Conclusions and recommendations
Sources of advice and expertise
Chief Advisers and Heads of Profession
1. We
support the current arrangement whereby the Government Chief Scientific
Adviser's remit encompasses the natural, physical and social sciences,
as well as engineering and technology, but we note that it is
a challenge for one individual to cover such a disparate range
of subject areas and disciplines. It is therefore vital that the
Government Chief Scientific Adviser works closely with the Government
Chiefs of Profession in the social sciences, including economics,
to establish higher profiles for these disciplines. (Paragraph
16)
2. We recommend that
the posts of Government Chief Scientific Adviser and Head of the
Office of Science and Innovation be separated. The Director General
of Science and Innovation at the DTI should become the new Head
of OSI. (Paragraph 18)
3. In view of the
cross-cutting nature of science and the cross-departmental responsibilities
of the Government CSA, it would make sense for the post to be
based in a department with a similarly cross-cutting remit. (Paragraph
19)
4. A long term solution
is required for the post of Government Chief Scientific Adviser,
not just one which happens to suit the strengths of present incumbent.
On balance, we recommend the relocation of the GCSA's office to
the Cabinet Office. In addition, the GCSA should be given a seat
on the board of the Treasury to ensure that the crucial work of
this department benefits from a scientific perspective at the
highest level. The changes we have recommended seek to strengthen
the influence and effectiveness of the GCSA. It is therefore essential
that the resources available to the GCSA to support his work do
not diminish as a result of these changes. (Paragraph 25)
5. We are of the view
that clear leadership can be valuable for improving accountability
and providing a driver for implementation of good practice across
departments. We recommend the Government clarify the lines of
ministerial responsibility for the scientific advisory system.
For example, whilst ultimate responsibility must rest with the
Prime Minister, day-to-day responsibility might best be assumed
by the Cabinet Office led by the Government Chief Scientific Adviser.
(Paragraph 26)
Departmental Chief Scientific Advisers
6. We
recommend that the presumption should be that all future departmental
Chief Scientific Advisers should be external appointments who
have occupied senior positions in their scientific community and
command the respect of their peers. (Paragraph 31)
7. We support the
use of part-time and fixed-term contracts for departmental CSAs
with the caveat that departments must provide adequate support
and resources for these appointments. We recognise that appropriate
staffing levels will vary between departments but it seems unlikely
that a DCSA can operate effectively with just one or two officials.
(Paragraph 34)
8. We commend to other
departments the Department for Transport's model whereby an externally
appointed DCSA is supported by a senior scientist, drawn from
the civil service, who acts as both deputy CSA and Head of Profession
for Scientists and Engineers in the department. (Paragraph 35)
9. The introduction
of departmental CSAs has been most welcome but they must be able
to contribute fully to strategic decision making and high level
policy development within the department if their contribution
is to be maximised. Departmental CSAs must be given the opportunity
to play a full and active and yet independent role at board level,
and be in a position to identify where their involvement is required,
rather than being brought in where others have decided that there
is a need for their input. DCSAs must be in the stream of policy
development, not watching from the bank. The misconception that
scientists in the civil service should be 'on tap, not on top'
must be laid to rest once and for all. (Paragraph 39)
10. We acknowledge
the potential difficulty facing departmental CSAs in balancing
the demands and expectations of their permanent secretary, minister
and the Government CSA. DCSAs should report to the Secretary of
State but retain the independence necessary not to restrict their
freedom to speak out internally or publicly when required and
to avoid any politicisation of their advice. (Paragraph 40)
11. It is good that
the Government CSA is able to go directly to senior officials
and ministers in departments in cases where he believes his intervention
is essential. In so doing he must be careful not to undermine
the position of the relevant departmental CSA and recognise those
areas in which their expertise should hold sway. He should, wherever
possible, include the departmental CSA in his discussions with
ministers and senior officials. By the same token, we believe
that departmental CSAs should be free to publicly disagree with
the Government CSA in instances where there is, for example, a
difference in their interpretation of scientific evidence, but
urge departmental CSAs and the Government CSA to co-operate closely
to deliver an active network of scientific support and advice
to every department. The scientific advisory system will be most
effective when the departmental and Government CSAs work together
collaboratively. (Paragraph 41)
Science in the civil service
12. It
is worrying and regrettable that there is a perception that not
only has there been a decline in scientific expertise within the
civil service, but civil servants perceive specialist skills to
be a hindrance to career progression. We recommend that the Government
implement the 2002 recommendation of the Cross-Cutting Review
of Science and Research to maintain records on specialist staff
in order to identify their qualities and experience and to investigate,
and if necessary tackle, negative attitudes towards scientific
qualifications. (Paragraph 45)
13. The Government's
failure to do enough to address the implications of the privatisation
of Public Sector Research Establishments for the scientific capacity
of the civil service has been damaging. Remedial action is now
required to redress the effect of the loss of, and restriction
of access to, expertise in establishments such as the Laboratory
of the Government Chemist, Forensic Science Service and QinetiQ.
Future plans for changing the status of such Establishments must
also take greater account of the potential detrimental impact
of these changes on the scientific advisory system supporting
Government policy making. (Paragraph 46)
14. It seems to us
necessary that all senior officials and policy makers should have
a basic understanding of the scientific method, the role and importance
of peer review, the relevance of different types of evidence,
and the way to evaluate it. (Paragraph 48)
15. We are encouraged
by the emphasis in the Professional Skills for Government framework
on the use and analysis of evidence. A basic understanding of
the scientific method and the interpretation of different types
of evidence, together with the development of an informed demand
for scientific input and analysis amongst generalist civil servants,
particularly those at senior levels, are important prerequisites
for effective policy making. We recommend that the Government
put in place the necessary reward systems and incentives to support
its ambitions in this area. (Paragraph 51)
16. In policy-making,
scientific literacy must be given equal value to economic knowledge
and drafting ability, while further reform of the civil service
is essential to bring about a cultural shift: specialist skills
must be given equal value to generalist skills and this should
be reflected in rewards structures. It is also essential that
more opportunities are created for scientists to progress to the
most senior positions without being required to sideline their
specialist skills. (Paragraph 53)
17. We recommend the
establishment of a Government Scientific Service. This would provide
a stronger professional identity and a focal point for specialists
from across the physical and natural sciences and engineering
working within Government. (Paragraph 56)
18. The proposed Government
Scientific Service should take the lead in identifying good practice
in professional development for scientists and engineers, including
the use of secondments, and promoting its adoption across Government
(Paragraph 59)
19. Determining which
expertise should be retained in-house and which sought externally
is of critical importance (Paragraph 60)
20. Departments must
collect comprehensive data, in a manner which is consistent and
comparable between departments, regarding the numbers of scientists
and engineers which they employ. (Paragraph 61)
21. We recommend that
the Government Chief Scientific Adviser commission a study of
the way in which departments should assess their need for scientific
skills and determine whether these needs are being met. (Paragraph
61)
External sources of advice
22. DEFRA's
decision to introduce an independent Scientific Advisory Council
to support the work of the departmental CSA is sensible and should
be emulated by other departments. It is critical that these Advisory
Councils are independent and are seen to be so. (Paragraph 68)
23. Wherever possible,
the secretariat of scientific advisory committees should include
secondees from appropriate scientific establishments, to both
enhance the specialist knowledge within the secretariat and safeguard
its independence. (Paragraph 69)
24. We urge the Government
to update the Code of Practice for Scientific Advisory Committees
and the list of code committees as a matter of urgency. (Paragraph
70)
25. We recommend that
the revised Code of Practice for Scientific Advisory Committees
provide explicit guidance on how the performance of these committees
should be monitored. It should give departmental CSAs clear responsibility
for overseeing the performance of scientific advisory committees
sponsored by their Department and advise them to commission light-touch
independent reviews every five years to ensure that committees
are functioning as required and to identify innovations in working
practices that could usefully be applied by other committees.
(Paragraph 72)
26. We recommend that
committees not designated as 'scientific advisory committees'
but which play a significant role in the provision of scientific
advice, or whose advice to Government relies heavily on scientific
input, be required to comply with the Code of Practice for Scientific
Advisory Committees. (Paragraph 73)
27. Industry members
of scientific advisory committees can be important sources of
expertise and experience but are frequently perceived to be less
trustworthy than NGO representatives. This is unfair and illogical:
the same standards and expectations should be applied to both
categories of representative. (Paragraph 74)
28. It is important
not to allow the "double counting" of non-scientific
opinion or advice. (Paragraph 75)
29. There is an urgent
need for greater clarity regarding the role of lay members on
scientific advisory committees and the status of their contribution.
Clearly, where a committee has been tasked with providing purely
technical advice, it would inappropriate to give the views of
lay members equal weight to advice from experts: scientific advice
must be based on science. In view of the many potential problems
identified in having lay membership of scientific advisory committees
(as opposed to policy commissions where they play a vital role),
we recommend that scientific advisory committees dealing with
technical advice to Government should not routinely have lay membership.
(Paragraph 76)
30. The efficiency
measures taken as a result of the Gershon Review have increased
the Government's dependence on consultants as sources of scientific
and technical advice. This gives cause for concern. The Government
must have sufficient expertise to ensure that it both asks the
right questions and does not become an uncritical, unquestioning
consumer of the advice it receives. We believe that improved auditing
of skills within the Government and a strong Government Scientific
Service would enable the Government to make more efficient use
of the existing expertise within the civil service and, ultimately,
to obtain better scientific advice. (Paragraph 79)
31. We find the institutional
structure of the scientific advisory system in the US attractive
and encourage the Government to discuss with the learned societies
the extent to which similar arrangements could be adopted in the
UK and the changes that this would necessitate. (Paragraph 81)
32. There is ample
room for greater involvement of the learned societies and professional
bodies in the UK scientific advisory system. We recommend that
the Government take up the offer by the Science Council to coordinate
a scientific advisory network comprising all the professional
bodies. (Paragraph 82)
33. The situation,
where the RAE acts as a disincentive to engagement by the scientific
community with policy, must be rectified in the successor to the
RAE. (Paragraph 83)
Evidence Based Policy
34. We
applaud Sir David King's efforts to integrate fully science into
an evidence based approach. Government should also be clear when
policy is not evidence-based, or when evidence represents only
a weak consideration in the process, relative to other factors.
Where there is an absence of evidence, or even when the Government
is knowingly contradicting the evidence—maybe for very good
reason—this should be openly acknowledged. (Paragraph 89)
35. We agree that
ministerial decisions need to take into account factors other
than evidence, but this is not reflected in the Government's oft-repeated
assertion that it is committed to pursuing an evidence based approach
to policy making. We have detected little evidence of an appetite
for open departure from the mantra of evidence based policy making.
It would be more honest and accurate to acknowledge the fact that
while evidence plays a key role in informing policy, decisions
are ultimately based on a number of factors—including political
expediency. Where policy decisions are based on other such factors
and do not flow from the evidence or scientific advice, this should
be made clear. (Paragraph 90)
Research
36. Departments
need to evolve more effective mechanisms for identifying gaps
in the evidence base for policy development which are capable
of responding to new and emerging political priorities. (Paragraph
91)
37. Commissioned systematic
reviews of the evidence base should usually be considered as research
for the purposes of publication policy. (Paragraph 94)
38. We urge the Government
CSA to investigate proactively any allegations of malpractice
in the commissioning, publication and use of research by departments
and to ensure that opportunities to learn lessons are fully taken
advantage of. We would expect the results of any such investigations
to be made public (Paragraph 96)
39. We recommend that
the Government Chief Scientific Adviser ensures that the publication
of research underpinning policy development and evidence cited
in support of policies is monitored as part of the departmental
science reviews. (Paragraph 97)
40. Research must,
so far as is achievable, be independent and be seen to be so.
We are not convinced that the current mechanisms for commissioning
research deliver this objective. We have also made the case for
greater investment in research to underpin policy development.
We recommend the creation of a cross-departmental fund for policy
related research to be held by the Government CSA in order to
meet these dual aims (Paragraph 98)
41. We recommend that
where the Government describes a policy as evidence-based, it
should make a statement on the department's view of the strength
and nature of the evidence relied upon, and that such statements
be subject to quality assurance. (Paragraph 101)
Trials and pilots
42. Pilots
and trials can make a valuable contribution to policy making but
there is no point the Government initiating them if it is not
going to use the output properly. In order to protect them from
political pressures, pilots and trials should be carried out at
arm's length from Government or at least be independently overseen.
(Paragraph 104)
Horizon scanning
43. We
commend the Government CSA and the Office of Science and Innovation
on their work aimed at strengthening horizon scanning in relation
to science and technology across Government. (Paragraph 106)
44. In the context
of the electoral cycle and an era of 24 hour news coverage, it
is not hard to see why politicians prioritise actions that can
deliver short term benefits over those not likely to yield dividends
until they have long departed from the Government. It is a major
challenge for the Government to ensure that the results of horizon
scanning are being used properly. The Government needs to put
in place incentives to encourage departments to take a more long
term view in developing policy. We recommend that it be a requirement
for departments to demonstrate in all major strategic planning
documents that they are using the results of—not just conducting—horizon
scanning and research. (Paragraph 110)
45. The Government's
current approach to policy making is not sufficiently responsive
to changing evidence, making it hard to feed in results from activities
such as trials, research and horizon scanning. We urge the Government,
as well as the opposition parties, to move towards a situation
where a decision to revise a policy in the light of new evidence
is welcomed, rather than being perceived as a policy failure.
(Paragraph 111)
Quality control
46. It
is useful that the Government CSA has issued guidance on the use
of scientific analysis in policy making but it is disappointing
that there has been so little monitoring of its implementation.
Departmental CSAs should, in future, be more proactive in ensuring
that the principles defined in the Guidelines on Scientific Analysis
in Policy making are adhered to within their departments. (Paragraph
114)
47. To increase public
and scientific confidence in the way that the Government uses
scientific advice and evidence, it is necessary for there to be
a more formal and accountable system of monitoring the quality
of the scientific advice provided and the validity of statements
by departments of the evidence-based nature of policies. (Paragraph
115)
48. Peer review of
the extent to which Government policies are evidence-based by
learned societies, professional bodies and researchers can play
a useful role in stimulating debate and refining policy makers'
thinking and should, therefore, be welcomed by the Government.
We recommend that the Government commission such reviews, on a
trial basis, of selected key policies after a reasonable period
of time as part of the policy review process. (Paragraph 120)
49. We recommend that
issue-based reviews be introduced as a means of auditing cross-departmental
policies. These could be incorporated into the Science Review
of the department which has been designated as lead department
for the relevant policy. (Paragraph 123)
Transparency in policy making
50. A
strong emphasis on the publication of all evidence used in policy
making, along with a clear explanation as to how it is used, should
be one of the guiding principles of transparent policy making.
(Paragraph 126)
51. We recommend that
departments make it a presumption that significant scientific
advice from departmental CSAs as well as scientific advisory committees
is published. (Paragraph 129)
52. We recommend that
departmental Chief Scientific Advisers monitor the extent to which
their departments and associated advisory bodies are adopting
best practice in terms of openness and transparency and seek to
ensure that any deficiencies are addressed. (Paragraph 130)
53. We recommend that
Government guidelines be amended to ensure that, as a matter of
good practice, some high level information about the progress
of major projects through Gateway reviews is made public. (Paragraph
131)
54. We recommend that,
as a matter of good practice, each policy statement or legislative
proposal which follows a public consultation make explicit reference
to how the consultation influenced the policy, including an explanation,
where necessary, as to why any views or proposals widely supported
by contributors were rejected. (Paragraph 138)
55. Whilst we accept
that there can be legislative and political uncertainties which
affect the policy making process, we recommend that public consultations
generally be accompanied by an indicative timescale of resulting
decisions. (Paragraph 140)
56. We recommend that
scientific advice be routinely used in drawing up the terms of
consultations, in order to ensure the right questions are asked
and to avoid any subsequent criticism of its terms. (Paragraph
143)
57. We recommend that
the Cabinet Office monitor whether departments are following best
practice on consultations and act where repeated breaches of the
code of practice for consultations occur. (Paragraph 145)
Risk and public communication
Cross-government work on risk
58. We
recommend that departments ensure that the Professional Skills
for Government programme and other training activities provide
comprehensive coverage of the principles and practice of risk
management. (Paragraph 153)
59. We welcome the
progress the Government has made toward promoting proper risk
analysis in policy making but are concerned about how this progress
will be sustained. We recommend that the sub-Committee on risk
continue to operate and that it ensure that the monitoring of
departmental performance on risk management is maintained. (Paragraph
155)
The Precautionary Principle
60. We
can confirm our initial view that the term "precautionary
principle" should not be used, and recommend that it cease
to be included in policy guidance. However, we do see value in
further work which seeks to clarify the terms and correct application
of a precautionary approach as set out helpfully by the GCSA.
We believe that it is best to use the term precautionary approach,
but with a consistent explanation of the degree and nature of
the risks, benefits and uncertainty and an explanation of the
concept of proportionality. It should never be considered a substitute
for thorough risk analysis which is always required when the science
is uncertain and the risks are serious. It should not be used,
in itself, to explain a decision or course of action. (Paragraph
166)
61. We believe that
further work should also focus on the practical application of
risk management theories in circumstances of scientific uncertainty
and the effective communication of the decision making process.
(Paragraph 166)
62. The term precautionary
principle is in current use in other jurisdictions, including
the EU, so it can not simply be wished away. However, both the
Government's current use of the term precautionary approach rather
than principle and the further work we are recommending to properly
clarify, constrain and apply a precautionary approach is something
that we recommend the Government invite the EU and other countries
to consider and adopt. (Paragraph 167)
Risk and communication
63. We
welcome the public commitment to transparency in the handling
of risk in policy guidance and the recognition by Chief Scientific
Advisers of the need to improve public communication on risk.
(Paragraph 171)
64. We recommend that
the Cabinet Office assume greater responsibility as the centre
of excellence on risk communication within Government. It should
have a leading role in collating and disseminating best practice
on risk communication, commissioning further research as appropriate,
in conjunction with other departments, and for monitoring performance
in implementing guidelines. (Paragraph 174)
65. We strongly endorse
the development of alternative voices for the provision of information
and advice of a technical nature. Given the issues of trust identified
by research, the often instinctive reaction of departments to
field a minister should be resisted. (Paragraph 175)
66. We believe scientists,
including departmental CSAs, should play a leading role in communicating
to the public levels of scientific agreement, where necessary,
and the degree of certainty in the scientific advice being offered.
We recommend that common terminology be developed to be used consistently
across Government in order to communicate these uncertainties.
(Paragraph 177)
67. We believe that
the Government's communication strategy would benefit from the
adoption of a higher public profile by departmental CSAs on policies
with a strong evidence or science base. We recommend that the
Government CSA explore with ministers and departmental CSAs how
this might be best achieved and that the impact of this enhanced
role be monitored. (Paragraph 180)
68. We welcome the
Government's attempts to liaise with the media on risk communication
and its recognition that there is more work to be done on this
front. We recommend that the Government continue to develop a
strategic and pro-active approach to engagement with the media.
The work started under John Hutton should be part of a structured
programme, with attention being given to learning from recent
examples of coverage as well as informing coverage of current
risk-related issues. Newspaper representatives should be a priority
for engagement. Government guidance should encourage a more aggressive
approach to correcting inaccuracies or mis-interpretations in
media coverage of risk, with departmental Chief Scientific Advisers
playing a leading role when appropriate. (Paragraph 186)
69. We recommend that
the Government build on existing work to develop, subject to academic
peer review, a scale of risks for use by all departments, as appropriate,
when communicating levels of risks to the public. (Paragraph 194)
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