House of Commons - Transport

Select Committee on Transport Eighth Report

7 Protection of crews

54. The figures of attacks on seamen are unacceptably high.[71] The UK Government and the international community generally, ought to be ashamed that they have failed to put effective measures in place to prevent the present high level of piratical attacks on seamen and women. The Department for Transport reports that 'the ferocity of [piratical] attacks appears to be increasing'.[72] This makes it all the more important that the level of protection afforded to seafarers by the UK and other Western governments should be stepped up.

55. The Honourable Company of Master Mariners expressed great concern about this 'worrying trend' of ships being hijacked and 'the crew being taken hostage and ransomed (or disposed of), the cargo being sold, the ship being re-named and then sold'.[73]

Arms

56. In these circumstances, arming ships' crews requires examination. Our evidence however was that arming seamen or ships carrying 'sea marshals' was not appropriate. The Honourable Company of Master Mariners said that 'pirates would be more likely to use lethal force if they feared that they would be at risk from firearm wielding merchant seafarers', and also that crew lacked the competencies to use arms effectively:[74]

The concern is that placing weapons in the hands of untrained merchant seafarers would be a recipe for disaster because they are just as likely to injure themselves as anyone else and the chances of injuring an innocent party would be high. The obvious response to that would be to train merchant seafarers in handling weapons. That is something we would not be in favour of. The type of person that is employed and the job they are employed to do is quite different from that of taking sentry posts and protecting a ship. It would require a level of resource that simply is not available currently in merchant ships (emphasis applied).[75]

Numast considered that arming seafarers is a 'boundary that should not be crossed';[76]the Chamber of Shipping would be 'deeply unhappy' about the idea of arming ships;[77] and the International Maritime Bureau considered that arming crews 'may not be the answer'.[78]

57. Placing armed personnel ('sea marshals') onboard merchant ships was not favoured either. Mr Simmonds of the Chamber of Shipping pointed to what he termed the 'immense legal difficulties involved in private armed guards being carried on board ships and perhaps being involved in an exchange of fire with innocent parties in somebody else's territorial seas'.[79]

Contrary evidence

58. Notwithstanding this evidence, we note that some companies do use private security. For example, the Pacific nuclear transport ships which carry eradicated nuclear waste between Japan and the UK have Atomic Energy Authority police onboard;[80] and it was widely publicised that the Seaborne Spirit, the passenger ship attacked off Somalia in 2005, had former Gurkha personnel on board acting in a security capacity.[81]

59. It is clear therefore that, despite what the representatives of the merchant marine told us, that some ships do carry guards. It is possible that some may be armed. The extent of this practice is however unclear.

60. It appears common sense that where there is a high risk of attack to an extremely valuable, or vulnerable and intrinsically dangerous, cargo, then special security steps need to be taken. These may include providing vessels with guards. Training for the guards, but also for all those on board, would be essential, particularly where firearms are involved. It cannot be beyond the capacity of the industry however, in conjunction with the Government, to provide suitable training to ensure that sailors and others travelling by sea are provided with good instructions on how to act in circumstances where their vessel has armed protection.

61. The fact is that unarmed crews are already frequently subject to ferocious attack by heavily armed pirates, and that this often results in loss of life and serious injury. It is difficult therefore to conceive of how sensible and good quality training of some ship personnel would create greater dangers.

62. The Chamber of Shipping, the Honourable Company of Master Mariners, Numast, and the International Maritime Bureau all stated that arming seafarers was a line that should not be crossed. We agree that it would be folly for any ship owner to permit the routine arming of untrained seamen to face the threat of armed attack on their vessels.

63. The evidence we had was also against armed guards on ships. But the fact is that some vessels do carry guards currently. Some of these may be armed. We understand that UK Atomic Authority Police guard ships carrying atomic material. Unarmed sailors are currently the victims of attack from heavily armed and unscrupulous pirates. Many lose their lives or are seriously injured. Any measure that can be shown to increase their safety is worthy of further, urgent investigation.

64. We wish to know from the Government what its policy is on placing guards on merchant marine vessels; under what circumstances it believes vessels should receive the protection of armed guards; what training to ensure effective use of arms and to minimise accidents is available to those guards, and to those who travel with them on board ship; what 'rules of engagement' exist for armed guards at sea; and what controls there are on ship owners' decisions to provide their vessels with armed guards.

Other protective measures

65. Several witnesses who gave evidence to us believe that security onboard ships could be improved by ensuring that ships are adequately staffed and crew properly trained. For example, the Honourable Company of Master Mariners believes that:

if crewing numbers were increased then this would lead to a reduction in accidents from fatigue in addition to providing more people to ensure a proper lookout is kept for suspicious individuals.[82]

Maritime & Underwater Security Consultants agreed 'Raising the minimum manning levels for merchant ships is likely to increase safety and allow crews to carry out their security duties more effectively'.[83] Similar advice came from the Chamber of Shipping 'All ships deter attacks by appearing alert, well managed and prepared'.[84]

66. The Honourable Company of Master Mariners pointed out that 'such fatigue levels and increased workload reduces the number of seafarers available for lookout duties and so increases the risk that pirates would not be detected before boarding'.[85] Numast considered that 'what must be questioned is the ability of seafarers to comply with … additional duties in an industry in which even leading owners and flag states admit that under-manning is a severe problem and many masters and officers are already at breaking point in terms of workload'.[86]

67. Seamen appear to be over-worked and to receive insufficient training. This is borne out by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) of the Department for Transport which stated in its 2004 annual report that fatigue rates amongst seafarers are at 'elevated levels'.[87] MAIB states that ships face 'depressingly consistent' problems: 'fatigued crews, due to undermanning; falsified hours of work records; no dedicated lookout on the bridge; and poor situational awareness/anticipation/judgement by officers of the watch - classic symptoms of fatigue'.[88]

68. In 2004 MAIB conducted a safety study of 1,600 accidents over ten years. This study found that on a ship with only two watchkeepers, even if they did nothing but their bridge watches, they would work an 84-hour week. Further, that seafarers are 'falsifying their timesheets to prove that they are only working a 98 hour week'.

69. MAIB ran a comparison of two Chief Officers, one with a 'six on-six off' shift pattern with one other officer and the other with a revised 'four on-eight off' pattern with two other officers. The latter showed a significant improvement in fatigue levels and resulted in MAIB's recommendation that all merchant vessels over 500 gross register tons have a minimum of a master plus two bridge watch-keeping officers.[89]

70. We were outraged to learn that seafarers are being overworked and lack sufficient training, and that this is placing ships personnel and vessels at risk from determined piratical attacks. Quite apart from being completely unacceptable in itself, there is evidence that the resulting tiredness amongst crews makes ships an easier target for opportunistic violent attack. The Government is failing in its duty to the Merchant Marine by allowing this situation to continue. It must take the most stringent measures against any owner exploiting its staff in this utterly reprehensible way.

71. Ships must be adequately staffed for all watches, and additional duties should be equally apportioned in order to combat fatigue. The recommendation of the Marine Accident Investigation Branch is that all merchant vessels over 500 gross register tons have a minimum of a master plus two bridge watch-keeping officers. We support this. The current situation is a disgrace. We want to know what steps the Government is taking with the industry to ensure the proper the crewing of ships; and their adequate training.

71 See Chapter 1, paragraph 1 above Back

73 Ev 06. Two recent examples were of the 'Steadfast', off the coast of Indonesia, and the 'Semlow', off Somalia. Both ships were recovered; the Steadfast after an immediate pursuit by the Indonesian Navy; the Semlow and its crew of ten were released after three months. Foreign Affairs in 2004 summarised what was happening:

From 2002 to 2003, the number of those killed and taken hostage in attacks nearly doubled. Pirates have also increased their tactical sophistication, often surrounding a target ship with several boats and firing machine guns and antitank missiles to force it to stop. As Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister Tony Tan [of Singapore] recently warned, "piracy is entering a new phase; recent attacks have been conducted with almost military precision. The perpetrators are well-trained, have well laid out plans." The total damage caused by piracy - due to losses of ships and cargo and to rising insurance costs - now amounts to $16 billion per year. Back

74 Ev 6 Back

75 Q63 Back

76 Q51 Back

77 Q49 Back

78 Ev 1 Back

79 Q49 Back

80 For example, in a Parliamentary question in November 2000, the Minister told the House that: "The masters of … ships undertaking shipments of nuclear materials between Europe and Japan retain full responsibility for the safe operation of the ships at all times … The role of the UKAEA Constabulary (UKAEAC) is to protect the cargo against theft or sabotage. (29 November 2000, c601W) Back

81 Qq50-51 Back

82 Ev 6 Back