2 Background
Inquiry
5. In March 1998, our predecessor Committee launched
a major inquiry into the scientific advisory system. The inquiry
took place against a backdrop of widespread concern over a perceived
loss of public confidence in the system of scientific advice supporting
Government policy making. In the introduction to the resulting
Report, published in March 2001, the Committee cited the Government's
handling of the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) crisis,
as well as mounting disquiet over standards in public life and
the operations of Government quangos, as key factors underpinning
the loss of public confidence.[4]
6. The Government was aware of these concerns too
and, around the time of our predecessor's inquiry, had begun taking
steps to address the problems. In March 1997, the then Government
Chief Scientific Adviser, Sir Robert (now Lord) May, published
the first version of Guidelines on the Use of Scientific Advice
in Policy Making, setting out principles to be followed by
government departments in using and presenting scientific advice
and evidence. The Guidelines were subsequently updated in 2000
and 2005. These Guidelines (referred to hereafter as the GCSA's
Guidelines) aim to address "how evidence should be sought
and applied to enhance the ability of government decision makers
to make better-informed decisions". The key messages are
that policy makers should:
- "think ahead and identify
early the issues on which they need scientific advice and early
public engagement, and where the evidence base is weak and should
be strengthened;
- get a wide range of advice from the best sources,
particularly when there is uncertainty;
- publish the evidence and analysis and all relevant
papers".[5]
The Guidelines explicitly state that they apply to
social science as well as natural and physical science.
7. In addition, in October 2000, Lord Phillips of
Worth Matravers' independent review of the "history of the
emergence and identification of BSE and new variant CJD in the
United Kingdom, and of the action taken in response to it up to
20 March 1996" was published. The review, which had been
commissioned by the Government, identified a wide range of key
lessons to be learned regarding the use of scientific advisory
committees, the commissioning and coordination of research for
policy and the communication of risk to the public. A selection
of Lord Phillips' conclusions can be found in Box 1.
Box 1: Some lessons highlighted by the Phillips Review
Departments should retain 'in house' sufficient expertise to ensure that the advice of advisory committees, and the reasoning behind it, can be understood and evaluated.
Government departments must review advice given by advisory committees to ensure that the reasons for it are understood and appear to be sound.
The proceedings of the [scientific advisory] committee should be as open as is compatible with the requirements of confidentiality.
The public should be trusted to respond rationally to openness.
Potential conflicts of interest should not preclude selection of those members otherwise best qualified, but conflicts of interest should be declared and registered.
When giving advice, an advisory committee should make it clear what principles, if any, of risk management are being applied.
Contingency planning is a vital part of government. The existence of advisory committees is not an alternative to this. The advisory committees should, where their advice will be of value, be asked to assist in contingency planning.
When a precautionary measure is introduced, rigorous thought must be given to every aspect of its operation with a view to ensuring that it is watertight.
It is not always clear in practice where responsibility rests as between ministers, officials and advisory committees for advising, determining policy and taking key decisions on medicines. This should be clarified, so as to ensure that important policy decisions are taken by, or approved by, ministers, whether those decisions are to take action or to take no action.
The progress of research and the implications of any new developments must be kept under continuous and open review.
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8. In embarking upon this inquiry, we took as our starting point
our predecessor Committee's findings. However, as noted above,
we cast our net more widely in this inquiry to look at the Government's
treatment of scientific advice, evidence and risk in the round.
We used our three case studies addressing different elements of
Government policy and involving distinct elements of the scientific
advisory system to examine the Government's approach in detail.
Some of the main findings of these case studies are listed in
Box 2.
Box 2: Key relevant findings of case studies
Watching the Directives: Scientific Advice on the EU Physical Agents (Electromagnetic Fields) Directive
- The Health and Safety Executive did not apply the necessary expertise to its assessment of the impact of the Directive
- Inquiry illustrated how a failure of policy makers to consider comprehensive scientific advice early in the policy making process can have serious consequences
- Use of the term "precautionary principle" should cease, in view of the lack of clarity surrounding its meaning
- Lack of involvement of senior scientists within government on an issue with strong science input
- HSE contradicted itself on the line it was pursuing in negotiations in Brussels
- Ministers were not informed early enough about concerns being raised, but acted with commendable speed when finally alerted
- Weaknesses in horizon scanning activities of Department of Health, MRC and medical research community
- Need for improved links between UKREP in Brussels and UK scientific community.
Drug classification: making a hash of it?
- Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD) failing to adhere to Code of Practice for Scientific Advisory Committees
- Lack of transparency in workings of the ACMD and confusion over its remit
- In view of cross-cutting nature of Government's drug policy objective, ACMD needs to play stronger role in supporting work of DfES and DoH, not just Home Office
- ABC classification system does not reflect accurately harm associated with misuse of illegal drugs
- Government has been attempting to use classification to 'send out signals' but no evidence base on which to draw in determining any effect of signal being sent out
- Found no convincing evidence for deterrent effect which is widely seen as underpinning Government's drug policy
- Lack of investment in research and consequent weakness of evidence base on drug abuse and addiction is severe hindrance to policy making
- Classification system should be replaced with more scientifically based scale of harm, decoupled from penalties, to give public better sense of harm associated with drug misuse.
Identity Card Technologies: Scientific Advice, Risk and Evidence
- Lack of transparency in the processes by which scientific advice is incorporated into policy within the identity cards programme
- Consultations had not provided the level of confidence in the scheme that could be expected following successful consultation
- Lack of clarity regarding the scope of the identity cards programme and how technology will be used within the scheme
- The Home Office is using advisory committees to provide guidance on biometrics. The Report recommended that this practice be extended to Information Communications Technology
- Home Office taking an inconsistent approach to scientific evidence and choices regarding biometric technology have preceded trials
- Lack of a clear process by which advice from external social science experts could feed into the scheme
- Home Office had developed a risk management strategy but was not making details public. The Report recommended that the Home Office makes details of its risk model public.
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Evidence based policy making
9. The Government's memorandum to this inquiry set out the origins
of the current emphasis on evidence-based policy making: "while
not a new concept, [it] has its roots in Government's commitment
to 'what works' over ideologically driven policy, and in the Modernising
Government agenda".[6]
The 1999 Modernising Government White Paper stated: "This
Government expects more of policy makers. More new ideas, more
willingness to question inherited ways of doing things, better
use of evidence and research in policy making and better focus
on policies that will deliver long-term goals".[7]
In addition, the Cabinet Office's 1999 report entitled Professional
policy making for the twenty first century identified nine
features of better policy making, most of which either focussed
on better use of evidence or helped to create conditions to promote
the effective use of evidence.[8]
10. There have also been a number of Government policy
documents addressing the scientific advisory system. The 2002
Cross-Cutting Review of Science and Research and the subsequent
White Paper, Investing in Innovation, made a number of
recommendations aimed at strengthening the Government's scientific
capabilities, including that departments should publish science
and innovation strategies and appoint Chief Scientific Advisers
(see paragraphs 27 and 28 below). In July 2004 the Government
also published a 10 year investment framework for science and
innovation. This framework defined eight attributes—listed
in Box 3—for the effective management of science and research
across Government, which sought to place scientists and scientific
advice and evidence at the heart of policy making. There are,
in addition, a number of guides and manuals issued by different
departments which seek to improve the way scientific advice, risk
and evidence are handled in policy making (see Box 4).
Box 3: Attributes for the effective management of science and research
across Government
- The Government as a whole, and all Government departments, will have adopted a culture of using sound scientific advice to inform policy development, delivery and departmental decision-making. This should involve DCSAs in all major departments with direct access to ministers and departmental managers, and with departmental managers involving DCSAs on all major policy issues, not just those with obvious scientific aspects.
- All scientific work commissioned and used by Government will be of appropriately high quality, drawn from the best possible sources (including the science base and the private sector), commanding the confidence of Government ministers and officials. Government departments will be paying the full economic costs of the research they commission from universities.
- Priorities for research will be set at the strategic level, not just within departments as they are now, but also across government as a whole, taking account, for example, of the 2003 Strategic Audit from the Cabinet Office. CSAs—acting as a group—along with other bodies, such as the Council for Science and Technology, will provide advice on the prioritisation of strategic issues. The use of science in policymaking will be applied consistently across the board where an issue affects more than one department.
- All Government departments will be using sophisticated scientific horizon-scanning techniques, linked both to their own policy horizon scanning, that of other departments, and to the OST horizon-scanning centre. This should involve departments drawing upon the science base to ensure they are informed about future risks and opportunities. Cross-departmental science initiatives, such as the Foresight programme and Prime Minister's Strategy Unit work, should develop and disseminate best practice guidelines and should provide capacity to deal with selected issues, working closely with other departments.
- Scientific expertise will be used to the maximum effect possible, allowing greater use of Research Council, charity and private sector input to Government advice, and giving Government scientists greater opportunities to contribute to the work of the science base and the exploitation of their work in the wider community, industry and commerce. Analysts, including scientists, will be able to network more effectively—within their own department, across departments, Research Councils, the private sector and internationally—to ensure awareness not just of research results already generated but also active research underway elsewhere.
- Knowledge transfer objectives will be fully incorporated into departments' S&I strategies, and scientific advice on procurement in Government departments will be seen as a natural and logical means of pulling through the development of new technologies.
- The use of scientific knowledge will have been fully integrated into Government analytical and risk assessment processes, and risk assessment guidance will be consistent with the advice in Guidelines 2000. Science will be regarded as one of the key analytical inputs to decisions along with specialisms like economics, law and statistics, with policy staff at all levels aware of the need to seek scientific advice—in the same way as they incorporate economic and legal advice.
- Scientific advice for the Government will be generated in a fully inclusive manner and command the support of the public and other stakeholders. Scientists, including Government scientists, will have the training and willingness to communicate openly with the public, including through the media. Politicians and the public will understand what science and research can and cannot deliver, in particular that science and analysis will provide information and knowledge to those who must take decisions, but that it is for politicians and for the public to take the decisions themselves.
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Source: Science and Innovation Investment Framework 2004-2014Box 4: Government manuals, guides and reports
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Guidance
Green Book: Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government
Magenta Book: Guidance Notes on Policy Evaluation
Orange Book: Management of Risk-Principles and Concepts
Guidelines on Scientific Analysis in Policy Making
Code of Practice for Scientific Advisory Committees
Managing risks to the public: appraisal guidance
Communicating Risks
White papers and policy documents
Modernising Government
Cross-Cutting Review of Science and Innovation
Investing in Innovation
Science and Innovation Investment Framework 2004-2014
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11. We also refer in this Report to the work that other select
committees have done recently on evidence based policy making
and the Government's approach to risk. In addition, the Public
Administration Committee is expected to publish shortly the Report
of its Governing the Future inquiry which has explored
the place of strategy and planning in Government and is, therefore,
of relevance to our conclusions on horizon scanning in chapter
4.
4 Science and Technology Committee, Fourth Report of
Session 2000-01, The Scientific Advisory System, March
2001, HC 257, paras 56-57 Back
5
Chief Scientific Adviser/Office of Science and Innovation, Guidelines
On Scientific Analysis In Policy Making, October 2005, para
4 Back
6
Ev 86 Back
7
Cabinet Office, Modernising Government, March 1999, Cm
4310, Chapter 2 Back
8
Ev 86 Back
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