Memorandum submitted by The Chamber of
Shipping
The Chamber of Shipping is the trade association
for UK-based shipowners and ship managers. It has 125 members
and represents over 730 trading ships; of these more than half
are UK mainland registered.
1. BACKGROUND
Merchant ships have long been confronted by
the threat of attacks by armed robbers and the general concept
of a pirate being a sea thief is documented from the mid 17th
century. Historical attacks on shipping conducted for personal
or monetary gain have taken many forms, many being characterised
by violence.
The terrorist attacks on the United States in
2001 brought about a fundamental review of national and international
vulnerabilities and as a result since then security in the widest
sense has become a major preoccupation of the maritime industry.
A new and comprehensive security regime has been developed to
counter the terrorist threat and implemented in the form of the
International Maritime Organisation's (IMO) International Ship
and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. These measures have enhanced
security in ports and on board ships and, as a consequence, have
also improved security against piracy attacks. Latest figures
show that 325 attacks took place in 2004 and 30 seafarers were
killed in the first six months of the year. Ship hijackings and
crew abductions, incident reports of which are merged and confused
with piracy attacks, have shown an increase. There is a clear
trend towards increasing violence and the use by pirates of sophisticated
weaponry and paramilitary tactics.
Prior to 1996, when the IMO commenced its monthly
reporting, the Chamber together with the International Chamber
of Shipping lobbied on behalf of its member companies for government
and inter-governmental action to address the piracy problem. Lobbying
often at that time consisted of compiling detailed statistics
and details of incidents to highlight piracy, armed robbery and
other maritime crime hotspots. Often these were persistent incidents
of armed robbery against ships while in port or at anchor. The
Chamber is content that adequate reporting arrangements exist
and that UK ships and companies are diligent and reliable in their
reporting. We welcome the Department for Transport (DfT) Transport
Security Directorate's (Transec) role in monitoring piracy, armed
robbery and other maritime crime trends and discuss developments
within the National Maritime Security Committee and its sub panels.
The Chamber has contributed to recent reviews
of piracy policy conducted by the Government and supports the
overall approach and specific recommendations which were most
recently presented in the joint Department for Transport and Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (FCO) "Future Strategy" paper
of 2005. The Chamber contributed to the preparation of Marine
Guidance Note 298 and believes it represents a sound and practical
range of general measures which can be taken to reduce the risk
of piracy-type incidents and responses in the event of an attack.
The classified Counter Piracy Report issued by the Ministry of
Defence (MOD) Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL)
in 2002 was given limited circulation to UK shipping companies.
The Chamber has endorsed the paper MSC80/17/1 Piracy—The
UK Government's strategy for tackling Piracy and Armed Robbery
at sea—submitted to the 80th session of the IMO's Maritime
Safety Committee in May 2005.
On the assumption that Committee members will
have received full information showing the growth of the "piracy"
problem from Government sources, this paper will not dwell on
global statistics. The position globally and impact on UK ships
are illustrated in the tables at annex 1. Rather this paper looks
at this issue from a ship-operators' and seafarers' perspective
and tries to quantify the impact it has on today's fleet, with
specific references on the questions in the inquiry's Press Notice
of 9 December.
The Chamber's policy is to handle the "piracy"
issue as one component of the industry's overall maritime security
agenda. Piracy and armed robbery are also considered by two other
committees:
— The joint Ministry of Defence/Chamber,
Shipping Defence Advisory Committee (SDAC) which provides defence
liaison.
— The Warlike Operations Area Committee
(WOAC), which brings together Chamber member companies and our
social partners (NUMAST and RMT). Its role is, in times of military
action, to exchange relevant information and monitor warlike activities
and to determine whether to recommend that clauses in collective
agreements dealing with service in specifically identified war
zones should be invoked. The agreed criteria for determining the
existence of a warlike operations area address military issues
which do not include "piracy" but this committee also
provides a useful forum for the joint consideration of piracy
and other security threats to seafarers and ships.
A review of piracy reports shows the impact
of "piracy" on UK ships and seafarers has been limited
by the range of practical measures which have been adopted by
what are predominantly modern efficient ships manned by well trained
and alert seafarers. However the violent nature of recent attacks
constitutes a clear indication that international seafaring and
trading are more exposed to security risks than they used to be
and that in a number of sea areas the maritime security environment
is in general deteriorating and is evidently becoming more (not
less, as we might expect) dangerous.
2. PIRACY AND
TODAY'S
MARITIME SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT
The industry is very alert to the range of threats
to maritime security. Post 2002 the ISPS Code has done much to
improve port security and introduce security procedures and to
develop a security culture on board ships but a wide range of
geographical variations exist in port security and a few flag
administrations likewise tolerate different security standards
on their ships. The UK domestic threat level from maritime terrorism
and crime is low although shipping companies recognise themselves
to be in a higher-risk category by virtue of their profile and
business, in the context of security risks generally, rather than
pure piracy. This is particularly true of high-profile international
energy, and trading and leisure interests.
Ship hijacking, hostage-taking and abduction
have emerged as a new and distinct threat in certain sea areas
throughout the world, with Nigeria and Somalia currently acting
as host to armed "pirate" groups. The Seabourn Spirit
incident of 5 November 2005 focused attention on the increasing
capability of such paramilitary groups operating off East Africa,
but similar quasi-military attacks have also been seen in the
Malacca Straits. In some regions the motive(s) for these ship
attacks appear much more complicated than simple "personal
gain" and the use of modern weaponry and military techniques
set these incidents apart from the incidents normally reported
as piracy. Paradoxically it appears that, despite the threat of
violence in recent high-profile incidents actual fatalities and
injuries to crew have been less than those sustained elsewhere.
The combination of the above factors and the military nature of
attacks would seem to justify a "one off" solution to
these particular current problems. In the longer term intergovernmental
mechanisms for dealing with the maritime security risks thrown
up by dysfunctional states will be required. The industry is alert
to the dangers of grounding and of environmental damage being
caused by an incident.
It is generally not helpful to confuse terrorist
threats with piracy although again from a statistical point of
view the data is often merged. Links between terrorist groups
and pirates remain unproven and industry believes the ISPS Code
regime provides adequate and proportionate measures to address
the terrorist risk. Additional often complementary measures are
required to counter piracy risks. Narcotics and people-smuggling
and other organised crime also affect mariners, as do the protests
by Non State Activist Groups but these represent a range of other
maritime security problems which are usually confined to certain
limited sea areas and are encountered on a more random basis.
3. QUANTIFYING
THE PIRACY
AND ARMED
ROBBERY PROBLEM
The data sources that we have used—IMB,
IMO etc—are commonly used by all others who monitor the
piracy problem. There is general agreement that these statistics
are becoming ever more reliable but may be misinterpreted as often
the incidents themselves are portrayed out of context by the media
and much play given to the emotive word "piracy". Nevertheless
a significant international problem exists as shown in table 1
of annex 1. Other tables we have included attempt to separate
the global statistics into four different categories of crime
according to the "severity" of the event:
(1) Terrorism/Ship-hijacking/Stolen or Disappeared
ships.
(2) High Seas Piracy and similar acts carried
out in Territorial Seas.
(3) Armed Robbery in an anchorage or port.
(4) Unarmed Robbery and Crime in an anchorage
or port.
At the outset it seems reasonable to identify
incidents of a terrorist or serious quasi-military nature representing
individual incidents each with an international impact. The trend
of just less than 20 incidents each year for the past 10 years
was surprisingly consistent until the recent emergence of hijacking
off Somalia.
Category 2 which might be described as conventional
"piracy on the high seas" but with the addition of armed
robbery in the territorial seas—so as to include for example
piracy-type attacks in the Malacca Straits—shows a downward
trend since the highs of 2000 but with a resurgence in 2004. This
relates to the well known "regional piracy problem"
in the Malacca Straits and Indonesia. It may be slightly premature
to assume that the downturn since then was caused by the effects
of the Tsunami; but this will likely be confirmed in the annual
figures.
The last two categories, showing maritime crime
committed within the jurisdiction and control of coastal states,
show a steady downward trend. This may reflect the impact of specific
initiatives by certain nation states and in general improving
port security disciplines introduced by the ISPS Code regime since
2002.
Any geographical analysis of the piracy problem
illustrates the fact that piracy and armed robbery today have
to be addressed on two levels as an "international menace"
and at the same time as a "local problem". In the past
decade South East Asia, China, the Indian Subcontinent, West Africa,
East Africa and South America have at various times figured prominently
in the statistics. Specific national action in China and South
America proved effective in almost eradicating the attacks that
were being mounted at one time in considerable numbers from certain
coastal bases. There is no doubt that the "MALSINDO"
trilateral patrols between Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia are
effective and will gradually erode the ability of pirates and
criminal groups to mount attacks in the Malacca Straits.
The frequency of incidents reported by UK-registered
ships in 2004 and 2005 are shown in table 3. Table 4 illustrates
those reported by UK mainland flag ships. The incidents reported
up to and including October 2005 amounted to six for UK ships,
of which two were UK mainland registered; these two reported actual
armed robbery against ships in port or at anchor. The figures
for the other Red Ensign Group registers record three attacks
made on Cayman flag ships, and one on a Gibraltarian ship; which
was subjected to an attempted hi-jacking off the coast of Somalia.
The recent trends shown by these statistics should be treated
with caution; however, they would seem to support the Chamber's
observation that in comparison with other flags the UK fleet's
incidence of piracy and armed robbery continues to be relatively
low.
4. UK GOVERNMENT'S
APPROACH
The UK's approach to combating piracy involves
the DfT, (Transec), the FCO, the MOD and perhaps at times also
the Department for Trade and Industry. The Chamber has maintained
close contact with each of these departments and has contributed
to a range of anti-piracy initiatives. It appears essential to
maintain continuous pressure on intergovernmental agencies to
respond to the problem. The most important of these is the comprehensive
anti-piracy agenda and programme being followed by the IMO's Maritime
Safety Committee. The Chamber agrees with the defensive and offensive
"next steps" laid out in the joint DfT and FCO future
strategy paper issued in 2005. We consider that as there are few
practical defensive measures capable of being taken that have
not already been taken—although we continue to trial new
equipments—and that proportionally more importance should
be given to the offensive measures. It is only by the effective
implementation of anti-piracy programmes with certain key "piracy"
prone states that the domestic roots of indigenous criminal groups
will be weeded out.
The MOD contribution has largely been made through
the Maritime Trade Operations (MTO) unit of the Royal Navy based
in Dubai. This is a small specialised cell. Last December 2,718
position reports were made to MTO by 255 vessels. Although designed
to respond to a military situation, MTO has shown itself to be
equally useful addressing wider maritime security threats including
piracy and armed robbery. The Chamber views this model as being
quite essential to maintaining the confidence of the UK trading
fleet in the prevailing maritime security environment east of
Suez. MTO could also serve as a prototype for delivering reassurance
to commercial shipping in other security hotspots throughout the
world.
5. THE SHIPPING
INDUSTRY'S
PERSPECTIVE
The shipping industry has been fully engaged
on the modern piracy and armed robbery problem which emerged in
1980s. However, today's problem is commonly viewed by shipowners
as a part of the wider (maritime) security environment and there
are many common security responses and obligations. Shipowners
have for a long time known that "defence" (together
with intelligence) has shown itself to be the best method of avoiding
an incident. Both the overt and covert anti-piracy measures adopted
by UK ships have regularly proven effective at deterring even
determined and armed attacks at sea and reducing crime in port.
Owners see their principal obligations as to:
1. Adopt policies and procedures and
employ equipment to protect the ships and persons on board from
the possibility of attacks and to repel, using reasonable means,
any attacks that might occur.
2. Minimise the risks to personnel
and to the ship if an attack takes place.
3. Report attacks to regional and international
centres, coastal state authorities and to the flag state.
4. Co-operate in criminal investigations.
It is common for shipping companies to carry
out both formal and less formal risk assessments which quickly
highlight specific geographical locations where their ships are
at greatest risk. Companies then implement the appropriate contingency
arrangements contained in the mandatory Ship Security Plan and
the non-mandatory Piracy Plan, when passing through these areas.
Ultimately, ship masters and individual crew members carry the
responsibility for carrying out effective anti-piracy procedures
and the measures on UK ships (at least) are known to be robust
and properly implemented.
The statistics show certain ship types are more
prone to attack than others. Small slow vessels with low freeboard
such as tugs and tows, offshore support and fishing vessels appear
frequently in the statistics. Conversely, fast moving large ships
with high freeboard such as container ships and tankers are better
able to evade an attack. Incidents occur more frequently in poorly
policed port areas. All ships deter attacks by appearing alert,
well managed and prepared. Shipping companies are well aware of
these vulnerabilities and the Chamber has highlighted to Government
the particular vulnerability of offshore supply vessels.
Within the Chamber of Shipping we see our role
as profiling and analysing risk and working with Transec and other
agencies, to reduce the risk to our members' ships and seafarers.
In addition to the direct government contacts and links with shipping
companies which exist for the transmission of maritime security
threat advice, the Chamber will on occasions relay advice to members
concerning "piracy hotspots" and danger areas and encourage
UK ships to join incident and position reporting schemes. The
industry has been supplied with guidance on passive defence (the
2002 DSTL Counter Piracy Report) but the Chamber is not in favour
of ships carrying firearms on board for use by the crew in defence
against pirates, because of the increased risk to crew of them
doing so. There are several practical measures owners will employ
to reduce this risk to both personnel and property and many companies
employ security consultants and deploy security guards and escorts
in high-risk locations, usually ashore but also at times on board
ships.
The cost of piracy and armed robbery to the
industry is incurred by direct and indirect means. Guards, security
plans and hardware represent direct costs as does extra fuel consumption
when, for example, a ship alters course to avoid a high piracy
risk area. Increased insurance levied by underwriters for ships
transiting "listed areas" is also a direct and sometimes
substantial cost. Other indirect costs are incurred when ships
are delayed, to participate in investigations or voyages altered
to avoid certain high risk ports.
Nevertheless on a global scale, the prognosis
for hi-jacking, piracy and armed robbery is a cause for real concern:
the continued availability of weaponry and paramilitary skills
and marine technology is all the time making it easier for criminals
to operate effectively offshore and to track target vessels; this
is true particularly now with Automatic Identification (AIS).
Lastly the Chamber is acutely aware of the negative
impact of piracy and armed robbery on the officers and crews serving
on UK ships. Such incidents may well constitute a direct threat
to individual personal safety; at other times they create specific
extra duties which may well be both onerous and stressful.
6. POLICY OPTIONS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The principal responsibility for addressing
the piracy and armed robbery problem lies with the states in whose
territory such criminals operate and are based. As such although
shipowners may "react", it is not within their power
to "redress" this international problem. Piracy (and
armed robbery) is not a domestic UK problem but occurs in other
states where domestic security is often deficient and where law
enforcement agencies are frequently corrupt and often complicit
in incidents. A range of responses is required, including:
— Intergovernmental arrangements to
combat international crime and piracy on the high seas.
— Co-ordinated approach by the UK Government
to address all aspects of the evolving piracy and armed robbery
problem.
— Effective policing of the territorial
seas where incidents occur.
IMO as the principal intergovernmental agency
dealing with the "piracy" problem has made considerable
(technical) progress but lacks the political influence to address
"piracy" alone. Additional governmental resources and
responses are required and if certain forms of terrorism, piracy
and armed robbery and crime in ports continue to increase, then
ultimately these issues should be given a higher priority within
the list of key UK international priorities determined by the
FCO and MOD.
1 February 2006
Annex 1
Table 1
GLOBAL INCIDENTS REPORTED
Table 2
Table 3
Table 4
Annex 2
LEGAL ASPECTS
The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) defines
Piracy and Armed Robbery as:
"An act of boarding or attempting to
board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any
other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use
force in furtherance of that act."
This functional and widely used definition covers
actual or attempted attacks whether the ship is berthed, at anchor
or at sea but excludes petty theft unless the thieves are armed.
In addition the IMO adopted a code of practice
for the investigation of crimes of piracy and armed robbery against
ships with regard to Article 101 of the UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS) at the 74th meeting of its Maritime Safety
Committee. This code of practice creates a distinction between
piracy and armed robbery against ships with the definition:
"Armed robbery against ships means any
unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of depredation,
or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy directed against
a ship or against persons or property on board such ship within
the State's jurisdiction over such offences."
Article 101—UNCLOS
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention,
or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew
or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and
directed-
(i) on the high seas, against another
ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such
ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons
or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation
in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of
facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally
facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).
These definitions now widely used cover actual
or attempted attacks whether the ship is berthed, at anchor or
at sea.
Piracy in municipal law may differ from the
international law definition and for example "piracy"
has never been defined in English law. This has lead to persistent
confusion in the Courts and in arriving at any common understanding
of what a lay person may understand to be the "piracy problem".
Thus legislators have over time created an arguably flawed framework—from
a practical point of view—in which the nature of the offence
does not determine whether a particular type of crime has taken
place but the nature of the crime is determined by the locus or
place of the event. While the rationale in identifying jurisdiction
is clear nevertheless this explains why very few piracy cases
have resulted in prosecution and why "legal" misunderstanding
and confusion regarding "piracy" persist.
For a current definition of piracy we have to
rely on UNCLOS but historically it is interesting to note that
in English Admiralty law the use of the term "high seas"
has in the past generally been taken as meaning all waters to
seaward of the low water line or all navigable waters it was only
much later following UNCLOS it has been employed to describe waters
beyond or outside a State's Territorial Sea (TS). However UNCLOS
produced clarity for the legal regime which together with the
IMO definition of Armed Robbery provides an adequate framework
for policy, if not legal redress.
The Chamber supported the review of piracy laws
and the development of model law in this area carried out by the
Comite Maritime in 2005. Furthermore the Chamber also recommended
against the repeal of the Piracy Act 1837 during the Law Commissions
review also carried out in 2005 on the grounds that recent maritime
security legislation has tended to address threats from terrorist
activities as its principal objective.
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