Memorandum submitted by NUMAST
INTRODUCTION
NUMAST is the trade union and professional organisation
representing some 19,000 shipmasters, officers, and other staff
working at sea and ashore in the maritime sector.
NUMAST welcomes the Transport Committee's decision
to conduct an inquiry into the problem of piracy and we have pleasure
in submitting written evidence, as requested. For ease of presentation,
we have produced this evidence in the form of answers to the specific
points highlighted in the Committee's announcement of the inquiry.
Reasons why piracy has increased over the previous
decades
Piracy has been called the world's second oldest
profession and has plagued maritime trade from as far back as
the Egyptian, Greek and Roman civilisations. Most popular mythology
about piracy developed from its "golden age" in the
Caribbean, from the late 17th century to the middle of the 18th
century, when it was crushed by the Royal Navy.
Its modern manifestation as a serious threat
to merchant ships and their crews emerged during the late 1970s
and the early 1980s. By 1983, the problem had become so great
that the International Maritime Organisation—a specialist
United Nations Agency—commissioned a report into the incidence
of piracy and armed robbery on merchant ships and an examination
of the legal position in respect of piracy. The IMO Assembly noted
with "great concern" the increasing number of attacks
and the "grave danger to life and the grave navigational
and environmental risks to which such incidents can give rise".
However, in the following two decades, the number
of attacks has soared, the levels of violence have increased and
the threat to shipping and seafarers has developed in both sophistication
and seriousness. Attacks have evolved from what could be described
as "maritime mugging"—in which poorly armed gangs
stole whatever they could get their hands on, including ship's
equipment, crew's personal effects and cash from the captain's
safe—to well organised raids in which ships and their cargoes
have been stolen by highly trained and armed gangs.
The immediate root cause of piracy is poverty,
and the disparity of wealth between developed and developing nations.
The problem has increased because of a failure by governments
and the shipping industry to take the problem seriously and to
respond to the attacks with effective counter-measures and precautions.
Despite the introduction of the International Ship & Port
facilities Security Code, the maritime sector continues to be
widely regarded as an "Achilles heel" for security post-9/11.
In this connection, NUMAST was extremely disappointed
when—during the UK chairmanship of the UN Security Council—we
joined with the International Transport Workers' Federation and
the International Chamber of Shipping to write to the Foreign
Secretary urging him to use the UK's chair to tackle the problem
and failed to receive a reply. We believe the issue of piracy
and armed attacks on shipping has to be addressed at this level,
and it is regrettable that this opportunity was missed.
NUMAST believes that in the post-9/11 world
it is completely unacceptable that no effective action is being
taken to prevent the proliferation of attacks that have the potential
to cause massive loss of life, enormous economic impact and huge
environmental damage.
How piracy is affecting British shipping in particular
During the past decade, the International Maritime
Bureau has recorded a total of 36 attacks on UK-flagged shipping
and 29 on Isle of Man-registered ships. However, because only
one-third of British-owned tonnage operates under the UK register,
these statistics tell only part of the story. Between 2003 and
September 2005, for example, the IMB records a total of 4o ships
controlled, managed or operated in the UK being victims of attacks.
Similarly, because around 50% of British shipmasters
and officers serve on foreign flagged ships, the threat of piracy
to UK interests goes beyond the immediate impact upon UK-registered
tonnage. Indeed, for NUMAST members serving on foreign-flagged
ships the problem of piracy and armed attacks can be particularly
fraught because many flags of convenience and open registries
have limited resources or political will in representing and protecting
the interests of the crews of the ships under their flags.
Over the past 15 years, one NUMAST member has
been killed by pirates, several have been injured—including
one member who was used as a "human shield" during a
gun battle between pirates and police on her ship—and dozens
have been threatened, held hostage or assaulted.
As an island nation, heavily reliant upon shipping
for its economic and strategic wellbeing, the issues of piracy
and maritime security should be of the utmost importance to the
UK. While it could be argued that the scale of attacks on British
ships and British seafarers is relatively small, the long-term
implications of continued failure to check the global phenomenon
of piracy and armed attacks on ships engaged in peaceful commercial
trade presents profound implications.
In this connection, NUMAST would also wish to
highlight the UK's high reliance upon foreign shipping. Some 94%
of UK trade comes by sea—and more than 70% of this trade
is on foreign registered ships; around two-thirds of which are
under flags of convenience. We believe the government needs to
give careful consideration to the potential security risks associated
with such marked dependence upon non-domestic operations.
What guidance national governments and international
organisations are providing to shipping to help prevent attack
and how this is drawn up and revised
A range of guidance is on offer, from bodies
such as the International Maritime Organisation, the International
Shipping Federation and the UK government's Marine Guidance Note
298 (M)—first issued over a decade ago.
Governments have a responsibility to combat
all unlawful acts against shipping and shipowners have a dutyof
carefortheir seagoing staff. NUMAST believes, however,that much
of this advice provided to seafarers is of fairly limited use
and serves only to provide a sign that "something is being
done". Quite simply, guidance is not good enough. Guidance
does not solve the problem, but rather may help to mitigate its
impact.
Such guidance usually involves advice to shipmasters
and officers on means of deterring attacks and of preparing and
responding to incidents. NUMAST would accept the need for seafarers
to receive as much advice as possible, and it is clear that vessels
that detect the threat of attack are often able to subsequently
deter boarding. Special anti-piracy watches and countermeasures
are of undoubted value, but what must be questioned is the ability
of seafarers to comply with such additional duties in an industry
in which even leading owners and flag states admitthat under-manning
is a severe problem and many masters and officers are already
at breaking point in terms of workload.
Most of the industry guidance is drawn up by
self-appointed teams,with some external input. The UK's MGN is
reviewed from time to time and NUMAST was involved in the most
recent revision and has supported its distribution to British
shipmasters and officers. However, the Union remains disappointed
that both the Department forTransport and the shipowners have
consistently failed to strengthen advice on crewing, to cover
the provision of additional security personnel in areas of high
risk and in anchorages and ports. Indeed, we believe that shipowner
pressure resulted in the UK government decidingtodilute its original
adviceto increase crew levels in high-risk areas.
NUMAST is also concerned that a great deal of
relevant information is not passed onto British seafarers operating
in high-risk areas. Often this is because a significant proportion
of them are serving on foreign-flagged or operated ships that
do not receive "official" UK security information—and
often it is because such information is deemed "confidential"
and cannot be disseminated by NUMAST to its members.
In recent times, the insurance market has made
constructive moves to provide a more informed assessment of the
risks to shipping. The decision last year by the Lloyd's Joint
War Committee to deem the Malacca Straits and a number of Indonesian
ports as a "war risk area" attracted considerable opposition
from regional governments and shipowners. However, NUMAST would
argue that the decision was taken on solid grounds and actually
provided some welcome impetus to both "name and shame"
danger areas and to generate some economic pressure for effective
counter-piracy action. Similarly, the "warlike operations"
agreement is essential for providing proper safeguards for seafarers,
including insurance and the right to sign off vessels bound for
known hazards.
NUMAST argues there is little difference between
acts of terrorism, piracy, armed robbery and other criminal acts,
including maritime theft. Preventative measures designed to combat
one can combat them all. It is clear that increased security will
mean increased costs—but this should be looked at as an
investment, and an essential measure, rather than a "burden"on
the industry.
How national governments and international organisations
are tackling the specific issue of maritime terrorism and whether
there is a threat of serious attack by sea
NUMAST considers that the growing threat of
piracy and armed attack on merchant ships has been met with a
wholly inadequate response from flag states, coastal states, shipowners
and the authorities. We believe that the scale of modern-day piracy
underlines the potential threat that ships could be open to terrorist
attack—either to hijack the cargo, hold the crew or passengers
hostage, sink the vessel to cause loss of life or environmental
damage, or to damage trade by closing down access to ports or
vulnerable trade routes.
Intelligence experts have repeatedly suggested
that al-Qaeda and its associates could be planning a "maritime
spectacular" and western naval forces have been extensively
involved in programmes of interception and inspections in areas
such as the Gulf and the Mediterranean with the aim of averting
such a strike.
Maritime attacks can deliver results, as 90%
of world trade moves by sea and maritime traffic has a number
of vulnerable choke points such as the Malacca Straits and the
Suez Canal. A major attack in such areas could severely disrupt
the world's oil trade and the consequences could include serious
economic problems, creating social and political instability.
Such concerns are rooted in reality. In recent
years there has been significant evidence to show that the maritime
sector is an emerging terrorist target, including:
— the circumstances surrounding the
attack on the Seabourn Spirit cruiseship in November 2005 and
the spate of attacks on other merchant ships off the coast of
Somalia;
— attack on the French VLCC Limburg
off Yemen in 2002;
— a suicide bomb attack on the USS
Cole in Aden in 2000;
— a thwarted plot to plant a bomb on
a Brittany Ferries vessel operating between Spain and the UK;
— a similar plot to blow up a ferry
operating between Valencia and Majorca; and
— fears that vessel hijackings, the
capture of seafarers and the theft of equipment and documents
from ships off Indonesia are serving as a "dry run"
for a major incident.
NUMAST recognises that many attacks on shipping
present jurisdictional problems, often being inherently transnational
in nature—with the flag state, port or coastal state, crew
and pirate nationalities all being factors in any incident. However,
the overwhelming number of incidents take place within territorial
waters and as such are clearly within the domain of national law
enforcement agencies. In many of the cases reported to the Union
by members, there are complaints of a lack of action or a slow
response by such authorities.
NUMAST recognises that piracy—or attacks
in international waters—present different challenges, including
potential problems in "hot pursuit" and the arrest of
pirates in another country's waters.
However, NUMAST believes there are available
solutions. Following the terrorist attack on the passengership
Achille Lauro in 1985, the 1988 international Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation,
which entered into force in 1992, gave states the ability to take
appropriate action against those who could be judged to be in
breach of the convention by, for example, hijacking vessels, committing
acts of violence against seafarers, or using arms onboard a merchant
ship.
The Convention offers a valuable tool for countries
to bridge the jurisdictional gaps arising from unlawful acts endangering
safe navigation. It is clear that this Convention needs more support
for effective implementation—including ratification by many
ofthe countries where piracy and armed attacks continue to thrive.
Given that piracy is a transnational crime,
it also makes sense for a transnational crime prevention strategy.
NUMAST believes there is a need for a more co-ordinated international
approach to the issue, with co-operation on the exchange of intelligence
and information and multilateral agreements on the policing and
enforcement of anti-piracy strategies. Such policies would help
to facilitate our long-standing requests for the deployment of
Royal Naval vessels and ships from other countries to protect
merchant shipping in high-risk areas.
NUMAST recognises that many of the areas in
which piracy and armed attacks on merchant shipping proliferates
are those of developing nation status, or with severe financial
and geographical limitations. In this respect, it is important
that more is done by the international community to provide technical
aid and assistance, as well as practical support, to improve anti-piracy
resources. However, it should be recognised that this has been
a key strategy pursued by both the IMO and the UK over recent
years and, to date, it appears to have had very limited impact.
Geographic areas of special concern
The IMB statistics have clearly and consistently
demonstrated that the attacks on merchant shipping over the past
20 years have been concentrated in several areas in the Far East,
West Africa and Latin America. Indonesian waters have continued
to be the most piracy-prone, with other recent "hot spots"
including Bangladesh, Nigeria, Somalia, the Malacca and Singapore
Straits, Vietnam and India.
Problems associated with ensuring that piracy
is taken seriously
NUMAST considers it is totally unacceptable
that such demonstrable threats to safety of ships and their crews,
and to the environment, have effectively been allowed to continue
and increase almost unchecked for almost a quarter of a century.
NUMAST suggests that there are several problems that have led
to such inertia in addressing the existing and potential dangers.
Firstly, there is immense ignorance about the
scale and nature of the problem. Most people think piracy died
out several centuries ago, with Captain Kidd and Blackbeard. Hollywood
movies, such as Pirates of the Caribbean, have continued to reinforce
the mythology and the swashbuckling imagery.
The international nature of the problem means
there are inherent difficulties in developing the necessary coherent
international response. This is exacerbated by the fact that much
of the shipping industry is operated through shell companies and
flags of convenience that have no genuine link to the country
of vessel ownership and crew nationality. This complex and opaque
operating structure provides huge obstacles to responsibility
and accountability, as well as presenting a diffuse and unstructured
approach to such important issues.
In addition, diplomatic sensitivities and concerns
over national sovereignty often provide obstacles to co-operation
at regional and international level to tackle the problem.
The intensely cost-competitive nature of international
shipping means that many shipowners resist the pressure to put
in place positive and effective security measures to deter illicit
boarding. They have also consistently opposed proposals to ensure
that their vessels have sufficient crew and resources to enable
the recommended precautions to be carried out.
Availability and reliability of data
It is accepted that the figures produced by
the IMB represent "the tip of the iceberg", with many
attacks and attempted attacks going unreported for a variety of
reasons, including reluctance to involve the ship in costly delays.
The true scale of the problem may be indicated by a study conducted
by the Nippon Foundation in 1999, which showed that there had
been 10 times as many piracy incidents involving Japanese-owned
vessels than had been officially recorded. Another perspective
on the figures was provided by Aegis Defence Services, of London,
which pointed out that the rate of attacks on merchant ships worldwide
(5.9 per 1,000) is about double the rate of car-jackings in South
Africa (2.75 per 1,000).
ANY FURTHER
RELEVANT MATTERS
Piracy has, for too long, presented an intolerable
threat to the safety of seafarers, shipping, the environment,
and to the very principles of global trade.
NUMAST believes the international community
and the international shipping industry have failed to provide
effective responses to the growing threats posed by piracy and
armed attacks on merchant ships.
In the post 9/11 world, however, the stakes
are different and there can be no excuse for inadequate action
to combat the proven risks.
NUMAST believes that important issues to be
addressed include:
— the UK and the EU should take the
lead in securing action by the UN Security Council, including
the deployment of a multinational naval "task force"
to protect merchant ships in high-risk areas;
— the UK and the EU should take the
lead in developing multilateral co-operation agreements to reduce
the risk of piracy and armed attacks on merchant ships, including
co-ordinated patrols in high-risk areas, intelligence exchange,
and rights of hot pursuit following attacks;
— flag states and coastal states need
to improve the standards of reporting and investigation of attacks
on their ships and in their waters;
— the UK and the EU should take a lead
the application of effective sanctions against flag states and
port states that fail to deal with problems of piracy and armed
attacks on ships under their administrative responsibilities;
— shipowners and flag states must recognise
the workload demands associated with the ISPS Code and the post
of Ship Security Officer. The additional duties created by the
post, and by the recommended precautions to deter piracy and armed
attacks on ships, must be reflected when determining safe manning
certificates and in assessing compliance with hours or work and
rest period requirements;
— global recognition and acceptance
of an agreed system for declaring "warlike operations"
status in high-risk areas;
— shipowners need to install more effective
security equipment onboard their vessels, including: vessel tracking
systems, CCTV, motion detectors, alarms and access control systems;
— tighter controls are required over
the operation of ship registries and the veils of corporate secrecy
that can be used to cover terrorist or criminal activities;
— technical and practical assistance
should be offered to developing nations to help improve standards
of security in their ports and waters, including seaborne patrols,
protected shipping lanes, greater use of CCTV and restricted zone
fencing around ports and berths; and
— countries such as the UK, which are
highly dependent upon foreign flagged shipping, need to assess
the security implications of this reliance.
10 January 2006
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