between cannabis use and mental illness and perceptions
that cannabis was becoming more potent. However, the timing of
the second review against a backdrop of intense media hype and
so soon after the change in cannabis classification had come into
effect gave the impression that a media outcry was sufficient
to trigger a review. (Paragraph 47)
18. Having already
caused confusion by failing to adequately communicate the implications
of the reclassification of cannabis to the public, the Government
must be careful that any additional changes to policy relating
to cannabis do not further cloud the picture. (Paragraph 50)
19. We have found
no conclusive evidence to support the gateway theory. (Paragraph
53)
Magic mushrooms
20. The
Government's use of a clarification of the law to put fresh magic
mushrooms in Class A contravened the spirit of the Misuse of Drugs
Act and meant that the ACMD was not given the chance to consider
the evidence properly before responding. (Paragraph 55)
21. The Chairman of
the ACMD's attitude towards the decision to place magic mushrooms
in Class A indicates a degree of complacency that can only serve
to damage the reputation of the Council. (Paragraph 57)
22. The ACMD should
have spoken out against the Government's proposal to place magic
mushrooms in Class A. Its failure to do so has undermined its
credibility and made it look as though it fully endorsed the Home
Office's decision, despite the striking lack of evidence to suggest
that the Class A status of magic mushrooms was merited on the
basis of the harm associated with their misuse. (Paragraph 57)
Ecstacy and amphetamines
23. We
see the logic behind the differential classification of amphetamines
depending on the method of administration but regret the fact
that the same rationale has not been applied, where appropriate,
to other drugs. We recommend that a consistent policy be developed
as part of the forthcoming review of the classification system.
(Paragraph 59)
24. In view of the
high-profile nature of the drug and its apparent widespread usage
amongst certain groups, it is surprising and disappointing that
the ACMD has never chosen to review the evidence for ecstasy's
Class A status. This, in turn, highlights the lack of clarity
regarding the way the ACMD determines its work programme. We recommend
that the ACMD carries out an urgent review of the classification
of ecstasy. (Paragraph 62)
25. The recommendation
by the ACMD that methylamphetamine should stay in Class B because
of the signal that reclassification might send to potential users
has given us serious cause for concern. We recognise that the
Council often has to make recommendations on the basis of weak
or limited evidence, but invoking this non-scientific judgement
call as the primary justification for its position has muddied
the water with respect to its role. (Paragraph 66)
26. It is highly
regrettable that the ACMD took it upon itself to make what should
have been a political judgement. (Paragraph 66)
27. The ACMD's decision
to revise its position and recommend that methylamphetamine become
a Class A substance will be welcomed by many. However, the fact
that the ACMD changed its mind so quickly makes it look like the
Council either realised that it had made a mistake, or had succumbed
to outside pressure. (Paragraph 68)
Transparency
ACMD
28. We
do not accept that the majority of the Council's work requires
the level of confidentiality currently being exercised. The ACMD
should, in keeping with the Code of Practice for Scientific Advisory
Committees, routinely publish the agendas and minutes for its
meetings, removing as necessary any particularly sensitive information.
(Paragraph 71)
29. Holding open meetings
where the public could witness the processes used by the ACMD
in developing its recommendations could have enormous benefits
in terms of strengthening public confidence in the scientific
advisory process. We do not believe that the need for confidentiality
in discussion of certain topics is an insurmountable obstacle
to holding occasional, if not routine, meetings of this nature.
(Paragraph 72)
30. It is extremely
disappointing that the Council has not taken any steps to increase
the transparency of its operations and, moreover, that the Chairman
displayed so little interest in improving the Council's approach.
(Paragraph 73)
Home Office
31. We
acknowledge that in this sensitive policy area scientific advice
is just one input to decision making, The Home Office should be
more transparent about the various factors influencing its decisions.
(Paragraph 75)
The need for a systematic approach
32. If
the Government wishes to take into account public opinion in making
its decisions about classification it should adopt a more empirical
approach to assessing it. The Government's current approach is
opaque and leaves itself open to the interpretation that reviews
are being launched as knee-jerk responses to media storms. (Paragraph
76)
33. More generally,
we have identified a pressing need for both the Home Office and
ACMD to institute a more systematic approach to reviewing the
classification of individual drugs. We recommend that the Home
Office and ACMD draw up a list of criteria to be taken into account
in determining whether a review of a particular drug is required.
(Paragraph 77)
Evidence base for classification
Evidence for deterrent effect
34. We
have found no solid evidence to support the existence of a deterrent
effect, despite the fact that it appears to underpin the Government's
policy on classification. In view of the importance of drugs policy
and the amount spent on enforcing the penalties associated with
the classification system, it is highly unsatisfactory that there
is so little knowledge about the system's effectiveness. (Paragraph
80)
35. The Government's
desire to use the Class of a particular drug to send out a signal
to potential users or dealers does not sit comfortably with the
claim that the primary objective of the classification system
is to categorise drugs according to the comparative harm associated
with their misuse. It is also incompatible with the Government's
stated commitment to evidence based policy making since it has
never undertaken research to establish the relationship between
the Class of a drug and the signal sent out and there is, therefore,
no evidence base on which to draw in making these policy decisions.
(Paragraph 82)
Evidence base for classification decisions
36. If,
as the ACMD Chairman indicated to us, the Council's work has been
seriously hindered by the lack of evidence, the ACMD should have
been far more vocal in pressing Ministers to ensure that more
research was commissioned to fill the key gaps in the evidence
base. (Paragraph 85)
UK investment in research
37. UK
investment in addiction research is woefully inadequate. The Government's
failure to ensure that sufficient resources are devoted to building
the evidence base to underpin drugs policy is at odds with its
commitment to adopt an evidence based approach. (Paragraph 87)
38. The Government
has been remiss in failing to conduct a proper evaluation of the
impact of its policy decisions in this area and has, as a result,
missed out on opportunities to gather valuable data to improve
policy making in the future. (Paragraph 88)
39. It is essential
that the ACMD and Home Office develop better relationships with
the Research Councils, particularly the Medical Research Council
and the Economic and Social Research Council, and further improve
relations with the Department of Health. The fact that the Council
has not devoted much effort to this in the past has been a contributing
factor to the weakness of the UK evidence base on drugs policy
and addiction. (Paragraph 90)
40. We do not underestimate
the challenges involved in undertaking scientific studies concerning
the misuse of illegal drugs, but the Government must not use this
as an excuse for not fulfilling its obligations to undertake proper
evaluations of the impacts of its policies and to fund research
for the public good. (Paragraph 91)
A scientifically based scale of harm?
Assessment of harm
41. We
welcome the initiative taken by the ACMD Technical Committee to
develop a standard framework for the assessment of harm but we
also note that determining harm scores using the matrix is almost
as much an art as a science. (Paragraph 93)
Current classifications
42. We
understand that the ACMD operates within the framework set by
the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 but, bearing in mind that the Council
is the sole scientific advisory body on drugs policy, we consider
the Council's failure to alert the Home Secretary to the serious
doubts about the basis and effectiveness of the classification
system at an earlier stage a dereliction of its duty. (Paragraph
97)
Review of classification system
43. We
urge the new Home Secretary to honour his predecessor's promise
to conduct the review—our findings suggest that it is much
needed. Although we are, of course, pleased that the Home Office
is placing such store by our recommendations, the long delay in
publishing the consultation paper on the review of the classification
system has been unfortunate and should be rectified immediately.
(Paragraph 100)
Relationship between classification and penalties
44. The
dismissive tone adopted by the Chair of the ACPO Drugs Committee
in giving evidence to this inquiry was disappointing, but his
lack of concern over the classification system was also revealing.
(Paragraph 102)
45. The fact that
the classification system is of such minor importance to the police
suggests that it is not fit for purpose. (Paragraph 102)
46. We recommend that
the Government make this de facto relationship more explicit
and decouple the ranking of drugs on the basis of harm from the
penalties for possession and trafficking. (Paragraph 102)
47. Decoupling penalties
and the harm ranking would permit a more sophisticated and scientific
approach to assessing harm, and the development of a scale which
could be highly responsive to changes in the evidence base. (Paragraph
103)
Benefits of a more scientifically based scale
of harm
48. A
more scientifically based scale of harm than the current system
would undoubtedly be a valuable tool to inform policy making and
education. (Paragraph 104)
49. It is vital that
the Government's approach to drugs education is evidence based.
A more scientifically based scale of harm would have greater credibility
than the current system where the placing of drugs in particular
categories is ultimately a political decision. (Paragraph 105)
50. In our view, it
would be unfeasible to expect a penalty-linked classification
system to include tobacco and alcohol but there would be merit
in including them in a more scientific scale, decoupled from penalties,
to give the public a better sense of the relative harms involved.
(Paragraph 106)
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