Select Committee on Science and Technology Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1100-1119)

PROFESSOR SIR GORDON CONWAY KCMG, PROFESSOR PAUL WILES AND PROFESSOR FRANK KELLY

7 JUNE 2006

  Q1100  Chairman: The short answer from Gordon and Frank is that you are not aware of these Guidelines.

  Professor Kelly: I am aware of them. They set a context rather like the context that a contract sets in commercial terms. Something is going wrong when you try to read the contract. What should happen is that you can fall back on it but things are going wrong if you have to fall back on it.

  Professor Sir Gordon Conway: I think it is important to understand that government departments are very different. The Department for International Development is not like the Home Office or like Defra; it has a quite different role. My understanding of the way in which evidence is used is that in general it conforms with those Guidelines which are the responsibility of the permanent secretary. The way in which in practice we make sure that evidence gets into what we do and help governments in developing countries look at evidence—which in some ways is the most important role we have—is a rather different approach from what other government departments will have.

  Q1101  Margaret Moran: Could you give us a concrete example, Professor Wiles, of how your science and innovation strategy is actually improving the Department's handling of scientific evidence?

  Professor Wiles: Until comparatively recently the Home Office had quite a large group of scientists but they were known as the Police Scientific Development Branch. They were very good; they did a lot of very important work to support practical policing, they also did work for the security service and some work for the Department of Transport as well. When I became CSA the problem was that there was no equivalent support for other areas of the Home Office and important though policing is it is one aspect of the Home Office. One of the things that we have been doing over the last eighteen months—you know this because we also renamed the Police Scientific Development Branch as the Home Office Scientific Development Branch—is try to make sure that equivalent scientific support was there for the Immigration and Nationality Directorate and for the National Offender Management Service, to make sure that the right kind of support and advice was there. That is an on-going project; it is something we are still working on and there are of course significant scientifically based or scientifically dependent projects as you are aware happening outside of the policing area and we need to make sure we get that science right. One of the things that has involved is changing the skills mix within the Home Office science base to make sure it was capable of handling that different area. We have recently recruited a chief biometric adviser; we have recently recruited from MOD a colleague who has expertise in CBRN and so on. We have been changing that skills base within the Home Office Scientific Development Branch in order to support a full range of the Home Office group activities.

  Q1102  Margaret Moran: Professor Conway, we are still waiting for your strategy around this. When is it coming and why is taking so long?

  Professor Sir Gordon Conway: The reason why we have put it off is to wait for the white paper because the white paper is what we have been working on and it is the commitments that will appear in the white paper which will determine what we write in the strategy. That is the reason for it. We are aiming for the strategy to be out in about November and that will be preceded by a document that I have been producing over the last year which is basically a review of the role of science and technology in development. It is a major review of all the aspects of science and technology as they relate to development: Millennium Development Goals, economic growth, sustainability, the resilience issues, natural resources, governance, science and technology capacity building, intelligent use of science. It is a major piece of work that I have been engaged on for the last year. That will come out with luck in September/October and then the strategy will come out in November.

  Q1103  Margaret Moran: A lot of the issues you are addressing require cross-departmental cooperation. How do you deal with that? Do you meet together? Do you peer review each other's agendas and science strategies? How does that work?

  Professor Kelly: I have spent a bit of time on the Ministry of Defence review of their alignment and capability and I have found very helpful comments from other chief scientific advisers on things. We are all very busy so it is hard to set it up in a very formal way, but the phone call or the meeting and the specific question seems to me to be the most effective way to get help from my colleagues.

  Professor Sir Gordon Conway: I can give you two examples. The big one is climate change. We work very closely with Defra. I represented the UK delegation at the Commission for Sustainable Development two weeks ago and I was representative of both the DFID and Defra components. It was the same in Ethiopia about a month ago on the Global Climate Observation System where I had both Defra and DFID staff and I was leading that. Another example is the Department for Education and Skills; we have been working with them on the issue of Higher Education in Africa. I suppose we have had some contact with most government departments one way or the other in terms of science.

  Q1104  Margaret Moran: In terms of horizon scanning we have heard some evidence that horizon scanning is not well developed within this area. Can each of you very briefly give one example of where you have been using a horizon scanning exercise in policy development and indicate whether that was just a one off or whether that is routine within your department?

  Professor Wiles: We have long done and published projections—note projections, not predictions—of prison populations and yes, those projections of future prison population, assuming current trends were to continue, are central to policy making in that area.

  Q1105  Chairman: I think we ought to know how you use it.

  Professor Wiles: If you look at those projections—as I say they are published, they are on the website so they are available for everyone to look at—what they are indicating is, as I think everybody knows and indeed it is those projections which have often been behind the press reports, that we have a problem with the prison population at the moment. We are heading towards capacity and therefore we need to do things to handle that situation. Those projections have been absolutely essential to those debates about what is the problem and what do we need to do about it. I do not think there can be much doubt about the importance of those in that area of policy making. They are precisely horizon scanning.

  Q1106  Margaret Moran: You are giving us one example from one part of the Home Office.

  Professor Wiles: Do you want some other examples?

  Q1107  Margaret Moran: Could one argue that the immigration policy, for example, has been dealt with in a similar way?

  Professor Wiles: I created a year ago a small central intelligence hub within my core economic and operational research group to work partly with Sir David's central horizon scanning team to do horizon scanning. That has been doing that. I think the issue we have—it is common not just within government but within commercial organisations—is that doing horizon scanning is one thing, getting an organisation to actually lift its head from immediate problems and think 10 or 20 years ahead and use that horizon scanning is sometimes a challenge.

  Q1108  Chairman: Are you saying it is not happening?

  Professor Wiles: No, I am not saying it is not happening, I am saying it is a challenge. I am saying that it is happening to some extent; it is still not happening in my view sufficiently and it is something I regard as a challenge. I regard it as something that I have to try to get the Department to do. You can imagine, particularly at the moment in the Home Office, it is difficult to get the Department to take its gaze above the immediate crises it has to deal with and say, "Yes, all very well, but in the long run the way to do that is to be able to look further ahead, understand the kinds of risks that lay in the future and think about how you are going to manage them." It is not easy but it is something we have to do.

  Professor Kelly: In Transport a major horizon scanning exercise was conducted by the Foresight group, the Intelligent Infrastructure systems project. The Department for Transport was involved with that and we have used, for example, the scenarios for what the future might look like in thirty or fifty years' time. They were radically different scenarios from each other and from what might be the man in the street's expectation of the future. We have used them as a basis for strategy group meetings within the Department and in different units within the Department, most recently rail. Rail has been using scenarios developed from these to look out. They have decisions to make about infrastructure which are long term decisions; they need to think along these timescales.

  Professor Sir Gordon Conway: Horizon scanning takes many different forms in DFID again. For example, with individual countries when they are helping them to develop their poverty reduction strategy plans which are the basis for long term funding, effectively that is a horizon scanning for the future of that country. We have just done it for Malawi, for example, and Tanzania. That is a kind of horizon scanning but it does not fall within the narrow definition. I think we are looking within DFID about how we will do more horizon scanning into the future and in particular I want to work more closely with the new chief economic adviser who has only come on board a few months ago. I think we have ideas about how we might together—which would be much more effective—get some more horizon scanning going. That is being looked at within the organisational review that is going on within DFID.

  Q1109  Bob Spink: Does DFID accept that with the increased occurrence of extreme weather events and natural disasters it may be that the way in which DFID operates in the future will change? Are you taking account of that in planning how aid will be distributed in years to come?

  Professor Sir Gordon Conway: We have a major programme in climate change in which I am heavily involved. We have had meetings and conferences and so on around the world. Quite specifically we are piloting some climate change screening. We are starting a pilot in Bangladesh and that will attempt to look at the impact of climate change on specific aid investments. It is a policy for the EU but we are going to pilot one of these for the EU as a whole and clearly that is going to be very important. Putting it very crudely, if you build a bridge and you have built the bridge according to a one in a hundred year flood you may have to revise that in the future because the one in a hundred year flood may be a one in fifty year flood. That is the kind of question we are going to have to tackle.

  Q1110  Margaret Moran: Do you each control your departmental budgets for commissioning research? If not, do you think you should or should there be ring fenced research council funding for that purpose?

  Professor Kelly: No, I do not think I should.

  Q1111  Chairman: You do not think you should have your own research fund?

  Professor Kelly: I have some of my own research fund but do I control the budget, no. The budged is devolved out to the units. There is a part of it which is within my unit but it is not the overall budget.

  Q1112  Chairman: I think one of the areas that we are anxious to get a handle on is that it is all right having a government policy about saying we must have policy based on good evidence and scientific evidence should feed into that, and yet there seems to be a situation whereby the chief scientific advisers have been appointed but do not have independent research funds in order to be able to carry out the sort of research that is necessary in order to inform the policy. Do you feel that you should have separate budgets? Do you think the Research Council should have ring-fenced budgets which you can tap into? Or is there some better way of actually being able to underpin the research you need?

  Professor Kelly: It is difficult to get good research and I have not myself found that the lack of money is the most severe constraint. For example, in the negotiation with research councils about how to get from the ESRC more money into transport related economic and social research, in that conversation money is not the issue. It is attempting to define the problem so it attracts the very best academics.

  Professor Sir Gordon Conway: The main research is funded by the central research department within DFID but there is also research funded by the policy division and of course each of the individual country offices will fund research. I can spend a small pot of money on research if I wish to do so but this has not arisen so far. It might be that that ought to grow in the future but at the moment it has not arisen. We have call down contracts for resource centres in various areas so that if we want something done quickly we can go and get it done. For example on climate change I only have to call the CEOs at the Natural Environment Research Council and say that we have a certain issue and do they know of anybody who can give advice on it and you get it.

  Professor Wiles: No, I do not control the research budgets in the Home Office. There is an interesting tension here that I think there is not a straightforward answer. I think it is actually important that the research that is done in the Home Office is the research that will drive future policy or delivery and as a result of that what we have done in the Home Office is to leave the budgets with those that are responsible for the policy and delivery so that they, as it were, are commissioning the research. Of course you could argue—I think it is implicit in your question—that that is all very well but it means that you, as CSA, cannot directly influence what is being done and that is true. The answer is that I have to get in there and mix it and talk to people about what kind of research I think is needed and why. I am genuinely ambivalent on this one. In some senses like any other scientist I would love to have the whole budget because then I could do exactly what I wanted, but I can actually also see that there would be problems if that were the case and I can see strengths in the way we do it. For example, before any social research is done in the Home Office we have what we call a triple key approach. A senior policy official at director level or above has to say they want the research, why they want it and what they are going to do when they get it. I have to say, as CSA, the research can be done to a quality that will answer the question and then a minister has to say, "Yes, that research should be done". Unless all three keys are in the lock research in the Home Office does not occur.

  Q1113  Margaret Moran: We have heard evidence, particularly on drug policy, that research is not being done at all.

  Professor Wiles: That is nonsense; I will talk to you about that later on.

  Professor Kelly: I, as Chief Scientific Adviser, and also the Chief Economist/Analyst have a scrutiny function, so that an evidence and research policy framework and the research that is funded by each unit has to go through a process of scrutiny. Quality pressure from the chief analyst and chief scientific adviser is important.

  Q1114  Mr Newmark: I want to turn now to risk uncertainty and how that is communicated both internally within departments and externally to the public. How well is scientific uncertainty being handled generally in terms of policy making?

  Professor Kelly: Transport has it relatively easy in terms of scientific uncertainty. Many, many of the risk aspects in Transport are those that are well measured and quantified: road deaths, railway deaths. There are large numbers, sadly, in these areas and it is a statistical problem rather than a problem of gross scientific uncertainty. Then there are other areas concerned with the evolution of technology, how rapidly technologies are evolving and what the impact of that will be on mechanisms for road user charging or mechanisms for train signalling, where the issue is how to set up a separation, what is it the Government should do and what is it that should be left to the market, the market being able to evolve rapidly as new technologies are adopted by society. I think Transport has it relatively easy, relative to other departments where there may be gross scientific uncertainties.

  Professor Sir Gordon Conway: In the big issues that I have been dealing with—tsunamis, avian flu, climate change—the issues of risk and uncertainty are huge. It is a real challenge to how you communicate the nature of the risk and the uncertainty and you have to be honest but you also have to be forceful. Some of them are extremely difficult. If you take the Sunda Shelf off the coast of Sumatra that is going to go, there is going to be another huge quake and a tsunami any time between tonight and fifty years from now. That is what you say but there is no evidence you can get at the moment to narrow that possibility. You have to try to convey that in the form that says, "Look, you must put in much better measures to actually prevent the damage being greater than it otherwise is going to be." That is what you tend to do.

  Q1115  Mr Newmark: Yes, but I want to focus on the communication of that risk. When that risk is communicated to ministers is that filtered through advisers who have no scientific background or is there direct communication through those who have the science and understanding to the minister who is handling that situation?

  Professor Sir Gordon Conway: For example in my case I will produce two or three page briefing notes on tsunamis or climate change or avian flu directly to the secretary of state. He will see them and look at them. In fact I have sat down with him and shown him the scenario for avian flu and tsunamis.

  Q1116  Mr Newmark: So in your experience there is no filtered mechanism between you and the minister?

  Professor Sir Gordon Conway: No, not at all.

  Q1117  Chairman: Sir David King does not filter it, neither does the permanent secretary.

  Professor Sir Gordon Conway: No. Obviously in many cases I am talking to the permanent secretary about this but in terms of those big issues I am dealing directly with the secretary of state. It is a tactic, if you like, because I think the most important thing we have to get within our departments is the confidence of the political leaders. We have to get to the point at which they trust us in what we are saying. They know that we are not being extremists on the one hand; they know we are not being too cautious on the other. We are presenting things forcefully and clearly as they are.

  Q1118  Mr Newmark: I hear what you are saying, but another way of looking at it is to explain that risk again to the outside world. It comes from you, it goes to the minister and you say there is no filter there. In communicating from government as a whole to the outside world unfortunately there are things out of your control such as the media and the media may well grasp onto something which in your analysis might be a tiny risk but it may well be blown out of all proportion as a disaster that is imminent.

  Professor Sir Gordon Conway: In my particular case the audience I am interested in is governments in developing countries when I travel to a developing country. For example when I was in Malawi recently we had dinner with three ministers and we talked to them about these issues. I have been speaking on climate change in about four or five different countries. I have had half hour interviews on television in those countries and you adopt exactly the same strategy as for the secretary of state. You lay it out honestly, forcefully and with the caveats that need to be there. You have to get people to accept that this is something really serious. On the one hand you are trying to be forceful but equally you must not be economical with the truth.

  Professor Wiles: I think the point about understanding more broadly out of the department is a difficult one. I am smiling slightly because Richard Ford from The Times is sat over there and he and I once a year sit down and I try to persuade him and his colleagues what is happening to crime in this country. It took me a long time to get the press to both accept and report that crime was actually going down. There was a great deal of scepticism when that first started happening. I am glad to say now that most of the press usually manage to say something like, "Overall crime is going down but . . ." and then go onto something else, but at least we have that broad picture. Richard knows that over five years that has been a kind of struggle. There are some real difficulties there. I am not blaming the journalists or the press; I think there is a problem. There is a problem because, as we know, we do tend to have a rather weak scientific and numeracy culture in this country which does not help. The simple thing that I have struggled to get across so far as crime is concerned is that what we are publishing are national crime rates. However, crime victimisation is heavily skewed in its distribution both socially and geographically and therefore those national risks grossly over-estimate the risks for the majority of people. That seems to me a fairly simple point about distribution. Have I managed to get any of the press yet to report that? No. There is a constant struggle I think to try to get understandings of risk and probability.

  Q1119  Mr Newmark: It is the same issue with avian flu.

  Professor Wiles: Absolutely.


 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2006
Prepared 8 November 2006