House of Commons - Science and Technology

Select Committee on Science and Technology Seventh Report

3 Sources of advice and expertise

Chief Advisers and Heads of Profession

12. The Government Chief Scientific Adviser (GCSA), currently Professor Sir David King, is responsible to the Prime Minister for the quality of scientific advice within Government. The Government told us that the GCSA's advice is independent and it is up to the Prime Minister and Cabinet to decide whether to act on it.[9] The GCSA is supported in his work by staff in the Office of Science and Innovation (OSI) Trans-departmental Science and Technology Group.

13. The GCSA acts through a number of channels. For example, he has regular meetings with ministers and permanent secretaries from different departments. He also leads ad hoc advisory groups focussing on issues such as GM science, natural hazards and biometrics. In addition, the GCSA participates in a number of important committees:

Various Cabinet committees, including Science and Innovation (SI) and the ministerial Committee on Animal Rights Activists;
The Chief Scientific Adviser's Committee (CSAC)—composed of departmental CSAs, as well as the Government Chief Social Researcher (chaired by the GCSA);
The Council for Science and Technology—the highest level committee on scientific advice to Government (co-chaired by the GCSA);
The Global Science and Innovation Forum (GSIF)—a cross-departmental forum for discussion of international issues of relevance to science and innovation (chaired by the GCSA);
The Scientific Advisory Panel for Emergency Response (SAPER)—comprised of internal and external experts and aims to strengthen the use of scientific advice in crisis management (chaired by the GCSA); and
The Coordination of Research and Analysis Group (CRAG)—promotes better dialogue between policy experts and the full range of analytical disciplines within Government (chaired by Sir Brian Bender, the DTI Permanent Secretary).

The GCSA has also recently taken on the role of Head of Scientific and Engineering Profession (HoSEP) and, as such, "seeks to give leadership and greater visibility to the role of scientists in support of overall Government policy".[10] We discuss the status of scientists and engineers in the civil service further in paragraphs 45-6. In addition, the GCSA is Head of OSI and holds Permanent Secretary status within the DTI.

HEAD OF THE GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC SERVICE

14. Sir Nicholas Stern is the Head of the Government Economic Service (GES). At present, there is no Government Chief Economist post but in the past this role has sometimes been combined with that of Head of the GES. Sir Nicholas told us that, as Head of the GES, he is "available to give advice to any minister, should that be requested".[11] The Government explained the role of GES members (i.e. Government economists) as follows:

"members bring economic analysis to the policy-making process in government, using basic economic principles and empirical evidence to analyse proposals for the allocation of limited resources. They use a range of tools including the key principles of public economics, an economic understanding of markets, incentives and institutions, cost-benefit analysis and econometric modelling, as well as providing less technical advice".[12]

As Head of the GES, Sir Nicholas "supports and guides departmental Government Chief Economists, who have a direct role in advising ministers on social science issues, and who meet regularly to discuss cross-cutting issues".[13] Sir Nicholas is also second Permanent Secretary at the Cabinet Office and Adviser to the UK Government on the Economics of Climate Change and Development. In addition, he leads the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change.

SOCIAL SCIENCE CHIEFS OF PROFESSION

15. Alongside economists, there are three other main professional groups of social scientists in Government: social researchers, statisticians and operational researchers, each overseen by a Chief of Profession. Karen Dunnell, the National Statistician, is based at the Office for National Statistics and Tony O'Connor, the Chief Operational Research Analyst, is based in the Prime Minister's Delivery Unit at the Cabinet Office.[14] Sue Duncan, Government Chief Social Researcher and head of the Government Social Research Service (GSR), oversees the use of social research in Government; social research being defined as follows:

"social research uses the methods of scientific enquiry—such as surveys, qualitative research, analysis of administrative and statistical data, case studies and controlled trials—to measure, describe, explain and predict social and economic change".[15]

The purpose of the GSR is "to provide government with objective, reliable, relevant and timely social research to inform policy-making and delivery".[16] The Government Social Research Unit (GSRU), which supports the work of the Head of the GSR and is based in the Treasury, takes a lead "on strategic social research issues and standards for research in government", helps to promote "the use of evidence in strategy, policy and delivery" and provides practical support to departments.[17] GSR has over 1,000 members spread across 20 departments and agencies, as well as the devolved administrations.

16. Sue Duncan explained that her principal role as Government Chief Social Researcher was "to set standards for the Government Social Research Service in areas of professional and ethical practice and to provide the resources to do that". Unlike Sir Nicholas Stern and Sir David King, she has "no role specifically in advising ministers; that is done via departmental experts".[18] This is perhaps to be expected in light of the fact that Sir David King made clear in his evidence to us that, as GCSA, he takes full responsibility for social science as well as for the natural and physical sciences, engineering and technology. We support the current arrangement whereby the Government Chief Scientific Adviser's remit encompasses the natural, physical and social sciences, as well as engineering and technology, but we note that it is a challenge for one individual to cover such a disparate range of subject areas and disciplines. We also note that Sir David King's advocacy of social science has been lower profile than his contributions in areas of natural and physical science. It is therefore vital that the Government Chief Scientific Adviser works closely with the Government Chiefs of Profession in the social sciences, including economics, to establish higher profiles for these disciplines.

HEAD OF OSI

17. Since OST's inception in 1992, the GCSA has fulfilled a dual role combining a cross-departmental coordination and advisory function with the post of Head of the OST (now OSI). Our predecessor Committee expressed concern in its 2004 Report on the introductory hearing held with the Director General of the Research Councils (DGRC), Sir Keith O'Nions, that the current arrangement "could impede the [G]CSA's ability to operate as an independent and high-level advocate of science across Government".[19] It is also questionable whether the role of administrative Head of OSI sits comfortably alongside the GCSA's responsibility to exert, where appropriate, a challenge function in respect of senior civil servants and ministers in other departments. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the GCSA has sufficient time to enable him to give full attention to developing both his cross-departmental challenge and advisory functions and his administrative and oversight responsibilities for OSI, meaning that aspects of one or both of these important roles may be neglected. Since the two strands of the job each require quite distinct skills sets and focus, it is also not clear that a single candidate would be well placed to fulfil both elements of the job.

18. If the GCSA did not occupy the post of Head of the OSI, the natural candidate to take up that role would be the DGRC—renamed in the 2005 restructuring of the DTI 'Director General of Science and Innovation' (DGSI). The DGSI already bears strategic responsibility for the science budget and it could be argued that the role of Head of OSI involves a more comparable skills set and focus to those required for the post of DGSI than is the case for the post of GCSA. The management and financial responsibilities involved in heading the OSI are not obviously complementary to the cross-departmental advisory role and challenge functions of the GSCA. We recommend that the posts of Government Chief Scientific Adviser and Head of the Office of Science and Innovation be separated. The Director General of Science and Innovation at the DTI should become the new Head of OSI. Clearly, the addition of another significant work stream to the DGSI's responsibility will have ramifications for his work load and it may be necessary to redistribute other elements of his portfolio accordingly, as well as ensuring that he has sufficient support. It will also be vital to make sure that the loss of this responsibility does not weaken the post of GCSA or in any way detract from its potential influence. This appeared to be a key concern of Sir David King when we put the idea to him. We address it in the following section.

ROLE OF DIFFERENT DEPARTMENTS

19. We have argued repeatedly that science should play a cross-cutting role within Government. This is reflected in the fact that our Reports and those of our predecessors Committee have looked at the work of a wide range of different departments—in this inquiry alone, we have received evidence from the following departments:

Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG);

Department for Education and Skills (DfES);

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA);

Department for Transport (DfT);

Department for Work and Pensions (DWP);

Department of Trade and Industry (DTI);

Food Standards Agency (FSA);

Health and Safety Executive (HSE);

HM Treasury;

Home Office; and

Office of Science and Innovation.

The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Rt Hon. Alistair Darling MP, also admitted that he "would be hard-pressed to name any department where [scientific advice] was not important".[20] In view of the cross-cutting nature of science and the cross-departmental responsibilities of the Government CSA, it would make sense for the post to be based in a department with a similarly cross-cutting remit, the most obvious candidates being the Treasury and the Cabinet Office or even Number 10.

20. Sir David King agreed with us that the question of whether he should be based in the DTI was "a good one because the role of the Chief Scientific Adviser is to report to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet and yet my office is in the DTI". Furthermore, he told us that this situation produced a "tension" that he felt "many days of the week".[21] However, he argued that moving to another department would "probably mean taking all 150" OSI staff with him.[22] This need not be the case—many of those staff do not directly support Sir David's role as GCSA and we have already proposed removing the role as head of the OSI from the GCSA. The GCSA could also follow the example of Sir Nicholas Stern, the Head of the Government Economic Service, and retain a desk in OSI while becoming affiliated to another department. Following his appointment as Adviser to the Government on the Economics of Climate Change, Sir Nicholas moved his base to the Cabinet Office but retained a desk in the Treasury. Sir Nicholas noted that his affiliation to the Cabinet Office made sense because he had "embarked on a project which cuts right across government and affects every department".[23] There is a case for applying the same rationale to Sir David King's position. In addition, placing the HGES and the GCSA in the same department would considerably enhance the importance of the cross-departmental role of the Cabinet Office.

21. The post of GCSR, and the Government Social Research Unit which supports it, have also recently relocated from the Cabinet Office to the Treasury "as part of machinery of government changes".[24] The GCSR Sue Duncan told us that she very much welcomed the move, not least because: "it also means that we are in the department that leads on the spending reviews, which draw heavily on government-generated research and evidence, and it is actually an opportunity for me to have a stronger input into that process".[25] Again, a similar logic could be applied to the post of GCSA.

22. We put the suggestion that the GCSA's post be relocated to either the Cabinet Office or Treasury to Sir David King and Mr Darling. Neither gave us a firm indication of their preference, but both indicated that they were open to change and acknowledged the arguments in favour of a move. Sir David told us: "I could be in the Treasury. I could be in the Cabinet Office", noting that "in the past the Chief Scientific Adviser has been in the Cabinet Office".[26] Sir David also emphasised the key role of the Treasury:

"it seems to me that the Treasury is in a trans-departmental role, in the sense that all of its actions […] are through other Government departments. […] I think, in the sense that I am the trans-departmental Chief Scientific Adviser, I work quite closely with the Treasury".[27]

The Secretary of State also pointed out that "There is very little that happens in government the Treasury does not both know about and approve and is not actively involved in^".[28]

23. Another argument for the relocation of the GCSA's office stems from the concern that science and technology have not been sufficiently influential in shaping the Government's long term policy agenda. The Environment Research Funders' Forum, for example, told us that "science tends not to be involved early enough in establishing policy priorities" and asserted that it "should be more engaged with establishing the government's bigger strategic questions, typically originating in Treasury or the Cabinet Office".[29] The long term strategies needed to address policy issues such climate change, obesity, transport infrastructure and even pensions would all benefit to varying degrees from an early scientific input. Moving the GCSA's office to one of these strategic departments or to Number 10 could help to ensure strategic questions are suitably informed by science.

24. It is not trivial to determine whether the GCSA's office would be best situated in the Treasury, Cabinet Office or Number 10—there are strong arguments for and against each. The Treasury obviously has a pivotal role to play in policy making across the piece and it is essential that the GCSA has an opportunity to work closely with senior officials and ministers in that department, which does not have a departmental CSA. However, locating the GCSA post within the Treasury could carry with it a risk that the GCSA's energies become channelled predominantly into matters of concern to that department and could also call into question his independence or the perception of it. The Cabinet Office (which also currently lacks a departmental CSA) would in many respects be a natural location for the GCSA, reflecting his role as CSA to the Cabinet and Prime Minister, his cross-departmental remit and his independence. These advantages need to be offset against perceptions that the influence of the Cabinet Office has been eroded by the growing concentration of power within Number 10 and Number 11. Finally, placing the GCSA's office in Number 10 could enable him to leverage the strategic role of this department and make the most of the Prime Minister's sponsorship but could again undermine his independence (or the perception of it) and potentially weaken his influence within the Treasury.

25. A long term solution is required for the post of Government Chief Scientific Adviser, not just one which happens to suit the strengths of present incumbent. On balance, we recommend the relocation of the GCSA's office to the Cabinet Office. In addition, the GCSA should be given a seat on the board of the Treasury to ensure that the crucial work of this department benefits from a scientific perspective at the highest level. The changes we have recommended seek to strengthen the influence and effectiveness of the GCSA. It is therefore essential that the resources available to the GCSA to support his work do not diminish as a result of these changes. This means that although the GCSA's new office is likely only to include the core staff currently employed within OSI whose work directly supports his function as GCSA, arrangements must be in place to ensure that he has ready access to the expertise and resources of the OSI. For example, the work of the Foresight team is clearly important to the GCSA but there would be no need for the entire team to move to the Cabinet Office, providing that close relationships are maintained with the GCSA's office and he is given access to their resources. The close working relationship already developed between Sir David King and Sir Keith O'Nions as GCSA and DGSI, respectively, would greatly facilitate such an arrangement.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY SYSTEM

26. We also identified during this inquiry a need for greater clarity regarding the ministerial responsibilities for the scientific advisory system headed by the GCSA and for evidence based policy making across Government. This was highlighted by the difficulty we experienced in trying to secure an appropriate minister to give evidence to us on behalf of the Government. The Treasury has been the lead department for risk and is perceived to be playing an increasingly important role in science policy—the recent Science and innovation investment framework 2004-2014: next steps document, for example, was widely considered to have been largely driven by the Treasury.[30] As noted above, the Cabinet Office plays a key role in promoting an evidence based approach to policy making. OSI obviously makes a major contribution to the effective use of science and evidence in policy making too, but the GCSA, Sir David King, takes the lead in the area of scientific advice, rather than the Minister for Science and Innovation, Lord Sainsbury. Ultimately, Sir David reports to the Prime Minister but the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Alistair Darling, chairs the Cabinet Committee on Science and Innovation (SI). Mr Darling told us that "every single Secretary of State" shared responsibility for ensuring that the Government was using scientific advice appropriately in policy development.[31] Although we accept that as being true at departmental level, we are of the view that clear leadership can be valuable for improving accountability and providing a driver for implementation of good practice across departments. We recommend the Government clarify the lines of ministerial responsibility for the scientific advisory system. For example, whilst ultimate responsibility must rest with the Prime Minister, day-to-day responsibility might best be assumed by the Cabinet Office led by the Government Chief Scientific Adviser.

Departmental Chief Scientific Advisers

ROLE

27. The Investing in Innovation White Paper published in 2002 stated that all departments that use or commission significant amounts of research should have a CSA and Sir David King has made it a priority during his time in office to promote the appointment of departmental CSAs (DCSAs). The DCSA Induction Pack describes their position as follows:

"The role of the DCSA is to provide independent advice to the Department's Ministerial Head and the Departmental Management Board. While implementation will vary between departments, the DCSA is responsible for ensuring that the quality of scientific evidence-based advice within the Department is to the required quality, fit for purpose and underpins implementation of the Government's guidelines on S&T policy making. A key part of the DCSA role is the ability to alert the Department to those areas where current research can assist in developing sound public policy".[32]

DCSAs have a number of other responsibilities, including delivering departmental science and innovation strategies, encouraging the use of horizon scanning and promoting the science and society and knowledge transfer agendas.

28. In practice, the role of the DCSA varies between departments. For example, in some departments, e.g. DEFRA, the DCSA has overall responsibility for the economic/social science function whilst in others, e.g. DFID, the DCSA sits alongside (i.e. is of the same seniority as) the Chief Economist and/or Chief Statistician/Social Researcher. Not all departments have appointed DCSAs. Some departments, such as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Department for Education and Skills, have de facto DCSAs with the function being fulfilled by, respectively, the Head of Science and Innovation and the Chief Economist. The Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) has recently announced its intention to appoint its first DCSA.[33]The Treasury and Cabinet Office do not have DCSAs.

APPOINTMENTS

External recruitment

29. The DCSA Induction Pack states that it is "very important that the DCSA is a scientist with a high and current reputation", noting that the "ability to continue in active research is helpful to achieving that objective".[34] DCSAs who have been appointed from outside the civil service have been employed on part-time fixed-term contracts (typically four days per week) with the aim of enabling them to maintain their external research.

30. In some departments, the DCSA has been appointed as a result of an internal promotion. Paul Wiles, Home Office DCSA, although originally an academic, was the Home Office Director of Research, Development and Statistics for three years before becoming the DCSA. In most other departments, DCSAs have been recruited from senior positions in academia. For example, the Department for Transport DCSA, Professor Frank Kelly, was, and remains, Professor of Mathematics at the University of Cambridge. He is shortly to be replaced by Professor Brian Collins, Professor of Information Systems at Cranfield University. Professor Sir Gordon Conway was President of the Rockefeller Foundation before being recruited as the DFID DCSA and also holds an academic appointment at Imperial College, London, on a part-time basis.

31. We heard support for external recruitment of DCSAs. Professor Kelly told us of his experience:

"I feel that some of the big wins from having a chief scientific adviser in the department is the challenge function and the opening up of the relationships between science and technology within the department and in the science base as a whole. I think that if you come from outside of government you perhaps find that a little bit easier".[35]

The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Mr Darling, who had previously been Secretary of State for Transport, told us that he had also valued Professor Kelly's contribution at the DfT and his external perspective: "having someone like that to look at problems afresh, to bring his own background to bear on the department's consideration was an immense help and partly it informed our decision actually to pursue road pricing as a solution to the congestion problems we will face in the future".[36] Professor Sir Gordon Conway, not surprisingly perhaps, also spoke in favour of recruiting DCSAs from outside the civil service, telling us:

"I think it does help having people from outside, particularly senior people from outside. […] When we speak it carries a bit of weight. […] If you come from an academic institution in this country and you have established a reputation there you carry with it a weight that goes behind the evidence you are trying to get across".[37]

As well as bringing fresh perspectives and experience, outside appointees might find it easier to be absolutely frank with ministers and senior officials than those with careers in the civil service. We recommend that the presumption should be that all future departmental Chief Scientific Advisers should be external appointments who have occupied senior positions in their scientific community and command the respect of their peers.

Part-time and fixed-term appointments

32. The majority of external appointments fulfil the DCSA role on a part-time basis. This has advantages for the department, as Sir Brian Bender explained to us:

"having someone […] who actually spends a day a week, usually probably a Sunday rather than the Friday that they are allocated, back dealing with live research with students helps keep them fresh. I remember Frank Kelly saying to me that he got a lot of benefit, if the Secretary of State will not mind me saying this, taking his problems back to the Clare College common room and actually discussing them".[38]

In addition, Professor Kelly pointed out that offering part-time contracts was important because "many of the academics you would like to get are not going to be willing to stop their academic research streams".[39]

33. For a similar reason, Professor Kelly was in favour of the use of fixed-term contracts for DCSAs, telling us: "I could not have done more and maintained my academic position". He further argued that the arrangement was beneficial for the department: "I think there are advantages in turning over chief scientific advisers. They come with different skills and will thus spread out the connections between the department and the science base".[40] However, he conceded that the use of fixed-term contracts—typically three years in the first instance—needed to be traded off against the six months to a year that it took him to get to know his way around the department and role.[41] The DFID CSA, Professor Sir Gordon Conway, also admitted that he had spent "the last year and three months or so [since starting the job] getting to understand DFID, getting to understand how it works, how the Civil Service works".[42]

34. Professor Kelly emphasised that "good support from within the Civil Service, establishing the right sort of support structures," was crucial to enabling DCSAs to be effective on a part-time, fixed-term basis.[43] He told us that he was "supported by the research and technology staff division which are a dozen".[44] Unfortunately, it seems that this level of support is not necessarily typical. Professor Paul Wiles, Home Office DCSA, said he had the direct support of "half a dozen people", while Professor Sir Gordon Conway had only "one member of staff and another one joining".[45] Effective civil service support is also crucial for addressing the concern raised by the Centre for Evidence Based Policy and Practice regarding the fact that "outsiders recruited into Whitehall, mostly in quite senior positions [have often] struggled to gain recognition from their insider colleagues of the expertise they brought with them; and some left quite quickly".[46] We support the use of part-time and fixed-term contracts for departmental CSAs with the caveat that departments must provide adequate support and resources for these appointments. We recognise that appropriate staffing levels will vary between departments but it seems unlikely that a DCSA can operate effectively with just one or two officials.

35. We further note that in the Department for Transport, the DCSA is supported by a deputy CSA who is a scientist drawn from within the civil service. The deputy CSA also fulfils the role of Head of Profession for Scientists and Engineers within the department. This seems to us an entirely sensible arrangement. An externally appointed DCSA is critically dependent on sound advice from experienced officials, and civil servants are better placed to understand the needs of, and to represent, other scientists and engineers within the civil service. The arrangement also ensures that the DCSA's challenge function is not constrained by the need to act as champion and Head of Profession for scientists within the department. We commend to other departments the Department for Transport's model whereby an externally appointed DCSA is supported by a senior scientist, drawn from the civil service, who acts as both deputy CSA and Head of Profession for Scientists and Engineers in the department.

POSITION WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT

On tap or on top?

36. While the introduction of DCSAs was universally welcomed in the evidence we received, several witnesses commented that DCSAs' effectiveness depended on their ability to play a full part in high level policy development. The Royal Society warned, for example, of the importance of ensuring "that the CSA is involved in all the key strategic decisions within a department".[47] The DCSA induction pack also notes that DCSAs should be "involved on all major policy issues".[48] However, we, and our predecessor Committee, have identified situations where this does not appear to have happened, including in the case studies undertaken in conjunction with this inquiry. In our MRI case study, we found that senior scientists had no involvement in a policy with a strong science input and potential significant consequences for medical science. In addition, our predecessor Committee commented in its 2005 Report on forensic science that the Home Office DCSA seemed to have had little input to the transformation of the Forensic Science Service (FSS), a key scientific resource for the Government, describing "the low visibility of the Home Office Chief Scientific Adviser" as "a source of concern, particularly in view of the history of weak scientific culture in the department".[49] We also note that, despite the fact that Sir David King has expressed disquiet over the loss of senior scientific posts from the civil service due to the privatisation or partial privatisation of the LGC, FSS and QinetiQ, he had little input into the discussions over the future of the FSS.[50]

37. Norman Glass, Director of the National Centre for Social Research and former Treasury civil servant, argued that "the old Civil Service phrase […] that eggheads/boffins should be on tap, not on top, is still very much alive and well".[51] Sir David King told us: "that phrase is unacceptable" on the grounds that "'on tap' implies that the minister knows exactly when to turn to the scientist, turn it on and turn it off again and I disagree with that completely". He told us: "Of course the Minister is on top but I do not think the scientist is 'on tap'".[52] Sir David also emphasised that for DCSAs to do their job, they need "to have a direct reporting line to the secretary of state [and] to be on the Board, so that during a discussion where the others think that science is not relevant it is for that scientist then to speak up and give the scientific case for it".[53] He gave the example of pensions policy, which was not widely thought of as requiring scientific expertise, but in fact relied heavily on scientific disciplines such as demography. Professor Sir Gordon Conway, DFID DCSA, also told us: "science gets into everything", giving the example of the role of technology in minimising corruption.[54]

38. We asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry his view of Mr Glass's assertion that there was a belief in the civil service that scientists should be 'on tap, not on top'. Mr Darling acknowledged that there could be a situation where "you have got an excellent chief scientific adviser who is completely up to date with all the evidence, and so on, but he is not regarded as an integral part of the department".[55] He also admitted that "in my last Department, Transport, for example, there were some divisions in that Department which were extremely good at looking at all this and taking it into account; others perhaps were more reluctant".[56] In Mr Darling's view, the solution was to make sure that DCSAs and the processes they oversee were embedded in a decision-making process—"get the thing in with the bricks".[57] We return to the need to create demand for scientific analysis and evidence in paragraph 51.

39. The introduction of departmental CSAs has been most welcome but they must be able to contribute fully to strategic decision making and high level policy development within the department if their contribution is to be maximised. Departmental CSAs must be given the opportunity to play a full and active and yet independent role at board level, and be in a position to identify where their involvement is required, rather than being brought in where others have decided that there is a need for their input. DCSAs must be in the stream of policy development, not watching from the bank. The misconception that scientists in the civil service should be 'on tap, not on top' must be laid to rest once and for all.

Lines of responsibility

40. DCSAs' primary reporting lines are to their Permanent Secretary and Secretary of State. However, Sir David King told us: "I also need the chief scientific advisers to report to me, but that is very much a dotted line".[58] We were interested to establish how this relationship, which Sir David described as "absolutely critically important", worked in practice.[59] Professor Kelly had a very positive view of Sir David King's input, telling us he had been "a great help".[60] Sir Gordon Conway told us that he had regular contact with the GCSA, seeing him informally or formally every week or ten days. Sir Gordon said that although Sir David "does not tell me what to do", he "makes suggestions; he makes strong and vigorous suggestions and I may agree with them or not agree with them".[61] We asked Sir Gordon whether he experienced any difficulty in balancing the wishes of his Secretary of State and the views of Sir David. He conceded that "There may be tensions over emphasis",[62] but said that "Government should be about argument and dialogue and tension".[63] We acknowledge the potential difficulty facing departmental CSAs in balancing the demands and expectations of their permanent secretary, minister and the Government CSA. DCSAs should report to the Secretary of State but retain the independence necessary not to restrict their freedom to speak out internally or publicly when required and to avoid any politicisation of their advice.

41. Professor Wiles noted that the GCSA also had a direct relationship with senior officials in other departments. He explained the situation as follows:

"Sir David does have regular meetings with my permanent secretary and I think he does with other permanent secretaries as well. He is not directly managing the science in the Home Office; I am accountable through the permanent secretary to the home secretary, but that does not mean to say that he has no routes to exercise some influence both via me and directly himself to the permanent secretary."[64]

It is good that the Government CSA is able to go directly to senior officials and ministers in departments in cases where he believes his intervention is essential. In so doing he must be careful not to undermine the position of the relevant departmental CSA and recognise those areas in which their expertise should hold sway. He should, wherever possible, include the departmental CSA in his discussions with ministers and senior officials. By the same token, we believe that departmental CSAs should be free to publicly disagree with the Government CSA in instances where there is, for example, a difference in their interpretation of scientific evidence, but urge departmental CSAs and the Government CSA to co-operate closely to deliver an active network of scientific support and advice to every department. The scientific advisory system will be most effective when the departmental and Government CSAs work together collaboratively.

Science in the civil service

42. One of the key roles of the GCSA, DCSAs and the staff supporting them is to oversee and develop scientific expertise within the civil service. The Induction Pack for DCSAs states that departments require scientific expertise in order to:

"interpret scientific issues simply and clearly;

harness and synthesise existing research;

identify their research requirements accurately;

procure science of high quality and relevance;

manage out-sourced research programmes;

understand the findings of research programmes and appreciate their policy implications; and

evaluate scientific advice from external sources and identify the implications for policy."[65]

43. Clearly, departments will need to buy in external expertise to supplement their in-house expertise but the memoranda we received also highlighted the need for the civil service to maintain sufficient scientific literacy to render it an effective, or 'intelligent', customer of science and research. The Campaign for Science and Engineering (CaSE) told us: "it is only possible for Government to handle risk and science appropriately if it has a sufficiently expert and critical in-house capability to allow it to formulate the questions it needs to ask of external experts".[66] The Centre for Evidence Based Policy and Practice also said that "securing scientific advice depend[s] on an in-house capability to handle it—identifying when science can contribute to policy, seeking it out from a wide range of sources and interpreting its relevance to policy".[67] In addition, the Science Council expressed concern that "often the department or unit responsible for handling an issue on behalf of government will have little or no in-house expertise in the area of policy under review", citing the example of "the HSE lead on MRI and the EU Physical Agents Directive"—the subject of one of our case studies.[68]

44. Our predecessor Committee criticised levels of departmental scientific expertise on a number of occasions. In its 2004 Report The Use of Science in UK International Development Policy, it stated that there were "serious weaknesses in DFID's approach to the use of science and technology" and suggested that its "fundamental lack of scientific culture" could be partly explained by "a lack of in-house expertise".[69] As a result of the Committee's criticisms, as well as the concerns of the GCSA, DFID appointed its first DCSA, Professor Sir Gordon Conway, in December 2004. Our predecessor Committee also commented on the weak scientific culture in the Home Office in its Reports on terrorism and forensic science in 2003 and 2005, respectively.[70]

SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS

45. There are no accurate figures regarding the total numbers of scientists and engineers in the workforce,[71] despite the recommendation in the 2002 Cross-Cutting Review of Science and Research that "Departments should maintain records on specialist staff in order to be able to identify their scientific qualifications and experience".[72] Nevertheless, Sir David King said there had been a "continuing reduction of scientists and engineers in the civil service", which he described as "a concern".[73] Sir David further revealed that "anecdotal evidence suggests that the situation has been exacerbated by individuals in more general civil service jobs hiding their scientific skills as they viewed them as an impediment to promotion".[74] It is worrying and regrettable that there is a perception that not only has there been a decline in scientific expertise within the civil service, but civil servants perceive specialist skills to be a hindrance to career progression. We recommend that the Government implement the 2002 recommendation of the Cross-Cutting Review of Science and Research to maintain records on specialist staff in order to identify their qualities and experience and to investigate, and if necessary tackle, negative attitudes towards scientific qualifications.

46. Sir David King told us that the changing status of Government scientific facilities such as the Laboratory of the Government Chemist (LGC), Forensic Science Service and QinetiQ (formed from the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency) had exacerbated the situation: "we are losing scientific expertise from within the civil service [and] the opportunity for people to bubble up into top positions in the civil service with a hard science training is being reduced".[75] The Government also acknowledged in its 2002 White Paper on Science and Innovation that "the privatisation of scientific research establishments, and the development of an arms-length relationship between departments and the remaining public sector establishments, has eroded what was previously the main base for the supply of practising scientists to departments".[76] However, there is no evidence that action was taken subsequent to this realisation in order to compensate for this loss of expertise. The significance of these research establishments can also be inferred from the Government's evidence to our predecessor Committee's inquiry into the scientific advisory system, in which the Government described Public Sector Research Establishments (such as the LGC and Forensic Science Service), of which there were then 50—either sponsored by Government departments or by the Research Councils—as "a key element in the Government science and technology advisory system".[77] The Government's failure to do enough to address the implications of the privatisation of Public Sector Research Establishments for the scientific capacity of the civil service has been damaging. Remedial action is now required to redress the effect of the loss of, and restriction of access to, expertise in establishments such as the Laboratory of the Government Chemist, Forensic Science Service and QinetiQ. Future plans for changing the status of such Establishments must also take greater account of the potential detrimental impact of these changes on the scientific advisory system supporting Government policy making.

Social science

47. We heard some evidence of deficiencies in civil service expertise in the social sciences although, as discussed below in paragraphs 54-6, there is a widespread view that the status and influence of economists in the civil service is significantly stronger than that of scientists in other disciplines. Nevertheless, Sir Nicholas Stern, Head of the Government Economic Service, was of the view that economic expertise was still lacking in some departments, telling us he would "welcome a still stronger presence of economists" in the Department of Health, Department for Education and Skills and Ministry of Defence.[78] Sue Duncan, Government Chief Social Researcher, also identified room for improvement in social research expertise. She explained that "across departments there are a lot of junior staff" and noted that the Health and Safety Executive and DEFRA in particular needed to strengthen their social research expertise.[79]

GENERALISTS

48. Experts in the civil service (and from outside) need to work closely with civil service generalists if scientific advice and evidence are to be effectively incorporated into policy. William Solesbury, Senior Visiting Research Fellow at the Centre for Evidence Based Policy and Practice, told us that it was in this area—the competence of the generalist staff - that the civil service's weakness lay: "I do not think there is, as yet, very much, or at least not a very sophisticated understanding of the occasions when evidence is useful, the sort of evidence to be obtained, how to evaluate evidence when it is available, how to interpret it, and how to weigh it".[80] We discuss the Government's recent efforts to address this problem below. It seems to us necessary that all senior officials and policy makers should have a basic understanding of the scientific method, the role and importance of peer review, the relevance of different types of evidence, and the way to evaluate it.

PROFESSIONAL SKILLS FOR GOVERNMENT

49. A key initiative undertaken by the civil service in recent years has been the Professional Skills for Government (PSG) programme. According to the PSG website, PSG is "a major, long-term change programme designed to ensure that civil servants, wherever they work, have the right mix of skills and expertise to enable their departments or agencies to deliver effective services".[81] The programme requires civil servants to demonstrate skills and expertise in four areas—leadership, core skills, job-related professional skills and broader experience—at the appropriate level in relation to their job and chosen career path. The core skills required comprise people management; financial management; programme and project management; and analysis and use of evidence. Senior civil servants will also be expected to demonstrate core skills in strategic thinking and communications and marketing. There are 18 named occupations within the PSG framework, including 'Scientist/Engineer', and three 'career groupings': corporate services delivery; operational delivery; and policy delivery.

50. Sir David King told us that the PSG initiative would improve the use of science and social science within Government on both the supply and demand side.[82] As noted above, one of the core skills policy makers are required to demonstrate is analysis and use of evidence. Senior civil servants will also be expected to move from 'using' and 'understanding' evidence to 'championing' the role of analysis and evidence.[83] Each of the core skills has a designated Head of Profession or 'Champion'. Currently, Sir Nicholas Stern is the Head of Profession for analysis and use of evidence, Sir David King is the Head of Profession for scientists and engineers and Sir Brian Bender is the Head of Profession for policy delivery.

51. Witnesses to this inquiry gave the introduction of the PSG framework a cautious welcome. The Centre for Evidence Based Policy and Practice told us that the recognition of the need for generalist civil servants to understand what science can offer and when that contribution is required was "laudable, but insufficient", asserting that "Skills alone are not the problem. Attitudes need to change too".[84] William Solesbury, Senior Visiting Research Fellow at the Centre, also warned that that the PSG requirement needed to filter "through into the training and, more importantly the reward systems in the Civil Service".[85] Professor Wiles, Home Office DCSA, went even further, telling us that the most important recommendation that we could make in this Report would be to "Make sure that Professional Skills for Government as they develop have clearly within [them] an insistence on a process and a framework for taking evidence into account".[86] We are encouraged by the emphasis in the Professional Skills for Government framework on the use and analysis of evidence. A basic understanding of the scientific method and the interpretation of different types of evidence, together with the development of an informed demand for scientific input and analysis amongst generalist civil servants, particularly those at senior levels, are important prerequisites for effective policy making. However, it is too early to assess whether Professional Skills for Government will succeed in achieving this objective. We recommend that the Government put in place the necessary reward systems and incentives to support its ambitions in this area.

52. We remain concerned that despite the introduction of PSG, the civil service is still likely to be a place where generalist skills are valued more highly than specialist ones. We note that under PSG senior civil servants are required to have 'broader experience' which the PSG guidelines state can be gained "most obviously by doing a job in another career grouping other than the chosen career path (the three groupings are operational delivery, policy delivery and corporate services delivery) and/or by working in another sector".[87] In many cases, the opportunities for civil servants who are, for example, lawyers or IT professionals to apply their skills within different contexts will be greater than for scientists whose professional expertise is considered to be less broadly applicable within Government. While it is, of course, understandable that the Government seeks to develop civil servants with transferable skills, it is short-sighted if that precludes highly-skilled experts who wish to remain experts within their field from progression to the upper echelons of the civil service or if its view of which transferable skills are valuable is too narrow. The tendency for civil servants to rotate between jobs on a regular basis (often in order to broaden their experience) can also be detrimental in specialist areas where accumulation of knowledge and experience is particularly important. As Dr Caroline Wallace, Science Policy Adviser, Biosciences Federation, told us: "there is a perception now that to progress in your career you move policy area every 18 months or so, so no-one is in one policy area for more than two years".[88]

53. In policy-making, scientific literacy must be given equal value to economic knowledge and drafting ability, while further reform of the civil service is essential to bring about a cultural shift: specialist skills must be given equal value to generalist skills and this should be reflected in rewards structures. It is also essential that more opportunities are created for scientists to progress to the most senior positions without being required to sideline their specialist skills.

A GOVERNMENT SCIENTIFIC SERVICE?

54. The evidence which underpins policy can be derived from either the social or the natural and physical sciences. It is generally accepted that within the civil service economists play a more central role in policy making than natural or physical scientists or engineers, whose input may be sought for specialised topics but are otherwise seen as having only a marginal contribution to make to policy development. The central role of economists in Government is reflected in the opening words on the Government Economic Service's website: "Think of all the issues that have hit the headlines recently. Behind every story there will be an economist, delving into the details to establish the economic pros and cons".[89] Sir David King told us that "the creation of the 'Scientist/Engineer' profession within the PSG framework clearly puts scientists and engineers on the same footing as other professional groups".[90] However, when asked whether scientists were now an equal footing with economists and lawyers in terms of their credibility and status in the civil service, Sir David admitted that the situation was "very mixed".[91]

55. In this context, it is perhaps noteworthy that while there is a Government Social Research Service, a Government Economic Service, a Government Statistical Service and a Government Operational Research Service, there is no equivalent Service for the natural and physical sciences, engineering and technology. Sir Nicholas Stern, Head of the Government Economic Service (GES), described the role of the GES as follows:

"we try to make economists better by helping with the recruitment […] and organising the training and the professional development of economists. We make them better economists so that they are better able to serve government".[92]

We asked Sir David whether scientists in the civil service would not benefit from a similar arrangement. He suggested that the Office of Science and Innovation was fulfilling the same function:

"The Office funds the science base in our university sector, the Office reviews the quality of science, as I have just said, in every government department, and, through the chief scientific advisers, I am trying to pull the evidence base in the sciences across the patch together, so I think that is the very function of the Office of Science and Technology [Innovation]".[93]

Although we do not dispute that, under Sir David's leadership, the OSI has taken steps to address the problems identified above in scientific expertise within the civil service, it is clearly not equivalent to having a Government Scientific Service, just as the existence of the Treasury does not obviate the need for a Government Economic Service. Sir David also asserted that scientists in Government comprised a "much more heterogeneous group of people" than the disciplines which already had their own Government Services and would be "therefore rather more challenging to corral".[94] It may be true that a Government Scientific Service would need to encompass a broad range of scientists and engineers but there is diversity too within the Government Economic Service. Moreover, it could be argued that the very fact that the scientific community within Government is currently fragmented between the various scientific disciplines and engineering makes the need for an over-arching and coherent Government Scientific Service even more pressing.

56. We recommend the establishment of a Government Scientific Service. Since the disbanding of the Scientific Civil Service, there has been insufficient action to strengthen the position of scientists and engineers as a professional group within the civil service. A Government Scientific Service would provide a stronger professional identity and a focal point for specialists from across the physical and natural sciences and engineering working within Government. We do not envisage the creation of a new bureaucratic structure: the Government Scientific Service should take over the existing relevant functions from within OSI and the PSG team.

57. In the course of this inquiry, we did identify some examples of good practice, most notably in the Food Standards Agency (FSA). Around 40% of FSA staff have scientific qualifications and the FSA seemed proud that many of its staff "are recognised internationally as experts in their fields".[95] The FSA told us that it sought to "develop the skills and knowledge of our scientific staff by encouraging them to attend or present papers to appropriate conferences or workshops so that their expertise is kept up-to-date and recognised by the scientific community".[96] Other departments have also taken steps to develop and support their scientists—one example would be the Science in DEFRA Change Programme led by the DEFRA DCSA, the aim of which is summarised as: "right science; right scientists".[97]

58. Some departments have also employed secondments as a means of strengthening their scientific capabilities. Secondments—both outward and inward—can be invaluable for enabling civil servants to deepen and update their specialist skills and for obtaining in-house expertise on a fixed-term basis. CaSE asserted in its memorandum that "The system of handling scientific advice within Government will not really be fit for purpose until departments build into their structures a constant flow of scientifically-trained individuals, who bring the eyes of independence to the overall handling of information and uncertainty relating to science and engineering".[98] Our predecessor Committee also concluded in its 2004 Report on the use of science in international development policy that DFID would benefit from more frequent secondment of scientists into the department. We have heard informally that DFID has taken steps to implement this recommendation.

59. Professor Kelly, DCSA at the Department for Transport, told us that he also had first hand experience of the benefits of secondments. In particular, he emphasised the advantages of being able to co-opt highly specialised expertise for the duration of a specific task:

"when there are particular initiatives—road user charging is one that is a big issue at the moment—the Department is able to second people in, very, very skilled people, who are able to be recruited for particular projects. Every department is different but I think there is an advantage in having the ability to have teams assembled and working on a critical project for a period of time rather than long term career civil servants."[99]

The proposed Government Scientific Service should take the lead in identifying good practice in professional development for scientists and engineers, including the use of secondments, and promoting its adoption across Government.

ASSESSING IN-HOUSE EXPERTISE

60. In the next section, we consider the Government's use of external scientific advice and expertise. Determining which expertise should be retained in-house and which sought externally is of critical importance but there are many compounding factors that render this process extremely challenging. Most departments have not been particularly effective at collecting data on the skills and experience of their employees in a way that facilitates assessment of the overall expertise held in-house—a problem exacerbated by the fact that, as discussed above, employees may not advertise their specialist skills in a generalist-oriented civil service. In addition, as the Government told us, "The ability to retain, fund and develop scientific expertise for unforeseen challenges is a real issue for departments. The need to fund, retain the expertise, and constantly update the skills is an equation that is rarely truly resolved."[100]

61. We repeatedly asked the witnesses who came before us how departments should determine whether they had sufficient in-house expertise to meet their needs and to be intelligent customers of external scientific advice. The fact that we did not receive a single answer that convincingly addressed the question no doubt reflects the difficulty of the task. Nevertheless, it is not sufficient for departments to continue making what appear to be ad hoc assessments of whether they possess appropriate scientific expertise without producing any convincing rationale or evidence to underpin them. Departments must collect comprehensive data, in a manner which is consistent and comparable between departments, regarding the numbers of scientists and engineers which they employ. Clearly, a distinction must also be made in these data between staff with scientific qualifications who are now employed as generalists and those who are employed as scientists or engineers. Furthermore, we recommend that the Government Chief Scientific Adviser commission a study of the way in which departments should assess their need for scientific skills and determine whether these needs are being met. The Government Scientific Service should play a leading role in the review and in taking forward the recommendations which emerge.

External sources of advice

62. As discussed in the previous section, the Government draws upon specialist expertise from both within and outside the civil service in developing its policies. Sir David King told us: "what we have got to recognise is that the science advisory system within government only works by going out for expert information outside of government".[101] The Induction Pack for DCSA lists possible sources as: "academics, eminent individuals, learned societies, advisory committees, consultants, professional bodies, public sector research establishments (including the Research Councils), lay members of advisory groups, consumer groups and other stakeholder bodies".[102] We consider some of these in more detail below.

SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMMITTEES

Council for Science and Technology

63. The Council for Science and Technology (CST) is the Government's top level advisory board on science and technology, with a remit "to advise the Prime Minister and the First Ministers of Scotland and Wales on strategic issues that cut across the responsibilities of individual government departments". Following a quinquennial review, the CST was re-launched in 2004 with new membership, terms of reference and mode of operation. Our predecessor Committee was critical of the previous incarnation of the CST and concluded in its 2003 OST Scrutiny Report that "The new Council for Science and Technology deserves a chance to succeed but the Government must not waste another five years. The Government should put it on a year's probation and have the courage to abolish it if it is not working".[103]

64. CST members, who are appointed by the Prime Minister, are senior academics and industrialists with backgrounds in science, engineering and technology. The Council has two chairs, each with a different role. One chair is elected from among the members (currently Sir Keith Peters); he chairs meetings where CST is discussing and developing its advice to Government. The other chair, Sir David King, chairs meetings where CST is reporting its advice to Government. The CST sets its own work programme but develops it in discussion with Government. It can deliver its advice to Government by publishing reports, by providing confidential written advice, or by holding discussions with ministers, officials and special advisers. In recent years, it has published various reports including Policy through dialogue, An electricity supply strategy for the UK, Better use of personal information: opportunities and risks and a Universal ethical code for scientists.[104] The Council also has periodic meetings with the Prime Minister.

65. We have not had the opportunity to look in detail at the workings of the CST during this inquiry. However, we believe that the CST has a potentially important role to play as the highest level scientific advisory committee, with a remit to advise the Prime Minister directly. Since it is comprised of eminent experts from a wide range of disciplines and sectors, the CST could—in addition to publishing policy statements and reports—provide a useful sounding board for, and challenge function to, the GCSA. We intend to return to the work of the CST later in this Parliament.

Departmental scientific advisory councils

66. DEFRA is frequently cited as an exemplar of good practice in terms of its scientific advisory system. Its establishment of an independent Scientific Advisory Council (SAC) has been widely welcomed. DEFRA told us that the Council was established in February 2004 to support the CSA in the provision of independent, expert, and strategic advice on the science underpinning the department's policies. The Council communicates its advice to the CSA and, via the CSA, to ministers. There are currently 16 members of the Council covering a broad range of expertise of relevance to DEFRA. The Council meets in full every quarter and at least one meeting a year is open to the public. Most of the Council's work is taken forward through sub-groups.

67. The Royal Society endorsed DEFRA's model of a Scientific Advisory Council and argued that other departments should follow suit: "Government Departments' access to independent advice in science and engineering should be based on having a panel (and in some cases panels) of independent experts available to each department to support their use of science".[105] Professor Wiles, the Home Office DCSA, told us that "The main Home Office advisory committee is similar but in some ways different from DEFRA's", noting that, unlike DEFRA's SAC, membership was based on nominations by learned societies and the committee was chaired by the Home Office Permanent Secretary.[106] Professor Wiles argued that this was an "advantage because it means that the independent external advisory group is talking immediately and directly to the most senior administrator in the Home Office".[107] Professor Sir Gordon Conway, DFID CSA, said that DFID did not have an equivalent group at present but he was attracted to the idea: "The issue of having a senior advisory group is one that I am feeding into this senior management review".[108] By contrast, Professor Kelly, DCSA at the DfT, told us that it did "not make sense to have a scientific advisory committee for the whole department because […] the range of input that we need from the broad scientific community is so large that we would have around the table people who would have difficulty in talking to each other".[109] We do not accept this point since the same argument could equally be applied in respect of DEFRA and indeed to the over-arching Council for Science and Technology.

68. DEFRA's decision to introduce an independent Scientific Advisory Council to support the work of the departmental CSA is sensible and should be emulated by other departments. It is critical that these Advisory Councils are independent and are seen to be so. By providing a manifestly independent expert opinion, such committees can add weight to the views of the DCSA where they coincide and provide an important challenge function where they do not. Scientific Advisory Councils may also be able to provide a more direct and trenchant critique of departmental policies and practices where necessary than a DCSA who has to balance his independence - real or perceived - against the need to retain influence within the Department. It is interesting, for example, that the Chairman of the DEFRA SAC, John Beddington, recently spoke publicly of the Council's concern about cuts in funding for research within the Department, telling reporters: "We're concerned whether DEFRA has sufficient funds to conduct its science programmes to underpin the government's policy goals".[110]

69. The Science and Technology Committee stated in its 2001 Report on the scientific advisory system: "While we accept that close links with the department concerned can be useful, we suggest that it would be beneficial for at least some of a committee's staff to be brought in from outside (for example on secondment from the Research Councils or the Learned Bodies)". The Committee also emphasised the need for staff of advisory committees to "appreciate that they work for the committee and not for the Department".[111] These views remain valid. Wherever possible, the secretariat of scientific advisory committees should include secondees from appropriate scientific establishments, to both enhance the specialist knowledge within the secretariat and safeguard its independence. In our case study Report on drugs classification, our concerns in this area led us to recommend that the secretariat arrangements for the ACMD should be reviewed.[112] We regret that this recommendation was rejected by the ACMD, although the Home Office accepted it in principle.[113]

CODE OF PRACTICE FOR SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMMITTEES

70. Most departments rely on a range of scientific advisory committees to provide specialist advice on specific policy areas. Examples include the nine scientific advisory committees feeding into the work of the Food Standards Agency and the Home Office's Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs. These committees are expected to conform to the Code of Practice for Scientific Advisory Committees. Committees which follow the Code of Practice are often referred to as 'code committees'. The GCSA is in the process of updating the Code of Practice, which was last issued in 2001, and there does not appear to be a public list of current code committees at present, despite the Government's commitment to ensure that this list is publicly available and up to date.[114] We urge the Government to update the code and the list of code committees as a matter of urgency.

71. We found evidence in our case study on the classification of illegal drugs that the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs—the scientific advisory committee responsible for the provision of advice in the area of drugs policy—was not complying with the Code of Practice. We also identified a need for departments to have mechanisms in place which enable them to check whether advisory committees are functioning properly without compromising the independence of the committees. The current Code of Practice contains no specific advice on how departments should achieve this. Sir David King made it clear that, in his view, DCSAs should take responsibility for overseeing such committees, telling us: "It is part of the role of departmental CSAs to ensure that scientific advisory committees within their department are performing effectively".[115] However, we note that the Home Office DCSA seemed reluctant to accept this mantle for fear of interfering with the Advisory Council's independence.[116] In relation to the identity cards technology case study, we were pleased to note that the Home Office has accepted our recommendation to create an ICT Assurance Committee, integrating this with the existing Independent Assurance Panel.[117]

72. We asked the Government whether it had ever commissioned independent reviews to assess the performance and working methods of scientific advisory committees. It told us that it had not but that the rolling programme of Science Reviews would examine "scientific advisory committees and the implementation of the Code of Practice by which they are covered" and that individual departments also carry out their own reviews, citing the fact that "DEFRA are currently reviewing how their Non Executive Bodies [including scientific advisory committees] could be improved".[118] We note that our predecessor Committee's Report on the scientific advisory system argued that the Government should "establish a system of five-yearly reviews for individual committees", in keeping with the quinquennial review system in place for Non-Departmental Public Bodies.[119] We recommend that the revised Code of Practice for Scientific Advisory Committees provide explicit guidance on how the performance of these committees should be monitored. It should give departmental CSAs clear responsibility for overseeing the performance of scientific advisory committees sponsored by their Department and advise them to commission light-touch independent reviews every five years to ensure that committees are functioning as required and to identify innovations in working practices that could usefully be applied by other committees.

73. The Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM), while not strictly speaking a scientific advisory committee, was heavily criticised by the House of Lords Science and Technology Committee in its Report on Radioactive Waste Management for its available expertise and the way in which it had fulfilled its role.[120] In addition, two of CoRWM's technical members left the committee before it published its draft recommendations—one was sacked; the other resigned in protest. Following the Lords Science and Technology Committee's Report, the DCSA at the sponsoring Department, DEFRA, has assumed a more active role in safeguarding the quality of technical input to CoRWM. We note that the Government Response to our predecessor Committee's Report on the scientific advisory system stated that the Code of Practice for Scientific Advisory Committees "may also be adopted by a broader range of committees".[121] We recommend that committees not designated as 'scientific advisory committees' but which play a significant role in the provision of scientific advice, or whose advice to Government relies heavily on scientific input, be required to comply with the Code of Practice for Scientific Advisory Committees.

MEMBERSHIP

74. Determining the membership of scientific advisory committees is an important and sensitive process. The Institute for the Study of Science, Technology and Innovation (ISSTI) warned that "when selecting which 'experts' to involve, government should be alert to the range of commitments and biases that advisers may bring", commenting that "bias is inevitable, whether it arises from career-based motivations, financial considerations or personal value systems, or as is more usual, a combination of all three".[122] ISSTI also agreed with the Crop Protection Association that "bias arising from people's membership of pressure groups is less likely to be remarked upon than the potential for bias amongst industry stakeholders or those funded by them".[123] The Royal Society of Chemistry argued, however, that the expertise of industrialists could be invaluable since "experts working in the field are more likely to be up-to-date with developments than those who are not".[124] The Society was concerned that because campaigning organisations tended to be perceived as more independent or credible than those of industry experts, they were "often able to make unsubstantiated claims that can distort the discussion and make informed, evidence-based policy-making more difficult".[125] The latter view was echoed by a number of other witnesses. Industry members can be important sources of expertise and experience but are frequently perceived to be less trustworthy than NGO representatives. This is unfair and illogical: the same standards and expectations should be applied to both categories of representative.

75. We heard various views about the role of lay members on scientific advisory committees. Professor Malcolm Grimston, Associate Fellow at Chatham House, asserted that: "Increasingly, committees examining complex scientific issues are being populated by lay members, 'elevating public opinion over professional expertise and subordinating science to prejudice'".[126] Dr Pike, Chief Executive of the Royal Society of Chemistry, appeared to disagree, arguing that it could be very useful "to have one or two people who have the wider picture" since "if you just have a lot of specialists focusing on their own areas, there may be some tunnel vision and you need one or two generalists, I think, to try to be the glue".[127] Dr Peter Cotgreave, Director of the Campaign for Science and Engineering, made a distinction between expert committees providing purely technical advice, where he saw "no place on that for someone who is not an expert in that issue", and more policy-oriented committees, where inclusion of lay members was desirable: "there is no point in making a policy based on scientific evidence if you cannot bring the public with you, on nuclear fuel, for example".[128] Our view is that in this respect scientific advisory committees are expert committees providing technical advice, rather than policy-oriented committees which might better describe a Policy Commission or review group. The Science Council also highlighted the "need for government to distinguish between scientific evidence; scientific opinion and advice from scientists based on the incomplete evidence available; and opinion and advice from scientists, non-scientists and campaigners where there is no evidence".[129] It is also important not to allow the "double counting" of non-scientific opinion or advice. Policy makers in Government will rightly weigh up the scientific and technical advice they receive against non-scientific considerations—for example, of an economic, political, cultural nature, according to other advice they receive. It is important therefore that scientific advice is not already diluted by these other factors as this will lead to such factors being effectively considered twice by policy makers, who will never receive unadulterated scientific advice.

76. The Code of Practice for Scientific Advisory Committees states that "Lay members should be clear about the capacity in which they have been appointed and the role they are expected to fulfil", but other than suggesting that they may be able to help the committee consider the wider context of its work, it does not specify what this role should be, presumably leaving it to individual committees to decide.[130] There is an urgent need for greater clarity regarding the role of lay members on scientific advisory committees and the status of their contribution. Clearly, where a committee has been tasked with providing purely technical advice, it would inappropriate to give the views of lay members equal weight to advice from experts: scientific advice must be based on science. It is not acceptable for lay members to speak on behalf of scientific advisory committees without the committee's agreement—recent instances of lay members being quoted in the media as 'experts' on scientific committees have been misleading and regrettable.[131] We also reiterate our predecessor Committee's comment in its Report on the scientific advisory system that "It should be clear that the role of the lay member is to bring an alternative perspective to the committee and not to represent an interest group".[132] In view of the many potential problems identified above in having lay membership of scientific advisory committees (as opposed to policy commissions where they play a vital role), we recommend that scientific advisory committees dealing with technical advice to Government should not routinely have lay membership.

CONSULTANTS

77. Consultants can play a helpful role in the provision of independent external advice but we encountered a widely-held view that the Government was not using them in an appropriate manner. Professor Nancy Cartwright, a Professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science, told us there was:

"a movement that suggests that evidence collected by agencies, such as consultancy firms, that know nothing about the subject matter will be better since the agency will have no stake in the results. But it is widely recognized that good studies generally require huge amounts of background knowledge, deployed in subtle ways […] expertise and implicit knowledge and practices matter tremendously".[133]

The Royal Society of Chemistry also expressed concern over "the use of private consultants by Government—which has the effect of undermining the traditional willingness of the scientific community to contribute to the formal consultation process".[134] The Society further told us:

"increasingly reliance appears to be being placed on administrative staff to 'buy in' the services of consultants. In many cases they lack the competency to frame the question, recruit the appropriate expert or understand the answer when it has been provided. Even where such departmental expertise is available, the scientists who are often located in Government agencies are too far removed from the policy making process".[135]

We saw for ourselves the extent of the Government's dependence on external consultants in our case study on the technologies supporting ID cards. In May 2004, the Home Office employed PA Consulting on a three-year contract to aid the implementation of the identity cards programme. The Home Office said that it was necessary to involve a private company as it did not have "ready access to certain skill sets and resources necessary for implementation of a large and complex project such as Identity Cards".[136] Between 6 April 2005 and 18 April 2006, the Home Office paid PA Consulting £14,248,799.21 for work on the identity cards programme.[137]

78. We asked the Secretary of State for his view. Mr Darling told us that there were two issues:

"One is, I think right across government there is a general feeling that we should be using less consultancy rather than more, and certainly that is my view […] That said, which is the second point, the size of government, and certainly Whitehall, in many places has been reduced, and the DTI has got over 1,000 fewer people than it had, what, two years ago".[138]

The latter phenomenon has been driven in large part by the recommendations of Sir Peter Gershon's review of public sector efficiency. It is interesting to note that Sir Peter found in his review "little evidence that the procurement of professional services (for example consultancy, legal services, financial advisory services) is managed to ensure value for money".[139]

79. The efficiency measures taken as a result of the Gershon Review have increased the Government's dependence on consultants as sources of scientific and technical advice. This gives cause for concern. As discussed above, the Government must have sufficient expertise to ensure that it both asks the right questions and does not become an uncritical, unquestioning consumer of the advice it receives. Consultants can often provide a 'one stop shop' for advice in different areas but may not necessarily possess the best expertise to answer all the questions Government is seeking to answer. We believe that improved auditing of skills within the Government and a strong Government Scientific Service would enable the Government to make more efficient use of the existing expertise within the civil service and, ultimately, to obtain better scientific advice. As discussed in the next section, better leveraging of the expertise embodied by learned societies and professional bodies could also help to strengthen the Government's scientific advisory system.

LEARNED SOCIETIES AND PROFESSIONAL BODIES

80. The GCSA's Guidelines state that "the potential networks of organisation such as learned societies should not be underestimated" by departments seeking expert advice. Nevertheless, many of the learned societies who provided evidence to this inquiry felt their resources were being under-utilised by the Government. The Royal Society of Chemistry told us that "scientific and learned societies should not be undervalued or underused as sources of scientific advice by Government".[140] In addition, Professor Martin Taylor, Physical Secretary and Vice-President of the Royal Society, told us:

"we are a very great resource. We have not just got our fellowship that covers expertise in all science but also all our various contacts, networks, including networks overseas. This is something superb for the Government to be able to draw from and I do not think, to be honest, they draw from us quite enough".[141]

The Science Council also commented that it was "disappointing that in spite of the OST [OSI] guidance on scientific advice, it is too often the case that specialist bodies are not consulted by government or non-departmental bodies in advance of policy positions or legislation being established".[142] We have observed that the Government is very ready to go to outside consultants rather than the learned societies as a first resort.

81. We saw during our visit to the US the more formalised role fulfilled by the National Academies—the National Academy of Science, National Academy of Engineering, Institute of Medicine and National Research Council—in the provision of scientific advice to Government. The National Academies have a mandate to "investigate, examine, experiment, and report upon any subject of science or art" whenever called upon to do so by any Department of the Government.[143] Most of the science policy and technical work is conducted by the National Academies' operating arm, the National Research Council, which was created expressly for this purpose. Collectively, the National Academies "provide a public service by working outside the framework of government to ensure independent advice on matters of science, technology, and medicine".[144] We recognise that the UK's learned societies were established within a different institutional framework. Nonetheless, the Government has on occasion commissioned work from the learned societies, including a well-received Royal Society/Royal Academy of Engineering study on nanotechnology.[145] We find the institutional structure of the scientific advisory system in the US attractive and encourage the Government to discuss with the learned societies the extent to which similar arrangements could be adopted in the UK and the changes that this would necessitate.

82. In the meantime, there is ample room for greater involvement of the learned societies and professional bodies in the UK scientific advisory system. Our predecessor Committee also argued in its 2001 Report on the scientific advisory system that "Involving the Learned Bodies more closely in the scientific advisory system would be a straightforward way of demonstrating its independence".[146] The Science Council, which acts as an independent body for scientific professional institutions and learned societies, told us that a scientific advisory network for Government drawn from its members would be "a positive step in building public trust and confidence".[147] It would also help the Government to surmount one of the current obstacles to more effective engagement—the fact that civil servants may not be able to readily identify the appropriate organisations and points of contact to consult in respect of a particular policy. We recommend that the Government take up the offer by the Science Council to coordinate a scientific advisory network comprising all the professional bodies. We note, however, that there are relevant scientific bodies that are not affiliated to the Science Council and an arrangement would need to be in place to ensure that these organisations are not sidelined.

ACADEMICS

83. The scientific advisory system could also be strengthened by addressing the barriers to engagement faced by academics and introducing incentives to promote their participation in the policy making process. The Environment Research Funders' Forum told us that "Differences in motivations, cultures, time-frames and reward structures were identified as obstacles to good communication [between scientists and policy makers], with time pressures exacerbating the difficulties".[148] Professor Malcolm Grimston, Associate Fellow at Chatham House, saw a more fundamental problem: "the philosophical and practical mismatch between the political and technical mindsets".[149] These barriers have significant repercussions for evidence based policy making, as discussed in the next chapter. Not all are easy to address but a recurring—and resolvable—problem raised in evidence concerned the influence of the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE). The Environment Research Funders' Forum, for example, commented on the "lack of incentives for researchers to engage with the policy process [with] the Research Assessment Exercise topping the list of negative influences".[150] This situation, where the RAE acts as a disincentive to engagement by the scientific community with policy, must be rectified in the successor to the RAE.

Conclusions

84. Much has been done under the leadership of Sir David King and his predecessors to strengthen the scientific advisory system supporting Government policy development. Nonetheless, challenges remain to ensure that the system is able to meet current and future demands and is functioning at its best. Separating the roles of GCSA and Head of OSI would give the GCSA greater freedom and independence, enabling him to focus on his advisory and challenge functions. Relocation of the GCSA's office to the Cabinet Office would further strengthen his position and place him at the heart of Government, in line with his cross-departmental remit. The introduction of DCSAs has been welcome but, like the GCSA, their effectiveness depends on their independence and ability to contribute to policy making at the highest level as much as on their knowledge and shills. DCSAs also need effective support from officials but we have noted with concern the sidelining of scientific expertise in the civil service and highlighted the need to move towards a situation where specialist skills are once again valued in their own right. The establishment of a Government Scientific Service could make a significant contribution towards redressing the current imbalance and strengthening the status of scientists and engineers within the civil service. This, in turn, could help to reduce the Government's dependence on consultants. We also encourage the Government to make greater use of the learned societies and professional bodies whose collective expertise provides an indispensable resource. Finally, we have identified a need for improved monitoring of the implementation of good practice that has been developed by the GCSA and others—our experience suggests that guidelines are not always being translated into practice within departments.

9 Ev 86 Back

10 Ev 87 Back

11 Not published Back

12 As above Back

13 As above Back

14 Ev 89 Back

15 As above Back

16 As above Back

17 Ev 90 Back

18 Q 1 Back