APPENDIX 2
Memorandum submitted by Maritime &
Underwater Security Consultants
1. INTRODUCTION
Maritime & Underwater Security Consultants
(MUSC) has been dealing with maritime security matters since the
1970s. We have long personal experience of pirate attacks, in
planning for operations in high piracy risk areas and in training
and drilling of crews.
Over the years MUSC has been engaged as specialist
maritime consultants to a number of governments. Throughout 2001-02,
MUSC provided input to the International Maritime Organisation
(IMO) as advisers for the development of the International Ship
and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. In 2005, MUSC received
an award from the Estonian government for port security advisory
services. Currently, MUSC is actively engaged by the Federal Government
of Nigeria as consultants for the development and implementation
of maritime security strategy; and has recently concluded a study
on behalf of the Australian Government (DOTARS) concerning measures
to enhance offshore oil and gas platform security. Also, recently,
MUSC has assisted in the release of two hijacked vessels off the
Somali coast.
MUSC offers maritime security training and has
provided services to, amongst others, the UK Maritime and Coastguard
Agency, the UK Ministry of Defence, the Malaysian Marine Department,
the Singapore Maritime Administration, the Nigerian Navy and Nigerian
Maritime Authority.
MUSC lectures at London City University and
at Lloyd's Maritime Academy on maritime security matters.
Therefore, MUSC is pleased to submit this memorandum
to the Transport Committee in response to its Press Notice 18/2005-06
dated 9 December 2005.
2. REASONS FOR
THE GROWTH
OF PIRACY
AND VIOLENT
CRIMES AGAINST
SEAFARERS
The committee will be aware that there has been
a steady growth in piracy over the past 20 years. MUSC believes
that this is due to a number of factors:
2.1 Ending of the Cold War
The end of the "Cold War" resulted
in a marked reduction in Soviet and Western Allies naval presence
in the waters of many of the developing countries. Also, defence
and other funding from the competing Super Powers were cut. This
had the effect of (a) reducing the law enforcement effectiveness
in certain national territorial waters, (b) reducing the availability
of international naval assets to be deployed outside areas that
were not high priority to the national interest and (c) increasing
internal economic and political instability, greater levels of
poverty and a consequential breakdown of law and order.
2.2 Easy access to weapons and munitions
The reduction in the number standing armies
in the European theatre has led to a huge rise in the availability
of redundant weapons that have found their way into the hands
of those intent on political terrorism and violent crime for financial
gain.
2.3 Increased access to navigation and communications
technology
Over the past 30 years there has been a revolution
in technology to assist seafarers. The introduction of the Global
Positioning System allows pin-point accuracy in offshore navigation.
Solid state radar systems are cheap to buy, simple to install
in very small vessels and easy to operate. Advances in satellite
communications technology allow non-technical persons to communicate
with other vessels and the shore without large investments in
hardware or training. These advances, and others, have lowered
the threshold of skills and experience needed to take and operate
a vessel offshore and to co-ordinate movements with or to intercept
other craft. Information on ship movements, cargos and other data
has been made more readily available through the internet and
electronic communications. This can provide valuable intelligence
to criminal gangs for planning the hijack of specific ships or
high value cargoes.
2.4 Tolerance and lack of action by the Member
States of the IMO
The steady growth in attacks on ships has been
met with some apathy by the international community, including
those within the maritime industry itself. In 2000, MUSC personnel
experienced a number of attacks during a project working along
the West Coast of Africa and the company tried to raise awareness
of the growing problems of piracy at the IMO, with Lloyd's underwriters
and marine classification societies. MUSC suggested that the International
Safety Management (ISM) Code, then under the final stages of development
at the IMO could be adapted to provide guidance to seafarers for
the enhancement of their security. Whilst individuals expressed
sympathy, there was little evidence of any concerted will to take
positive action to tackle the issues of piracy.
In due course the Norwegian marine classification
society, DNV, agreed to cooperate with MUSC to develop some guidelines
for seafarers using the framework of the ISM Code.
Some months later, the attacks on New York and
Washington occurred. Very quickly after 9/11, the US government
concluded that their country was vulnerable to attack, not only
from the air, but also via their sea ports. It was this "new"
appreciation that provided the impetus for the frantic activity
within the IMO to develop the International Ship and Port Facility
Security (ISPS) Code, MUSC was requested to assist the IMO committee
tasked to develop the Code (and was honoured to be invited to
address the IMO on maritime security matters in September 2002).
The growing risk of hijacking and kidnap off
the coast of Somalia was largely ignored by the world's press
until the spectacular but unsuccessful attack on "Seabourn
Spirit" on 5 November 2005. Somali pirates, encouraged
by their successes, are becoming more sophisticated and wider-ranging
in their attacks. In spite of this, there appears to be little
international will by governments to take action to curb the activities
of these violent criminals.
Notwithstanding the above, it should be noted
that the IMO, TRANSEC and the MCA have addressed the issues of
violent crime at sea through the production of conventions and
guidance notes. These include:
— Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988
(IMO).
— MSC Circular 622 Recommendations
to Governments 2001 (IMO).
— MSC Circular 623 Guidance to ship-owners
and ship operators, shipmasters and crews 2002 (IMO).
— MGN 298 (M) Measures to Counter Piracy,
Armed Robbery and other Acts of Violence against Merchant Shipping
2002 (Maritime & Coastguard Agency).
However, the introduction of these documents
has not had, in themselves, a significant effect on growing annual
occurrences on attacks on ships.
2.5 Reluctance of many ships' Masters to report
piracy incidents
MUSC believes that actual numbers of attacks
are far greater than those reported and that the true figures
may be at least double those quoted in official reports. Many
Masters are reluctant to report an incident because doing so may
result in delays to the vessel programme while the incident is
investigated. In some ports, Masters are aware that reporting
a crime will result in an unwelcome visit from corrupt police
or other port officials who will use the opportunity to extort
cash, spirits or cigarettes from the ship. Often the cost of the
delays to the vessel and the demands of the investigators are
greater than the value of the losses from an attack.
2.6 Impact of the ISPS Code
The ISPS Code requires (amongst others) that:
1. Operators of ships of over 500 gross registered
tonnage (GRT):
(a) Conduct a security assessment and implement
a security plan specific to each ship.
(b) Appoint a Company Security Officer with
direct responsibility for implementing the Code.
(c) Appoint a Ship Security Officer to each
ship.
2. Operators of port facilities that handle
international shipping s of over 500 GRT:
(a) Conduct a security assessment and implement
a security plan for each facility.
(b) Appoint and train a Port Facility Security
Officer.
3. Contracting Governments:
(a) Conduct security assessments of port
facilities.
(b) Approve the security plans of their ships
and port facilities.
Since the Code came into effect on 1 July 2004
most signatory governments have declared compliance.
However, in spite of the apparent compliance,
it is generally recognised within the maritime industry that the
Code has not contributed to the security of seafarers. This perception
is supported by statistics on reported pirate attacks and from
anecdotal information from insurers regarding claims for cargo
theft from ports. It has been noted that, immediately after the
2004 Asian Tsunami, reports on ship attacks reduced sharply. This
was largely due to the devastation caused to coastal communities
in the Indonesian province of Aceh, one of the world's piracy
hubs. By May 2005, attacks in the area had resumed as the region
began its recovery. At the same time, there has been an increase
in pirate activity off Somalia, in the Persian Gulf and off West
Africa.
There are several reasons that the ISPS Code
has not produced better security for seafarers:
The primary impetus behind the introduction
of the Code was the concern that ships are a potential vehicle
for weapons and terrorists. In other words, those ships—and
their crews—are the threat. This is clearly seen in the
US where in many ports seafarers are prevented from leaving their
ships. Thus the focus is not on the protection of the seafarer
but on the protection of the country to which the ship will visit.
The schedule for the introduction of the ISPS
Code gave the world-wide maritime industry 18 months to comply
with the Code. This resulted in a massive short term demand for
security assessments and security plans for ships and ports around
the world, and for the training of large numbers of ship and port
facility security officers. It should be noted that prior to the
introduction of the ISPS Code, the maritime security sector was
extremely small and specialised. MUSC was one of very few companies
around the world who were active in ship and port security and
who commanded any significant experience in the sector. Many companies
and individuals that had no prior experience in maritime security
saw the opportunity to expand their businesses and promoted themselves
as experts in this field. Engineering and ship management companies,
marine classification societies and maritime academies have played
significant roles in conducting security training, security assessments
and security plans. Few have had any actual expertise in maritime
security matters. The result of this is that many security plans
are weak and lack rigour and that Ship Security Officers, Company
Security Officers and Port Facility Security Officers have not
received sufficient training to be effective. The conduct of consolidation
training in the form of exercises and drills has been patchy.
National audits of ISPS compliance is, in many countries, non-existent.
Mariners are required to improve and update
their skill levels in most of the areas of their core competencies.
This is not so in the case of security skills. Coupled with this,
most mariners (thankfully) are rarely exposed to attack and so
there are few opportunities for the Ship Security Officer to test
and develop such skills.
The duties of the Ship Security Officer have
been introduced by legislation without any corresponding requirement
to increase manning. Prior to the ISPS Code, there was already
much discussion that manning standards in the shipping industry
were at levels where accidents from crew fatigue were becoming
worrying. Many consider that security duties are an additional
burden on already overworked merchant ships complements.
There has been lack of commitment from IMO Contracting
Governments to ensure proper compliance to the ISPS Code by their
port facilities. Many countries pay only superficial attention
to ISPS compliance in ports. The IMO website indicates that most
countries of the world have reported their port facilities as
compliant with the Code. It is widely recognised amongst seafarers
that in very many cases this is not so. Little effort has been
made to improve perimeter security, access control, etc. The IMO
is itself constrained in that it is obliged to accept a member
nation's compliance reporting as objective. Regrettably, some
nations tend to submit reports that are more imaginative than
objective. In short, there is no international standard in measuring
the degree/extent of ISPS compliance.
3. MEASURES TO
ENHANCE THE
SECURITY OF
BRITISH SEAFARERS
3.1 Increased Awareness and Education
As stated above, one of the reasons that the
ISPS Code has not greatly improved maritime security is the low
levels of initial and follow-on training for Ship Security Officers.
In order to address this situation, a not-for-profit organisation,
the International Maritime and Shipping Organisation (IMSSO),
has been launched to provide an internet-based forum for seafarers
and others to allow the sharing of their experiences in implementing
the ISPS Code and in combating piracy and other criminal acts
. A website has been developed and some 100 members have enrolled
with the organisation. IMSSO has been introduced to some of the
leading industry trade bodies (such as BIMCO, Intertanko, NUMAST,
International Chamber of Shipping, the Honourable Company of Master
Mariners, the International Marine Contractors Association, marine
insurers and others). All have expressed support, but this support
has so far fallen short of any positive commitment to take on
some or all of the work required to maintain the website, collect
piracy and related data and promote membership of IMSSO. We propose
that Her Majesty's Government considers adopting IMSSO to foster
greater understanding and information sharing of security matters
amongst British vessels and their officers and crews. IMSSO is
also an ideal focus for information sharing between seafarers,
regulators, marine insurers and trade associations.
MUSC has been active in the inception of IMSSO,
in providing on-going support and funding and believes strongly
that, with appropriate support, IMSSO would be able to provide
material benefit to the British seafarer and the shipping industry
in security matters.
Law Enforcement Agencies in many piracy risk
areas would benefit from greater awareness and understanding of
counter piracy measures and procedures. We believe that sponsorship
by the British Government of regional seminars and training programmes
to advise LEAs in prevention and prosecution of acts of piracy
would be a crucial step, and recommend that this is given serious
consideration.
3.2 Improved Harmonisation of Reporting
In many instances the edges between illegal
acts motivated by pecuniary or political gain are blurred. The
spoils from theft, smuggling and hijack are used to fund terrorism.
Terrorist threat information provided by the security services
to government agencies does not generally address threat of piracy
and crime. The World Wide Threat to Shipping, prepared by the
Defence Intelligence Services provides valuable historical reports
on incidents of attacks on ships but provides little in the way
of forward-looking guidance on for seafarers.
We suggest that TRANSEC may consider:
Adding a piracy risk assessment to the information
currently provided to British shipping.
Providing UK seafarers with piracy bulletins
and other guidance notes.
IMSSO (introduced in 3.1 above) may be a medium
through which such information and guidance could be disseminated.
3.3 Resolute International Commitment to Deter
Piracy and Apprehend Criminals
A co-ordinated and determined international
effort to:
(a) patrol high piracy areas and to provide
a high profile to such activities;
(b) to intervene rapidly and robustly when
attacks occur; and
(c) to arrest pirates, confiscate or destroy
their craft and equipment and to punish the criminals.
These measures would provide a significant and
effective deterrent and would almost certainly result in a marked
reduction in attacks. In order to be able to effectively suppress
pirates, appropriate international legal instruments may need
to be introduced to allow the prosecution, sentencing and punishment
of criminals in situations where national jurisdiction is unclear
or where facilities for a fair trial are doubtful or unavailable.
3.4 Greater international commitment to ensure
compliance with the ISPS Code
Those countries whose port facilities do not
meet the minimum requirements of the ISPS Code should be encouraged
to do so by "naming and shaming" those facilities that
clearly fail to comply and where port officials are corrupt. Poorer
countries should be assisted in establishing improved infrastructure
and capacity building to support the enhancement of security in
their ports and territorial waters.
3.5 Improved guidance for seafarers for security
drills
Ships' crews that regularly conduct counter-piracy
drills are able to react more quickly and effectively to avoid
boarding by pirates. Initial advice and coaching from experienced
specialists in this area can be of great value. Such guidance
may be augmented effectively by computer-based training (conducted
onboard ship) for all seafarers serving on UK flagged vessels.
This would help to ensure that seafarers are
fully familiarised with the appropriate deterrence and response
procedures contained in MGN 298.
Increasing ship manning levels.
Raising the minimum manning levels for merchant
ships is likely to increase safety and allow crews to carry out
their security duties more effectively.
3.6 Funding
Partial or complete funding for some of the
activities described in 3.1, 3.2 and 3.5 may be available from
the Global Opportunities Fund.
4. CONCLUSIONS
It is encouraging to note the concern of the
Transport Committee in piracy and crime issues at sea.
Improvements in navigation, communications and
information technology increase criminals range and capabilities
for operations at sea.
Tolerance (or benign neglect) by the international
community has caused crime against ships to grow and become more
sophisticated.
Seafarers feel increasingly exposed and under
threat.
The ISPS Code has not improved significantly
the security of seafarers.
Determined international action needs to be
taken to deter, arrest and punish maritime criminals.
Consideration should be given to assist countries
where piracy risk is high through seminars and training by experts.
Guidance and information to the UK shipping
industry and to seafarers should be enhanced.
IMSSO could form a hub for the maritime industry
for increasing understanding and improved application of counter-piracy
measures.
Funding for some activities may be available
from the Global Opportunities Fund.
5. RECOMMENDATIONS
(a) HMG considers adopting IMSSO (Para 3.1).
(b) TRANSEC considers providing piracy risk
assessments and news bulletins to British shipping (Para 3.2).
11 January 2006
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