Conclusions and recommendations
Introduction
1. The
outcome of the Department for Transport's latest BTP review is
awaited as this short report is published. We understand that
the review is due to finish later this month. We hope that our
work will assist the Government in reaching a proper conclusion.
(Paragraph 7)
Matters of concern
2. Throughout
this short report, we have sought to identify a sound rationale
for the review, a justification for the uncertainty created at
a time - in the aftermath of the terrorist bombings of the London
Underground in 2005 - when it is of particular importance that
the Force should concentrate on protecting the travelling public,
and when distractions should be avoided. (Paragraph 8)
3. The clear up rate
of the British Transport Police for some serious crime is not
inspiring; the Force is operating over a wide geographic area.
We expect the Force to bend all its efforts to make improvements
in this very important area. But this is true of many other police
forces in England and Wales. In itself, we do not believe that
the Force's clear up rate is a valid reason for destroying the
British Transport Police as a serious force by removing from it
the investigation of serious crime on the railways. In particular,
it is not clear what would be gained by shifting responsibility
for these crimes to the Metropolitan Police whose clear up rate
is only a little better than that of the British Transport Police,
and whose experience of railways policing is non-existent. (Paragraph
14)
4. The Metropolitan
Police have proposed to take over the responsibilities of the
British Transport Police in London. We have established that no
detailed plan of the proposal has been put to the Government;
and that no local representations in London have been made proposing
such a move. (Paragraph 24)
5. The Metropolitan
Police was unable to point to any specific problems of coordination
between themselves and the British Transport Police, or give even
one example of poor policing arising from the present arrangements.
(Paragraph 25)
6. We were provided
with no costing for the supposed 'value for money' benefits of
the take over, and we have doubts that costings exist. The Metropolitan
Police Authority has not raised any proposal to amalgamate the
forces with the British Transport Police Authority. (Paragraph
26)
7. No thought appears
to have been given by the Metropolitan Police to how the remaining
parts of the British Transport Police would operate were a London
amalgamation to take place. Finally, far from being critical of
the British Transport Police's performance, the Home Office and
the Department for Transport are highly complementary, in particular
about the Force's counter terrorism effort. (Paragraph 27)
8. We were anxious
to ascertain a justification for the review of the British Transport
Police at a time when the terrorist threat to the UK and to London
is exceptionally high, and where police concentration needs to
be tightly focussed on the job in hand. Unfortunately, we did
not find that justification. (Paragraph 29)
9. The facts speak
for themselves: no case for changing the status quo, much less
justifying the 'take over' of the British Transport Police by
the Metropolitan Police Service, has been made in the areas examined
so far. (Paragraph 30)
10. We were concerned
to hear such diametrically different evidence about the future
of the BTP and the way it works with its partner police forces
on successive weeks from different senior policemen from the Metropolitan
Police. This suggests an absence of 'strategic thinking' in the
higher echelons of that Force which we hope will be resolved speedily
by the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir Ian Blair. We would
like to have questioned the Commissioner about this, but he was
unfortunately unavailable. (Paragraph 38)
11. So far as the
counter terrorism role of the British Transport Police is concerned,
it was hinted to us that intelligence gathering could be improved.
What is lacking however is any shred of evidence that this is
a problematic area for the BTP. On the contrary, from Commander
Carter of the Metropolitan Police we have received an assurance
in the firmest of terms on 3 May that cooperation between the
British Transport Police and other forces is excellent. We also
note that the Force has recently established its own Special Branch.
This is good evidence that the British Transport Police is taking
intelligence gathering seriously and is intent on raising its
game in this area. (Paragraph 39)
12. In the light of
this evidence, and particularly lack of evidence, the Department
must consider very carefully indeed justifying the break up of
the British Transport Police by reference to problems of counter
terrorism. It is perfectly acceptable, indeed essential, for the
Government to examine whether the present security and counter
intelligence arrangements affecting the rail network are fully
operational. But there must be no changes without the firmest
evidence that improvements are in fact required. Veiled references
to 'issues' and general statements about systemic improvements
are insufficient. The policy for the future of the British Transport
Police must encapsulate to the fullest extent possible the Government's
own commitment to evidence based policy. (Paragraph 40)
13. The Government's
review must not only address but establish a sensible and efficient
system of funding for the BTP. The Government has allowed to run
on for far too long a time consuming process in which the Chief
Constable of the British Transport Police is forced to spend large
parts of his working year negotiating with the train operating
companies, some of whom have proved less than willing to make
their payments to this essential service on time. The Government
should seize the opportunity of the present review to put sensible
arrangements in place without any more prevarication. (Paragraph
44)
14. A cardinal part
of devising a 21st century funding package for the British Transport
Police is to ensure that it receives adequate funds on time and
without undue delay. While we understand from ATOC that currently
there are no outstanding payments to the BTP, it is not tolerable
that some train operating companies can remain in arrears of payments
to the Force, and that this can drag on for years at a time. (Paragraph
45)
15. The Department
should ensure that the users pay up where there is a duty incumbent
on them to do so, and free the Chief Constable to lead his Force
full time in the vital job he has of protecting the travelling
public. A formal mechanism such as 'top-slicing' might be an efficient
way of achieving this. Where the activities of the BTP clearly
contribute to the wider policing of the country, for example its
counter terrorist duties, the Government should recognise this
by single payments, such as the £3.5 million it paid the
BTP in November 2005. (Paragraph 46)
16. The option of
privatising the policing of the railways would be little short
of a disaster. In place of a public police force, the British
Transport Police, with deep experience of policing the railways
and considerable public standing, applying the law throughout
the national rail network in a consistent way, there would arise
a hotch potch of ad hoc arrangements with each train operating
company negotiating its own level of policing. Such a system would
place the railways at risk of descending into policing chaos.
The train operating companies find it difficult enough to navigate
the present set of negotiations to finance the British Transport
Police. Presented with more complex agreements to make on policing
levels in their areas we doubt that some would manage at all.
The result would be to the serious detriment of the travelling
public and the overall security of the country. (Paragraph 50)
17. We find it extraordinary
at a time of heightened national threat, when the police forces
throughout the length and breadth of the country need to be in
a state of high morale and completely focussed on their primary
job of protecting the public, that the Government could seriously
entertain so bizarre a notion as to remove a dedicated and experienced
police force from protecting the rail network which continues
to be a primary terrorist target. We do not believe that any form
of privatisation of the BTP is viable or desirable. Policing is
fundamentally a public good. The commercialisation of the funding
regime that this would entail has no support from the BTP or the
train operating companies. The Government must not go down this
path. (Paragraph 51)
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