Memorandum submitted by Passenger Focus
1. SUMMARY
1.1 The Transport Committee of the House
of Commons is conducting an inquiry into "the current standards
of passenger safety in railway stations". In this context,
"safety" refers to personal security and protection
from crime and harassment, rather than physical safety and protection
from accidental injury. Among the issues which the Transport Committee
wishes to identify are:
— What are the most effective methods
of making railway stations safer for passengers?
— What measures would be required to
ensure significant improvements in passengers' safety in railway
stations?
1.2 This Memorandum and its Annex seek to
draw together the evidence emerging from recent research
in this field. The key messages are:
— Tracking of passengers' priorities
shows that personal security is not highest on the list of aspects
of performance in which they most wish to see improvements. Concerns
about reliability, frequency, cost and comfort almost always take
precedence.
— It is plain, however, that many passengers
do wish to see enhanced security, and some are deterred from travelling
by such concerns.
— Research suggests that, overwhelmingly,
they regard more adequate levels of staffing, and the more visible
and authoritative presence of those staff who are currently deployed,
as the appropriate solution.
— Physical or technical measures such
as CCTV, help points, and enhanced lighting and sightlines are
regarded as ancillary improvements rather than as substitutes
for staffing.
— Except in the still-limited areas
where complementary policing personnel such as community support,
travel safe and/or rail enforcement officers are routinely deployed,
passenger-facing railway staff are not recruited and trained primarily
to perform security functions, and they are not necessarily equipped
or willing to act in the protective roles which passengers expect.
2. PASSENGER
FOCUS'S
POLICY
2.1 Passenger Focus believes that the safety
and security of passengers is of paramount importance.
2.2 Passenger Focus presses for stations
to be staffed wherever possible. This is not only to provide ticket
sales and direct revenue protection but also to provide a reassuring
staff presence for both personal security and information and
as a deterrent to crime. To achieve this, staff must be visible
and conduct regular patrols. They must be trained in the skills
necessary to exercise authority when required and to provide reassurance
through their presence, appearance and demeanour. They should
be invested with the legal powers (eg under the police accreditation
scheme) necessary to allow them to discharge this role effectively.
Passenger Focus's definition of full staffing covers all times
when trains call at the station; the industry's definition is
less rigid and obvious: "fully staffed" can refer to
a situation where two shifts are covered but where early-morning
and late-evening trains, and often all day at weekends, are uncovered.
2.3 Passenger Focus believes that the role
of staff should be complemented, not replaced, by technology.
Help points (capable of both summoning assistance in emergencies
and obtaining information at other times) should be prominently
available and conveniently sited at stations and be maintained
in good order. We support the system used in Scotland and parts
of London whereby the help point and CCTV system are linked. CCTV
should be monitored rather than just recorded, and be of a standard
capable of allowing the successful prosecution of offenders. We
would also like to see CCTV systems at stations linked with those
outside so that offenders can be tracked once they leave the station.
2.4 Passenger Focus supports initiatives
such as the Secure Stations and Secure Car Parks schemes, but
believes that their effectiveness (and entitlement to continuing
accreditation) should be related to their measured impact on passengers'
perceptions of security, not simply a checklist of physical features.
We endorse the recommendation of the RSSB report Fears and
experiences of passengers from assault that the Home Office
Fear of Crime Matrix (in a suitably modified form, as the current
version applies only to major stations) can be a useful tool to
help rail companies develop strategies and priorities for action.
2.5 Passenger Focus accepts that the railway
does not operate in a vacuum and suffers from the same problems
with crime and disorder as the rest of society. Tackling issues
of security on the railway is, therefore, a wider social issue
and not a problem for the industry to resolve in isolation. Passenger
Focus therefore welcomes and encourages the active participation
of rail industry in local community safety partnerships, and its
engagement with all relevant agencies working in this field. We
welcome the successful introduction of anti-social behaviour orders
on the railway, and the work being done by RSSB Rail Personal
Security Group with the Crown Prosecution Service to increase
judicial awareness of the seriousness of railway crime.
2.6 We are particularly keen that in its
plans for station regeneration, Network Rail should encourage
the use of station precincts for a range of activities (not necessarily
directly rail-related) which will foster a continuous flow of
people and help overcome the air of isolation and abandonment
which can be a deterrent to passengers.
2.7 Passenger Focus believes that there
should be a clearly located source of authority within the industry
partnerships charged with the responsibility of championing such
activity in each region, and that promoting specific security
initiatives (including station staffing) should become obligatory
upon operators through the franchising process. We warmly welcome
the priority to be given to this facet of passenger service in
the new franchising regime to be introduced by TfL on the North
London Railway, and commend this as a model to the DfT.
3. NATIONAL PASSENGER
SURVEY
3.1 The only quantified country-wide index
of rail users' views is the National Passenger Survey (NPS), originally
commissioned by the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) and now compiled
twice-yearly under the direction of Passenger Focus. This is based
on the results of polling more than 28,000 passengers twice a
year in the course of journeys made on the National Rail network.
3.2 In the most recently published wave
of results (Autumn 2005), 59% of those polled declared themselves
to be satisfied with security at stations, placing it only ninth
out of twelve station-related service attributes covered1. This
rating has risen by 5% over the past three years, but its relative
position in the rankings has remained constant.
3.3 Leisure users are most likely to be
satisfied with station security (65%), followed by business users
(59%), while commuters' satisfaction rating was only 55%. Of users
of high speed long distance trains, 68% were satisfied, compared
with 59% of passengers on regional services and 57% on London
and south east routes. Among the last of these, the off-peak/peak
differential was 59% to 55% respectively. Frequent users therefore
have more negative perceptions than those who travel occasionally.
3.4 Those who voiced active concern about
station security (less than a quarter of the total) were invited
to indicate their reasons. In descending order of frequency, the
principal reasons given were:
| 57% | Saw rowdy behaviour by other people on station
|
| 43% | Lack of station staff
|
| 37% | Fear of terrorism |
| 20% | Lack of other passengers
|
| 18% | Poor on-station lighting
|
| 17% | Lack of information |
| 11% | Saw actual vandalism or violence
|
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3.5 When asked about their reasons for being concerned
with personal security in the vicinity of stations, the
same respondents' answers were:
| 23% | Poor lighting around station
|
| 19% | Fear of terrorism |
| 19% | Lack of other people in neighbourhood
|
| 16% | Station in an isolated position
|
| 11% | Insecure station car park
|
| 9% | Saw vandalism or violence in neighbourhood
|
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3.6 It is noteworthy that only a small minority had been
witnesses to actual vandalism or violence, as distinct from rowdy
behaviour, so that a sense of isolation and an absence of effective
authority are sufficient in themselves to engender feelings of
insecurity. This underlines the strength of passenger perception.
4. PASSENGER PRIORITIES
4.1 Although the NPS gives a valuable snapshot of how
passengers in general perceive the level of security currently
achieved on stations, and the reasons underlying the dissatisfaction
of those who believe it is inadequate, it does not give any direct
indication of the importance ascribed to improving personal
security relative to other service attributes. This was
investigated by SRA in May 2005 by means of a specially-commissioned
study using multivariate analysis2. When passengers were invited
to rank different journey elements to show their priorities for
improvement, personal security at stations came only 16th out
of 30. There was little variation between the ratings of different
categories of respondent.
4.2 The NPS data also do not address:
— the views of non-passengers who may be deterred
from rail travel because of a perceived lack of security on the
system,
— other sub-sets of users within the total body
of passengers (differentiated by, for example, gender, ethnicity,
age, or time of travel) who may have distinctive views, or
— the measures open to the industry which would
be likely to raise satisfaction levels, and the cost-effectiveness
of these.
4.3 The last of these considerations is important. This
is not only because improving personal security has an opportunity
cost (it consumes resources which would otherwise be available
to meet other passenger expectations) but also because it may
be that the remedy to the problem lies partly or wholly outside
the industry's control. If some people will only use door-to-door
transport because they are unwilling to run the perceived risks
encountered while travelling to or from a station at either end
of the rail trip, it is immaterial to them what level of security
is offered while on the railway itself.
4.4 It is therefore necessary to turn to other sources
of information to explore these issues in greater depth. There
is a substantial body of research literature relating to public
attitudes to safety and security on transport systems in general
and the railway in particular, including the solutions which are
seen to be most likely to be effective. The Annex to this Memorandum
comprises a review of some of the most significant studies.
5. WHAT PASSENGERS
WANT
5.1 2005 saw the publication by the then Rail Passengers
Council (now Passenger Focus) of What passengers want from
stations3, the findings of a series of focus group studies
conducted in various parts of the country. In relation to security,
this work confirmed the conclusions of previous researchers:
5.2 Security both inside and outside the station is a
high priority for passengers with fear of or direct experience
of car crime and a low perception of personal security in and
around station entrances, especially so at night. Commuters and
business passengers feel that some smaller stations are "lonely
places" and that leaving them at night is "dangerous".
Other participants do not use train services at night because
this is considered "too risky".
5.3 The main concerns with travelling at night can be
summed up as:
— no staff or supervision at the station when returning
home late;
— ticket office is closed;
— gangs of youths hanging around the station or
in waiting rooms drinking;
— lack of adequate lighting in stations and in car
parks;
— bushes and foliage along walkways/exits.
5.4 It was thought that stations being staffed would
be the most effective way of improving station security at night.
In general it was felt that stations should be staffed as long
as trains were running. The presence of retail facilities in the
station which were open also led to a higher perception of security.
Retailers were seen as a point of help if it should be required
. . . A major concern, particularly for the smaller stations,
was that although staff would be desirable it would [not be] practicable
because of concerns about personal security of staff.
5.5 Although it was generally thought that the introduction
of CCTV and panic buttons could do little to improve personal
security, participants thought they should be fitted as standard,
even if stations were staffed. The benefits of CCTV were thought
to be that film could be used for identification purposes and
might reduce car crime. If introduced, participants thought that
CCTV should be clearly and very obviously signposted so that people
knew it was there.5.6 When prompted it was agreed that better
lighting would benefit passengers emotionally leading to an increased
feeling of personal security. There was an awareness of help points
at medium [sized] stations, but they were underused by participants
who seemed to be unsure of their purpose or of what would happen
if they used one.
6. MAINTAINING AND
IMPROVING STATIONS
6.1 The July 2005 report by the National Audit Office
(NAO) on Maintaining and improving Britain's railway stations4
suggested (quoting Crime Concern's research) that measures to
improve personal security would result in 15% more travel by rail
and Underground, much of it out of peak hours (when there is spare
capacity). Staff presence, good lighting and CCTV surveillance
were seen as being the three most important factors reassuring
passengers about their personal safety while waiting for a train.
Passengers felt less secure at small stations which are unstaffed
for all or part of the day, and after dark.
6.2 The NAO also commented on the limited impact of the
Government-sponsored Secure Stations scheme. It was felt that
it suffered from a lack of support from train companies (partly
because of the cost of the regular surveys required to acquire
and retain accreditation). Many of the accredited stations had
a low level of crime initially, so accreditation was achieved
without making significant changes, and had little practical impact.
Passenger awareness of the scheme was low, so it did little to
affect perceptions of crime. In January 2005 only 118 stations
(out of more than 2500) were accredited, and the number was declining—although
as these included 87 of the busiest stations on the network, more
than two thirds of journeys began or ended at a "secure station".
The difficulty faced by the industry is that although recorded
levels of crime are highest at the busiest stations, passengers'
concern for their security is greatest in relatively unfrequented
locations. A review in 2003 of the separate Secured Car Park scheme
showed that improvements made to achieve this award had a positive
effect on users' perceptions, but in March 2004 only 125 station
car parks were covered by it.
6.3 Standards will not be driven up in the absence of
an enforcement regime. The SQUIRE regime used in Scotland and
in PTE areas indicates the need for and effectiveness of monitoring.
NAO reported that the regime cost £600,000 to implement in
2003-04 while the train operators paid £1 million in penalties.
The NAO report highlighted the absence of a single organisation
co-ordinating the development of stations and facilities at them.
7. CRIME AND
SAFETY AT
LONDON STATIONS
7.1 Earlier this year, the Transport Committee of the
London Assembly published the findings of its own scrutiny of
Crime and Safety at London's Suburban Railway Stations5.
This report was critical of the lack of integration between CCTV
systems operated by local authorities and those found on the railway.
It expressed concern at the lower level of policing provided on
the National Rail network compared with the Underground. It described
many suburban stations as being "poorly lit and sparsely
staffed" which made for "an unwelcoming, sometimes threatening
environment hardly designed to encourage greater use—especially
during off-peak periods." The Secure Stations award scheme
was felt to be well-intentioned but "misdirected and too
concerned with corporate procedure rather than the experience
of the passenger."
7.2 The Committee "sought to highlight that by providing
better and brighter lighting inside and outside the station, better
street level real time travel information, more consistent signage,
offering more commercial lettings and raising basic design standards,
stations can become more welcoming to the passenger." But
quoting research conducted by Transport for London (TfL), which
confirms that increased staffing tops the list of passenger preferences
for improving station safety, it noted that "it is rare that
any Tube station is unstaffed during service hours and yet on
London's rail network it is common to find stations after a certain
time in the evening completely devoid of staff." It accepted
that staff represent a greater cost over time than some of the
other improvements discussed, but suggested that they could be
more imaginatively deployed. "Ticket office staff, though
essential during peak time, may provide a more visible presence
elsewhere in stations during off-peak hours." It applauded
TfL's declared intention of requiring stations on the North London
Railway to be continuously staffed when it assumes responsibility
for this franchise next year.
8. IN CONCLUSION
8.1 Passenger Focus welcomes the Committee's inquiry
and its opportunity to present evidence. We highlight four aspects
which must be tackled:
1. More staff—visible and clearly uniformed—at
stations;
2. Physical facilities which complement staff presence:
help points, CCTV, good lighting, clear sight lines;
3. Better co-ordination between the numerous bodies which
share responsibility for rail operations; and
4. Monitoring regimes incorporating SQUIRE requirements/passenger
perceptions.
8.2 We also wish to address the points raised by the
Committee more specifically. These points are largely addressed
in the preceding paragraphs, but for sake of completeness we cover
them again in brief below. Many of the concepts in the questions
overlap, and we have therefore brought both the questions and
our direct responses together for ease of reference.
8.2.1 What are the most effective methods of making
railway and underground stations safer for passengers? Is it sufficiently
clear to passengers and others who is responsible for the safety
of passengers in railway and underground stations?
— Staffing is the single most effective means of
making stations safer. Staff should be visible, easily recognisable,
trained in the skills necessary to exercise authority when required
and invested with necessary legal powers. They must patrol frequently.
Staffing is clearly a greater cost over time than some other expedients,
often depending on how they are deployed—but it is the one
which passengers consistently expect. Questions of station staffing
need to be addressed through the franchising process. There seems
to be merit in examining the role and effectiveness of South West
Trains' "travel safe officers". Staff presence must
be complemented with appropriate technology: CCTV, help points
and good lighting. Design, especially to ensure clear sight lines
is vital, as is the active engagement of the industry with all
other relevant agencies to deter crime and disorder. Ensuring
CCTV coverage of help points is beneficial as is integration of
railway and external CCTV systems. Monitoring of such systems,
rather than only recording is important, as is ensuring that recordings
made are of prosecutable quality. Greater effort needs to be made
in providing another human presence at stations, such as offering
commercial lettings of more station buildings. Pilot schemes have
been undertaken for various situations; these should be evaluated
and where successful, implemented more widely and good practice
shared.
8.2.2 Are the minimum standards to provide a safe
and secure station environment high enough? Are the requirements
sufficiently clear and specific to be effective? If not, what
changes should be made? What measures should be required to ensure
significant improvements in passengers' safety in railway and
underground stations? Are the minimum standards effectively policed?
Are the penalties for failing to provide a secure station environment
sufficiently severe?
— In certain areas SQUIRE regimes are in operation,
specifying the level and number of features and facilities to
be provided and maintained. Monitoring of their provision is a
key component and levels of penalty have exceeded the costs of
operation, indicating non-compliance. Absence of any regime would
doubtless permit even greater non-compliance. Extension of this
type of measurable provision and monitoring for enforcement, in
future franchise specifications, is a possible way forward. Overall
responsibility for co-ordinating station developments should be
vested in a single organisation. Different requirements apply
under different franchises which complicates definition of satisfactory
standards, and any absence of monitoring renders them meaningless
in any case. It is preferable for contractual obligations to enhance
station security, as a requirement without a contract to underpin
it will be ignored.
8.2.3 Why are so few stations accredited under the
Secure Stations Scheme? Should the scheme be made compulsory?
— The scheme is useful in focussing on station security.
At the outset, larger stations achieved accreditation with little
need to make alterations. However, the cost, both of accreditation
and monitoring to retain accreditation, is a drain on scarce resources
and has led many train companies to give little priority to the
scheme which has, in any case, minimal passenger awareness, and
no business case was made for smaller stations. Compulsory introduction
of the scheme to current operators could have a major financial
impact on them. Reincentivisation may be best achieved through
the refranchising process; for this reason, we welcome the requirement
in the SWT Invitation to Tender for those stations experiencing
the significant majority of footfall to achieve Secure Station
Accreditation (SSA), incorporating an appreciation of the stations'
experience of crime. The requirement to liaise with BTP on assessing
the security/crime risk at all the franchisee's stations and ensure
that the proposals include all identified high-risk locations
is a particularly significant new development. A priced option
of up to 95% footfall coverage is most encouraging. These requirements
should be adopted in other new franchises.
8.2.4 Is the Government's approach to passenger safety
in railway stations effective?
— The franchise agreement is the government's principal
tool in this respect. (Our comments on the SWT ITT, in 8.2.3 apply
equally here.) However, bidders are left to make their own suggestions.
While this heavy hint is welcome, it stops short of a requirement
or compulsion. Bidders for different franchises may easily offer
different levels of provision, which will make a common national
approach much more difficult to achieve, unless a common level
is specified. The absence of targets hampers enforcement.
— Good practice can be shared but introduction of
such measures must be tempered by the evaluation of passengers'
perceptions and needs and the recognition of the differing circumstances
during daytime compared with evening and of station size and location.
Clear responsibility for the implementation of measures to enhance
passenger security should be based on a partnership approach where
each partner has contractually enshrined objectives. Passengers
need to understand what they can expect and confidence should
not be undermined by confusion over staff roles or unmet expectations.
REFERENCES
1 National Passenger Survey—Wave 13—Autumn
2005—Consultees Report. Passenger Focus (2006).
2 Passenger Expectations and Priorities for Improvement
(research summary RS0501). Continental Research for Strategic
Rail Authority (May 2005, unpublished).
3 What passengers want from stations. Rail Passengers
Council (June 2005).
4 Maintaining and improving Britain's railway stations.
National Audit Office (July 2005).
5 Crime and Safety at London's Suburban Railway Stations.
London Assembly Transport Committee (January 2006).
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