Memorandum submitted by Go-Ahead Group
The Go-Ahead Group welcomes the opportunity
of presenting evidence to the Committee in relation to passenger
safety at stations.
With effect from 1 April 2006, Go-Ahead will
operate two of the largest franchises in London and the South-East
with responsibility for over 330 stations. The Southern and Southeastern
franchises carry in excess of 110 million passengers a year, 15%
of the National rail business.
We fully recognise the importance of safety
and security in our rail operations. We are acutely aware that
confidence in public transport is essential not only for the success
of our business, but also in terms of the London and thus National
economy, and the ecological benefits of encouraging greater use
of environmentally friendly transport modes.
Personal security is a priority for our business.
We will produce evidence describing the measures we have taken
and the substantial financial investment made. These measures
go far beyond the obligations in our Franchise Agreement.
The recent high profile press campaign on crime
at London stations has exaggerated the risks to the travelling
public and has raised the fear of crime. Reported crime levels
are significantly lower than in the community at large, and the
risk of exposure to crime is low. East Croydon, one of our busiest
stations, had a reported crime level of 270 notifiable offences
during 2005, set against a passenger throughput of some 22 million
passengers per annum. Crime levels at all our Southern stations
have reduced significantly over the last three years. (See Annex
"A")
Nevertheless, we are in no way complacent about
security, and recognise that more needs to be done to counter
the fear of crime and to encourage use of the railway during the
more vulnerable off-peak periods of the day.
What are the most effective methods of making
railway and underground stations safer for passengers?
There is rarely a single solution to combating
crime and disorder. Under the guidance of a professional Head
of Security and in close cooperation with the British Transport
Police, the Group adopts a holistic approach to combating crime
and disorder. We follow the accepted crime reduction strategies
based around the principles of the five "E"s: Evaluation,
Enabling, Education, Engineering and Enforcement. This strategic
approach ensures that a proper risk based evaluation based on
the combined intelligence of the police and our own data, is the
precursor to any solutions or counter-measures.
The key issue is to create a safe environment
for our passengers and staff, which in turn will improve the perception
of personal security. Perception of crime at stations is often
influenced by the geographic location. Railway stations do not
sit separately from the communities they serve and consequently
they are a reflection of the fears of the community in general.
If the public feel secure in their neighbourhood this perception
is likely to be reflected in their view of their local station,
and vice versa.
In general terms, passengers are likely to feel
most secure in a well-lit, well-maintained, clean and open environment
where there is natural surveillance from fellow-travellers, railway
staff or from adjacent properties. Conversely, an area that is
poorly lit, and where there is litter graffiti or evidence of
vandalism, will have the opposite effect and create a sense of
isolation and vulnerability that feeds the fear of crime.
As a consequence, Go-Ahead has concentrated
on improving the cleanliness, appearance, and lighting standards
at all of its stations. It has fitted CCTV, Help Points, improved
waiting accommodation, car parking and cycle storage facilities,
amongst other measures.
Most research relating to passenger security
indicates that the public believe that the presence of staff is
particularly reassuring. In our Southern franchise we have recognised
this concern, and over the last three years have increased staffing
levels at stations in the London Metro area by 70 people. Furthermore,
where circumstances have indicated a need, we have also employed
private security officers to supplement our own staff presence.
It is not simply the presence of railway staff, but having the
right people in the right place doing the right job. In terms
of combating the albeit low levels of station crime, it is no
more realistic to expect a security presence in every station
than it is to expect a police officer on every street corner.
In our view a holistic approach, by risk assessing stations and
providing appropriate physical and material solutions, is the
most appropriate way to address passenger concerns.
For ease of reference, we attach at "Appendix
A" a brief summary of security measures implemented in the
Southern franchise over the last three years, together with "Appendix
B" for Thameslink.
Is the minimum standards to provide a safe and
secure station environment high enough?
Train operators are required to ensure the safety
of their passengers under Section 3 of the Health and Safety at
Work Act, and in the civil law Occupiers' Liability Act. Both
these require that train operators take all reasonably practicable
and proportionate steps to reduce the risks to the public and
staff. Train operators have a legal duty of care.
The National Rail Security Group sets a high
level strategy for crime prevention, and the tactics for delivery
are determined within Network Rail Regions. Individual operators
fully participate in this process as well as setting their own
crime strategy (See Annex "C") and by setting measurable
objectives in their Safety and Environmental Plan.
The opening hours of ticket offices are regulated,
which together with the number of windows to be opened, partly
determines station staffing arrangements.
The only other requirements under the terms
of a Franchise Agreement are those which are negotiated with the
Department for Transport (DfT) when individual companies enter
into a Franchise Agreement. In the case of Southern, this is contained
in Schedule Four of the Franchise Agreement. It also covers issues
of presentation and cleanliness that have a bearing on perceptions
of security. Other parts of the Franchise Agreement include specific
obligations such as "Secure Station" accreditation,
"Park Mark" standard for car parks, CCTV on stations
and trains, and Help Points at stations.
In recent years the DfT has placed greater emphasis
on station security as evidenced by the Invitation to Tender in
franchise competitions. There are other minimum standards, such
as those contained in the counter terrorism measures of the National
Railways Security Programme, which also serve to set standards
for security. The counter terrorist measures are considered to
be appropriate and sufficiently robust to deter terrorism and
other forms of crime without being unduly restrictive on an open
public railway transportation system.
Are the requirements sufficiently clear and specific
to be effective? If not, what changes should be made?
These basic standards and requirements, coupled
with the Group's strong commitment to improvement, has reduced
crime on the stations in our franchises.
Otherwise, there is a clear expectation that
operators will include security plans and measures for the safe
operation of the railway in their Franchises. Crime levels at
stations are generally low, and security spend has to be on a
sensible and risk assessed basis. It may be perfectly feasible
for example, for the DfT to specify stations that need to have
"Secure Stations Accreditation", to specify the provision
of "Help Points" and CCTV or indeed to specify levels
of station staffing. These costs would not be matched by additional
revenue, and the resultant extra subsidy requirements would have
to be prioritised alongside other demands for railway funding.
Are the minimum standards effectively policed?
Are the penalties for failing to provide a secure station environment
sufficiently severe?
The internal standards of a Rail Operator and
the commitments entered into through Safety and Environmental
Plans are the subject of both internal and independent external
audit. A failure of any of our Group companies to perform against
published targets would be a matter of a focus by our Board where
there is no less concern about security issues than other aspects
of railway safety. The consequence of significant failure to meet
safe operating practices would have significant impact on both
Directors and Management of the company concerned.
Minimum standards specific to station security
differ in our Franchise Agreements, and where these form part
of the Franchisees obligations, they are subject to audit by DfT.
In recent years the process has been more one of "self audit"
or "certification" by the train operator. However we
are, from time to time, subject to verification by DfT Audit random
checks. Minor non compliance can result in the operator being
served a notice of breach and being required to produce, at their
own expense, an action plan to achieve compliance. In severe cases,
or what is known as a "material breach" of the franchise
an operator could lose the franchise with severe reputational
and financial consequences.
In the case of compliance with the provisions
of the National Railways Security Programme, stations in the higher
security groups are subject to regular audit by DfT Transport
Security Inspectors. Any failures to comply with mandatory elements
can result in warning notices and ultimately in prosecution of
the franchisee or duty holder.
Is it sufficiently clear to passengers and others
who are responsible for the safety of passengers in railway and
underground stations?
Emphatically, yes. Train Operating Companies
(TOC) are the public face of the railway, and passengers look
to TOC staff for all their needs, including their safety. Our
staff wear distinctive uniforms, and we prominently display at
all stations details of the station manager and contact details
for enquiries.
It may not be quite as clear to the public so
far as policing is concerned. Whilst we have the benefit of a
distinct railway police the public may often see the local police
force as being the first point of contact, and not appreciate
the demarcation lines between Metropolitan and Home Office police
forces and the British Transport Police.
Why are so few stations accredited under the secure
stations scheme?
The Secure Stations Scheme represents a national
standard for passenger safety and security at Britain's railway
stations. The Scheme was first launched in 1998, but following
an independent review was subsequently revised and re-launched
in 2005. These revisions are aimed at simplifying some procedures
with the objective of encouraging more operators to take part.
There are seven guidelines to accreditation and four specific
elements that need to be addressed by station operators. These
are:
— Design and crime—the design
of the station must conform to standards judged by the local BTP
Crime Reduction Officer to prevent and reduce crime and improve
passenger perceptions.
— Managing a secure station—the
management of the station must allow the operator to take steps
to prevent crimes, respond to incidents, and communicate effectively
with passengers.
— Recording and monitoring of crimes
and other incidents—crime statistics for the station over
the twelve months prior to the inspection must show that the TOC
is managing crime. This entails a crime level in relation to people
using the station that is below specified crimes per footfall.
— Passenger perceptions—a survey
of users must show that, on the whole, passengers feel secure
when using the station.
It will be noted that the process of accreditation
is not simple. The process is quite rightly challenging, and has
to be so if accreditation is to have any purpose, significance
or credibility. Neither is accreditation a quick process. It requires
considerable engagement from a limited crime reduction police
resource and a process of rectification of any physical shortcomings
arising from the police audit. In some cases this may involve
capital expenditure although generally cost is not the principal
bar to accreditation.
It can take some time for the physical and managerial
measures to impact on crime and to reduce it to a qualifying level
in proportion to footfall. Stations with relatively low levels
of crime, but low usage, often struggle to meet the crime per
footfall criteria, whereas a larger station with higher levels
of crime and high usage may pass the criteria more easily. It
has been pointed out repeatedly to the DfT and to BTP that small
stations are disadvantaged in the "managing crime" per
footfall formula.
In its original form a very costly element of
accreditation was the need for an independent passenger survey
of specific age groups by gender. The survey had to show that
on the whole, passengers felt secure when using the station. The
cost of the survey and analysis was disproportionately expensive
and produced unreliable results, even after high levels of investment
in the station. Further, as public perception is often dictated
as much by the area outside the station, over which the railway
has no control, as by the reality of the risk of crime on the
station itself, the scheme became discredited. For this reason
Go-Ahead chose to invest finite security resources in making improvements
to security across the board rather than in expensive public surveys.
In its revised form the Secure Stations Scheme
permits the use of existing surveys in relation to perceptions
of security—for example the National Passenger Survey conducted
by the Oxford Research Institute—provided a sufficiently
large ample is obtained, which obviates the need for further surveys
by train operators. Southern currently has only three accredited
stations, and is working towards accreditation of an initial tranche
of 40 stations that we expect will result in 25% of our stations
achieving secure stations status. However, as indicated above,
the process is not a "quick win" and involves time and
effort to engage staff in actively managing crime and security,
physically improve the station environment, reducing crime to
footfall ratios and gaining passenger confidence.
By comparison, 22 Thameslink stations (79% of
total), have achieved Secure Station Accreditation.
Should the scheme be made compulsory?
No—we think this would be counter productive.
Much is already an integral part of Go-Ahead's
bidding strategy and franchise management processes—namely
infrastructure provision—intelligent CCTV, Help Points,
long-line PAs, completed by adequate staffing both static and
peripatetic.
The burden of processing a significant increase
in SSA applications would fall to the Police, who would not be
able to cope.
Further, by mandating SSA, additional sanctions
for failure would be necessary. In our view, it would be unreasonable
to penalise an operator who had used reasonable endeavours to
reduce crime and anti-social behaviour but who had failed due
to circumstances or perceptions beyond their control. It may also
lead operators to fail to report crime.
What measures would be required to ensure significant
improvements in passengers' safety in railway and underground
stations?
Passenger safety and confidence may be improved
by a more visible presence of Police and other complementary policing
resources during off peak times. Southern has already contributed
to this element of confidence building in its own multi disciplined
"Task Force" and through the employment of some 50 Rail
Security Officers. However, crime and disorder can occur anywhere
and it is unrealistic to expect every station and every train
to maintain a permanent security presence, just as it is unreasonable
to expect Police or Community Support Officers or Street Wardens
to be visible on every street in the land. All resources whether
human of physical are finite and to be most effective need to
be directed on an intelligence led basis.
A joined-up approach which involves bus, underground,
light rail and heavy rail stations environments needs to be encouraged.
For example, there remains scope to develop railway CCTV capability
along the lines of the joint Southern and Transport for London
scheme in London. By Autumn of 2006 monitored CCTV and help points
will be introduced to 50 metro stations. When integrated with
on board CCTV this has the potential of providing a comprehensive
public security and surveillance system. We also look forward
to forthcoming proposals on the future of the British Transport
Police that has the potential of refocusing policing efforts on
a transport led agenda rather than a more generic National Policing
Strategy
Is the government's approach to passenger safety
in railway stations effective?
With the exception of counter terrorism, much
of the initiative for improved station security has come from
within the rail industry, aided by local and national government
partnership arrangements.
Greater emphasis could be given to transport
security in the work of local Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships
and a Government lead would be useful in that context. The introduction
of the Railway Accredited Persons Scheme with enhanced powers
of enforcement under railway bye-laws has also been welcomed.
However the scheme could have been more attractive had the enforcement
powers been more relevant to the railway rather than being a direct
copy of powers, scope and offences currently available under Community
Safety Accreditation Schemes. Further, the process of accreditation
of railway businesses, managed by the Association of Chief Police
Officers Crime Prevention Initiatives Ltd is viewed as being unnecessarily
onerous and bureaucratic, which is also a disincentive to participation.
Conclusions
Since privatisation and through the process
of competitive tendering for rail franchises the industry has
made significant investment in the security of stations and trains.
Public perception of security measured through independent survey
has steadily improved as have passenger numbers. Crime at stations
has fallen consistently, but more can be done.
In the new Go-Ahead franchise for the Southeastern
franchise, the most significant element of £70 million of
proposed investment is £20 million on security.
31 March 2006
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