Memorandum submitted by the International
Maritime Bureau
1. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB)
operates the Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) located in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia. Arguably, it is the most comprehensive, single source
of information on attacks against merchant ships around the world.
The PRC receives reports from Ship Masters on attacks against
vessels during or just after an attack has taken place. It is
thus a good source of information from the front line victims
of this crime. This information is promptly passed on to the nearest
law enforcement agency for their action.
2. The IMB publishes quarterly and annual
reports on piracy which are widely circulated to law enforcement
agencies, governments, the IMO, the shipping and insurance communities.
There are a significant number of attacks which go unreported.
3. This memorandum looks at the current
hot spots of piracy, key areas where changes have taken place
and issues of response. For the purposes of this memorandum, piracy
refers to attacks as defined by article 101 of UNCLOS (1982) and
the IMO MSC/Circ.984, article 2.2. (the Code of Practice).
4. The IMB's 2005 report on piracy and armed
attacks was released on 31 January 2006.
5. Basically, there are two types of attacks:
(a) The opportunistic attack: This attack
is aimed at theft of cash, crews' personal effects and small equipment
from the vessel. Depending upon the area, the gangs may be well
armed and injuries have been caused to the crew. For the duration
of the attack, usually up to an hour, the officers and crew may
not be in control of the vessel. The vast majority of attacks
fall within this category.
(b) The taking over the vessel: At the other
end of the spectrum is the well organized, well armed attack aimed
at taking control of the vessel. This is typically aimed at either
hijacking the multi million dollar vessel to steal its cargo or
the abduction of members of the crew for ransom. The crew may
be killed or seriously injured.
6. For the second year running the number
of attacks fell, bringing the total in 2005 to 276. Despite this
drop in attacks there were 440 crew held hostage, the highest
number since the IMB began compiling statistics in 1992. 23 vessels
were hijacked, the highest since 2002. New high risk areas have
emerged.
7. Somalia: The Somali attacks are aimed
at seizing the vessel, taking it into Somali waters and then holding
the vessel and crew to ransom. Once the ransom is paid the vessel
and crew are released. In 2004 there were two attacks reported
to the PRC. In a nine month period from March to December 2005,
35 attacks were reported. 15 of these attacks resulted in vessels
being hijacked. 241 crew were held hostage. The attacks previously
took place within a 50 mile range of the Somali coast. In 2005
many attacks have taken place hundreds of miles off the coast.
The furthest attack was on 8 November 2005 against a general cargo
vessel about 390 miles off the coast. In these long range attacks,
small attack craft are launched by pirate mother ships against
the target. Automatic weapons and rocket propelled grenade launchers
are typically used to force the target to reduce speed or stop.
8. Iraq: There were no attacks in Iraq in
2004. In 2005, there were 10 attacks off the ports of Umm Qasr
and the Basra Oil Terminal in 2005. These attacks are typically
opportunistic attacks. The gangs are well armed and have no shown
no hesitation to use them if challenged by the crew. Crew members
have been seriously injured. Tankers, bulk carriers and general
cargo vessels have been attacked.
9. Malacca Straits: The attacks in the Malacca
Straits range from opportunistic attacks to the taking over of
vessels. These attacks have dropped from 38 in 2004 to 12 in 2005.
In the last six months of 2005 there were only three attacks,
of which one was serious. The reduction in attacks is largely
due to the recent efforts of the Indonesian Navy in firmly responding
to the cases of piracy in the Straits.
10. Elsewhere in Indonesian waters the overall
number of attacks have dropped, but they still account for just
over 28% of worldwide attacks. Other high risk areas include the
waters of Bangladesh and Nigeria.
11. Piracy tends to take place in countries
with a weak maritime law enforcement infrastructure. Criminals
find that it is more lucrative and less risky to attack a ship
in coastal waters rather than a house or business ashore. It has
been the case historically, that when governments allocate adequate
resources to law enforcement agencies and give piracy priority,
the attacks come down promptly. In the last 10 years this has
occurred in Southern China, Thailand, ports in East Malaysia and
certain hot spots in Indonesia.
12. Normally, opportunistic attacks are
committed by nationals of the coastal state, within its waters
who after the attack remain within the jurisdiction. The response
to these attacks rests solely with law enforcement agencies of
that state. With political will and resources, they should be
able to investigate, arrest and prosecute the pirates. Today this
would apply to Iraq, Nigeria, Bangladesh and other high risk areas,
except for Somalia and the Malacca Straits.
13. In the cases of the organized attacks
aimed at taking over vessels, the co-operation of the law enforcement
agencies of different countries may be required. In these cases
it is important that the country which seizes the pirates has
the right to investigate and prosecute a crime which took place
in the waters of another country. One mechanism which may confer
such rights is the IMO convention on the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (the SUA Convention).
14. In our view, the best deterrent against
piracy is when pirates are caught and punished under law. Arming
crews on board vessels or other private military type responses
may not be the answer.
15. Somalia poses very special challenges.
It is a country with no effective national government and hence
no national law enforcement infrastructure that victims of these
attacks can rely on for help. If foreign naval units do not intervene,
there is no other authority which can deter the pirates. There
are difficulties. If a foreign naval vessel seizes Somali pirates,
landing them in Somalia for prosecution is not a realistic option.
Most of the countries with naval units in the region are too remote
to mount a meaningful prosecution of the pirates in their countries.
A practical answer is for the pirates to be landed, for prosecution,
in a coastal state which has ratified the SUA convention.
16. In the Malacca Straits it is essential
for all three littoral states to co-operate effectively on the
water to deter pirates. There is better co-operation now than
ever before and the number of attacks have fallen. We understand
that agreement has been reached allowing for limited right of
hot pursuit across territorial boundaries. This had been a weakness
previously exploited by pirates.
17. The new high risk areas of piracy need
to be monitored closely. Raising awareness of the risks, training
and resourcing coastal state forces to deal with piracy is essential
to bringing piracy under control.
27 February 2006
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