APPENDIX 7
Memorandum from QinetiQ
QinetiQ is Europe's largest integrated research
and technology organisation, with over 9,000 employees in the
UK, more than 750 of them PhDs. Formed from the Ministry of Defence's
research, development and testing agencies and now in the market
place, QinetiQ generates world-class technologies that are applied
not only in the fields of defence and security but in aerospace,
financial services, health care, transport and the environment.
QinetiQ has a long tradition of tendering impartial and respected
advice to UK Government departments and agencies, and as a contractor
to government is also subject to the scientific advice received
by Departments from a wide range of other sources.
QinetiQ has an involvement in all three of the
areas selected as case studies by the Committee, but most deeply
in the field of ID card technologies, to which most of our observations
relate. We also have a couple of general points to make. In view
of the brevity of our evidence, we have taken the liberty of dispensing
with an Executive Summary.
GENERAL POINTS
1. We fully support Sir David King in his
drive to ensure that decisions in all Government departments are
taken on the basis of high-quality scientific advice. The Departmental
Chief Scientific Advisers are starting to make their presence
felt, some more quickly than others depending on the culture of
different departments.
2. The term "scientific" tends
to be drawn too tightly. It is important that government and its
agencies receive not only the best scientific advice, but technological
advice of a similar calibre. This is not always fully appreciated
at present.
THE NATIONAL
IDENTITY CARD
PROGRAMME
Sources and handling of advice
3. In programmes such as CBRN the influence
of the Government Chief Scientific Adviser has been very clear.
However, for the NICP, the impression given is that most of the
policy has been driven by the results of technology assessments
from outside government and outside the Home Office.
4. There is little evidence that the Chief
Scientific Adviser has had any influence on the ID Card programme,
not least since there appeared to be some duplication in technologies
being sought between the NICP and eBorders programme. These are
two very similar programmes, with similar aims, being run by two
different departments within the Home Office with no apparent
coherence although it would be fair to recognise that matters
have improved over the past nine months.
Are existing advisory bodies being used in a satisfactory
manner?
5. The Home Office has used the National
Physical Laboratory in its earliest soundings of appropriate technology
for NICP, but QinetiQ, in its advisory capacity, has been surprised
that our involvement with similar biometric programmes conducted
on behalf of the Home Office and other Departments has not been
sought.
Are Government departments establishing the right
balance between maintaining an in-house scientific capability
and accessing external advice?
6. Although we are accustomed to the very
structured approach to R&D and procurement adopted by the
MoD, the Home Office's reliance on S-CAT and University research
seems to miss the depth of experience and expertise available
in the UK defence industry, a resource which is more familiar
with the challenges of large scale programmes and could guide
the Home Office on managing innovation into major projects.
Relationship between scientific advice and policy
development
Are departments engaging effectively in horizon scanning
activities and how are these influencing policy?
7. In the case of the NICP, we were surprised
that no activity was undertaken to look at technology lifespans
over the duration of the expected programme, with a view to understanding
vulnerabilities that will arise as technologies become obsolete
and vulnerable to criminal exploitation.
Is Government managing scientific advice on cross-departmental
issues effectively?
8. There are two issues to be addressed
here: the effective management of scientific advice on issues
affecting more than one department, and the need to make sure
that effort on differing programmes within a department is not
duplicated.
9. Within the Home Office, the similarity
and possible duplication of effort in NICP and eBorders suggest
that cross-departmental issues and projects could be managed more
effectively, although it is accepted that this particular duplication
may be a one-off instance.
Treatment of risk
Is risk being analysed in a consistent and appropriate
manner across Government?
10. It is our view that the programme still
contains considerable risk at this stage of procurement, even
though the Bill under which it is due to operate is well on its
way through Parliament. Although the outline business plan—not
available in the public domain—has clearly costed the system,
it has not done so from the standpoint of a telecommunication
system and sized the system, and thus the programme, by data size
and data transmission. This suggests to us that the programme
is not being costed or scaled on a basis more normal to standard
communication engineering practices.
How does the media treatment of risk issues impact
on the Government approach?
11. It inevitable that the media will focus
on the sensational or the worrying stories. More attention needs
to be given upfront to combining a media-savvy approach with informed
technical input. Unless acceptable risk is presented in an intuitively
understandable manner then the project can suffer from either
excessive conservatism or it becomes vulnerable to media drive
alarms.
Transparency, communication and public engagement
Is there sufficient transparency in the process by
which scientific advice is incorporated into policy development?
12. There is probably sufficient transparency
by now on this issue, and the situation continues to improve.
Unfortunately, at the beginning of the programme, available information
and justification for activity appeared thin.
Is publicly-funded research informing policy development
being published?
13. In some areas of the NICP, scientific
advice has been used to support policy. However, on scrutiny the
evidence has been more limited than the claims made for it. In
addition, much of the information made public so far has been
published after policy has been made, and has not been used to
inform debate or comment.
Is scientific advice being communicated effectively
to the public?
14. The technology aspects of the NICP could
be better used to justify policy action. QinetiQ has undertaken
considerable work for government on various aspects of identity
management. We were surprised that much of this was not utilized
and, instead, a single report from the National Physical Laboratory—valid
though it was—was the sole justification for using three
biometrics, for instance. The case could have been stronger by
tapping into the archive of technology reports that existed in
Government and elsewhere.
Evaluation and follow-up
Are peer review and other quality assurance mechanisms
working well?
15. In the case of the NICP, this process
is not visible to QinetiQ.
What steps are taken to re-evaluate the evidence
base after the implementation of policy?
16. Some re-evaluation is now being undertaken
within NICP to further risk reduce the programme in the light
of the very short procurement period that is provided for after
the Bill is enacted. Although an earlier re-evaluation of procurement
strategy would have improved the procurement strategy, it would
probably not have affected policy.
February 2006
| 
