Select Committee on Transport Minutes of Evidence


APPENDIX 1

Memorandum submitted by Marine Impact Ltd

1.   Piracy on the high seas

  Statistics reveal that piracy is on the increase, and that the methods used are becoming ever more violent.

  It is also apparent that the nature of piracy is evolving with closer links to terrorism, the increased use of "kidnap for ransom" tactics and theft of humanitarian aid cargo.

  We understand the Transport Committee will be looking at the following issues, and this submission is intended to aid the understanding of these areas, and to provide the potential solutions.

2.   Reasons why piracy has increased over the previous decades

  This is covered in section 6, in which we discuss the factors that we believe prompt and sustain piratical activity.

3.   How piracy is affecting British shipping in particular

  Records show that the prevalence of attacks on UK vessels is lower proportionally than for those on the vessels of other states. We also understand that pirate incidents in the UK (ports, territorial and international waters) are extremely rare.

  Looking internationally there were 32 incidents involving UK flagged ships between 1993 and 2004, seven of which occurred in 2004.

  This 2004 figure, while understood to be higher than usual, represents just 2.15% of the total 325 reported global attacks. According to an UNCTAD study in 2003, UK vessels represented just 2.35% of the entire global fleet.

  We can see piracy is affecting UK shipping at a lower ratio than the volume of vessels. Though this could be explained by the fact that a majority of UK vessels do not regularly trade into piratical areas, or it could reflect high standards of awareness and response onboard these UK registered ships.

4.   What guidance national governments and international organisations are providing to shipping to help prevent attack and how this is drawn up and revised

  The advice provided by many flag States is deemed to be adequate, although some States do place greater emphasis on the promulgation of information to vessels than others.

  Improvements in threat information distribution have been made in light of the introduction in 2004 of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, and the increased flag State responsibilities and setting of security levels 1-3.

  Additionally the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) issue updated figures on attacks and "hot-spot" areas. This is seen as invaluable industry advice and a vital service.

  Whatever the information provisions, we do not believe that lack of knowledge of the threat, the areas neither of risk, nor of the necessary responses are the primary factors in the continuing prevalence of modern marine piracy.

  We do, however, recognise the importance of Company Security Officers (CSO) ensuring that their vessels are constantly aware of the dangers of the areas they operate in, and of the ways in which the security risks can be mitigated.

5.   How national governments and international organisations are tackling the issue of maritime terrorism and is there a threat of serious attack by sea

  There have long been suspicions that many pirate groups have terrorist roots and involvement, and as such need to be addressed more seriously and require the full force of a government and an international multilateral response to fight them.

  As to whether there is a threat of serious attack on ships, yes a threat does exist, though rather surprisingly a number of terrorist organisations with known maritime capabilities have yet to fully exploit this modus operandi internationally.

  There have, however, been ample demonstrations of the powerful effect of attacking merchant vessels, and the most notable attack has been that on the oil tanker "Limburg", in October 2002, as she manoeuvred off the coast of The Republic of Yemen.

  With one small boat laden with explosives the terrorists wreaked not only death (one sailor died) and destruction onto the vessel, they threatened an area with huge potential environmental damage, they inflicted panic across an entire industry, and nearly crippled a nation's ability to trade—as the attack forced insurance rates for vessels entering the Yemen to rocket by approximately 300%.

  The knock-on effects of this small-scale attack will not have gone unnoticed by terrorists, and another wave of such attacks will happen in the future. A number of domestic disputes have seen maritime terrorism techniques employed, particularly off the Philippines and Sri Lanka.

  Recently the Egyptian Embassy in Denmark issued a warning about a possible attack by elements affiliated to the Al-Qaeda network on ships passing through the Suez Canal. Speculation sparked by the Limburg attack and also the 2005 rocket attacks on vessels in Jordan, for which al-Qaeda has claimed responsibility.

  The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has introduced the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, which came into force in 2004, which has been heralded as the first step in ensuring that all vessels over 500 Gross Tonnes, effectively manage their security vulnerabilities. It remains unclear as to whether these very basic security provisions would be able to mitigate the risk of a concerted terrorist attack.

  We have also seen an increasing effort by many governments to increase their "maritime domain awareness"—as they wrestle with the concepts of shipping business and try to fully understand this complex and global industry. As governments look to know when to react, and when all is normal, as they recognise the need to secure trade, but still allow its free flow.

  We actually find ourselves in an extremely pivotal and vulnerable position, in which an attack is likely, but which governments and shipping companies, despite the recent legislation is place are no closer to guarding against. Shipping remains a vulnerable and soft target.

6.   Geographic areas of special concern

  Piracy is global by its very nature, but there are a number of specific areas that account for the majority of piracy and armed robbery incidents, these areas include, but are not limited to:

    South East Asia and the Indian Sub Continent, particularly areas off Indonesia, the Malacca and Singapore Straits.

  Other areas include the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, numerous areas off West Africa, South and Central America and within the Caribbean Sea. There has also been a significant and disturbing increase in the waters off Somalia, and all vessels have been advised to stay as far off the coast as practicable.

  Piracy thrives under certain conditions, and it needs these to continue in order to further take hold, to grow and flourish in an area. We have developed the concept of the "piracy triangle" in order to illustrate these factors:


  If you remove one side of this "piracy triangle" the threat of piracy can be greatly reduced. However, if instability or a lack of law and order remains, if pirates can move with impunity between territorial waters, or hide themselves away and if there is a basic economic need for the population to be tempted into piracy, then the problem will remain. In fact it will not only remain, but will become ever more entrenched, more professional, and often more brutal.

  In viewing the recent spate of attacks off Somalia, the BBC reported that, "the problem will clearly not be resolved in the long term until there is more political stability in Somalia—and more economic development to discourage people from turning to piracy to make a living".

  Nations affected by piracy need to apply the provisions of law more effectively, they need to allow extended freedom of hot-pursuit into their territorial waters, and even allow other nations to assist in patrolling their waters. They need to fight poverty and to educate waterside communities on the dangers of piracy, and also to demonstrate the severe sanctions that will be applied to those found guilty of the act, or of supporting the act of piracy.

7.   Problems associated with ensuring that piracy is taken seriously

  In order for piracy to be taken seriously it needs to be better defined and understood.

  A definition was laid down within the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas (Article 15), which also makes up Article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the sea (UNCLOS) 1982 and declares piracy a criminal act.

  The IMO follows UNCLOS, Article 101 definition, which contains five elements:

    1.  Piracy must involve a criminal act of violence, detention, or depredation.

    2.  Piracy is committed on the high seas, outside the jurisdiction of any state.

    3.  The "two-ship rule". Pirates need to use a ship to attack another ship, which excludes mutiny and privateering from being acts of piracy.

    4.  Piracy needs to be committed for private ends, which excludes the acts of terrorists or environmental activists from being piratical acts.

    5.  Piracy must be committed by the crew or passengers of a privately owned vessel. Thus attacks by naval craft fall outside of the bounds of piracy.

  Put simply, attacks inside territorial water are not piracy, while those outside are! Restricting piracy to the high seas means that an alternative term has to be created for attacks against ships within territorial waters. Though that may be of little consolation to those attacked.

  Despite the move by Somali pirates further out to sea, IMO statistics, based on reports received from member states, show that most attacks actually take place within territorial waters, or while the ship is at anchor or on a berth. So the majority of pirate attacks are not actually "piracy" due to them occurring within territorial waters.

  This causes an immediate problem in both quantifying and then fighting piracy. Confusion abounds and this can slow the process of combating piracy and of dealing with the perpetrators. To attempt to counter this the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), has adopted the following definition for acts of piracy:

    "An act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act".

  This definition thus covers actual or attempted attacks whether the ship is berthed, at anchor, or at sea. Petty thefts are excluded, unless the thieves are armed.

  However this definition is not without its problems, and as such a common criminal armed with a knife and boarding a "Cross Channel Ferry" becomes a de jure pirate (even a mere pickpocket intent on stealing an old lady's purse).

  Also The IMB definition does not require that the act of piracy be committed for private ends. Attacks on a ship for political or environmental reasons qualify as piracy. In the 1999 IMB publication "An overview on piracy problems—A global update", according to the IMB definition even The "Achille Lauro" incident in 1985 is thus piracy. Even naval attacks in certain circumstances could conceivably be deemed to be piracy.

  It follows that the maritime industry requires a more realistic and effective codification of the act of piracy—where there is confusion and uncertainty we can see that pirates will prosper, while innocent seafarers will continue to suffer.

8.   Availability and reliability of data; and reporting

  The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) has long performed an excellent job of compiling and promulgating reports of pirate activity. This system means that the industry has a proper and efficient source of available information, however as for the reliability of the data, the industry suffers from under reporting of attacks. Regrettably many vessels simply do not report attacks, due to the threat of a sustained criminal investigation hampering the vessel's ongoing commercial operations.

  If a vessel suffers a small to moderate financial loss this can be compounded if an ensuing investigation causes the vessel to miss important commercial and operational deadlines. The legal bureaucracy of many States is a real deterrent to reporting piracy.

  An internationally agreed, and streamlined system for the investigation of attacks needs to be introduced. Until governments can guarantee that vessels will not be delayed then this hesitancy to report will continue, and we may never know the full extent of the problem.

  Governments need to work in partnership with shipowners to defeat piracy, and not subject them to the "double" punishment of delay and further financial loss.

9.   Advertising and education campaigns

  We feel that the fight against maritime piracy can learn from the concerted efforts and strategies used to fight intellectual piracy. The music, computer and entertainment industries have invested enormously on educating people on the negative effects of this form of piracy, and we feel the same needs to be done about attacks on ships.

  Many living in pirate-affected areas may not fully understand or appreciate the devastating effects on their livelihood that piracy can potentially cause. If an oil tanker were to ground in the Malacca Straits the effect on fishing and tourism could be devastating—and so we propose that a major education programme be introduced to show people who may otherwise harbour, support or buy from pirates, the harm that can befall them unless they take a stand against this crime.

10.   Identifying stolen goods

  No matter what resources are introduced to fight piracy, and no matter the changes in the law, or of the education that may be provided, if law enforcement agents cannot trace stolen goods, or conclusively prove that they were stolen in a pirate attack, then the efforts have all be for nought.

  As such, one of the most difficult areas surrounding piracy is actually to catch the perpetrators, and members of their support network. The very nature of the crime means that often the stolen goods vanish, and there is no way of linking them to a particular vessel or instance of piracy.

  That is until now . . . we are working in conjunction with a number of partner companies, to develop a foolproof system for the identification of stolen ship equipment, and even of hi-jacked vessels. This is the SeaSure microtagging system.

  What does SeaSure do?—In order for law enforcement agents to successfully prosecute pirates, it is necessary to identify the true origins of any stolen property. Has this come from a ship? If so which ship and was it subjected to pirate attack?

  Marking property with SeaSure Microtags is the easiest way to ensure any property is quickly identified, and as such provides proof that they are handling pirated goods, and so the law can deal with the receivers of such goods.

  SeaSure Microtags can be used on all parts of the vessel, and on all equipment. In the event of discovery the law enforcement agents can locate the Microtags by using an ultra violet light. The Microtag is then read using a reading device, or a conventional microscope.

  Each SeaSure Microtag, which is approximately the size of a grain of sand (1.25 mm) and is suspended in a clear adhesive substance, is laser etched with a freephone helpline number and an email address, the vessel's own unique number which is then registered on the Marine Impact security register.

  We intend to approach the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) in the hope that they may endorse the product, as the means to trace goods back to a pirate event is vital in deterring piracy, and will mean that all persons in the piracy chain can be identified and brought to justice. Especially as it is often the people handling the goods, and who sell them on, that are the driving force behind this serious and organised crime.

11.   Seafarer Insurance

  With the increase in seafarers being kidnapped and held for ransom we believe that all shipowners/operators should be obliged to place insurance cover to protect the interests of their crews in the event of such attacks.

  Leading UK based seafarer insurance provider, Seacurus Ltd (www.seacurus.com), now offer such services, and we strongly believe that the IMO should call for full industry-wide adoption, usage and provision of such facilities.

CONCLUSIONS

  It has not been possible to fully cover all aspects of the international maritime piracy problem within this brief review, nor has it been possible to explore all the answers—however, as a basic minimum we have identified the following conclusions.

  To reduce maritime piracy and its effects there is a need for:

    —  Clearer legal definition of piracy.

    —  Better information between nations and shipping.

    —  Access to territorial seas—co-operation between nations.

    —  Better reporting techniques—to avoid vessel delays, and encourage reporting.

    —  Specific offences created to aid prosecution of "Land-Side" accomplices to piracy.

    —  The use of severe legal deterrents.

    —  The adoption of anti-piracy advertising and education campaigns.

    —  The means to identify stolen property, pirates and receivers of pirated goods.

    —  Financial assistance, education and support for water-side communities.

    —  Mandatory "kidnap for ransom" insurance to protect seafarers interests.

6 January 2006



 
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Prepared 6 July 2006