Memorandum submitted by the Rail Safety
& Standards Board
THE RAIL
SAFETY AND
STANDARDS BOARD
(RSSB)
1. RSSB is an independent not-for-profit
company owned by major stakeholders in the rail industry including
Network Rail and train operators.
2. The RSSB response to the questions posed
by the Transport Committee reflects the company's role in relation
to:
— Safety policy and the industry's
Strategic Safety Plan.
— Research and development.
— Facilitation and support of industry
initiatives, in particular the Rail Personal Security Group (RPSG).
3. Essentially all of the stations on the
national rail network, formerly the responsibility of British
Rail, are owned by Network Rail. Franchised train operators manage
all but 17 "major stations" operated by Network Rail.
It is therefore inappropriate for RSSB to respond to some of the
specific questions raised by the Committee.
PASSENGER SAFETY
AND SECURITY
4. More than a billion passenger journeys
are made on the main line network each year and the vast majority
are incident-free with the British Transport Police (BTP) recording
less than one assault for every hundred thousand passenger journeys
made. Of the assaults that take place approximately four fifths
are to members of railway staff. The risk to the public within
the railway environment is lower than it is in the wider community.
5. The industry's Strategic Safety Plan
for 2006 addresses personal security and station safety as set
out in Annex A of this submission.
THE RAIL
PERSONAL SECURITY
GROUP (RPSG)
6. RPSG was established in response to a
recommendation in the research project "Reducing Assaults
on Railway Staff" (December 2002), that "the industry
should establish and equip (including the provision of financial
support) a Task Force to develop a common strategy and promote
it within the industry, to local and national government, law
enforcement agencies and the media".
7. The industry agreed that a group focused
on personal security issues would be beneficial, but that to concentrate
solely on staff assaults would be restrictive. For that reason,
customer and public security (excluding terrorism) are addressed
by RPSG.
8. RPSG first met in August 2003 and has
continued to meet every two months since then. Membership of RPSG
is drawn from passenger train operators, Network Rail, railway
trades unions, British Transport Police (BTP), Passenger Focus,
the Department for Transport (DfT), Transport for London and the
Home Office. RPSG is facilitated and supported by RSSB.
TRANSPORT COMMITTEE
QUESTIONS
What are the most effective methods of making
railway and underground stations safer for passengers?
9. RPSG identified that it could best contribute
to making stations safer by raising the profile of personal security
on the railway, to encourage sharing of best practice thereby
supporting train operators and Network Rail in discharging their
duties to manage the risk.
10. Assaults occurring at railway stations
cannot be addressed in isolation as this risk has to be addressed
in the context of the communities within which stations are located.
RPSG recognises the importance of working with communities and
wishes to see transport representation in Crime and Disorder Reduction
Partnerships (CDRP). Because violence is a wider societal problem,
a holistic approach is needed to tackle it. Accordingly RPSG is
currently working with the Home Office and BTP to develop guidelines
for the rail industry and CDRPs to use in their joint activities.
11. RPSG is dependent on the willingness
of the members to share their ideas and learn from each other
not only in respect of successful measures but also the unsuccessful,
with the aim of improving personal security and reducing anti-social
behaviour on the railway. The following are amongst the successful
initiatives that individual train operators have adopted to improve
personal security for staff and passengers.
— "Adopt a Station"—community
involvement to improve the environment at unmanned stations (which
is also the subject of further research—see below).
— Progression of "Secure Stations"
scheme.
— Increased visibility of staff and
funded recruitment by BTP of railway staff as Special Constables
and Police Community Support Officers (PCSO).
— Creating links with local schools
to encourage rail travel in a safe environment, including agreement
of "Schools Charters" and accreditation of those who
go into schools as presenters of railway safety messages.
— More use of station and on train
CCTV systems.
— Installation of automatic ticket
barriers which act as a deterrent to antisocial behaviour by limiting
access opportunities for fare evasion.
— Strict imposition of penalty fares
for ticketless travellers.
12. RSSB is, on behalf of the wider industry,
currently in dialogue with the Crown Prosecution Service to promote
the view that the range of sanctions available within the criminal
law is appropriate but that there are occasions where the public
interest would be better served if prosecutors were more aware
of the impact on the railway of assaults and other crime.
Are the minimum standards to provide a safe and
secure station environment high enough? Are the requirements sufficiently
clear and specific to be effective? If not, what changes should
be made?
13. Individual duty holders are best placed
to determine the configuration of stations and determine the levels
of staff appropriate to the levels of use of each station and
the risks of assaults and other inappropriate behaviour.
Are the minimum standards effectively policed?
Are the penalties for failing to provide a secure station environment
sufficiently severe?
14. The combined economic and safety regulatory
regime to be introduced in April 2006 is appropriate as is the
range of penalties provided for in the Health and Safety at Work
etc Act 1974.
Is it sufficiently clear to passengers and others
who is responsible for the safety of passengers in railway and
underground stations?
15. Duties under the law are clear.
Why are so few stations accredited under the secure
Stations scheme? Should the scheme be made compulsory?
16. This question is best addressed to station
operators.
What measures would be required to ensure sufficient
improvements in passengers' safety in railway and underground
stations?
17. Research into personal safety and security
at stations is a component of the wider DfT funded research and
development (R&D) programme managed by RSSB on behalf of the
rail industry and associated stakeholders. Public behaviour has
been subject to scrutiny since the inception of the programme
in 2001. Early outputs of the R&D programme generated recommendations
that led to the setting up of RPSG (see paragraphs six to eight
above).
18. All reports generated by projects within
the R&D programme managed by RSSB are available on-line at
www.rssb.co.uk
19. Published research reports specifically
addressing issues of personal security can be summarised as follows:
— Reducing assaults on railway staff
(T039), published 2002
This project provided a better understanding the
size of the growing problem of assaults on railway staff, and
identified measures to counteract it. A range of techniques was
used in the study, including focus groups, staff surveys, gathering
information from train and station operators, comparing data from
operators and the Safety Management Information System (SMIS)
and the modelling of experts' views about influencing factors.
The project recommended that railway organisations review their
countermeasures, publish plans, set targets and share information.
The project also proposed that the industry establish a personal
security task force on the issue (as previously indicated this
led to the creation of RPSG). This project further recommended
better and more consistent data should be input to the industry's
Safety Management Information System (SMIS) and that there should
be regular reporting from SMIS. RSSB has since upgraded SMIS to
deliver the requirements specified by RPSG on behalf of duty holders.
— Fears and experiences of assault
and abuse on the railway (T047), published 2004
This project Investigated the fears and experiences
of railway staff and customers in relation to assault and abuse
on the railway. The report identified measures to improve personal
security—better data, risk analysis, best practice and partnerships.
This project has helped inform industry's response to concerns
about personal safety and security amongst the travelling public.
It surveyed existing rail users and non-rail users to determine
which groups consider themselves to be at risk, and which groups
actually are at risk. Specific recommendations were to improve
industry data (changes to SMIS have been made) quality and systems,
to undertake further analysis of risk at stations, to determine
and share best practice and to work in partnership with other
agencies to ensure appropriate skills and resources are brought
to bear on the problem. This report is also material to the industry
having set up RPSG.
20. A number of other research projects
also of relevance to the subject of personal security have also
been published. They relate to the perception and evaluation of
route crime, the benefits of CCTV, trespass and vandalism, the
benefit of complementary policing, cost of assaults and the development
of suitable materials for teachers and schools. Further research
is ongoing and projects under development with the support of
RPSG and other community safety stakeholders include Safety at
London Stations—Review of Existing Knowledge
Is the Government's approach to passenger safety
in railway stations effective?
21. The principles set out in the Government's
National Community Safety Plan are appropriate.
31 March 2006
Annex A
EXTRACT FROM STRATEGIC SAFETY PLAN 2006 RELATING
TO STATIONS AND PERSONAL SECURITY
Statistics on crime at stations may reflect
changes in the level of reporting rather than the number of actual
crimes. The most reliable estimate is that violent crime is generally
falling, although this may mask acute problems in specific locations,
or rises in certain categories of violent crime. What can be said
with certainty is that the overall risk to the individual passenger
is very small.
Anti-social and dangerous behaviour by the public
remains a cause of concern. For example, drivers frequently report
encountering dangerous practices such as sitting on platform edges.
Actions:
Station operators will:
— Continue to improve station environments
with improved lighting and core safe areas, where appropriate;
— Continue to work with the British
Transport Police, supporting the police community support officer
scheme and employing dedicated security staff, where appropriate;
— Make greater use of CCTV;
— Work towards an agreed industry specification
for CCTV installation and download to simplify the process of
making use of recorded images in tackling crime;
— Bring more stations into the Secure
Stations Scheme[1].
— Review the impact of the proposed
change to 24-hour licensing on public behaviour issues on the
railway.
More information is available at:
http://www.dft.gov.uk/stellent/groups/dft—mobility/documents/divisionhomepage/036930.hcsp
1 Stations are accredited under this scheme as complying
with a set of minimum standards. Back
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