Memorandum submitted by Association of
Train Operating Companies
PART ONE: INTRODUCTION
SUMMARY
Train operators are committed to maintaining
a safe environment for their passengers on stations and in trains.
We understand that some passengers are nervous about travelling
at night, and we would not wish our passengers to feel threatened.
We have transformed the position we found ten years ago and have
been successful in reducing crime by broadly 40% and in attracting
40% more passengers to use the railway. More staff are employed
by train operators than at privatisation, specific training on
security has been introduced, and we contribute 60% more to policing
costs. Help points, CCTV, better lighting and opening up the station
environment are all practical initiatives by train operators to
improve security as well as passengers' perceptions.
Operators aim to improve passenger security
further on stations and trains and some ideas for doing so are
set out below. However crime is a wider societal issue not confined
to the railway station and tackling it requires an integrated
approach involving police together with local and national Government.
PERSONAL SAFETY
HAS BEEN
A PRIORITY
FOR TEN
YEARS
Ten years ago, the station environment was often
poor. Routine ticket checks at the entrance to the platforms came
to an end at many stations between 1990 and 1994 as an economy
measure, being replaced by a kind of honour system backed up by
the £10 penalty fare levied under the British Railways (Penalty
Fares) Act, 1989. The consequences were serious. In London, fare
evasion was high at around 8%, and antisocial behaviour was widespread
on many routes.
Besides the loss of revenue from ticketless
travel, train operators with problem routes considered that the
level of disorder faced by their passengers was unacceptable.
They set about reclaiming control over the railway space and returning
the railway to passengers.
Train operators take the responsibility for
passengers in their care very seriously. Looking after passengers
is an inherent part of being a train operator and is not simply
something in a franchise agreement. But stations are not citadels
on a rock, they are part of the local community, and train operators
cannot achieve safety on stations without community support, nor
can it be guaranteed once passengers have left the station.
Whilst train operators will take all reasonable
measures to ensure passenger security, beyond a certain point
it becomes a wider issue shared with Government. The railway and
Government, particularly local Government, must tackle the issue
together.
HOW EFFECTIVE
HAVE THE
MEASURES BEEN?
Over the last ten years, train operators have
recruited security staff to patrol trains and stations, installed
ticket gates at stations, provided help points, cleaned and painted
stations, removed graffiti, set up a proper process for litter
clearance (recognising the removal of litter bins for security
reasons) and introduced 20,000 CCTV cameras, which have proved
very valuable both as deterrents and for securing convictions.
In some cases, stations have been remodeled or redundant buildings
removed to eliminate hidden corners which might encourage crime.
The measures taken by train operators and BTP
have had a considerable degree of success, but the picture has
been confused by changes in definitions and recording procedures.
Further information is given in the Annexe Data on Crime on
the Railway, attached to this paper.
If account is taken of these changes in definitions,
the picture which emerges is of a decline in crime on the railway
of broadly 40% in the last ten years.
In absolute numbers, the level of crime on the
railway is small compared with that in the community at large.
To put the total figure in context, there is less crime on the
whole of the railway in England and Wales than in the single London
Borough of the City of Westminster. Stations are safer than the
streets around them.
CONCERN FOR
SAFETY AT
STATIONS AND
IN THE
LOCAL COMMUNITY
Notwithstanding the safety measures taken, there
is no doubt that some passengers remain concerned at making certain
rail journeys at night. Though it varies by locality, the National
Passenger Survey shows overall that 10% of passengers are dissatisfied
with their personal security whilst using rail. (This is 3% lower
than in the previous survey.) Variations between train operators
are quite wide generally reflecting their locality, as shown in
the Annexe to this paper.
But this concern for personal safety is not
confined to the railway. People are similarly concerned about
their personal security in their own neighbourhood.
In answer to a British Crime Survey 2000 question:
"How safe do you feel walking alone in this area after dark?"
33% answered "a bit or very unsafe". This is a particularly
significant figure, given that it refers to the area where the
respondent lives and could be expected to be most comfortable.
A similar concern is shown in a British Crime Survey 2004-05 question
which indicated that 26% of people in London had a "high
level of worry about violent crime" (16% for England and
Wales).
Thus, concern about safety, particularly at
night, applies to people walking in their own neighbourhood as
much as it applies to people travelling on the railway.
LONDON—CRIME
AT STATIONS
The figures for stations within the M25 show
the nature of the challenge. As the table below shows, most crimes
are committed at the largest stations, where the number of passengers
is highest, even though they are fully staffed and have security
measures in place. There are relatively few crimes at small stations,
even though they may be unstaffed or partially staffed. These
figures are the key to prioritisation of resources to give best
value for money.
The first table below shows all notifiable crime
incidents excluding theft of railway and passenger property and
car crime. The second table includes all notifiable crime incidents
without exclusions. The tables also show the measures taken at
the stations:
Table 3.1 (CRIME
EXCLUDING THEFT AND CAR CRIME)
Incidence of crime on
London stations
| Number
of
stations | Crime
incidents in
2005
| Gated | Staffed
| |
| CCTV | | |
| | |
| |
| | Per station
| | Full | Part
| Min | |
| Very large stations | 16 |
160 | 11 | 16 |
0 | 0 | 16 |
| Large stations | 90 | 28
| 40 | 50 | 35 |
5 | 88 |
| Medium stations | 152 | 13
| 20 | 15 | 132
| 5 | 144 |
| Small stations | 115 | 6
| 6 | 5 | 58 |
52 | 101 |
| TOTAL | 373
| — | 77 | 86
| 225 | 60 | 349
|
Notes: "Crime Incidents" are all notifiable crime types
including criminal damage, drug offences, fraud, line of route
offences, public order, robbery, sexual offences, violence and
other. But it excludes theft of passenger or railway property
and car crime; (figures are available for these). "Full"
means staffed till last train. "Min" means either not
staffed, or staffed for 4 hours or less Monday to Friday only.
This table shows 373 stations—a greater number than in London
Zones 1-6.
Table 3.2 (ALL NOTIFIABLE CRIME)
| Incidence of all notifiable crime on London stations
| Number of
stations | All Crime
incidents in 2005
|
| | Per station
|
| Very large stations | 16 |
633 |
| Large stations | 90 | 69
|
| Medium stations | 152 | 30
|
| Small stations | 115 | 13
|
| TOTAL | 373
| — |
| Source: BTP/ATOC. |
| |
The table showing all notifiable crime might exaggerate the
concentration of crime at very large stations as some crime occurs
elsewhere but gets reported at the large station.
PART TWO: THE COMMITTEE'S SPECIFIC QUESTIONS
1. What are the most effective means of making railway
and underground stations safer for passengers?
This needs to be approached in the context of tackling crime
in the communities the stations serve, and of targeting resources
to where they are most needed—usually the busier stations
with higher crime rates. No single measure will deal with crime.
It requires a combination of measures which can be approached
systematically through the "Five Es": Evaluation, Enabling,
Engineering, Education, and Enforcement—a well established
approach to crime prevention.
The principal initiatives by train operators are listed below:
Train Operator Measures to prevent crime
Measures making it difficult to commit an offence (or "target
hardening") include:
— Designing crime out through station renovation
or rebuilding, including removal of "blind spots".
— Gating stations to exclude those who are not genuine
passengers—about 140 stations have ticket gates nationally,
of which 77 are within the M25.
— Focus on patrolling known "hot spots".
— Deployment of people and patrolling:
— Deployment by train operators of staff specially
trained and accredited by BTP, examples being Rail Enforcement
Officers (South East Trains) and Travelsafe officers (South West
Trains).
— Deployment of security staff contracted by train
operators, for example, Task Force (Southern).
— Deployment of Police Community Support Officers,
both employed by BTP and train operators, such as Arriva Trains
Wales.
— Higher lighting levels at stations and in car
parks.
Other measures include:
— Increased financial support for BTP, up 60% over
the last five years.
— Intelligence used to detect organised crime.
— Help points linked directly to a control room.
— CCTV, including systematic surveillance and evidence
gathering.
Some of these measures have been funded or part funded with
help from local Government.
Train operators have increased their front line staff. While
total train operator staff numbers came down from about 46,000
to 39,000 after privatisation, in the last five years staff numbers
have increased to about 47,000. Most of the increase has been
in front line staff. These figures do not include agency staff
and police community support officers which are additional to
the numbers quoted.
The mix of initiatives described above is a more effective
way of promoting safety and security on the railway and provides
better value for money than conventional ticket office staff or
platform supervision on their own. Full staffing of stations would
not stop crime happening, as demonstrated by figures in Table
1, and by the figures for LUL stations which are staffed but still
experience crime.
Train Operator measures which help in catching offenders
The increasingly widespread use of CCTV plays a role in both
preventing and detecting crime. Many train operators are expanding
the deployment of CCTV and increasing its effectiveness by providing
a live feed to a monitored control room and through providing
resources for evidence gathering.
There are now about 20,000 CCTV cameras on the national railway,
including stations and depots. About one-third of passenger coaches
also have CCTV on board. Guidance on use of CCTVs has recently
been produced by ATOC and Network Rail.
There is merit in including smaller stations in town centre
CCTV schemes, and this could be encouraged through guidance from
DfT and the Home Office to local authorities.
Improving information exchange with the British Transport Police
(BTP)
Some train operators participate in the BTP's National Intelligence
Model through the Area BTP Tasking and Coordination Group. This
helps ensure the most effective deployment of both police and
railway security resources.
Developing links with the local community
There has been some success in train operator engagement
with Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships, and there is scope
to extend these. Further progress may require some framework to
manage the expanding matrix of relationships—the Northern
Rail franchise, for example, has 80 such schemes. Northern Rail
also has a particularly extensive station adoption scheme.
Other opportunities at the local level include station adoption
schemes and community rail partnerships, which encourage the development
of businesses at unstaffed stations, examples of which include
cafes, taxi offices and even a church. The Northwich station project
in Cheshire is a good example of a multi-agency partnership that
is bringing people and activity to an unstaffed station. Opportunities
also include improving the integration of stations within the
National Neighbourhood Policing Programme.
The Government's initiatives announced in the Budget to provide
an additional £100 million to support and extend community
policing and double the number of community support officers to
16,000 is welcome and in line with the approach of train operators
to work towards community policing.
2. Are the minimum standards to provide a safe and secure
station environment high enough? Are the requirements sufficiently
clear and specific to be effective? If not what changes should
be made?
Defining minimum standards or requirements.
Train operators aim to take all reasonable steps to secure
the safety of their passengers, and to fulfil their duty of care.
There are some standards which help to fulfil this duty:
— Specific requirements for investment included
in franchise agreements (these may relate to, for example, Secure
Station accreditation or CCTV).
— The train operators' own internal station management
control processes.
— The opening hours of ticket offices are regulated,
but often exceeded by TOCs.
— The Secure Stations Scheme.
— A guidance note on CCTV systems, recently produced
by ATOC and Network Rail.
In practice, over the last ten years, the majority of improvements
to security have come about from action by train operators, rather
than from Government specification.
Are these standards high enough, are they clear, what changes
should be made?
These standards or requirements, coupled with train operators'
commitment to improvement, have been effective in reducing crime
on the railway.
Notwithstanding the reduction in crime, and the measures
taken on problem routes, it has to be recognised that has not
resulted in the removal of concern by some people about travelling
at night, though, according to the National Passenger Survey,
that fear has been reduced.
Train operators aim to achieve further reduction in crime
and progressively greater confidence amongst passengers travelling
at night, as discussed in paragraph 7 below.
3. Are the minimum standards effectively policed? Are
the penalties for failing to provide a secure station environment
sufficiently severe?
Train operators comply with the standards and requirements
set out above, and these are policed. They also have internal
control arrangements to ensure that their management processes
are followed. Where any standards at stations are part of a franchise
agreement, they are monitored by the Department for Transport.
All breaches of franchise requirements are recorded and persistent
breach results in action under the terms of the franchise agreement.
The recent National Audit Office report stated that an investigation
had found high level of compliance with franchise obligations
at stations.
In the case of counter terrorism, DfT is able to direct the
measures to be taken through Transec and the national Rail Security
Programme.
4. Is it sufficiently clear to passengers and others who
is responsible for the safety of passengers in railway and underground
stations?
Yes. The responsibility for creating a safe and secure environment
for passengers at a station rests clearly with the relevant station
operator. All franchise agreements require that there is an information
display giving the contact details for the person who is responsible
for the station and that the information is kept clearly legible
and current. At smaller stations, help points connect directly
to a staffed control office. Contact points of the Train Operator
and for Passenger Focus or London Travelwatch are posted at every
station.
5. Why are so few stations accredited under the secure
stations scheme? Should the scheme be made compulsory?
To obtain accreditation for secure station status:
— The design of the station must conform to standards
judged by the local BTP Crime Reduction Officer to prevent and
reduce crime and improve passenger perceptions.
— The management of the station must enable you
to take steps to prevent crimes, respond to incidents, and communicate
effectively with passengers.
— Crime statistics for the station over the 12 months
prior to the inspection must show that you are managing crime.
— A survey of users must show that, on the whole,
passengers feel secure when using the station.
The principles underlying the scheme, which are essentially
those of designing crime out of the station (and car park) environment,
are sound. Following its introduction in 1998 there was considerable
enthusiasm for the scheme as a tool for improving station safety.
Station accreditation was included as a commitment in a number
of franchise agreements and delivered.
By 2003, many of the stations which would yield most benefit
had been accredited. The DfT reviewed the scheme, and some helpful
changes were made in 2005. However, the scheme is not and was
not designed to be suitable for all stations. Accreditation can
involve costs, administrative processes and time, without any
evidence that they would lead to improved safety. The time taken
to collect data and make physical changes means that this initiative
cannot be implemented quickly, and the present system disadvantages
smaller stations. Nonetheless, the scheme has merit as it is;
if it was changed to make it applicable to all stations, it would
loose some of its existing merits.
In recent years train operators progressed other means of
enhancing passenger security—specialist staff to patrol
trains is one example and further, more sophisticated use of CCTV
another. They have continued to apply the principles underlying
the Secure Station Scheme, even though they have not sought accreditation
for many more stations and in some cases have allowed accreditations
to lapse. Nevertheless, 21 train operators participate in the
scheme, and some have achieved accreditation for all their stations.
We do not think that the scheme should be made compulsory,
and certainly not for all stations, particularly the smaller ones
with little or no evidence of recorded crime or disorder. However
it does have merit and it should have more prominence in the future.
6. What measures would be required to ensure significant
improvements in passengers' safety in railway and underground
stations?
A holistic approach is required that covers bus, underground,
light rail and station environs, as well as National Rail stations
themselves. Significant reductions in crime levels have been secured
over the last five years, and the objective must be to continue
this progress. The most obvious measures would be those which
reduce antisocial behaviour in the community at large. Partnerships
with local police and local authorities are likely to be most
effective in reducing crime and the fear of crime.
ATOC has formed a Police and Station Security Group to disseminate
best practice. A wide range of measures have been taken already
and more can be done and achieved through a shared understanding
of what has been found to work and how best value for the money
available can be obtained. A research project has been initiated
through RSSB to create a robust factual basis for this work.
7. Is the Government's approach to passenger safety in
railway stations effective?
The approach outlined above has been effective, and train
operators aim to continue to take the lead in improving security
at stations. They believe that in the main the most cost effective
approach is commercially driven and targets resources where they
are most needed.
Nonetheless, there comes a point beyond which the requirements
to address public concern and public order have to be addressed
jointly by train operators and Government. Accordingly we welcome
the support received from Local Government, including TfL, and
we welcome the Secretary of State's intention to include additional
measures in new franchise agreements, which enables them to be
properly specified and funded.
Train operators, for their part, intend to seek further improvements.
They can achieve this through patrolling (with police, agency
and their own trained staff), equipment (CCTV and station design
to deter crime and assist detection) and partnership (with central
and local government and Home Office forces and other agencies).
In particular, they will:
— Work with BTP, particularly to develop a programme
of neighbourhood policing in the railway environment.
— Work with local authorities and other partnerships,
including station adopters.
— Support the Secure Stations Scheme where it is
most suitable.
— Continue to "design out" crime in stations
as they are rebuilt or renovated.
— Continue to deploy CCTV where justified to stations
not so far covered, and linked to town centre schemes where appropriate.
— Further develop live monitoring of CCTV and evidence
gathering with local authorities and BTP, as has been successfully
done with TfL and in Scotland.
— Complete research to establish a better understanding
of the trends of crime and of the measures effective in reducing
it.
In addition, we would encourage:
— DfT to introduce appropriate transitional arrangements
to ensure that short franchise lengths do not deter the introduction
of security programmes and initiatives.
— DfT to encourage local authorities to include
stations in town centre CCTV schemes.
31 March 2006
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