Joint memorandum submitted by the Department
for Transport and Foreign and Commonwealth Office
INTRODUCTION
1. This memorandum provides the Transport
Select Committee with an account of how the Government of the
United Kingdom deals with the threat, and acts, of piracy. In
keeping with the lines of questioning set out in the Transport
Select Committee's Press Notice announcing this inquiry, this
memorandum includes, inter alia, information on:
— the definition of piracy and maritime
armed robbery (see Annex A);
— reasons why piracy has increased
over the previous decades;
— how piracy is affecting British shipping
in particular;
— what the UK has been doing to tackle
piracy (see Annex B);
— the guidance national governments
and international organisations are providing to shipping to help
prevent attack and how this is drawn up, revised and issued;
— problems associated with tackling
piracy (see Annex C);
— geographic areas of special concern
(see Annex D);
— piracy from an international and
EU perspective; and
— availability and reliability of data.
POWERS AND
STATUTORY DUTIES
2. Under article 100 of UNCLOS, there is
a duty on every state to act against piracy. Piracy is defined
by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
(see Annex A). This definition forms part of our domestic law.
Indeed, the Merchant Shipping and Maritime Security Act 1997 (c
28) clarified for the avoidance of doubt that for the purposes
of any proceedings before a court in the United Kingdom in respect
of piracy, the provisions of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea 1982 that are set out in Schedule 5 shall be
treated as constituting part of the law of nations. For the purposes
of those provisions the high seas shall (in accordance with paragraph
2 of Article 58 of that Convention) be taken to include all waters
beyond the territorial sea of the United Kingdom or of any other
state. If an incident takes place within the territorial sea,
then it is not, as a matter of international law, piracy. For
incidents that fall outside the remit of the UNCLOS definition
of piracy, the UK refers principally to the definition of piracy
provided by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), the organisation
that collates and analyses the statistics used internationally
to monitor incidents of piracy and maritime armed robbery (see
Annex A).
3. Article 105 of UNCLOS provides that every
State may seize a pirate ship or a ship taken by piracy and under
the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property
on board. Furthermore, Article 110 of UNCLOS enables warships,
military aircraft, or other duly authorised ships or aircraft
clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service
to board any ship when there is reasonable ground for suspecting
that the ship is engaged in piracy.
4. The penalty for piracy is not prescribed
by UNCLOS. Pirates may be tried before the courts of any state
which carried out the seizure pursuant to UNCLOS. The courts may
decide upon the penalties to be imposed and may also determine
the action to be taken in relation to the ship, subject to the
rights of third parties acting in good faith. So far as the law
in the United Kingdom is concerned, the Aviation and Maritime
Security Act 1990 (c 31) covers anything that might come within
the compass of piracy. A person guilty of the offences of threatening
or carrying out an act of piracy including hijacking a ship is
liable on conviction to imprisonment for life.
5. In addition to the articles of UNCLOS
relating specifically to piracy, there is a general duty to render
assistance under article 98. This includes a duty on the master
of a ship to "proceed with all possible speed to the rescue
of persons in distress, if informed of their need of assistance,
insofar as such action may reasonably be expected of him".
It is, however, in the Master's discretion, considering all of
the circumstances, to determine whether the ship is in a situation
which requires assistance.
DEPARTMENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES
AND THE
PUBLICATION OF
COUNTER-PIRACY
GUIDANCE
6. The Department for Transport (DfT) and
its predecessor departments have worked on defensive measures
against piracy for many years. Originally the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office held the lead ministerial responsibility and parliamentary
accountability on piracy although this passed to the DfT in early
2004. Essentially the FCO had led on all international issues
and the DfT had led on defensive measures for UK shipping. Much
work was done to tackle the threat from piracy and a list of the
practical steps taken can be found in Annex B.
7. Since the Department for Transport took
the lead within HM Government for formulating policies to tackle
piracy it has, in partnership with the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, and with the assistance of Ministry of Defence (MOD),
developed a strategy to take forward the fight against piracy.
The strategy marked confidential was agreed by Alistair Darling
and Jack Straw towards the end of 2004. Having published an unclassified
version of the strategy in March 2005 http://www.dft.gov.uk/stellent/groups/dft_transsec/documents/divisionhomepage/039632.hcsp,
the UK then gave a presentation in May 2005 to the International
Maritime Organisation (IMO) where it requested all Member States
to either review or develop their own counter-piracy strategies.
Consistent with our own message, the DfT this year has updated
and amended the UK's official guidance titled "Measures to
counter piracy, armed robbery and other acts of violence against
merchant shipping", published by the Maritime and Coastguard
Agency as Marine Guidance Note 298.
8. The guidance note sets out the areas
of the world where piracy is most prevalent and it explains the
tactics that pirates are known to use when attacking a ship. It
also explains the preventative measures that can be taken to help
prevent an attack in the first place and advises on the course
of action that Masters and crew should take in the event that
pirates successfully board the ship. The revised note takes into
account the changes resulting from the implementation of the International
Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code), which is the
new international maritime security framework and it contains
the latest information that Government has available on piracy.
The marine guidance note has been developed in consultation with,
and agreed by, the UK maritime industry and it is publicly available.
9. The DfT issues further guidance, as necessary,
in the form of ad-hoc piracy warning notifications regarding areas
of concern and has issued three such warnings about the situation
off Somalia since July 2005 to the UK merchant fleet (the last
being 7 November 2005). All warnings take into account the views
and analysis of the intelligence agencies and the shipping industry
itself so that any advice provided is pragmatic and proportionate.
References to the risks of piracy, where appropriate, are also
included within the FCO's Travel Advice.
SUMMARY OF
RECENT UK ACTIVITY
10. The majority of Government activity
over the last year has been focused on pursuing the actions listed
in the Government's Piracy Strategy. The DfT has worked with G8
countries to produce an ISPS Code "Checklist", designed
to assist Contracting Governments to measure the effectiveness
of their interpretation and implementation of the Code. This helps
strengthen the implementation of security measures at ports thereby
increasing protection against acts of maritime armed robbery.
The draft "Checklist" was agreed as an interim measure
at the IMO's Maritime Safety Committee in December 2004 and it
is currently being trialled by Member States.
11. The DfT has been researching and evaluating
new technologies in partnership with the Home Office that could
improve detection capabilities, enhance protective ship security
and defensive measures in the event of an attack and allow rapid
and accurate reporting of piracy attacks.
12. Since the summer, we have been working
closely with the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) at the MOD who
have been providing us with intelligence on piracy attacks. In
addition, we have been working closely with the MOD/Royal Navy
to determine what generic assistance can be offered within a known
piracy region or in response to a specific incident.
13. In line with the consultative approach
that the DfT has taken in the development of piracy guidance and
warnings with industry, we have also conducted a regular dialogue
on tackling piracy with the main stakeholders in the UK Government,
UK shipping industry, UK Chamber of Shipping and other interested
parties, including NUMAST, via the National Maritime Security
Committee and its Shipping Panel.
14. In September 2005, the DfT attended
a seminar organised by the IMO in Jakarta on the safety, security
and environment of the Straits of Malacca (see Annex D: Indonesia
and Malacca Straits). The seminar ended with the agreement of
the "Jakarta Statement" which outlined areas of future
co-operation and assistance.
15. The FCO has led on the negotiations
at the Diplomatic Conference held by the International Maritime
Organization in October 2005 which concluded the Protocol of 2005
to the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation. The DfT are seeking an early
parliamentary opportunity to take forward amendments to the Aviation
and Maritime Security Act 1990 that will allow the UK to ratify
the revised Convention.
16. The FCO argued for piracy to be raised
on the EU agenda during the UK Presidency, specifically by proposing
the adoption of the Strategy on the Eradication of Piracy and
Armed Robbery at Sea (drawn directly from the UK Piracy Strategy,
as presented to the IMO), with a view to agreeing a common European
response to the threat.
17. The Minister of State, Stephen Ladyman,
met the IMO Secretary General on 3 November to support the IMO's
proposal for a resolution on Piracy and Armed Robbery Against
Ships in Waters of the Coast of Somalia. This was passed at
the 24th IMO Assembly (23-30 November 2005), bringing the subject
before the UN Security Council (UNSC). The UN Secretary General
received the request on 28 November and on 22 December passed
it to the (UK) President of UNSC for consideration.
18. Dr Ladyman is also attending the Ministerial
conference on Transport Security in Tokyo during January 2006,
which will address both maritime security and piracy. The aim
of the conference is to maintain the profile of transport security
matters, to enhance international co-operation and to support
the continued evolution of maritime security policy.
19. The UK Government has supported and
approved a number of IMO initiated and managed capacity building
projects ("train the trainers", ISPS awareness) to enhance
the ability of coastal states to patrol their own waters through
the use of FCO Global Opportunities Funds (Economic Governance
Programme and Counter Terrorism). Funds have also been allocated
towards helping the IMO to host two sub-regional maritime security
seminars in the Middle East, the first in Yemen last April and
a follow up in Oman in January 2006. While the principal aim of
these seminars has been to strengthen regional maritime security
based on the requirements of the International Ship and Port Facility
Security Code, they have also addressed piracy. The UK has attended
and spoken at both seminars, sharing its best practice with the
attending states.
20. As a result of all of the above initiatives,
the UK Government has developed a good and constructive working
relationship with the key UK and international stakeholders in
tackling piracy including the International Maritime Organisation,
the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), the International Chamber
of Shipping and NUMAST. The recent attack on the Seabourn Spirit
cruise ship off Somalia has re-invigorated the piracy debate within
the media and has presented the UK Government with an opportunity
to further our engagement with the main stakeholders both within
the UK and internationally.
THE ROLE
OF THE
EU
21. During the Netherlands/Luxembourg EU
Presidencies, the UK was invited to organise a presentation on
Piracy for COMAR (EU Law of the Sea working group in Brussels)
to publicise the UK Government's counter-piracy strategy and to
generate Member State initiatives to eradicate this crime. Under
our own Presidency, this initiative was followed by a recital
of what measures the UK had taken, principally through the IMO,
inclusive of FCO Global Opportunities Funding. Three countries
offered brief details of their anti-piracy programmes: Germany
in funding training programmes in the Malacca Straits, Spain has
established a monitoring system in the Straits of Gibraltar and
the Danes had asked the IMO to update their Piracy incident website
instantly, rather than monthly which has been done. Denmark has
also offered technical assistance, through IMO programmes, in
the Malacca Straits. The Austrians have agreed to keep Piracy
on the COMAR agenda, during their Presidency.
BACKGROUND AND
STATISTICAL DATA
22. Piracy and maritime armed robbery is
a threat to the principles of freedom of navigation and rights
of innocent passage of shipping. More importantly it is a threat
to the lives of passengers, crews, their property and the livelihoods
of ship and cargo interests. The precursors and key threats from
piracy are discussed in Annex C.
23. The International Maritime Bureau is
an authoritative source on piracy. It collates its data at its
Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur. While reporting of incidents
on the whole is accurate, it is widely acknowledged that there
is an unknown level of under-reporting. A trawl of additional
data sources suggests that it may be as high as 25% of the IMB
figure. This can be due to voyage delays and possible extra significant
costs whilst the incident is investigated and a consequent reluctance
to report it. The UK also receives monthly reports from the IMO.
Intelligence assessments are carried out by DIS within the MOD
in both regular classified reports and ad-hoc reports on specific
areas of concern such as Somalia.
24. Under-reporting not withstanding, these
sources indicate a general increase in the trend of piracy attacks
between the start of the 1990's and 2003 and a steady decrease
for the two years since (although it is too early to determine
whether this downward trend will continue). The statistics record
that there were 325 piracy or maritime armed robbery incidents
recorded in 2004, a decrease from the 445 incidents recorded in
2003. There have been 205 recorded incidents in the first nine
months of 2005 indicating a second consecutive drop in total piracy
or maritime armed robbery incidents (although it should be noted
that the Tsunami which struck on 26 December 2004, led to a total
cessation of piracy attacks in the affected region for two months
due to the devastation wrought on coastal communities and infrastructure,
and the preponderance of military units in the vicinity involved
in rescue and aid operations). Despite this recent reduction,
the ferocity of the attacks appears to be increasing, although
significant efforts are being made by the Malacca Straits littoral
states, India and Bangladesh, all of which are having beneficial
effects.
The impact on British shipping
25. Since the early 1990's when the IMB
began to collect data there have been a total of 36 attacks against
UK registered vessels and a further 62 against the Red Ensign
Group (REG). The highest number of recorded attacks were 2001
and 2004 with seven attacks each. In total there have been 98
attacks (including both piracy and maritime armed robbery) against
UK and REG ships over the last 13 years. In comparison with the
total of 3,613 recorded attacks, this represents less than 3%
of all attacks worldwide, in line with the size of the UK fleet
as a proportion of the world's merchant fleet. There is no suggestion
that the UK or REG fleet is being specifically targeted by pirates
as attacks tend to be opportunistic and against vessels that hold
an attractive cargo or are easier to board.
26. The only report of a UK seafarer being
killed in this period was in 1992 (the Captain of a foreign flagged
vessel)[7].
There have not been any reports of UK seafarers being killed either
on a British or a foreign flagged ship since then, but there have
been some injuries. The most serious occurred 1998 on the Isomeria
at Santos in Brazil, when two British seafarers who had been taken
hostage were injured after the pirates opened fire during a police
rescue attempt.
27. In the first nine months of 2005, there
were four incidents against UK flagged vessels. In three cases
the pirates boarded whereas in the other they failed to do so
and it was recorded as an attempted attack. The locations were
different in each case and ranged across the world from South
America, East Africa and South East Asia. Of these incidents,
two of the successful attacks occurred while the vessel was anchored
or berthed within territorial waters and the attempted attack
occurred while the ship was underway. None of the attacks over
the last couple of years have caused serious casualties, but they
have resulted in the seizure of some ship equipment, stores, personal
effects and cash.
28. In its Press Notice announcing this
inquiry, the Select Committee has noted two reported "piracy"
incidents within UK territorial waters. Both occurred while ships
were berthed in the port of Goole in July 2002. In both cases
cash was stolen and both are classified as maritime robbery and
not piracy, as the incidents did not take place in international
waters. There have been no other incidents in the UK in this period.
Since 2002, the ISPS Code has been implemented in the UK and security
at every port facility within the country which serves ships engaged
on international voyages, including Goole, has been considerably
tightened.
Geographic areas of concern
29. There are a number of specific areas
of concern, termed as piracy "hot spots" around the
world where piracy is thriving. The four main hot spots are Indonesia,
the Malacca Straits, East Coast of Somalia and western Africa.
Annex D contains background information on each area.
MARITIME TERRORISM
30. The Committee has indicated that it
wishes to examine how national governments and international Organisations
are tackling the specific issue of maritime terrorism and whether
there is a threat of serious attack by sea. It is the Department's
understanding that this will be addressed by the Select Committee's
wider inquiry of Transport Security and is therefore not covered
in this memorandum.
31. It is, however, pertinent to record
that during the initial stages of a major maritime incident involving
British interests, an act of terrorism or hijacking will be assumed
until clarification is made. Options to counter these threats
will be dictated invariably through COBR, for Ministerial sanction
on actions to be taken, or not taken. Within the FCO, the Counter
Terrorism Department leads on terrorist related crisis management
operations, in close liaison with the Maritime Team and Consular
Directorate, the DfT, MOD (including UK Special Forces), Home
Office and the Metropolitan Police.
10 January 2006
Annex A
THE DEFINTION
OF PIRACY
The UNCLOS and IMB definitions are contained
below.
1. Article 101—UNCLOS
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention,
or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew
or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and
directed—
(i) on the high seas, against another ship
or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship
or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or
property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in
the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts
making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally
facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).
2. International Maritime Bureau (IMB)
However, the majority of recorded incidents
to date have taken place in the territorial waters and therefore
fall outside the UNCLOS definition of piracy. The IMO adopted
a code of practice for the investigation of crimes of piracy and
armed robbery against ships with regard to Article 101 of the
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) at the 74th
meeting of its Maritime Safety Committee. This code of practice
creates a distinction between piracy and armed robbery against
ships.
"An act of boarding or attempting to
board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any
other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use
force in the furtherance of that act".
This definition covers actual or attempted attacks
whether the ship is berthed, at anchor or at sea, excluding petty
thefts unless the thieves are armed.
Annex B
UK GOVERNMENT ACTIONS
TO TACKLE
PIRACY
Over the past seven years the UK Government
has taken practical steps to combat piracy. In particular the
UK has:
— Participated in several IMO regional
Missions and Seminars in "piracy hotspots" presenting
UK government actions and chairing working groups and syndicates.
These seminars have played an important role in raising awareness
of the incidence and impact of piracy and armed robbery at sea.
— Provided UK financial support for
the IMO programme of Missions and Seminars, including funding
the participation of two Metropolitan Police officers with expertise
in investigating acts of piracy and more recently to conduct a
feasibility study to develop an integrated coastguard for West
and Central Africa.
— DfT and the Metropolitan Police prepared
a draft Code of Practice on the investigation of acts of piracy
and armed robbery at sea. Additionally the UK prepared a Code
of Practice for the registration of "phantom" ships.
These Codes were adopted at the IMO General Assembly and have
subsequently been issued as Circulars to all IMO member states.
— The UK took the lead in promoting
the inclusion of piracy in the United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA) annual resolution on the oceans. We also backed an EU Law
of the Sea working group (COMAR) initiative to demarche countries
in whose waters most incidents occur.
— The UK was represented on an International
Working Group set up by Comite Maritime International (CMI) in
May 1998. This work culminated in December 2001 with the submission
to the Secretariat of UNCITRAL (UN Commission on International
Trade Law) of a CMI Draft Instrument on Transport Law. This model
law, which can be applied to maritime violence such as armed robbery
and piracy, can be used by any nation, but must first be incorporated
into the respective national legislation.
— In 2001 the FCO produced an information
film called Savage Seas to raise awareness of the extent and impact
of piracy.
— In 2002 the UK worked with the Philippines
to organise a European Union/Association of South East Asian Nations
(EU/ASEAN) experts' meeting on piracy and crimes at sea in Manila
and the FCO sponsored the attendance of delegates from three South
East Asian countries at a seminar on piracy at the World Maritime
University in Sweden.
— TRANSEC commissioned a report from
Defence Science Technology Laboratories (DSTL) which was published
in December 2002 and circulated to key industry stakeholders.
The report identified what commercially available to the shipping
industry to help detect and deter acts of piracy.
— In June 2004, representatives from
the FCO, MOD, Security Service and the Metropolitan Police attended
the triennial IMB Conference on Piracy and Maritime Security in
Kuala Lumpur.
— The UK successfully implemented the
new IMO International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code.
The Code requires SOLAS Convention ships and ports to adhere to
an international security framework. The Code went live on 1 July
2004 and provides a new baseline for maritime security.
— Transec first developed specific
and substantial counter-piracy guidance in 1998, set out in a
Marine Guidance Notice to UK industry. This was updated in 2002
and again in 2005.
— The UK has consistently raised piracy
in bilateral meetings with officials and ministers from overseas
countries (for example Indonesia).
Annex C
THE PRECURSORS
OF PIRACY,
THE KEY
THREATS AND
THE OBSTACLES
TO TACKLING
PIRACY
Piracy can be attributed to a variety of precursors
although it is primarily a socio-economic issue arising in regions
where maritime trade meets poverty and social deprivation, combined
with an absence of effective law enforcement. Such instability
and lawlessness combined with an abundance of easy maritime targets
provides a strong attraction to poor disaffected locals who will
be motivated by financial gain, thus creating a fertile breeding
ground for piracy. In addition; a maritime sea-lane bottleneck,
an indigenous coastal fishing fleet to provide camouflage for
pirate craft, adequate provision of facilities for boat repair
and the existence of a market for stolen goods and money laundering
will all fuel the development and growth of a piracy problem.
The key threats, in order of likelihood, to
ships and to those on board are:
(a) Theft of valuables while a ship is at
anchor or in port.
(b) A short-term seizure of a ship underway,
during which valuables and cargo might be stolen by pirates (who
may be carrying weapons).
(c) Hi-jacking and seizure of a whole ship
and cargo, the cargo then being offloaded and sold in another
location.
(d) Creation of a "phantom ship".
After the ship has been hi-jacked, the ship is repainted, falsely
re-flagged, renamed and then operated by pirates for fraudulent
cargo handling and illegal shipping activities.
There is a risk of injury or death to all those
on board the ship in all of the above incidents, especially if
they show signs of resistance. There is also the risk of being
held hostage, potentially for a prolonged period and, in some
of the worst cases, subsequent abandonment overboard.
The UK view is that piracy is acknowledged as
a serious threat to shipping around the world but that the States
suffering maritime armed robbery in their territorial waters or
piracy in nearby international waters have often lacked co-ordination,
technical expertise or the assets to devote to thwarting the problem.
Although the international community had sporadically engaged
on piracy with the regional Governments of South East Asia in
the past, there has been a noticeably more concerted effort in
the past year to resolve the piracy problem, whilst respecting
the sovereignty of the littoral states.
Actions to combat piracy may help the developing
economies of SE Asian nations, such as Indonesia and Philippines.
However, the IMB has suggested that only about 1% of shipping
transiting the Malacca Straits actually trades with Indonesia,
for example, and this may explain its historical record of limited
success in combating piracy and armed robbery. It follows that
other, non-economic arguments must be found in order to encourage
a more proactive attitude. The situation relating to Malaysia
is different and closure of the Straits would have a significant
impact on its "mega-ports", for example Port Klang,
which handles a large amount of world/regional trade. Coalition
working between the regional littoral states, and the mutual benefits
this brings in terms of being a force multiplier, engendering
trust and building rapport, appears to be a more effective way
of promoting counter-piracy initiatives. Early indications are
that the recent Jakarta Conference hosted by Indonesia, which
culminated in the Jakarta Statement, was a significant milestone
in the process of recognising and addressing the piracy threat
in a concerted and co-ordinated way.
Annex D
GEOGRAPHIC AREAS
OF CONCERN
Piracy attack statistics indicate that there
are seven general areas of concern (of which the three most significant
are discussed below). They are: Indonesia and the Malacca Straits,
Somalia/Horn of Africa, Gulf of Guinea, Latin America and the
Caribbean, Northern Arabian/Persian Gulf, the Philippines and
South China Sea and the Bay of Bengal.
Indonesia and the Malacca Straits
1. Attacks during 2005 suggested that violence
is on the increase with a rise in kidnap and ransom cases in the
Northern Malacca Straits. Destabilising local influences are further
compounded by regional instability and jurisdictional tensions.
The high incidence of piracy in this region reflects the particular
law enforcement difficulties across complex maritime boundaries.
2. UK flagged shipping in the Malacca Straits
tend to be large vessels which steam through the centre of the
Straits making them hard targets. There is far greater risk to
smaller boats (the majority of which is indigenous coastal traffic)
in ports and anchorages along the coasts. Yet, it is such an important
trade route as 50% of the world's oil is transported through the
Straits and the Straits suffers 50% of the world's reported piracy,
that it must remain a high focus of attention.
3. There is some evidence of regional governments
in SE Asia taking steps to tackle the problem and the Singaporean
Navy is conducting random escorts for high value merchant vessels
such as oil tankers and LNG carriers. In addition, Malaysia, Indonesia
and Singapore have signed a tri-partite agreement to co-ordinate
law enforcement in the Malacca Straits. This has led to the initiation
of Operation Malindo, which is a year round anti-piracy and anti-terrorism
protection operation for the Malacca Straits. A "hotline"
has been set up to provide rapid communications especially when
a warship of one nation is in hot pursuit of a pirate vessel toward
the waters of another partner nation with the right of hot pursuit
up to five miles within each other's territorial waters. There
has also been recent agreement on providing joint air patrols
of the Malacca Straits. However, these positive initiatives do
not detract from the overall need for greater coordination of
anti-piracy activity.
4. In June 2005 the Joint War Committee
at Lloyds of London decided to list the Malacca Straits as a war
risk area for insurance purposes. Since then there has been a
burst of activity by the littoral states. Apart from the potential
damage to these States' reputations, the increase of insurance
premiums for voyages to this area have certainly provided a spur
for action.
5. The IMO sponsored an international conference
on the Security, Safety and Environment of the Malacca Straits
in September 2005 which examined concerns regarding the high piracy
activity in these waters. The UK along with a number of other
principal users of the Straits (USA and Japan) offered technical
assistance to the littoral states to help combat piracy and they
are currently considering this offer.
Somalia
6. Until 15 March 2005, Somalia was not
considered to be a piracy hot spot, although there has been a
low level of concern regarding the general lawlessness for some
time, especially since the collapse of the central government
in 1991. Since March 2005 the IMB report that there have been
up to 35 attacks against ships including 13 hijackings. The UK
has very little regular traffic transiting to the east of Somalia
and all UK registered ships have been advised to stay at least
150NM from the coast. The significance of this coast is it is
the direct route to Mombasa from the Red Sea and is a very important
shipping route for East Africa. Going wide around Somalia adds
very significantly to the total voyage distances.
7. Two of the more high-profile incidents
have been the UN World Food Programme Ship, hijacked on 27 June
2005 with the crew and cargo held hostage for over three months.
Also, the Seabourn Spirit, a Bahamian flagged Cruise Ship was
attacked while 80NM off the Somali coast and sustained significant
damage, although the crew successfully prevented the ship being
boarded.
8. The pirates may be linked to local warlord
militias and have a considerable reach to at least 180 nautical
miles out from the coast. This seems to indicate the presence
of a mother ship since the small fast craft that the pirates have
been spotted in are not normally known to operate over such distances.
The pirates are well armed having used AK47s and RPGs and have
established an effective strategy in hijacking a ship and then
demanding a ransom. Once the ransom has been paid, the group have
hijacked another ship just as the first is being released which
provides an insurance against attack.
9. There has not yet been a concerted international
military response against the Somali pirates. Assets would need
to be marshalled and there will need to be an international consensus
that it is appropriate to intervene in Somali territorial waters.
The acting Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is not
yet able to exert any authority domestically, but it has indicated
that it is willing to try to prevent piracy. In December 2005
it was reported to have contracted an American company to tackle
and eliminate piracy off its coast although the details are still
quite vague and it is not clear either how the TFG will find the
means to pay the contract or whether the contract would fall foul
of the UN arms embargo on the country.
10. The IMO Assembly has passed a resolution
to the UN Security Council concerning the rampant levels of piracy
seen off the eastern coast of Somalia since March 2005.
Gulf of Guinea
11. The Gulf of Guinea/coast of western
Africa is another hotspot with 102 piracy incidents in the last
three years. During 2004, the situation had become so bad that
it was the most worrying piracy hotspot. The focus of pirate activity
in this area appeared to be in the delta of the Niger River against
coastal and smaller boats passing through, although the pirates
attacked a number of large ships and tankers as well. The Nigerian
authorities seemed unwilling or unable to take control of this
situation and during early 2005 the number of recorded incidents
fell to zero. The IMB believed that the increased number of attacks
was linked to law and order problems ashore and the pirates were
using this to their advantage knowing that the authorities are
unable to respond adequately to such maritime attacks.
12. The UK is through the FCO's Global Opportunities
Fund, funding a joint feasibility study between the IMO and the
Maritime Organisation of West and Central Africa for an integrated
coastguard network.
12 January 2006
7 Captain John Bashforth, a British National, and his
Filipino Chief Officer, died from gunshot wounds on board the
"MV Baltimar Zephyr" while sailing 60NM from the coast
in Indonesian waters on 11 December 1992. The Indonesian Government
concluded that the case was one of mutiny, however the MPS investigated
and based on all of the evidence available, decided beyond any
reasonable doubt that the Captain and Chief Officer had been murdered
by boarders intent on theft (piracy). Back
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