APPENDIX 1
Memorandum submitted by Marine Impact
Ltd
1. Piracy on the high seas
Statistics reveal that piracy is on the increase,
and that the methods used are becoming ever more violent.
It is also apparent that the nature of piracy
is evolving with closer links to terrorism, the increased use
of "kidnap for ransom" tactics and theft of humanitarian
aid cargo.
We understand the Transport Committee will be
looking at the following issues, and this submission is intended
to aid the understanding of these areas, and to provide the potential
solutions.
2. Reasons why piracy has increased over
the previous decades
This is covered in section 6, in which we discuss
the factors that we believe prompt and sustain piratical activity.
3. How piracy is affecting British shipping
in particular
Records show that the prevalence of attacks
on UK vessels is lower proportionally than for those on the vessels
of other states. We also understand that pirate incidents in the
UK (ports, territorial and international waters) are extremely
rare.
Looking internationally there were 32 incidents
involving UK flagged ships between 1993 and 2004, seven of which
occurred in 2004.
This 2004 figure, while understood to be higher
than usual, represents just 2.15% of the total 325 reported global
attacks. According to an UNCTAD study in 2003, UK vessels represented
just 2.35% of the entire global fleet.
We can see piracy is affecting UK shipping at
a lower ratio than the volume of vessels. Though this could be
explained by the fact that a majority of UK vessels do not regularly
trade into piratical areas, or it could reflect high standards
of awareness and response onboard these UK registered ships.
4. What guidance national governments and
international organisations are providing to shipping to help
prevent attack and how this is drawn up and revised
The advice provided by many flag States is deemed
to be adequate, although some States do place greater emphasis
on the promulgation of information to vessels than others.
Improvements in threat information distribution
have been made in light of the introduction in 2004 of the International
Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, and the increased
flag State responsibilities and setting of security levels 1-3.
Additionally the International Maritime Bureau
(IMB) issue updated figures on attacks and "hot-spot"
areas. This is seen as invaluable industry advice and a vital
service.
Whatever the information provisions, we do not
believe that lack of knowledge of the threat, the areas neither
of risk, nor of the necessary responses are the primary factors
in the continuing prevalence of modern marine piracy.
We do, however, recognise the importance of
Company Security Officers (CSO) ensuring that their vessels are
constantly aware of the dangers of the areas they operate in,
and of the ways in which the security risks can be mitigated.
5. How national governments and international
organisations are tackling the issue of maritime terrorism and
is there a threat of serious attack by sea
There have long been suspicions that many pirate
groups have terrorist roots and involvement, and as such need
to be addressed more seriously and require the full force of a
government and an international multilateral response to fight
them.
As to whether there is a threat of serious attack
on ships, yes a threat does exist, though rather surprisingly
a number of terrorist organisations with known maritime capabilities
have yet to fully exploit this modus operandi internationally.
There have, however, been ample demonstrations
of the powerful effect of attacking merchant vessels, and the
most notable attack has been that on the oil tanker "Limburg",
in October 2002, as she manoeuvred off the coast of The Republic
of Yemen.
With one small boat laden with explosives the
terrorists wreaked not only death (one sailor died) and destruction
onto the vessel, they threatened an area with huge potential environmental
damage, they inflicted panic across an entire industry, and nearly
crippled a nation's ability to tradeas the attack forced
insurance rates for vessels entering the Yemen to rocket by approximately
300%.
The knock-on effects of this small-scale attack
will not have gone unnoticed by terrorists, and another wave of
such attacks will happen in the future. A number of domestic disputes
have seen maritime terrorism techniques employed, particularly
off the Philippines and Sri Lanka.
Recently the Egyptian Embassy in Denmark issued
a warning about a possible attack by elements affiliated to the
Al-Qaeda network on ships passing through the Suez Canal. Speculation
sparked by the Limburg attack and also the 2005 rocket attacks
on vessels in Jordan, for which al-Qaeda has claimed responsibility.
The International Maritime Organisation (IMO)
has introduced the International Ship and Port Facility Security
(ISPS) Code, which came into force in 2004, which has been heralded
as the first step in ensuring that all vessels over 500 Gross
Tonnes, effectively manage their security vulnerabilities. It
remains unclear as to whether these very basic security provisions
would be able to mitigate the risk of a concerted terrorist attack.
We have also seen an increasing effort by many
governments to increase their "maritime domain awareness"as
they wrestle with the concepts of shipping business and try to
fully understand this complex and global industry. As governments
look to know when to react, and when all is normal, as they recognise
the need to secure trade, but still allow its free flow.
We actually find ourselves in an extremely pivotal
and vulnerable position, in which an attack is likely, but which
governments and shipping companies, despite the recent legislation
is place are no closer to guarding against. Shipping remains a
vulnerable and soft target.
6. Geographic areas of special concern
Piracy is global by its very nature, but there
are a number of specific areas that account for the majority of
piracy and armed robbery incidents, these areas include, but are
not limited to:
South East Asia and the Indian Sub Continent,
particularly areas off Indonesia, the Malacca and Singapore Straits.
Other areas include the Red Sea, the Gulf of
Aden, numerous areas off West Africa, South and Central America
and within the Caribbean Sea. There has also been a significant
and disturbing increase in the waters off Somalia, and all vessels
have been advised to stay as far off the coast as practicable.
Piracy thrives under certain conditions, and
it needs these to continue in order to further take hold, to grow
and flourish in an area. We have developed the concept of the
"piracy triangle" in order to illustrate these factors:
If you remove one side of this "piracy
triangle" the threat of piracy can be greatly reduced. However,
if instability or a lack of law and order remains, if pirates
can move with impunity between territorial waters, or hide themselves
away and if there is a basic economic need for the population
to be tempted into piracy, then the problem will remain. In fact
it will not only remain, but will become ever more entrenched,
more professional, and often more brutal.
In viewing the recent spate of attacks off Somalia,
the BBC reported that, "the problem will clearly not be resolved
in the long term until there is more political stability in Somaliaand
more economic development to discourage people from turning to
piracy to make a living".
Nations affected by piracy need to apply the
provisions of law more effectively, they need to allow extended
freedom of hot-pursuit into their territorial waters, and even
allow other nations to assist in patrolling their waters. They
need to fight poverty and to educate waterside communities on
the dangers of piracy, and also to demonstrate the severe sanctions
that will be applied to those found guilty of the act, or of supporting
the act of piracy.
7. Problems associated with ensuring that
piracy is taken seriously
In order for piracy to be taken seriously it
needs to be better defined and understood.
A definition was laid down within the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the High Seas (Article 15), which also makes up
Article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
sea (UNCLOS) 1982 and declares piracy a criminal act.
The IMO follows UNCLOS, Article 101 definition,
which contains five elements:
1. Piracy must involve a criminal act of
violence, detention, or depredation.
2. Piracy is committed on the high seas,
outside the jurisdiction of any state.
3. The "two-ship rule". Pirates
need to use a ship to attack another ship, which excludes mutiny
and privateering from being acts of piracy.
4. Piracy needs to be committed for private
ends, which excludes the acts of terrorists or environmental activists
from being piratical acts.
5. Piracy must be committed by the crew or
passengers of a privately owned vessel. Thus attacks by naval
craft fall outside of the bounds of piracy.
Put simply, attacks inside territorial water
are not piracy, while those outside are! Restricting piracy to
the high seas means that an alternative term has to be created
for attacks against ships within territorial waters. Though that
may be of little consolation to those attacked.
Despite the move by Somali pirates further out
to sea, IMO statistics, based on reports received from member
states, show that most attacks actually take place within territorial
waters, or while the ship is at anchor or on a berth. So the majority
of pirate attacks are not actually "piracy" due to them
occurring within territorial waters.
This causes an immediate problem in both quantifying
and then fighting piracy. Confusion abounds and this can slow
the process of combating piracy and of dealing with the perpetrators.
To attempt to counter this the International Maritime Bureau (IMB),
has adopted the following definition for acts of piracy:
"An act of boarding or attempting to board
any ship with the intent to commit theft or any other crime and
with the intent or capability to use force in the furtherance
of that act".
This definition thus covers actual or attempted
attacks whether the ship is berthed, at anchor, or at sea. Petty
thefts are excluded, unless the thieves are armed.
However this definition is not without its problems,
and as such a common criminal armed with a knife and boarding
a "Cross Channel Ferry" becomes a de jure pirate (even
a mere pickpocket intent on stealing an old lady's purse).
Also The IMB definition does not require that
the act of piracy be committed for private ends. Attacks on a
ship for political or environmental reasons qualify as piracy.
In the 1999 IMB publication "An overview on piracy problemsA
global update", according to the IMB definition even The
"Achille Lauro" incident in 1985 is thus piracy. Even
naval attacks in certain circumstances could conceivably be deemed
to be piracy.
It follows that the maritime industry requires
a more realistic and effective codification of the act of piracywhere
there is confusion and uncertainty we can see that pirates will
prosper, while innocent seafarers will continue to suffer.
8. Availability and reliability of data;
and reporting
The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) has
long performed an excellent job of compiling and promulgating
reports of pirate activity. This system means that the industry
has a proper and efficient source of available information, however
as for the reliability of the data, the industry suffers from
under reporting of attacks. Regrettably many vessels simply do
not report attacks, due to the threat of a sustained criminal
investigation hampering the vessel's ongoing commercial operations.
If a vessel suffers a small to moderate financial
loss this can be compounded if an ensuing investigation causes
the vessel to miss important commercial and operational deadlines.
The legal bureaucracy of many States is a real deterrent to reporting
piracy.
An internationally agreed, and streamlined system
for the investigation of attacks needs to be introduced. Until
governments can guarantee that vessels will not be delayed then
this hesitancy to report will continue, and we may never know
the full extent of the problem.
Governments need to work in partnership with
shipowners to defeat piracy, and not subject them to the "double"
punishment of delay and further financial loss.
9. Advertising and education campaigns
We feel that the fight against maritime piracy
can learn from the concerted efforts and strategies used to fight
intellectual piracy. The music, computer and entertainment industries
have invested enormously on educating people on the negative effects
of this form of piracy, and we feel the same needs to be done
about attacks on ships.
Many living in pirate-affected areas may not
fully understand or appreciate the devastating effects on their
livelihood that piracy can potentially cause. If an oil tanker
were to ground in the Malacca Straits the effect on fishing and
tourism could be devastatingand so we propose that a major
education programme be introduced to show people who may otherwise
harbour, support or buy from pirates, the harm that can befall
them unless they take a stand against this crime.
10. Identifying stolen goods
No matter what resources are introduced to fight
piracy, and no matter the changes in the law, or of the education
that may be provided, if law enforcement agents cannot trace stolen
goods, or conclusively prove that they were stolen in a pirate
attack, then the efforts have all be for nought.
As such, one of the most difficult areas surrounding
piracy is actually to catch the perpetrators, and members of their
support network. The very nature of the crime means that often
the stolen goods vanish, and there is no way of linking them to
a particular vessel or instance of piracy.
That is until now . . . we are working in conjunction
with a number of partner companies, to develop a foolproof system
for the identification of stolen ship equipment, and even of hi-jacked
vessels. This is the SeaSure microtagging system.
What does SeaSure do?In order for law
enforcement agents to successfully prosecute pirates, it is necessary
to identify the true origins of any stolen property. Has this
come from a ship? If so which ship and was it subjected to pirate
attack?
Marking property with SeaSure Microtags is the
easiest way to ensure any property is quickly identified, and
as such provides proof that they are handling pirated goods, and
so the law can deal with the receivers of such goods.
SeaSure Microtags can be used on all parts of
the vessel, and on all equipment. In the event of discovery the
law enforcement agents can locate the Microtags by using an ultra
violet light. The Microtag is then read using a reading device,
or a conventional microscope.
Each SeaSure Microtag, which is approximately
the size of a grain of sand (1.25 mm) and is suspended in a clear
adhesive substance, is laser etched with a freephone helpline
number and an email address, the vessel's own unique number which
is then registered on the Marine Impact security register.
We intend to approach the International Maritime
Bureau (IMB) in the hope that they may endorse the product, as
the means to trace goods back to a pirate event is vital in deterring
piracy, and will mean that all persons in the piracy chain can
be identified and brought to justice. Especially as it is often
the people handling the goods, and who sell them on, that are
the driving force behind this serious and organised crime.
11. Seafarer Insurance
With the increase in seafarers being kidnapped
and held for ransom we believe that all shipowners/operators should
be obliged to place insurance cover to protect the interests of
their crews in the event of such attacks.
Leading UK based seafarer insurance provider,
Seacurus Ltd (www.seacurus.com), now offer such services, and
we strongly believe that the IMO should call for full industry-wide
adoption, usage and provision of such facilities.
CONCLUSIONS
It has not been possible to fully cover all
aspects of the international maritime piracy problem within this
brief review, nor has it been possible to explore all the answershowever,
as a basic minimum we have identified the following conclusions.
To reduce maritime piracy and its effects there
is a need for:
Clearer legal definition of piracy.
Better information between nations
and shipping.
Access to territorial seasco-operation
between nations.
Better reporting techniquesto
avoid vessel delays, and encourage reporting.
Specific offences created to aid
prosecution of "Land-Side" accomplices to piracy.
The use of severe legal deterrents.
The adoption of anti-piracy advertising
and education campaigns.
The means to identify stolen property,
pirates and receivers of pirated goods.
Financial assistance, education and
support for water-side communities.
Mandatory "kidnap for ransom"
insurance to protect seafarers interests.
6 January 2006
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