House of Commons - Transport

Select Committee on Transport Eighth Report

9 Maritime terrorism

79. Numast told the Committee that 'the maritime sector continues to be widely regarded as an 'Achilles' heel' for security post-9/11'.[97] We were disturbed to hear that the growing threat of piracy and armed attack has met with a 'wholly inadequate' response from flag states, coastal states, ship owners and the authorities according to Numast.

80. Numast told us:

intelligence experts have repeatedly suggested that al-Qaeda and its associates could be planning a 'maritime spectacular' and western naval forces have been intensively involved in programmes of interception and inspections in areas such as the Gulf and the Mediterranean with the aim of averting such a strike.[98]

The Government rejected Numast's description of maritime security as an 'Achilles' heel'.[99] But the union believes that if ships continue to be 'attacked [by pirates]' with impunity it is 'essentially an advert to the terrorists to show the ease with which a few men armed with just knives and guns can commandeer a ship',[100] and that there is 'significant' evidence to show that the maritime sector is an emerging terrorist target.

81. As evidence, Numast cited the attack on the Seabourn Spirit cruiseship in November 2005, and other attacks on merchant ships off Somalia; the attack on the VLCC Limburg off Yemen in 2002; the suicide bomb attack on the USS Cole in Aden in 2000 in which 17 sailors lost their lives; a thwarted plot to plant a bomb on a Britanny Ferries vessel operating between Spain and the UK; a similar plot to blow up a ferry operating between Valencia and Majorca; and fears that hijackings, kidnappings and the theft of documents and equipment off vessels off Indonesia are serving as a 'dry run' for a major incident.[101]

82. Marine Impact Ltd. agreed pointing out that the attack on the Limburg in particular 'will not have gone unnoticed by terrorists, and predicting that another wave of such attacks will happen in the future'.[102] International warnings have been issued about the danger of maritime terrorism. For example, the Egyptian Embassy in Denmark issued a warning about a possible attack on ships passing through the Suez Canal by elements affiliated to Al Qaeda.[103] In 2005 there were rocket attacks on vessels in Jordan, for which Al Qaeda has claimed responsibility.[104]

83. One general concern is that the nature and location of attacks at sea are difficult to predict accurately. Numast pointed out that the options for attack are so varied that you can 'pick your permutation':

You have gas carriers which would make a very dramatic explosion. You have the totemic value of an attack on the cruise ship. All of those scenarios are very real. I would argue that we have been extremely fortunate so far that we have not had a major environmental disaster. We have had several cases of fully laden tankers going done the Malacca Straits, the second busiest shipping lanes in the world, with no-one at the controls because they are all being held at gunpoint.[105]

84. Following the 9/11 attacks on the United States there have been concerns about a so-called 'jihad at sea':[106] 'terrorist groups have come to view piracy as a potentially rich source of funding' and that:

intelligence agencies estimate that al Qaeda and its affiliates now own dozens of phantom ships - hijacked vessels that have been repainted and renamed and operate under false documentation, manned by crews with fake passports and forged competency certificates.[107]

It has been suggested that Al Qaeda was responsible for an aborted attack on the USS The Sullivans in Yemen in January 2000, and the suicide speedboat attack on the USS Cole.[108]

85. These, and similar analyses,[109] fall short of proof of a direct link between those involved in piracy and terrorists.[110] Marine Impact Ltd. found it 'rather surprising' that 'a number of terrorist organisations with known maritime capabilities have yet to fully exploit this modus operandi internationally'.[111] However, the very fear that oceangoing vessels carrying oil, natural gas or other hazardous cargo could be used as weapons - in the same way that civilian aircraft were on September 11 - remains a potent concern.

UK Government's approach to maritime terrorism

86. Given the consensus about the maritime industry's vulnerability to terrorist attack, we asked the Government to supply specific evidence on this.[112]

87. The policy of the British Government is that 'during the initial stages of a major maritime incident involving British interests, an act of terrorism or hijacking will be assumed until clarification is made.'[113] The Government applies and coordinates a 'National Maritime Security Programme' which covers arrangements for the protection of ships and ports.[114] Port and ship security assessments are used by operators of ships and port facilities to draw-up ship and port facility security plans in accordance with security instructions issued by the Department.

88. The focal point for consultation between the UK Government and the UK maritime industry on maritime security is the National Maritime Security Committee which is chaired by the Department for Transport. There are various specialised panels, a programme of compliance inspection by the Transport Security and Contingencies Directorate of the Department for Transport (Transec), a variety of ad hoc meetings and participation in port security committees, and contingency work including exercises.[115] A working group focuses on measures to protect cruise ships.[116]

89. The Government also contributes to the establishment of a more 'consistent security culture' world-wide thereby increasing international resilience throughout the maritime network. The Government hopes that when the new Protocol to the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation ('SUA Convention') comes into force 'it will improve the effectiveness of international cooperation to combat terrorist acts at sea'.[117]

90. Our evidence was that the industry broadly welcomed the strategy adopted and some practical measures being taken by the Government.[118] For example, the Royal Navy's Maritime Trade Operations unit based in Dubai was seen as a model of reassurance for the UK trading fleet by the Chamber of Shipping.[119]

91. Piracy provides a tempting and successful demonstration to terrorists of what can be achieved with relatively straightforward equipment and organisation. Well organised and determined terrorists could take control of a ship and use it to achieve terrible ends. Dangerous cargo could be seized and used as a weapon; the ship itself could be used as a weapon; hostages could be taken. Operations such as that undertaken by the Royal Navy's Maritime Trade Operations' Unit in Dubai are welcome. Consideration needs to be given how these may be strengthened. In its response to this report, we want the Government to tell us what further practical steps it is taking to lessen this all too real risk.

92. We had evidence that a link between piracy and terrorism is likely; the Government however points out that 'nothing has been proved'. This is the wrong message for the Government to send out. The nature of terrorism is such that we are unlikely to receive such 'proof' until it is too late and an outrage has occurred. Warnings about terrorist activity have been received, and alerts issued to shipping in the Suez Canal. Indeed, terrorist attacks on ships may already have taken place in the Middle East. Action is required now. We must get off the 'back foot'. As a start, the Government must drop its 'nothing has been proved' refrain.

93. We expect the Government to take the probability of a future maritime terrorist attack with the utmost seriousness. We do not believe that it is yet demonstrating a sufficiently robust approach. We would have liked to see evidence of fresh thinking and more resources deployed in a 'smarter' way being brought to bear on this problem. We did not. Bold and extensive practical measures in the UK and overseas, in the Middle East and elsewhere are required to lessen the risk. There is no room for complacency.

97 Ev 2 Back

98 Ev 2 Back

99 Q130 Back

100 Q43 Back

101 Ev 2 Back

102 Ev 39 Back

103 Ev 39 Back

104 Ev 39 Back

105 Q47 Back

106 Ali M. Koknar, 'Corsairs at Starboard: Jihad at sea', Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International (Vol. 11, No. 1), spring 2005 Back

107 I bid Back

108 Foreign Affairs, November/December 2004 Back