APPENDIX 15
Supplementary evidence from the Government
1. In early 2003, as part of the initial
feasibility analysis behind the decision to introduce an Identity
Cards Scheme, an assessment was facilitated by the Office of Government
Commerce to assess its likely technical elements. This exercise
included representatives from the Home Office, UK Passport Service,
the Driver, Vehicle & Licensing Agency (DVLA), the Office
of the e-Envoy, the Office of Government Commerce, the Department
of Transport, the National Physical Laboratory as well as external
consultants from Fujitsu.
Since that time, a substantial amount of work
has been undertaken on the business and technical assumption behind
how the Scheme might be delivered.
Ten major technical components to deliver a
card scheme were identified at the time. These are listed in Annex
A (not printed) as drafted in the report produced at the time.
These components included biometric and smartcard technologies.
The conclusions reached and agreed by all participants on these
two components as reported to Home Office Ministers is reproduced
at Annex B (not printed). As these extracts formed part of documents
that formed direct policy advice to Ministers, I would be grateful
if you could treat them in confidence.
The assessment of these technologies was assisted
by previous studies and included analysis produced by the National
Physical Laboratory in their report "Feasibility Study on
Use of Biometrics in an Entitlement Scheme" and expertise
from the Department of Transport in the field of smartcard technology.
This document, including a recommendation to conduct a biometric
enrolment trial of 10,000 people was the reflected in subsequent
papers as the policy came up for collective discussion, such as
at meetings of the DA Committee.
However, the key conclusion of this assessment
was that, while certain risks existed around the technical solution
for a proposed Scheme, the risks around changes to business processes
were greater and this was highlighted to Ministers along with
the technical assessments derived from the exercise.
Furthermore, as planning for the Identity Cards
Scheme has progressed; the Identity Cards Programme has taken
steps to develop its understanding of the risks in these areas
as well as implementing the recommendations contained in the assessment
through:
— Conducting a biometric enrolment
trial with 10,000 participants in line with NPL recommendations
— Employing internal and external advisors
to develop the Programme's understanding of biometrics and smartcards
further
— Establishing the Biometric Experts
Group and Biometric Assurance Group to ensure up-to-date, relevant
and accurate advice is considered
— Conducting market sounding exercises
to understanding the opinion of companies in the technology sector—such
as a smartcard durability survey, which is included at Annex C
(not printed).
2. A report on the pilot system for the
e-Borders/IRIS project (STP final report) trial report is included
at Annex D (not printed). This summarises the deployment of the
pilot system and enrolment of approximately 900 individuals.
Since the UKPS Facial Recognition system (utilising
23,000 photos from STOP file entries) has been in operation as
a proof of concept, the system has helped to find 432 matching
photographs. This confirms that Facial Recognition is an effective
tool in the detection and possible prevention of fraud.
The Identity and Passport Service and, formerly,
the UK Passport Service have been performing further tests of
facial recognition systems. These tests concluded in March 2006
and showed that for 1-to-many face recognition, accuracy rates
in the region of 90% can be expected (when using ICAO/ISO compliant
search images and given that the top 20 ranked candidate images
from each search are checked). The facial recognition database
size being used for these tests is in the region of 25,000 images.
Information from other biometric programmes
and biometric testing initiatives is fed into the ID Cards Programme
through the Biometrics Experts Group, whose members work with
a number of these programmes, through the Home Office biometric
practitioners' group "Goldfinger" which has representatives
from eBorders, the FCO and others and through members of the ID
Cards team having a role in the governance of other projects,
e.g. the UKPS facial recognition testing project.
3. The decision to use multiple biometrics
was made after investigation into biometric technologies which
resulted in recommendations which were presented to the programme
board in early 2005 and to the Home Office Science and Technology
Reference Group, a panel of independent scientific advisors chaired
by the permanent secretary.
Developing on previous analysis of biometric
technologies, this work looked at the available biometric technologies
and investigated what the available scientific evidence had established
with regard to their ability to identify individuals and the weight
which could be attached to that scientific evidence. It also took
into account the merits of including certain biometric technologies,
such as facial recognition, for reasons of conforming to international
regulations. As a result of this work, the recommendations were
that face, fingerprint and iris biometrics should be used.
As mentioned in oral evidence, the factors behind
this decision were primarily accessibility to the Scheme for the
widest number of people possible, improved performance and the
impact of international regulations.
4. In considering the likely performance
of biometrics as part of the National Identity Scheme, it is important
to note that biometrics checks form one part of enrolment and
verification processes. The success of these procedures will not
rest solely on biometrics as other more traditional processes
and checks of identity will also be employed and indeed, improved
on in comparison to what is in place today—through the development
of electronic checks against other databases to verify identity
information provided by applicants for identity documents, for
example.
Nevertheless, the Identity and Passport Service
does recognise that biometric checks will need to perform at a
high level in order to facilitate efficient verification and secure
enrolment. We are using evidence from existing biometric schemes
and from biometric test programmes to inform our procurement process,
to ensure we get value for money and to enable us to set challenging
requirements to the market. We have examined the evidence on matching
performance achievable from different biometrics and have found
that such performance would be consistent with our requirements.
For face, the failure to acquire rate
should be close to zero. The verification rate for face is about
90% with a false accept rate of 1% (FRVT-2002 overview and summary).
This report is available at Annex E (not printed).
For finger, the failure to acquire will
be 0.5-1% depending on enrolment conditions (UK National Physical
Laboratory, report available at Annex F (not printed), validated
by the biometric expert group. A false match rate of about 1.3E-10
and a false non match rate of about 0.01 can be achieved. These
figures are based on research by the US National Institute of
Standards & Technology (NIST IR7110, available at Annex G
(not printed)) and make assumptions about the improvements that
would result from going from 2 to 4 or more fingers for searching.
Those assumptions are based in the improvements found in verification
tests more recently—for example, in further research by
US NIST (NIST IR7123, available at Annex H (not printed)).
For iris, the failure to acquire rate
is approximately 0.5%, when it is assumed that one iris sufficient.
This is based on the ITIRT final report for US Department of Homeland
Security (available at Annex I (not printed)). Schipol airport
trial results indicate 5% false non-match rate and the UAE iris
system indicates a false match rate, at the same decision threshold,
of approximately 5E-12 although the data were not collected under
the same conditions so caution should be used in interpreting
these figures.
Note that for fingerprint and iris, threshold
settings consistent with a large scale identification application
have been assumed, whereas for face 1:1 verification has been
assumed.
5. Internal health checks referred to in
oral evidence to the Committee are applied to different elements
of the programme at times that are important to the development
of that individual element of the programme. Thus, they would
not be seen as reoccurring quarterly or monthly checks.
However, while these checks may be varied in
subject matter, they will be assured thorugh a uniform process.
An Identity and Passport Service Internal Review is lead by the
Head of Standards and Practices. Two to three additional review
team members are drawn from technology and operations divisions,
who are independent from the specific project teams. Such reviews
follow OGC guidelines depending on the stage the project has reached
as a whole.
Furthermore, it should be noted that this process
takes place in addition to other review processes such as the
scrutiny applied by the Independent Assurance Panel and the OGC's
Gateway review process as well as other internal assurance processes
within the Programme, such as the Programme's Design Authority
and regular risk and issue reviews for example.
6. Advice provided by the Office for Government
Commerce is gained from their experience in monitoring and assuring
projects and programmes across Government as well as from the
experience gained from reviews conducted by the National Audit
Office. This experience is then distilled into analysis to assist
project and programme managers to improve the quality of projects
across government.
Hence, based on this experience, OGC have recommended
an incremental approach to programme and project implementation
supports project success and have illustrated this in lengthy
analytical documents such as "Successful IT: Modernising
Government in Action", in which "modular and incremental
development" is dealt with at length under Section 5 and
Annex E of that document.
In addition, such advice has been reiterated
in shorter reference documents such as the pamphlet "Why
IT Projects Fail" where it advices against sweeping into
a single project—"all good ideas—all deliverables
in one chunk"
Furthermore, the British Computer Society report
"The Challenge of Complex IT Projects" states
"There is overwhelming evidence that incremental developments
are much less risky than big-bang projects" (p.41)
Indeed, these documents also validate the initial
findings of the OGC red/blue exercise and the oral evidence provided
to the Committee that the key risk lies primarily in the business
change that surrounds the implementation of technology rather
than just in the implementation of technology itself.
These documents mentioned in this reply can
be found at:
"Successful IT" (http://www.ogc.gov.uk/embedded—object.asp?docid=1005071)
"Why IT Project Fail" (http://www.ogc.gov.uk/embedded—object.asp?docid=1004824)
"The Challenge of Complex IT Projects"
(http://www.bcs.org/upload/pdf/complexity.pdf)
7. The current best estimate of the volume
of transactions across both private and public stakeholders is
771m per annum. These estimated volumes, based on stakeholder
benefits cases and programme estimates, cover verification, identification,
authentication and information provision services. This figure
is larger than the estimate previously published as part of the
procurement process because of the progress made in understanding
public and private sector organisations' intended use of the scheme.
This is an update on the interim estimate published
in October 2005 which stated that, at that time, at least 163
million verification transactions could be anticipated at full
rollout but that figure could be exceeded considerably. The increase
in the current estimates arises out of further work conducted
with stakeholders, which provided greater certainty to allow a
higher estimate to be assumed. The Identity and Passport Service's
User Integration and Marketing teams are continuing to engage
with stakeholders to deliver further updates of volume estimates.
While the definitive estimate of transaction
points is still evolving and depends on several factors, the programme
currently estimates that approximately 44,000 user organisations
will seek accreditation to use identity services, including finance
sector organisations, employers, and government agencies.
It is important to note that one Government
department or commercial organisation may constitute multiple
user organisations as it is envisaged that accreditation should
be provided on a unit-by-unit basis, rather than to a Government
department or parent company as a whole. This reflects the different
functions, operation processes and technological standards operating
within Government department or commercial organisations.
However, rather than developing the Scheme's
assumptions around a fixed number of transaction points which
is potentially difficult to predict precisely, it is more important
to ensure the solution that is implemented in such a manner that
it can be scaled to the demand required. This is being reflected
in requirement setting in advance of procurement to ensure that
this is reflected in the final design of any bidder.
8. To reiterate the points made at the public
hearing, the Identity and Passport Service is not performing trials
of the specific technical solution that will be implemented
for National Identity Scheme as this solution will be decided
as part of the procurement process and selection of suppliers.
As described in Q9, testing will take place as part of the procurement
process.
As mentioned, the Identity and Passport Service,
in the context of the introduction of facial recognition biometrics,
has conducted testing of the performance of facial recognition
systems (current FRS2 trial), which tests the capability to recognise
faces with varied poses, disguises and aging. A test population
of approximately 300 is being recruited and tested against a database
of 23,000 images. The results are currently being analysed. We
have also conducted testing of the capability of facial and iris
systems to resist spoofing attempts, which was carried out at
the National Physical Laboratory. These results are confidential
for security reasons. Finally, we have also conducted `benchmarking'
of the IND IAFS fingerprint system to establish a base-line performance
for procurement of an improved system. This data is currently
being analysed.
In addition, biometric technology is well tested.
For example, the National Physical Laboratory in the UK and the
National Institute of Standards & Technology in the United
States perform very well-respected testing programmes for biometrics.
Furthermore, large scale biometric programmes
are already in existence and we are also learning from the operational
use of biometrics in other schemes both here and abroad.
9. We intend to undertake extensive testing
of the biometric solution both during procurement and the build
phase of the programme.
We are taking advice from the Biometrics Experts
Group on the content and timetable of our biometric testing programme.
These proposals have been presented to the Biometrics Assurance
Group, chaired by Sir David King.
These tests planned are:
1. A live enrolment intended to simulate
an actual ID Card enrolment. The test will be a competitive trial
of bidders' proposed solutions and will enrol and verify approximately
3,000 people, including a large special-needs group. It will test
the quality of recorded images, verification performance, usability
and spoof resistance. In contrast with the UKPS Biometric Enrolment
trial which was a wide-ranging trial examining areas of process
timing and customer perception, this is designed to be highly
targeted technical trial. 3000 people is the minimum number needed
in order to achieve statistically significant results when examining
verification performance.
2. A large scale matching test using pre-recorded
biometrics intended to provide statistical information on the
relative performance of bidders' matching algorithms.
3. A large-scale live enrolment to confirm
statistically that the solution will be capable of performing
correctly when the National Identity Register is fully populated.
10. In addition to the work mentioned in
the answer to question 3 and ongoing monitoring of research, testing
and development of biometrics internationally, the Identity and
Passport Service is currently contributing funding to the EU Minutiae
Interoperability Test research programme. The project aims to
deliver strategic research targeted at testing and improving the
interoperability of minutiae-based fingerprint systems in time
to meet the needs of EU policy legislation.
The trials documented in the answer to question
9 will provide vital new information on fingerprint performance,—large
scale performance, verification performance, enrolment and image
quality, spoof resistance, usability and inclusivity.
11. Advice contained in the British Computer
Society's report "The Challenges of Complex IT Projects"
are integrated into the Identity Cards Programme in a number of
ways.
Managers within the Identity Card Programme review
major reports or research relevant to their functional specialism
as a matter of course and share important findings with functional
teams in team meetings or one-on-ones where relevant. If necessary,
the results of such reviews are escalated to the wider programme
through its governance structure. In addition, key reports connected
with project management and delivery, such as this report, are
scrutinised by the Office of Government Commerce. Indeed, OGC
contributed to the development of the BCS report. Key learning
points are then reflected both in OGC's own publications and in
the Gateway Review Process. As the Identity Cards Programme is
subject to the Gateway Review Process, the lessons learnt from
such reports have been integrated and form part of the criteria
against which it is judged in such reviews.With respect to this
specific report, the recommendations from this report are similar
to those from the OGC's"Common Causes of Project Failure".
The lessons from this are routinely used in the governance of
the programme and new projects are reviewed against these common
causes of failure at their inception, for example.
"The Challenge of Complex IT Projects"
report can be found at:
http://www.bcs.org/upload/pdf/complexity.pdf.
12. While we have robust assumptions on
the volumes of enrolment data, based on the number of people likely
to be enrolling for an ID Card every day and the operating hours
of the enrolment centres, the verification volumes, in particular
the peak verification load and the distribution of load over time
is harder to assess with a high degree of confidence. We are exploring
with Qinetiq, based on their considerable experience in this area,
what help they can give us in validating our assumptions and suggesting
model technical architectures which are tolerant of high data
volumes and variations in data volumes. There are not yet finalised
scope and timescales for this project.
13. The bulk of the Identity Card Programme's
advice on technical and biometric areas is from technical experts
within the programme (civil servants and consultants) and related
government programmes (including IND (ARC, Biometric Residents'
Permits), PITO (IDENT1), the IPS passport projects (e-Passport,
Facial Recognition Pilot)), and from the biometrics experts who
make up the Biometrics Experts Group (see earlier written evidence
for the membership of this group), and from government experts
(principally from CESG) in the fields of cryptography and secure
computing. Our contact with industry has been to share the high-level
intentions of the Identity Cards Programme with companies and
invite their reaction and feedback, and also to question them
on specific technical areas. A list of participating companies
in these seminars is listed below:
VERIFICATION SYSTEMS
SEMINAR:
| 3M Health Care Limited |
Advantage Business Group |
| ARM Limited | Atkins Management Consultants
|
| Bayer Polymers | BT Group Plc
|
| Computacenter (UK) Ltd | CSC
|
| ECA | EDS |
| EMEA Architects Office | Entrust (Europe) Limited
|
| FFW | Fujitsu Services Ltd |
| Giesecke & Devrient GB Ltd | IBM United Kingdom Limited
|
| LogicaCMG Plc | Mantix Limited
|
| Marconi Selenia Communications Ltd | Methods Consulting Ltd
|
| National Identity Cards | Nortel Networks Ltd
|
| Novell UK | Oberthur Card Systems Ltd
|
| OGCbuying.solutions | Oracle Corporation UK Ltd
|
| Ovum Limited | PCCW (Europe)
|
| Sagem Communications UK Ltd | Senselect Ltd
|
| Tata Consultancy Services | TIBCO
|
| Triad Group Plc | Unisys Limited
|
| URU Technologies UK Ltd | |
| |
SECURITY SYSTEMS
SEMINAR
| 3M Health Care Limited | Accenture (UK) Ltd
|
| Advantage Business Group | ARM Limited
|
| Atkins Management Consultants | Bayer Polymers
|
| BT Group Plc | Charteris Plc
|
| Cornwell Management Consultants Plc | CSC
|
| Daon | Desborough Associates
|
| Detica Ltd | Digimarc ID Systems
|
| Eads Defence Security Systems Ltd | Ecebs Limited
|
| EDS | EMEA Architects Office
|
| Entrust (Europe) Limited | Experian Ltd
|
| Fujitsu Services Ltd | Giesecke & Devrient GB Ltd
|
| Hewlett Packard Ltd | IBM United Kingdom Limited
|
| LaserCard Systems | LINK Interchange Network Ltd
|
| LogicaCMG Plc | MAOSCO Ltd |
| Marconi Selenia Communications Ltd | Methods Consulting Ltd
|
| National Identity Cards | Nortel Networks
|
| Northrop Grumman Information Technology Limited
| Oracle Corporation UK Ltd |
| Oberthur Card Systems Ltd | PCCW (Europe)
|
| Ovum Limited | Senselect Ltd
|
| Sapior Ltd | SiVenture |
| Serco Justice | Sun Microsystems Ltd
|
| Steria Limited | TIBCO |
| Syntegra Ltd | Unisys Limited
|
| Triad Group Plc | Vega Group Plc
|
| URU Technologies UK Ltd | Xansa Plc
|
| Voca Limited | |
| |
The first of these types of contact has been through a number
of events hosted by Intellect, each one focussed on a specific
area of requirements. The second has involved specific questions
sent to selected companies to provide detailed information on
market capability. For example, we have met with 15 companies
involved with biometrics and have undertaken market sounding activity
in relation to biometric matching performance and card durability.
This contact has taken place in accordance with OGC (Office of
Government Commerce) procurement rules.
The bulk of advice on a day-to-day basis is provided by the
members of the programme team and the external advisors working
as part of the team. At appropriate times external advisors are
asked to assure the work of the programme and to provide input
on specific areas.
Reports generated from workshops, surveys, studies, etc.
by the programme team and evidence used to inform costing assumptions
in our business case and to influence functional and non-functional
requirements and interoperability requirements and advice provided
to ministers.
14. I have noted your request for copies if the OGC Gateway
Reviews to be provided in confidence to the Committee. As you
may know, OGC Gateway Reviews are provided in confidence to the
Senior Responsible Owner. They are candid assessments as to what
action is needed in order for a programme or project to proceed
to the next stage. I share OGC's concern that provision of these
reports to a wider audience—whether in confidence or not—will
put the Gateway process at risk and lead to review teams and people
interviewed during the review "pulling their punches".
I am therefore unable to comply with your request, however
I have set out the timeline for the Gateway reviews which have
taken place. If the issues set out by the review team in the preceding
report had not been resolved to its satisfaction, the subsequent
review would not have taken place. I hope therefore this reassures
the Committee that the Gateway process is being adhered to by
the Identity Cards Programme.
Gateway Zero (Strategic Assessment) completed on the 30 January
2004
Gateway One (Business Justification) completed on the 18
July 2005
Gateway Zero (Strategic Assessment) completed on the 14 January
2006
Gateway Two (Procurement Strategy) completed on the 11 April
2006
I should remind members of the Committee that multiple Gateway
Zero reviews take place throughout the life of a project or programme
as it develops.
In addition, you requested a copy of the Programme's risk
register from the last 12 months in confidence. The register is
a dynamic tool which is constantly reviewed and updated to reflect
changes in the programme. Most of the risks in the register do
not relate to technical issues which are of most relevance to
your enquiry, rather they focus on areas such as implementing
business change, financial and commercial risks. As such, I regretfully
decline your request to provide the risk register to the Committee.
However, I can assure the Committee of our approach to risk
by pointing to the Gateway reviewers satisfaction with our approach
to risk. If they were not satisfied with this approach, further
reviews could not have taken place.
15. Overview of the different stages in the programme
There will be several separate procurements for different
parts of the scheme, each with their own timetable. This overview
is based on the process for the NIR (National Identity Register)
and associated technology package, which is the largest and most
complex of the procurements. Other procurements may follow a slightly
different process according to individual requirements.
|
Stage | Purpose
| Key activities in this stage |
Strategy & Scoping (Pre-OJEU)
| To ensure the rationale for the procurement, its approach, strategy and scope of the services required are all clearly defined and properly authorised.
| — Develop the Business Case
— Develop the Procurement, Commercial and Evaluation Strategies
— Market Sounding activity to test the viability of the Procurement Strategy
— Preparation of the pre-qualification questionnaire (PQQ) and supporting documents
— Set up Programme Governance
— Prepare for OGC Gateway Reviews
|
| Commence Procurement and Pre-Qualification |
To select only those potential suppliers who meet the IPS security requirements, who can demonstrate track record of successful delivery of the required services and whose financial and commercial risk profile is appropriate for the IPS to consider contracting with them.
| — Publish Prospectus
— Issue OJEU Notice
— Bidder Conference
— Issue PQQ
— Evaluate responses and short-list
— Debrief bidders
— Ongoing preparation of the PITN documentation
|
| Preliminary Invitation to Negotiate (PITN) and solution refinement
| To enable bidders to gain an understanding of the requirements, propose their solutions and begin solution testing.
| — Issue PITN
— Manage bidder information & queries
— Develop cost comparators
— Finalise evaluation model and process
— Bidder workshops to develop solution
— Evaluate bidders responses to PITN
— Optional down-select at this stage
— Draft FITN documentation
|
| Biometric Technology Demonstrator and Database Tests
| The purpose of the testing is to provide assurance on the biometric elements of NIR package. Results from the testing will be fed into the requirements, where appropriate.
| — Testing will occur throughout the PITN, and FITN stages. There are also likely to be additional tests for other elements of the solution, to be determined by the Test Strategy.
|
| Final Invitation to Negotiate (FITN) | To ensure bidders have the maximum opportunity to propose solutions that will meet the requirements fully, and agree the overall shape of the contract.
| — Issue FITN to bidders
— Continue to populate the contract and its schedules
— Continue clarification and solution development
— Complete the testing phase and provide analysis of the results
— Evaluate the FITN response & select the most appropriate 2-3 bidders to invite to detailed negotiations
— Prepare for the negotiations stage
— Issue of final requirement
|
| Negotiation | To negotiate with successful FITN respondents to agree service requirements and contract terms against which they will be asked to submit their Best and Final Offer (BAFO)
| — Due Diligence by bidders on the relevant data
— Negotiation with short-listed bidders to resolve risks and issues identified during FITN evaluation
— Issue BAFO
— Evaluate BAFO response and select Preferred Bidder
— Prepare for Contract Award
|
| Contract Close and Award | To finalise the contract ready for signature, to finalise build and test plans and to make an authorised the decision to award the contract to the new supplier
| — Close contract issues and financials
— OGC Gateway 3
— Approve decision to award
— Finalise plans for the build and test stage
— Final Business Case to confirm the agreed contract & price provide VFM
— Sign contract
|
| Build and Test | The objective is to move successfully to the point where the new service can be provided by the supplier
| — Service provider develops systems
— Progressive testing and trialling
— Readiness for service checks
|
| Operation | To commence operation of the new service under the contract, and manage and maintain the service to deliver the required performance and benefits over the duration of the contract
| — Implement new client arrangements
— Start new service
— Manage delivery of benefits
— OGC Gateway 5
|
| |
|
This will be followed by continuous monitoring and improvement,
change control, ongoing security accreditation, technical refresh
and re-specification.
16. You asked for a breakdown of technology costs in
confidence. This has been provided.
Detailed assumptions on technology and the costs of the technology
are created that support reference models and the scheme requirements.
These are based on and validated by a number of sources and expert
advisors, and as a whole, form the cost model and business case.
For example, in the case of the timing for the biometric enrolment
process, our assumptions on this were informed by timing data
coming out of the UKPS biometric enrolment trial and other sources.
These data in turn became evidence for the costs model and will
allow us to set appropriate, challenging requirements to the market.
17. To support programme decisions and aid in scheme
design we have carried out nine separate pieces of social science
research in the years 2004 and 2005:
— Omnibus research was carried out in February,
April, October and December 2004.
— Two pieces of qualitative research were delivered
in December 2004 looking at "Special Needs Issues" and
"Citizens" Views on Proposed Customer Propositions'
— Two pieces of quantitative conjoint research were
published in October and December 2005. The first assessed UK
citizens' and user organisations' views on the scheme. The second
assessed Foreign Nationals' views on the scheme.
In addition the UKPS Biometric Enrolment Trial gave valuable
evidence on customer perceptions and attitudes, and we have conducted
substantial reviews of demographic and geographic information
for the purposes of improving our models of identity card roll-out
and usage.
Advice on social science studies (qualitative and quantitative
research) has been gained through a number of different sources
dependent on its nature:
— Statistical advice and a review of all published
social science work has been received from the Research Development
and Statistics (RDS) units within the central Home Office and
the Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND) for issues relating
to Foreign Nationals.
— Advice on research requirements: The Identity
and Passport Service (IPS) Marketing and Communications team has
significant experience in working with social science studies,
and as such has provided advice to the scheme on when issues should
be informed by research and how best to use research.
— Advice on commissioning of research and ensuring
maximum value is gained from social science has been delivered
by the Central Office of Information (COI), the Government's centre
of Excellence for Marketing Communications. The third party research
agencies which have undertaken the fieldwork have been sourced
through COI's framework agreement and as such the agencies have
been vetted for their "best practice" approach. For
example, the two core pieces of social science research carried
out in 2005, "British Citizen Trade-off Research" and
"Foreign Nationals Trade-off Research" (both published
on the IPS website) were conducted by Taylor Nelson Sofres (TNS)
on the Home Office's behalf. TNS is one of the world's leading
market information groups with over 14,000 full-time employees
across the world and they provided continuous advice throughout
the running, analysis and write-up of these two important pieces
of social science research.
Social science studies have been used extensively to guide
the decision making process within the programme:
— Research has been used to guide scheme design
on issues such as price acceptability and acceptable customer
time commitment.
— It has also been used to support business case
assumptions on volumetrics and likely customer behaviour.
— From a marketing perspective social science has
also been used to guide the external marketing strategy by ensuring
it is developed to address the public's issues and concerns.
The mechanism for incorporating the result of social science
work into the programme is predominantly a robust change control
process. Assumptions are validated through research and when the
research rejects a current assumption a change request is raised.
All our marketers on the programme are also thoroughly briefed
on the research findings and provide direct support into different
work-streams. As such, they will share the findings across the
programme.
18. The Independent Assurance (IA) Panel provides oversight
of the programme's ability to deliver the scheme. Whereas other
assurance mechanisms such as Gateway reviews measure the strengths
and weaknesses of the programme at a specific point in time the
IA panel is complementary to this and is more closely involved
with the programme and provides ongoing assurance.
The Panel consists of individuals with a vast range of experience
of large scale projects and organisations from across the public
and private sector. The membership of the panel is:
| — Alan Hughes (chair) | Former CEO of First Direct Bank
|
| — Malcolm Mitchell | Director of Interleader Limited
|
| — John Clarke | Former Director of Group Technology for Tesco
|
| — Fergie Williams | Former CIO of HSBC's European Businesses
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| |
The panel has covered a wide range of topics, including Security,
Fraud, Data Integrity, Systems Process Architecture, Marketing,
Organisational change, and Risk. The chair of the IA panel sits
on the monthly Programme Board, providing the Board with the conclusions
of reviews conducted by Panel members on key decisions and papers
before the Board.
No significant paper is passed by the Programme Board without
first having been reviewed by the IA Panel. Significant papers
the IA Panel has reviewed in detail recently include:
— Communications Strategy
Furthermore, the chair of the Independent Assurance Panel
is involved as a contributor to the OGC Gateway Process reviews,
allowing the Panel to also express their views to other independent
reviewers.
19. Use of a "modular IT architecture design approach"
will reduce risk to the programme by allowing components to be
designed and built separately, having first been defined in terms
of their inputs and outputs and their performance characteristics.
This also allows the technology to evolve as the needs of the
scheme change. If a modular approach is adopted, functional modules
can be more easily replaced than if their functionality was embedded
in a single, monolithic, system.
This follows standard best practice in a programme such as
the Identity Cards Programme. This is reflected in the recommendations
of the specific recommendations on modular architectural design
raised in the BCS's "The Challenge of Complex IT Projects"
on page 29. As noted previously, such advice is also reflected
in OGC recommendations more generally.
20. While there are assumptions of technical refresh
periods which underlie the components of the National Identity
Scheme, the actual renewal and refresh times will depend on the
precise technology procured from suppliers.
As noted under 16, detailed assumptions on technology and
the costs of the technology are created that support reference
models and the scheme requirements. These are based on and validated
by a number of sources and expert advisors, and as a whole, form
the cost model and business case.
21. The Identity and Passport Service programme and project
risk management policy draws on experience and best practice from
across the public and private sector including the Office of Government
Commerce (OGC) Management of Risk (MoR), HM Treasury Orange Book,
the Institute of Risk Management and the Government Communications
Head Quarters (GCHQ) as well as from its own experience of project
implementation. The policy has been developed by the IPS Programme
Control Office Risk Management team, who have significant private
and public sector experience; several of the team also have professional
risk management qualifications. This team is "embedded"
within the constituent projects, enabling a consistent and professional
approach to be communicated and implemented.
Furthermore, advice on the Programme's approach to risk management
is obtained throughout the development of the Scheme through the
OGC Gateway process, which provides practical experience and lessons
learnt from the public sector, as well as through the work of
the Independent Assurance Panel, which provides experience and
advice from private sector background as well.
More specifically, specialist advice is used to mitigate
and track risk in specific functional areas within the Programme.
For example, key decision papers as well as security risks and
issues are raised to and reviewed by the programme's Security,
Fraud and Resilience Board which includes representatives from
CESG, fraud experts, the programme's security accreditor from
CSIA and law enforcement agencies. Such reviews are fed back to
experts working with the Programme with recommendations for incorporation
into the Scheme's future development.
22. The mechanisms to be used by Identity and Passport
Service will not be substantially different from those used prior
to the formation of IPS documented in the responses to answers
13 and 17 and in sections 3.6 to 3.14 of the memorandum of evidence
submitted by Sir David King to the committee earlier this year.
As the CEO of Identity and Passport Service will also have a role
within the Home Office as Director General Identity Services and
will sit on the Home Office's Group Executive Board, the procedures
and facilities in place for the Home Office will remain available
to the Identity and Passport Service.
23. Our involvement with international Identity Card
schemes has been ongoing through the lifetime of the programme,
starting with visits to EU partners before the consultation paper
went out. We have continued to share experiences with EU partners
and with the US. We also engage with other schemes and projects
related to identity cards though international conferences, standards
organisations, and bodies such as ICAO (International Civil Aviation
Organisation).
The visits to the identity card schemes in Hong Kong and
the Philippines. These visits covered:
— Layout of enrolment offices
— Checks made on applicants at enrolment
— Location of enrolment offices
— Card production and card costs
Information gained from these visits has been used within
the programme to validate our business case assumptions and to
inform our requirements.
24. We have met with officials from the US Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) on a number of occasions. We visited
officials in January 2004 and briefed them on our plans for biometric
ID Cards. There was further contact and ongoing dialogue through
2004 and 20005 both directly and through the Biometrics Working
Group.. An official from the DHS presented a summary of the department's
work to officials from the Identity Cards Programme on 24 February
2006 and officials from the Identity Cards Programme visited DHS
for demonstrations and meetings on the 10, 11 and 12 April. As
this visit was recent, the conclusions have not yet been properly
written up but this visit did serve to demonstrate the feasibility
of running a highly reliable biometric enrolment and verification
system with 40-50m individuals enrolled.
In the oral evidence session on 22 March the chairman of
the committee stated (Q272 in the transcript), that in terms of
biometrics for ID cards, the Department for Homeland Security
had said that "the technology was not there". During
this visit we put this to several very senior officials responsible
for the operation, development and management of US-VISIT, They
rebutted this assertion strongly and pointed to the marked success
of the technology employed in US-VISIT which allows rapid 1-to-many
matching of fingerprints on a database of 40-50m with negligible
impact on process times, and which processes 125,000 verification
transactions per day at present.
25. A public communications strategy was developed for
Identity Cards Programme in co-operation with the UK Passport
Service. Following the creation of the Identity and Passport Service,
this now forms part of the wider communications activities of
the organisation. This strategy also reflects emerging technical
changes that will be common to both the development of the passport
and the introduction of the identity card.
The Identity and Passport Service recognises that, as biometric
technology is increasingly used to improve identity authentication
and document security, we need to ensure that our customers understand
what biometrics are and how they will be used. This is an important
element of our ongoing marketing and communications strategy.
Examples of our marketing and communications activity to date
include the following:
— A series of regional biometric roadshows took
place in September/October 2005 to raise awareness amongst the
general public about biometrics and changes to passports. Members
of the general public had the opportunity to have their iris and
fingerprints recorded and verified.
— To prepare for the introduction of e-passports
this year, a customer leaflet has been produced to explain what
biometrics are, how facial biometrics work, and what information
will be held on the chip. This is also available on our website
www.passport.gov.uk . A copy of this leaflet is provided in Annex
J (not printed).
— A separate leaflet has also been produced which
we send to customers with their new e-passport. This explains
why the IPS is introducing this new style of biometric passport
to help fight fraud and forgery. A copy of this leaflet has been
provided in Annex K (not printed).
— The IPS website is an important channel for providing
information to our customers and other stakeholders about biometric
technology. The site includes questions and answer sections about
biometric passports and biometrics generally.
— A DVD has been created that helps explains the
planned implementation of the Identity Card Scheme, which has
been used in consultations with the public, such as the Programme's
consultation with faith communities. An abridged version of this
DVD has been placed for download on the IPS identity cards website
(www.identitycards.gov.uk). Copies of the full DVD was placed
in the House of Commons and House of Lords libraries during the
passage of the Identity Cards Bill through Parliament. A further
copy has been provided to the Committee.
— The media is an important channel for raising
awareness about biometric technology. IPS has issued various press
releases over the last 12 months which have explained the need
to improve the security of travel documents through technological
advances which are being adopted across the world.
As the IPS continues the delivery of the key changes already
underway to improve the passport document and issuing process,
and develops the National Identity Scheme, our marketing and communications
strategy will continue to incorporate key messages and activities
to build awareness and understanding for our customers and other
audiences.
May 2006
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