House of Commons - Science and Technology

Select Committee on Science and Technology Sixth Report

4 Sources of scientific advice

48. The identity cards scheme relies on several different sources of scientific and technological advice on both the biometric and ICT aspects of the scheme. The Home Office has formalised this advice to a certain extent in relation to biometrics by creating advisory committees. Currently advice regarding ICT is seemingly provided on a more ad hoc basis.

Advisory committees

BIOMETRICS

49. The Home Office has set up two advisory committees on biometrics: the Biometrics Experts Group and the Biometrics Assurance Group. The Biometrics Experts Group has gradually evolved during the life of the identity cards programme. The Biometrics Assurance Group first met on 24 November 2005 and again on 20 February 2006 and 15 May 2006.[107] As well as creating these committees the Home Office has sought to enhance its work in biometrics by establishing a Home Office Biometrics Centre of Expertise.[108] This Centre, which opened in November 2005, is based at the Home Office Scientific Development Branch and it is headed by Marek Rejman-Greene.

50. According to the Government evidence, the Biometrics Experts Group "is a group of Home Office and external experts which meets approximately once a month. Its role is to actively contribute to the biometrics requirements of the programme".[109] In oral evidence, Katherine Courtney explained that this meant that the identity cards programme team used the Biometrics Experts Group "in reviewing our own plans, our own understanding, of what the technical risks are and how we can work with the technologies, and also to do that horizon scanning around what is likely to be developing over time".[110]

51. The Biometrics Assurance Group is made up of experts from academia and industry. It has ten members and is chaired by the Government's Chief Scientific Adviser, Sir David King.[111] Its functions include ensuring that the programme's requirements for biometrics are adequately specified, evaluating solutions proposed by suppliers, interpreting the outcomes of testing, and reviewing advice from the Biometrics Experts Group. However, the Assurance Group has only recently begun its work. Dr John Daugman, a member of the Biometrics Assurance Group, said in oral evidence on 3 May 2006 that the two meetings to date had been "mainly briefing opportunities for us to be briefed by Home Office officials and affiliated scientists", although he also acknowledged that "things are accelerating a bit more now".[112]

52. It is likely that in the future the work of the Biometrics Assurance Group could extend beyond the identity cards programme. In oral evidence to the Committee, Marek Rejman-Greene said that the Biometrics Assurance Group "will also look in the future at all the other related programmes using biometrics, such as the UK Visas Programme, programmes to do with immigration and eBorders".[113] This assertion was supported by the explanation from the Home Office Chief Scientific Adviser, Professor Wiles, regarding the involvement of Sir David King. Professor Wiles said that:

"This is a new technology which I think is probably going to have wider application. It therefore seemed to me it would make more sense to have an advisory committee that was chaired by the Government's Chief Scientific Adviser so that it could act as a scientific advisory committee in the first instance for the Home Office development but then subsequently for development anywhere else in government."[114]

We note that the Home Affairs Committee recommended in its Report on identity cards that the Government's Chief Scientific Adviser be involved in overseeing biometric testing.[115] This recommendation was accepted by the Government in October 2004 in its response to the Home Affairs Committee Report.[116] It is disappointing that, after accepting the recommendation, the Government took over a year to set up the Biometrics Assurance Group.

53. We welcome the establishment of the Biometrics Experts Group and the Biometrics Assurance Group, although we regret the time that the Home Office has taken to set them up. We support the involvement of Sir David King and believe that the Assurance Group has the potential to work well, particularly in providing consistent advice across Government. We seek confirmation from the Home Office that the Biometrics Assurance Group will be given the direction, tools and time to fulfil its tasks in practice and that the Group's recommendations will be taken into account.

Information and communication technology

54. The Government's written evidence asserts that assurance on ICT within the identity cards programme is provided firstly by the Independent Assurance panel made up of representatives drawn from industry and secondly by external review by the Home Office Science and Technology Reference Group. The Independent Assurance panel consists of four members with experience of large-scale projects in the public and private sector. The Home Office explained that the panel "provides oversight of the programme's ability to deliver the scheme".[117] The panel not only provides assurance on ICT but also on marketing, organisational change, risk and fraud. The Science and Technology Reference Group covers all science and technology within the Home Office and is chaired by the Permanent Secretary. The membership is drawn from the learned societies and in November 2005 the Committee had eleven members, including the Permanent Secretary and departmental Chief Scientific Advisor.[118] Only one of these members, Dr Michael Rodd, specialises in computing.

55. We acknowledge the roles played by the Independent Assurance panel and the Science and Technology Reference group in providing assurance on ICT. However, we are concerned that although these panels have important roles in addressing generic issues, they may not be best-placed to offer expert advice regarding ICT. We welcome the balance of in-house and external advice regarding biometrics and recommend that a similar approach is used for ICT. We also note that the input of external experts has been recently formalised by another department, the Department of Health, in its Connecting for Health Programme. The role of advisory committees more generally will be explored in the over-arching report into scientific advice, risk and evidence. We recommend that the Identity and Passport Service establish an ICT Assurance Committee consisting of academics and industry experts and that this committee reviews the programme specifications relating to ICT.

56. Furthermore, we note that references regarding who has responsibility for ICT in the identity cards programme have been noticeably absent from the Government's evidence. Professor Wiles told us that "I do not have responsibility for ICT in the Department".[119] We were told informally by the Science Secretariat at the Home Office that the Chief Information Officer, Vincent Geake, had responsibility for ICT advice within the Home Office, including the identity cards programme. However, this was later qualified in a written response by the Home Office that stated "Vincent Geake is responsible for providing advice about ICT strategy, but not about ICT delivery within programmes".[120] The Home Office noted that the principal way that the Chief Information Officer was engaged with the identity card programme was through meetings of the Programme Board.[121] The response provided little further detail regarding the possible sources of ICT advice within the identity cards programme and did not explain the role of the Chief Information Officer within the Identity and Passport Service (see Figure 1, page 10).

57. Since 2004, as part of its Transformational Government agenda, the Government has developed the roles of Chief Information Officers and Chief Technology Officers.[122] The Chief Information Officer and Chief Technology Officer should in principle be part of a joined up, Government-wide ICT profession that is aiming to improve performance of Government ICT resources and helping to find solutions to common problems using technology.[123] However, there appear to be problems with the implementation of this strategy within the Home Office and in relation to the identity cards programme in particular. First, we have not seen any evidence to suggest that the Home Office has a Chief Technology Officer. Secondly, the roles of the Home Office Chief Information Officer and the Identity and Passport Service Chief Information Officer are unclear in relation to the identity cards programme. Although we were assured in relation to scientific and technological advice that "the mechanisms to be used by Identity and Passport Service will not be substantially different from those used prior to the formation of IPS", it seems that the establishment of the agency has caused confusion and in ICT in particular, responsibility for advice is unclear.[124] We welcome the work that has been undertaken over the last two years by the Government in developing the network of Chief Information Officers and more recently, Chief Technology Officers. We have not received any evidence demonstrating that these changes have impacted upon the identity cards programme. Given the central role played by ICT in the identity cards programme, we recommend that the involvement of ICT professionals within Government in the scheme be made clear and, if appropriate, that the Chief Information Officer chair the ICT Assurance Committee.

Academia and learned societies

58. Although the Home Office has engaged productively with representatives from academia in some aspects of the programme, such as the Biometrics Assurance Group, in other areas evidence has shown that a dialogue about scientific advice with academics has been less visible and successful.

UK COMPUTING COMMUNITY

59. The UK Computing Research Committee (UKCRC) was highly critical of the Home Office's approach to the academic computing community. In oral evidence, Professor Martyn Thomas of the UKCRC said that, "I do not think there has really been any consultation with the academic community".[125] It seems however that the academic community is keen to offer advice on ICT. The evidence submitted to us by the UKCRC catalogues a series of attempts to engage with Government officials regarding ICT issues with little apparent success. This written evidence concludes that "overall, we have been disappointed with the extent to which scientific evidence has been sought or used in our area of expertise".[126] The involvement of the academic community is important because, as Professor Thomas pointed out, it is "independent and therefore can bring something to a consultative process that industry really cannot because we can stand back as independent academics and look at the viability of something and look at best practice without having a vested interest of any sort".[127]

60. Despite its apparent lack of direct contact with the academic ICT community, the Home Office is still reliant upon its advice. In oral evidence to the Committee, Nigel Seed Director of the National Identity Register explained that "The British Computer Society put out quite a comprehensive report on the complexity of IT projects…They listed the ten most common causes of failure…I went through this and we have ticked the box and we have learnt from the Computer Society who are the experts in the field".[128] In response to written questions from us, the Home Office also noted that its decision to use a modular IT architecture was supported by same report.[129]

61. We are perplexed as to why the identity cards programme team does not approach the ICT academic community directly rather than merely using published material. We believe that the Home Office is not taking full advantage of the impartial advice that could be offered by the academic computer science and information systems community. We recommend that the Home Office uses the ICT Assurance Committee in order to fully engage the academic ICT community.

LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS IDENTITY PROJECT

62. The London School of Economics (LSE) has featured strongly in the debate on identity cards because it has published several reports considering the Government's proposals. The written evidence submitted by the LSE notes that the Department of Information Systems at LSE began research into authentication and identification systems in the 1990s. In 2003 this progressed to research to inform policy and the public debate on identity cards. This research culminated in several reports: the Interim Report in March 2005, the Identity Project Report in June 2005 and the Research Status Report in January 2006.[130]

63. The LSE Identity Project Report was critical of the identity cards scheme and proposed an alternative scheme. According to the LSE, its reports have "questioned some of the key policy goals of the ID cards scheme, reviewed the likely effects on policing, assessed the challenges and risks in the Government's proposals, and offered an alternative scheme for public consideration".[131] The LSE reports have attracted a lot of publicity and although the reports considered various aspects of the scheme, debate has focused on the costs of the scheme. The assertions made by the LSE and the Government regarding costs will be dealt with in more detail in the following chapter (see paragraph 100).

64. It seems that the LSE reports were intended to stimulate discussion regarding the Government's proposals. In oral evidence to the Committee, Professor Angela Sasse, Professor of Human-Centred Technology at University College London explained that "the intention was to seek a constructive debate"[132] Unfortunately, the reports created a debate that appeared at times to be more destructive than constructive. Dr John Daugman from Cambridge University has noted that "public debate about the proposed biometric ID cards has been dominated by a single document, the 'LSE Report'".[133]

65. Given the central role that the LSE reports have played in the debate regarding identity cards, it is unfortunate that the information released by the LSE at an early stage had factual errors, particularly in relation to technology. For example, the LSE acknowledges that there were errors in its interim report confusing the iris with the retina. It has written that "in our interim report our lack of specialist advice in the area meant that we did confuse the two and we sought specialist advice and made many corrections before issuing our main report in June 2005".[134] The Identity Project Report was overseen by a steering group of 14 professors and we note that 79 of the 91 recommendations made by this report supported, or supported conditionally, recommendations made by the Home Affairs Committee in July 2004.[135] The LSE reports served a useful purpose in opening up debate on the scheme but the resulting emphasis upon the cost of the scheme and the errors in the initial interim report inhibited the development of the necessary wide-ranging debate.

66. Some of the controversy surrounding the LSE reports has resulted from the Government's reaction to them. The Home Office response to the LSE Identity Project Report outlined the Government's concerns regarding the LSE's cost assumptions and identified apparent weakness in the LSE's alternative scheme and inaccuracies in the report. It did not recognise any benefits within the LSE scheme or acknowledge any of the recommendations. The Home Office asserted that that LSE report was "vague in parts", "contradictory" and contained a "number of inaccurate assumptions".[136] On 18 January 2006, the Prime Minister told the House of Commons that "As for the calculations made by the LSE, I think that I am right that, although the report was put out under the LSE's name, it was actually written by the leading campaigner against ID cards on the ground of civil liberties. So I do not think that it is an entirely objective assessment".[137] According to the submission from the LSE this comment was one of many "spurious, misleading and ad hominem attacks on the reports and its authors".[138] In oral evidence, Professor Angela Sasse said that "I have been quite astonished by the way in which the Home Office reacted against the report because the intention was to seek a constructive debate and unfortunately it did not quite work that way".[139]

67. We are disappointed by the nature of the Government's reaction to the criticisms outlined in the LSE reports. We believe that the way in which the LSE reports have polarised the debate regarding identity cards, whether intentionally or not, has been detrimental. The Home Office would have been better advised to put together a dispassionate critique of the LSE Identity Project Report rather than seek to undermine its credibility and motivation.

Industry

68. Industry is a key source of scientific and technological expertise in the areas of ICT and biometrics. Many companies are eager to feed scientific advice into the identity cards programme. Microsoft for example, states that, "The industry has learned many lessons around identity, privacy and security and we are keen to share this knowledge more widely".[140] We recognise that industry has a vested interest the scheme in terms of winning contracts. Companies are keen to provide scientific advice because this could have a beneficial impact during the procurement process. However, it must also be noted that industry wants the scheme to succeed for reputational reasons. Jerry Fishenden from Microsoft explained that "I do not think anyone in industry would like to be here in 2, 3, or 5 years time, whatever the time scale might be, explaining why yet another major public sector IT project has gone off the rails if that were to happen".[141]

69. The Home Office has undertaken market sounding exercises and other forms of consultation with industry. As we have already explained, this process has not produced confidence in the identity cards scheme within the private sector (see paragraph 29).We reiterate our earlier recommendation that the Home Office engages in a wide-ranging debate regarding the scientific and technical aspects of the scheme with industry, to complement the procurement process.

70. We are also concerned that industry representatives may not have taken every opportunity to raise concerns regarding the scheme due to a fear of the commercial consequences. Jerry Fishenden from Microsoft wrote in an article for The Scotsman that "When we attend meetings with the Home Office I have noticed that representatives do not voice their concerns very much. Only out of meetings do you hear their concerns".[142] This reticence has perhaps been exacerbated by the lack of clarity regarding the procurement process, which has resulted in industry not knowing if commenting critically would harm their chances (see paragraph 46). It is therefore surprising, given the importance of commercial interests, that some industrial representatives such as Jerry Fishenden from Microsoft have taken the relatively unusual step of publicly criticising the scheme. In these circumstances, the issues that they have raised such as clarity, interoperability and the assessment of risk should be treated as particularly significant. We are also concerned that these individuals have been forced to write articles or give lectures because there are no channels through which they can feed their advice directly into the identity cards programme. We recommend that, particularly as it enters the procurement phase, the Home Office works to develop further its relationships with industry. Industry is a significant source of scientific and risk reduction advice as well as being a pool of potential suppliers. We reiterate that the Home Office needs to engage in wide-ranging debate with industrial experts regarding scientific and technical aspects of the scheme.

Co-ordination within Government

71. There is also a wealth of experience in large ICT systems and some biometrics programmes within Government. It is particularly important that this technical expertise and experience is available to the identity cards programme. Furthermore, given that identity cards may be used by several departments, it is crucial that these departments are involved in specifying the technology and ensuring interoperability. In May 2006, a new Ministerial Committee on Identity Management chaired by the Leader of the House of Commons was created.[143] The Committee includes Ministers representing 16 portfolios: Treasury; Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs; Trade and Industry; Home Affairs; Health; Cabinet Office; Northern Ireland and Wales; Constitutional Affairs; Education and Skills; Communities and Local Government; Work and Pensions; Environment, Food and Rural Affairs; and Transport. This Committee is intended to "co-ordinate the Government's policy and strategy on identity management in the public and private sectors, and to drive forward the delivery of transformational benefits across government".[144] The Committee will be supported by an Identity Strategy Management Group with representatives from key departments at Director-General level.

72. We have received evidence regarding several specific groups that enable cross-departmental working within the identity cards programme. The Home Office explained that an assessment of smart card technologies was aided by expertise from the Department of Transport.[145] The Home Office also has a biometrics practitioners' group, "Goldfinger", which has representatives from the eBorders programme, the FCO and other projects such as the facial recognition testing project.[146] The National Physical Laboratory (NPL) submission notes that it "has seen some evidence that the Home Office is engaging in horizon scanning activities with other government departments".[147] Furthermore, the NPL states that the "cross-departmental government Biometrics Working Group (BWG) [which] has been in existence for some years, provides a mechanism for sharing advice on biometrics across government".[148]

73. The evidence that we have received has highlighted two main areas of concern with regard to co-ordination on this issue within Government. Firstly, there has been a lack of communication between programmes that have a level of technological overlap such as the e-Borders programme or the then Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) Smart Card project. The e-Borders programme involves pre-boarding electronic checks of everyone flying to the UK, the collection of information from people on arrival and the monitoring of departures. As part of this programme, Project IRIS (Iris Recognition Immigration System) has been implemented at Heathrow, Gatwick, Birmingham, Manchester and Stansted airports. This system stores and verifies the iris patterns of qualified travellers. Qinetiq has stated that:

"there appeared to be some duplication in technologies being sought between the NICP [National Identity Card Programme] and eBorders programme. These are two very similar programmes, with similar aims, being run by two different departments [Directorates] within the Home Office with no apparent coherence although it would be fair to recognise that matters have improved over the past nine months."[149]

74. In oral evidence, the Minister, Joan Ryan, explained that it was not correct to say that "there is no interaction between our eBorders development team and the ID card scheme because there is and it is very important. I am not sure the relationship between what is being developed in both these things is as close as the relationship with UK Visas and biometric residents' permits".[150] Evidence also raised concerns that there was unnecessary overlap between the identity card programme and the National Smart Card Project, which was established by ODPM in November 2002. This project will use smart cards to identify people in the following situations: gaining access to buildings, proving entitlement to benefits, recording transactions and making payments. It is envisaged that smart cards, without biometric details, will be used to access services such as education, libraries and leisure facilities. In relation to the National Smart Card Project, the ALCO Group Limited has said that "the ODPM's Government Connect project has to follow a parallel track to the ID card which is both wasteful on cost and will be confusing for citizens".[151] The Home Office responded to written questions regarding its interaction with Local Government regarding smart card technologies by stating that they have discussed common interest such as transaction authentication levels with the National Smart Card Project and Government Connect.[152]

75. The second, and perhaps more pressing, area of concern is the co-ordination of the scheme across Government and the risk posed to the technological success of the scheme by function creep. As already noted, the Home Office has not clarified the scope of the scheme or the ways in which the card might be used (paragraph 43). Furthermore, several external organisations have raised concerns regarding cross-departmental co-ordination and communication in relation to the scheme. The LSE has noted that "Since it was first proposed in 2002, the Identity Cards proposal has failed to win universal support amongst central government departments".[153] Nick Kalisperas from Intellect said in oral evidence that "what we have here is a reflection of the silo mentality that exists with the public sector. What we have here is the Home Office procuring a national identity card scheme but only within the boundaries that the Home Office can do".[154]

76. When this issue of cross-departmental interaction on the identity cards programme was raised in oral evidence, the departmental Chief Scientific Adviser, Professor Paul Wiles, did not answer, regarding it as "an implicit policy question".[155] Professor Wiles did at least acknowledge that "there is an important issue here about interoperability and whether we can ensure there is interoperability".[156] This point was underlined by the Minister, Joan Ryan. She said that "it is absolutely crucial that interoperability exists".[157] She emphasised that across Government the e-Government unit and the Government's Interoperability Framework will ensure interoperability. However, given that the scope or use of the card within different Government departments does not yet seem have been finalised it is difficult to see how the scheme will be truly interoperable (see paragraph 41). It is more likely that other departments will have to fit into the scheme as developed by the Home Office. As explained by Intellect, the result is likely to be "a card that is very much reflective of the Home Office's own objectives and aims".[158] It is crucial that the scheme has a level of interoperability across Government and that technical specifications are able to interface. It is also important that the functions of the identity card are clarified as soon as possible across Government. During these discussions, the Home Office should also discuss the technological aspects of the scheme with other departments as well as the aims of the project. We recommend that the Home Office undertakes a cross-Government consultation regarding its plans for technology to support the identity card scheme before the specifications of the scheme are finalised and that it makes the findings of this consultation public.

International models

77. Several countries already use biometrics within identity card schemes. Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Hong Kong and the Philippines for example collect one or more fingerprints as part of their national identity card schemes. These countries illustrate the trend towards the use of biometrics in travel and other identity documents (see paragraph 20). As the use of biometrics grows, the potential sources of scientific, technical and practical advice also increases.

78. The identity cards programme team has sought advice internationally, in particular from the US, Hong Kong and the Philippines. This has involved visits to these countries, meetings and ongoing dialogue.[159] It has also used evidence on biometric technology from one of the world-leading institutes, the National Institute of Standards and Technology in the United States.[160] In oral evidence, Nigel Seed explained that the identity cards programme team were considering the scalability of the project by comparing it to other systems. He noted that "The FBI fingerprint database has something like 45 million records, so the number you can process are up there. The UAE has got in excess of a million records on iris. We know these large projects can work".[161]

79. There is little information publicly available regarding the performance of other large-scale biometric projects. Professor Angela Sasse from University College London said in relation to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) iris scanning scheme, that "there have been no observed, properly controlled trials where we would have the figures that we can work on. We basically have to take on trust what they are saying".[162] Furthermore, the value of such advice is obviously limited according to the comparability of the schemes. The UK is the first country to introduce a nationwide scheme using three biometrics. Dave Birch from Consult Hyperion said that "The UK is in a very different situation. Most of the countries that are rolling out what you would call smart identity cards…already have some form of ID card they are upgrading, so it is not transparently obvious that the lessons you would pick up could automatically be applied in the UK".[163] We also note that the success of different schemes varies according to cultural and social norms of different countries. For instance, acceptable behaviour in the UAE in recording or verifying biometrics might not be acceptable in the UK. Thus information from the UAE iris scanning scheme may not be applicable to the UK. Professor Angela Sasse explained in oral evidence that:

"the social and cultural context in those countries may not be exactly the same as in the United Kingdom, so certain behaviour that might be required from the citizen user in order to make the systems operate that may be perfectly acceptable there may not be acceptable to the citizens of the United Kingdom, and that aspect has not been looked at in a great amount of detail."[164]

80. Dr Tony Mansfield from the National Physical Laboratory agreed that "the environment, the population that is using the system, have a strong influence on the performance and the way these systems will work, so it does not matter how closely we look at other large schemes; it does not necessarily tell us exactly what would happen with biometrics on the United Kingdom scheme".[165] We recommend that the Home Office continues to develop international links during the programme but stress that the limitations of advice and evidence from other schemes must be recognised by Ministers in the light of the unprecedented scale, the use of multiple biometrics and the complex IT requirements of the UK scheme.

81. We also note an apparent discrepancy between the advice offered to us during our visit to the United States in March 2006 and the advice subsequently provided to the identity cards programme team. On 6 March 2006, we met informally a group of senior policy advisers from the Department of Homeland Security to discuss the identity cards programme. When questioned about the maturity of biometric technologies, the advisers agreed that currently the technology was probably not as reliable or as accurate as it might need to be for a national identity card scheme. We put these views to Katherine Courtney during an oral evidence session and she declined to comment on what we had been told.[166] The Home Office subsequently wrote saying that during a visit to the US in April 2004, officials put these views to senior advisers responsible for the operation, development and management of the US-Visit programme who rebutted them strongly.[167] Our visit to the US illustrated to us the ground-breaking nature of the UK scheme. In order to build public confidence in the technologies involved, we recommend that the Home Office publishes an overview of the scientific advice and evidence that it receives as a result of international co-operation.

107 Ev 72 Back

108 Home Office, Science and Innovation Strategy 2005-08, November 2005, p 14 Back

109 Ev 72 Back

110 Q 279 Back

111 Ev 73 Back

112 Q 529 Back

113 Q 283 Back

114 Q 1128, HC 900-x, (to be published in HC 900-II, Session 2005-06) Back

115 HC (2003-04)130-I, para 39 Back

116 Home Office, The Government Reply to the Fourth Report from the Home Affairs Committee, Session 2003-04, Cm 6359, October 2002, p 21 Back

117 Ev 117 Back

118 Home Office, Science and Innovation Strategy 2005-8, November 2005, p 36 Back