Conclusions and recommendations
Introduction
1. Since
1992, there have been a total of 3,583 piratical attacks worldwide.
This represents an increase from 1993 to 2005 of 168%. In the
same period, 340 crew members and passengers died at the hands
of pirates, and 464 received injuries. In 2005 alone piracy resulted
in over 150 injuries and assaults and over 650 crew members were
taken hostage or kidnapped. (Paragraph 1)
2. These
statistics may appear modest by contrast with the casualties suffered
in other violent conflicts. But these attacks were not sustained
in a violent conflict. They were suffered by innocent people travelling
lawfully by sea. Even one such attack is one too many. (Paragraph
2)
Piracy - a growing problem
Incidences of piracy involving the United Kingdom
3. Piracy
has dire consequences for its victims. Fifty six per cent of the
attacks that happened in 2004 occurred while the ship was berthed
or anchored; 30 crew members were killed, the highest number since
2000, and a further 71 were injured, 148 taken hostage and 86
kidnapped. Among incidents where the types of arms used was specified,
48% involved attacks by pirates with knives and 44% pirates with
guns. This mayhem has continued in 2005 when 152 crew members
were injured, and 652 were taken hostage or kidnapped. Eleven
of these remain missing. (Paragraph 12)
4. The
growth in piracy over the past decade represents an appalling
amount of violence against the maritime community. It is completely
unacceptable. We must be clear about what piracy involves: kidnapping,
theft, assault, rape, wounding, murder. There is nothing remotely
'romantic' about the perpetrators of these appalling crimes, or
their detestable activity. The Government needs to take the upward
trend of violent attacks seriously, and to take action to reverse
it. (Paragraph 13)
Policy
5. The
Government is taking part in a range of 'anti-pirate' inter-governmental
activities and discussions. Discussions and agreements are all
very well, but the fact is that piratical activity is increasing.
That piracy is on the increase suggests that the political activity
of the British and other Western governments has not been effective.
Inter-governmental agreements are useful only as a springboard
to effective action. Activity 'on the ground' implementing international
agreements to destroy piracy and make travel by sea safer is what
is needed. It is on successful practical action, not talking,
that the UK Government will be judged. (Paragraph 19)
International
6. The
International Ship and Port Security Code is designed to be the
keystone of tighter security throughout the merchant marine. But
we have been told that it is not being implemented properly, and
that it has failed to improve maritime security. If true, this
is outrageous. In its reply to this report, the Government must
spell out in detail what has been done to implement the Code in
the UK, and internationally; and the measures that have been taken
to measure the extent and success of that implementation. Grand-sounding
international agreements are a waste of time if not followed up
promptly with action to ensure the safety of those who use the
sea. We want a reassurance from the Government that the Code is
not mere window dressing. (Paragraph 24)
Definitions of piracy
7. There
are currently two international definitions of piracy. The definition
which is the basis of international law confines piracy to attacks
on the 'high seas' but excludes attacks in states' territorial
waters. The other is a more practical definition used by the International
Maritime Bureau which covers attacks on the 'high seas' and in
states' territorial waters. This situation is patently ridiculous.
The Government has been complacent in not having pressed vigorously
for a single internationally agreed definition of piracy. (Paragraph
30)
8. The
absence of a single definition means that the classification of
violent maritime incidents can become a matter of dispute and
confusion. This leads to uncertainty about the real extent of
piracy. In the absence of accurate and agreed statistics about
the scale of the problem, it is unlikely that the correct level
of resources will be deployed to meet the threat. The absence
of a single definition encompassing all violent maritime attacks
contributes to this muddle. It must not be tolerated any longer.
The Government must promote a single definition of piracy vigorously
with its international partners. (Paragraph 31)
Under-reporting
9. Where
Masters do report pirate attacks they and their vessels can often
be subject to delay, increased insurance costs, and corrupt approaches
by local officials. This amounts to a major disincentive for Masters
to make reports. It is not surprising therefore that the official
number of piratical attacks recorded is inaccurate, and attacks
are likely to be significantly under-reported. The UK Government's
estimate is that the real number could be 25% more than the official
estimates. Others gave us a higher estimate. But even the Government's
own, lower, figure is an indication of the scale of the failure
on the part of national governments to get a proper grip of this
pernicious problem. (Paragraph 38)
10. This
unsatisfactory situation must be reversed and incentives created
to encourage the proper reporting of all piratical attacks to
the Piracy Reporting Centre of the International Maritime Bureau.
The UK Government needs to take the lead in ensuring that investigations
of attacks by states do not unduly delay the commercial operations
of the vessel concerned; that where corrupt officials demand payments
from Masters the strongest representations are made to the countries
concerned and that they should, if necessary, be 'named and shamed';
and discussions must be held with the insurance industry to mitigate
the effect on ships' premiums of Masters' reporting piratical
attacks, and to ensure that premiums are not raised automatically
when a report is made. The classification of piracy from a maritime
to a war risk needs to be reassessed to ensure that it has not
increased the disincentive on ships' Masters to report attacks.
(Paragraph 39)
11. The
reporting arrangements organised by the International Maritime
Bureau based upon the Piracy Reporting Centre deserve renewed
international support. Every opportunity must be taken by the
Bureau itself, and national governments, to publicise the reporting
opportunities offered by the Bureau and to encourage Masters to
report incidents to it. Piracy reporting in general must be better
structured with a single international standard for reporting
incidents, and a procedure agreed for passing this information
on to the most appropriate local or international force for action.
Where action is taken, it must be robustly recorded and publicised
as a deterrent. We expect the UK Government to be increasingly
effective in all these areas and to take a very strong international
lead. (Paragraph 40)
Weak and 'failing' states
Responses
12. The
measures required to deal with piracy are clear. These will often
amount to 'hot pursuit' agreements in which one state extends
cooperation to another to permit the entry into its territorial
waters of the others' police and naval units; and also, where
appropriate, to try in its courts possible perpetrators who have
been apprehended locally by the forces of another state. The piecemeal
approach taken to the development of the 'hot pursuit' agreements
so far is unlikely to provide the flexibility of response to address
the problem of piracy world-wide. The arrangements need a more
systematic and international focus with the International Maritime
Organization in the lead. The UK Government needs to press much
harder for this outcome. (Paragraph 52)
13. There
can be no excuse for the violence and cruelty perpetuated by pirates.
But poverty in states with high levels of piracy is likely to
be a contributory factor in sustaining such activity. We would
like the Government to tell us what social and economic programmes
it is supporting in areas where piracy is endemic and which are
aimed at eradicating piracy. (Paragraph 53)
Protection of crews
14. The
UK Government and the international community generally, ought
to be ashamed that they have failed to put effective measures
in place to prevent the present high level of piratical attacks
on seamen and women. The Department for Transport reports that
'the ferocity of [piratical] attacks appears to be increasing'.
makes it all the more important that the level of protection afforded
to seafarers by the UK and other Western governments should be
stepped up. (Paragraph 54)
Contrary evidence
15. The
Chamber of Shipping, the Honourable Company of Master Mariners,
Numast, and the International Maritime Bureau all stated that
arming seafarers was a line that should not be crossed. We agree
that it would be folly for any ship owner to permit the routine
arming of untrained seamen to face the threat of armed attack
on their vessels. (Paragraph 62)
16. The
evidence we had was also against armed guards on ships. But the
fact is that some vessels do carry guards currently. Some of these
may be armed. We understand that UK Atomic Authority Police guard
ships carrying atomic material. Unarmed sailors are currently
the victims of attack from heavily armed and unscrupulous pirates.
Many lose their lives or are seriously injured. Any measure that
can be shown to increase their safety is worthy of further, urgent
investigation. (Paragraph 63)
17. We
wish to know from the Government what its policy is on placing
guards on merchant marine vessels; under what circumstances it
believes vessels should receive the protection of armed guards;
what training to ensure effective use of arms and to minimise
accidents is available to those guards, and to those who travel
with them on board ship; what 'rules of engagement' exist for
armed guards at sea; and what controls there are on ship owners'
decisions to provide their vessels with armed guards. (Paragraph
64)
Other protective measures
18. were
outraged to learn that seafarers are being overworked and lack
sufficient training, and that this is placing ships personnel
and vessels at risk from determined piratical attacks. Quite apart
from being completely unacceptable in itself, there is evidence
that the resulting tiredness amongst crews makes ships an easier
target for opportunistic violent attack. The Government is failing
in its duty to the Merchant Marine by allowing this situation
to continue. It must take the most stringent measures against
any owner exploiting its staff in this utterly reprehensible way.
(Paragraph 70)
19. Ships
must be adequately staffed for all watches, and additional duties
should be equally apportioned in order to combat fatigue. The
recommendation of the Marine Accident Investigation Branch is
that all merchant vessels over 500 gross register tons have a
minimum of a master plus two bridge watch-keeping officers. We
support this. The current situation is a disgrace. We want to
know what steps the Government is taking with the industry to
ensure the proper the crewing of ships; and their adequate training.
(Paragraph 71)
Technology
20. New
technology designed to ensure that ships can be located at all
times does, in the hands of pirates, has the potential to assist
pirates to identify and track down high value cargoes and to attack
vessels at sea. We want to know what the UK Government is doing
to find out how pirates are gaining access to sophisticated technologies;
and what it is doing to help to deny them the use of these technologies.
(Paragraph 78)
Maritime terrorism
21. Numast
told the Committee that 'the maritime sector continues to be widely
regarded as an 'Achilles' heel' for security post-9/11'. We were
disturbed to hear that the growing threat of piracy and armed
attack has met with a 'wholly inadequate' response from flag states,
coastal states, ship owners and the authorities according to Numast.
(Paragraph 79)
UK Government's approach to maritime terrorism
22. Piracy
provides a tempting and successful demonstration to terrorists
of what can be achieved with relatively straightforward equipment
and organisation. Well organised and determined terrorists could
take control of a ship and use it to achieve terrible ends. Dangerous
cargo could be seized and used as a weapon; the ship itself could
be used as a weapon; hostages could be taken. Operations such
as that undertaken by the Royal Navy's Maritime Trade Operations'
Unit in Dubai are welcome. Consideration needs to be given how
these may be strengthened. In its response to this report, we
want the Government to tell us what further practical steps it
is taking to lessen this all too real risk. (Paragraph 91)
23. We
had evidence that a link between piracy and terrorism is likely;
the Government however points out that 'nothing has been proved'.
This is the wrong message for the Government to send out. The
nature of terrorism is such that we are unlikely to receive such
'proof' until it is too late and an outrage has occurred. Warnings
about terrorist activity have been received, and alerts issued
to shipping in the Suez Canal. Indeed, terrorist attacks on ships
may already have taken place in the Middle East. Action is required
now. We must get off the 'back foot'. As a start, the Government
must drop its 'nothing has been proved' refrain. (Paragraph 92)
24. We
expect the Government to take the probability of a future maritime
terrorist attack with the utmost seriousness. We do not believe
that it is yet demonstrating a sufficiently robust approach. We
would have liked to see evidence of fresh thinking and more resources
deployed in a 'smarter' way being brought to bear on this problem.
We did not. Bold and extensive practical measures in the UK and
overseas, in the Middle East and elsewhere are required to lessen
the risk. There is no room for complacency. (Paragraph 93)
Iraq
25. In
2005, there were ten attacks at sea near the ports of Umm Qasr
and the Basra Oil Terminal off the coast of Iraq by well armed
gangs. Seafarers have been seriously injured in these attacks
which have included tankers, bulk carriers, and general cargo
vessels. There are significant numbers of British, American and
other warships in the area. Despite this, the British Government
seems to have no idea about the source and nature of these attacks.
This level of ignorance on the Government's part is a matter of
the gravest concern. (Paragraph 96)
26. The
Government must assess the situation as a matter of urgency to
discover why piratical attacks in these waters have appeared in
the last year, and what relation these have to insurgency operations,
if any. It must take forceful measures to prevent further attacks
on merchant vessels in this highly sensitive and volatile area,
including considering the deployment of additional naval units
to the area. In its written response to this report it must come
forward with a much more competent and informed summary of the
situation than the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister made
in evidence to us. At present we have little confidence that the
Government commands the initiative in these matters. (Paragraph
97)
Piracy's modern image
27. The
popular image of piracy as a joke is redundant and has failed
to keep pace with reality. The Government must now consider what
imaginative and practical measures might be taken to broaden the
public understanding of piracy as a brutal and cowardly crime.
The merchant marine is a unique service with 2,015 British ships
and 26,500 seafarers serving around the globe. The Government
needs to work much harder to ensure that British mariners, wherever
they are serving, are aware that every action possible is being
taken to ensure their safety in what is a frequently a dangerous
and lonely profession. (Paragraph 100)
Conclusions
28. Piracy
is a loathsome activity. In the past decade instances of piracy
have spiralled by 168 per cent bringing misery, severe injury,
and death to many people including innocent British sea farers.
But despite a horrific level of violence which, if seen in any
other means of transport would cause a storm of public protest,
the subject receives only sporadic press attention. It is no wonder
then that many consider the maritime industry to be 'invisible'.
(Paragraph 101)
29. The
techniques used by pirates have the capacity to be used in acts
of maritime terrorism. There is evidence that this may already
have happened. This should be a development which is of profound
general public concern. (Paragraph 102)
30. The
Government needs to be at the forefront of the fight to destroy
piracy. But it is being insufficiently active. This must change.
There is a good deal of international 'activity' -defined as inter-governmental
dialogue- about the problem of piracy. A plethora of correct-sounding
codes and checklists to define better security have been drawn
up. But our evidence has brought into question how well these
codes and checklists are being implemented. Unless there is the
will to apply them these will prove useless in the drive to obliterate
piracy. (Paragraph 103)
31. What
the Government must demonstrate is practical action that international
cooperation is succeeding in making piracy a thing of the past.
That is woefully lacking. So far from destroying piracy, it is
growing; and the Government does not even know the scale of the
problem. That is failure by any measure. The Government needs
to demonstrate a new level of commitment in tackling piracy. We
expect to see this reflected in its response to this report. (Paragraph
104)
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