Memorandum submitted by the British Transport
Police Authority
1. INTRODUCTION
The British Transport Police Authority welcomes
this further inquiry by the Committee into the British Transport
Police.
The British Transport Police Authority (BTPA)
was created in July 2004 to provide more public accountability
for the Force and to ensure the Force is fit for purpose. This
was prompted by pressure to align governance arrangements with
those of Home Office Forces and to address the issues of inadequate
funding settlements from the BTP Committee.
The BTPA is charged with securing the maintenance
of an efficient and effective British Transport Police (BTP) Force,
appointing officers, entering into police service agreements with
railway operators, and bearing the expenses of the Force. It has
a three-year strategic plan to secure operational improvements,
which is part-way through its period of implementation. Part of
this is to address a number of "legacy issues" caused
by the years of under funding. These improvements have been central
to improving performance and increasing the capacity for counter-terrorism.
2. REVIEWS OF
BTP
Numerous reviews by various bodies in the last
five years have concluded that a national, specialist force is
best placed to protect the railway network, and an overview of
their conclusions is set out in Annex I. Of key note are the comments
made by the Secretary of State in the Rail Review White Paper,
and the DfT Review in 2004. These are reproduced here.
"The Government remains committed to the
principle that the costs of the BTP should remain largely funded
by the rail industry. However, it is acknowledged that the recently
abolished BTP Committee has left a number of legacy issues that
need to be addressed. The Government will look to the newly created
BTP Authority to improve business planning and ensure, with the
industry, that the BTP is appropriately funded." [2]
"Given this support for a specialist rail
police force, there is no suggestion that the BTP should be merged
or linked to the Metropolitan Police or other Home Office County
Forces. To do this would be to lose the valuable specialisms that
the BTP has established. It would also take away the extremely
positive ability of the BTP to police across boundaries."
[3]
The Secretary of State announced on 11 October
2005 in the House of Commons, a review into the role of the BTP,
in parallel to the review by the Home Secretary into local police
forces. The stated aim of the review is to examine "the functions
of the British Transport Police and whether some or all of these
are best carried out by a national force, regional forces, or,
indeed, by industry itself." [4]These
various reviews and reports demonstrate consistent support for
the role of the BTP, and nothing has materially changed since
them. We believe this forms a conclusive case that the BTP is
best placed to carry out its existing functions. The BTPA is therefore
very concerned at suggestions that the two options being considered
by the latest review are to either abolish BTP or refocus on "core"
railway issues (which has yet to be defined). The BTPA believes
that the conclusions reached in the 2004 DfT review confirming
the advantages of BTP as a functional force remain valid. We are
therefore committed to preserving a fully functional British Transport
Police Force for the railways.
The HMIC report, "Closing the Gap",
is the basis of the Home Office review of the structure of police
forces. However, "Closing the Gap" did not include a
review of the BTP's protective services, and such a review had
not been made when the DfT review was decided upon. We therefore
believe that the DfT review of BTP was premature. A review of
BTP's protective services has since been commissioned by DfT.
The BTPA also takes note of the Secretary of
State's reply during the debate in the House on 11 October 2005
on the announced review, that:
"the BTP have significant expertise, and
working on a railway involves a great deal of skill and detailed
knowledge. A lot of the work they do . . . involves specialist
policing, first to deal with the immediate situation, but then
to get the train running on time. When other police forces have
come on the lines, lack of expertise has caused some unhappy experiences."
The BTPA wholeheartedly agrees with this view
and hopes that the Secretary of State will continue the historic,
and constant, government support enjoyed by BTP.
3. FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS
In the light of the number and extent of endorsements
of the BTP's existence and role, we believe that the real debate
on the future of the BTP lies in how the operations of the BTP
are funded rather than whether it should exist as a separate force,
and that the DfT's review could most usefully focus on resolving
this issue. The BTPA has made a number of suggestions to DfT in
the last two years on alternative funding arrangements, which
to date have gone no further, but feel that this review offers
an ideal opportunity for DfT to consider these and other suggestions
afresh.
The previous government support has done much
to improve the status of policing of the railways. The newly-created
Authority received a clear direction from the Secretary of State
to address the legacy issues, which it has sought to do via the
three-year Strategic Plan and associated budgets. The focus has
been on rectifying backroom problems, which will not only increase
efficiency in itself, but will also release officers back to the
front-line, increasing visibility and operational effectiveness.
The Secretary of State himself stated on 11 October 2005:
"Through the British Transport Police Authority,
we have been able to ensure that [the Force's] funding has been
significantly increased"[5]
However, it is right that the issue of funding
be re-examined, as it continues to be a source of tension between
the BTP and the train operation companies. The potential for such
continued tension was pointed out by both the PSA holders and
BTP during the DfT consultation on the new Authority, as well
as by this Committee when it last looked at the BTP.
It is worth noting that TfL invest heavily in
police numbers for the Underground, and increasingly, the overground
rail in London also.
The TOCs currently feel that although they fund
the BTP, their input via the BTPA has been considerably diminished.
The BTP's functions are directly beneficial to them, but the Force
also carries out a number of wider societal roles (public good)
which the rail industry is reluctant to finance. In particular
it is legitimate to contend that anti-terrorist operations and
other activities not directly related to the railways should be
met by the public purse.
It is therefore unlikely that funding tensions
will go away, and this will continue to be an issue going forward.
BTPA feel the current review should increasingly be focused on
finding the right balance between TOC funding and central government
funding. We feel that the reaching of such a balance is an issue
for government, rather than for either BTPA or the Force to become
involved in, as long as our ability to ensure the Force is adequately
funded is not compromised.
The BTPA position is simply this—there
is a proven case, confirmed over a number of reviews, for the
existence of the BTP as a separate force. The real issue is who
funds it and that is a matter for government, and not for us.
It is important that this review does not confuse the case for
the existence of the BTP with the way in which it is funded.
It is right that the Chief Constable makes operational
decisions and that the BTPA formulates the Policing Plan, in consultation
with TOCs. However, we point out that the Authority has to take
into account the National Community Safety Plan and the views
of other stakeholders, such as passengers. The railway industry
should not be in a position to dictate what is policed and what
is not on the public transport network. TOCs are ultimately accountable
to shareholders for their bottom line profit, rather than to society
at large. Past experience of how the rail industry strikes a balance
between efficient and effective policing and cost has seen staff
numbers decrease and the Force's infrastructure left underfunded,
leading to HMIC's assessment that the infrastructure was "groaning".
The TOCs represent the private sector, and understandably they
have legitimate commercial interests to consider. We are therefore
concerned that their priorities are not always appropriate for
determining policing priorities on the public transport network.
The BTPA believes that from a public policy point of view, the
TOCs should not have a controlling influence over the size of
the annual budget. The DfT drafted the Railways and Transport
Safety Act 2003 to have this deliberate effect.
This Committee has previously noted pressure
from TOCs to identify specific numbers of officers for their franchise
areas and the consequent dilution of the Chief Constable's role
and the benefits gained from a national police service. We would
add that were more detailed service agreements to be made with
individual TOCs, as has been suggested, none would want to fund
overarching services or BTP infrastructure and support costs,
and that policing of the railways would become a fragmented and
confused state of affairs.
There is, furthermore, a misunderstanding on
the part of the TOCs about the increases in the BTPA budgets in
2004-05 through to 2006-07. These are largely due to unavoidable
expenditure, with additional smaller amounts for investment programmes
which are vital to bring the Force up to date and enable it to
function effectively, as well as enabling cost savings and efficiencies
to be made in the longer term. We support the Chief Constable's
aim to ensure that the BTP carries out the policing of the railways
to national policing standards. These investments are necessary
to address the legacy issues and respond to the last HMIC report
and improve performance. Last year's increase, for example, has
enabled the upgrade of the Force's computer systems, which had
been so lacking in funds in previous years that there was an imminent
risk that the Force would be unable to access the Police National
Computer. The budgets likely to be proposed for the years after
these investments have been made are that increases will only
be at around the level of inflation.
A greater increase is proposed for 2006-07 than
was previously envisaged due to a compromise which involved a
lower increase in 2004-05, which was possible thanks to a DfT
loan which has now to be repayed. The TOCs were in favour of this
option rather than the greater upfront cost in 2004-05, and the
consequences of this on the 2006-07 budget were made explicitly
clear in all communications with them.
The input of the rail industry into the budget
setting process is, in constitutional terms, via their representatives
on the BTPA. The BTPA has brought forward a new consultation exercise
and engages with the industry via workshops, written briefings
requesting comments, meetings and liaison with ATOC as well as
the formal Authority meetings. Industry therefore has a number
of opportunities and mechanisms for inputting into the process
and raising concerns. The BTPA has listened to these concerns.
The budget for 2005-06 was reduced on three occasions, and the
budget for 2006-07 has been reduced twice. An account of the budget-setting
process for the 2006-07 budget can be found at Appendix III.
The funding arrangements currently in place
may of course be improved, something the BTPA recognises and has
for the last two years suggested alternatives to DfT. We are not
opposed to change per se and have been willing to be proactive
and initiate change, but we would be seriously concerned were
DfT to reverse government policy and put funding decisions solely
back in the hands of the rail industry. As the funders, clearly
they need to have a say, but this should be alongside the interests
of passengers and the wider public.
In conclusion, the current DfT review is an
opportunity to resolve the funding issues for the BTP, but in
its current direction it is a potential threat to the proper policing
of the railways, in that it is overly concerned with the rail
industry's reaction to the previous reforms and the necessary
costs that they are bearing as a consequence of the legacy issues.
BTPA believes that the previous policy position taken by the department
remains valid and we do not believe there is any fundamental case
for change on this issue. The situation should not be allowed
to revert back to the situation whereby companies looking after
profit margins were able to squeeze policing costs to a level
which threatened proper policing for the railways.
4. AN EFFECTIVE
AND EFFICIENT
POLICING SERVICE
Following the HMIC's criticism of groaning infrastructure,
and the direction from the Secretary of State, the BTPA is committed
to continuous improvements and has been acting to improve performance
further, via the three-year strategic plan and increased budgets.
A key strength of the BTP is its sensitivity
and ability to keep the railways running as much as possible.
This was well demonstrated in the aftermath of the London bombings,
when Kings Cross mainline station was able to re-open later that
evening, allowing those who live and work in London to carry on
with their lives. This is in part because the BTP have been continually
exposed to the threat of terrorism on the railways since the IRA
campaigns of the late 1970's. By continually being exposed to
the risk in these specialised areas, the Force has become well
equipped to taking measures of prevention and better at enforcement.
Following the last DfT review, the BTP significantly
increased its counter terrorism capability, thanks to both central
government funding and increased budget revenues. The impact of
this enhanced funding was clear during the events of July 2005,
as was the impact of increased numbers of staff and officers in
sustaining such a prolonged level of manpower. In particular,
PCSOs played a significant role in freeing up police officers
and increasing visibility at major interchanges, as well as providing
additional "eyes and ears".
The increased funding has had further impacts,
with the Force meeting all nine of its operational targets for
2004-05 and currently meeting all eleven operational targets for
2005-06. The BTPA aims, through the strategic plan, for the Force's
performance to be in the second performance quartile of all police
forces, allowing funding to resume to levels nearer inflation.
The budget increase of 2004-05 included provision
for a London Special Response Unit. That unit was deployed on
over 300 occasions between 7 and 31 July 2005. The government,
in its response to the Transport Select Committee's inquiry into
the work of TRANSEC, states that BTP officers clear a suspect
package in around 12 minutes[6].
In contrast, anecdotal evidence suggests that Home Office Forces
take around 2½ hours. Not only is this significant in terms
of public safety and the overall efficient functioning of the
public transport rail network, it is an endorsement often cited
by industry members, given that every minute worth of delay costs
a significant amount of money. Further anecdotal evidence suggests
that by simply knowing an SRU can attend so rapidly empowers patrol
officers and railway staff to deal robustly with unattended items.
The BTPA recognises and supports the need for
reviews at appropriate junctures to ensure that the existing arrangements
are fit for purpose and deliver an efficient and effective police
service.
5. HOME OFFICE
FORCES RESTRUCTURING
The DfT review of BTP was announced after the
Home Secretary's announcement of his review into the structure
of Home Office Forces, and is to run in parallel with it. The
terms of reference of the DfT review state that it will take account
of the "emerging outcomes of the Home Secretary's review
of police force structures" and we have therefore been following
that debate very closely. On 11th October 2005 the Home Secretary
stated that "Proposals for the British Transport Police will
be brought forward, if appropriate, once the outcome of [the DfT]
review is known".
The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) has submitted
a proposal for taking over BTP responsibilities within the M25,
for which the BTPA has seen the outline business case. The status
of the MPS proposal is unclear to us, as it infringes one of the
criteria set out by the Home Office, that of not splitting up
existing force boundaries. The MPS proposal would clearly take
out the London area from the BTP Force's existing area of jurisdiction—giving
rise to a number of issues which we will outline. In this context
we note the ODPM's consultation paper[7]
on the responsibilities of the GLA and London Mayor, which points
out that the Metropolitan Police Authority is different to other
police authorities in a number of ways: it includes elected members
from the GLA rather than local authorities; it includes one member
appointed by the Home Secretary to reflect the national and international
functions of the MPS; and it is larger than other authorities,
with 23 members. The ODPM believes that:
"the MPS is not held to account as efficiently
and effectively as it could be. The existing structure in which
many bodies have a direct or indirect role in holding the MPS
to account needs to be streamlined in order to ensure the process
is transparent to the people of London."
In view of this assessment, the BTPA would be
very concerned at suggestions that the MPA become accountable
for the operations of the BTP, either in part or whole.
RESTRUCTURING BTP—KEY
ISSUES
The DfT review of BTP and the MPS proposal raise
three possibilities, as we understand them, for the future of
the BTP:
1. Abolition.
2. Complete or partial merger
with MPS (likely to lead to abolition).
3. "Refocusing" on core
railway issues (yet to be defined).
Each of these raises a number of issues which
we have outlined below.
Abolition
— HMIC has already stated that such
a situation would lead to a dilution of the BTP's specialist service
and fewer officers on the network as they would be diverted to
provide more officers elsewhere. This conclusion was reiterated
by the Transport Select Committee's 12th Report of 03/04.
— With these additional responsibilities
there would also be additional operational costs for the Home
Office Forces—how would this be funded given that the rail
industry would no longer have accountability for its contribution
and has indicated it would not pay?
— If separate forces outside London
take over the functions of the BTP, this will require far more
complex administrative arrangements with a multiplicity of agreements
between railway operators and various police forces compared to
the current arrangements.
— Should the BTP be merged or disbanded,
how will its specialist experience be preserved? There are significant
training implications for other forces, such as the provision
of track safety training for officers.
— We do not know whether the Home Office
review has included this possible outcome of the DfT review in
its financial and operational assumptions at this stage, nor if
any assessment has been made of the potential impact on council
tax precepts. We understand from notes of meetings between the
APA and Home Office officials that if new costs fell on Home Office
police authorities, they would expect to receive a transfer for
DfT to fund them.
— The railway network is subject to
high volumes of low level disorder and level 1 crime, with many
criminals cutting across force boundaries. Following any restructuring,
how would railway policing be prioritised to retain the standard
and effectiveness of policing on the rail network? What priority
will be given to assaults on railway staff? How will commercial
interests and the importance of keeping the railways running be
balanced against security and safety requirements?
— How will several forces share intelligence
across the network as efficiently as a single force? How will
patterns of crime, eg graffiti (which are only significant if
viewed across the entire network) be detected?
— The Home Office review does not apply
to Scotland. How will any impact of the DfT review of BTP relate
to Scotland where BTP also has jurisdiction?
Merger with MPS
— Were the Metropolitan Police Service
(MPS)'s proposal to the Home Office that it take over the BTP's
role in London be accepted, this would remove a critical mass
of officers and support staff, likely rendering the rest of BTP
unviable. Discussions with the Association of Police Authorities
indicate no appetite for other Home Office Forces taking over
BTP responsibilities in their areas. Will other forces be obliged
to pick up the rest of BTP's operations, given that they have
already indicated they do not want to?
— The boundaries of the MPS and the
Underground do not coincide—how will this be handled? Underground
stations outside of London are also interchanges with national
rail
— If changes are made to the policing
situation in London, how would counter terrorism for the railways
in the rest of England, Scotland and Wales be organised and co-ordinated?
— How will accountability be ensured,
given the assessment by ODPM of the MPA? How will the interests
of the rail industry, rail staff, and the travelling public be
represented?
— How will the priorities of other
areas of the UK be regarded? How will democratic accountability
be handled in the MPA if MPS take over responsibility for a national
force?
Refocusing on core railway policing
— The BTP has limited capacity to deal
with, for example, murder investigations or serious and organised
crime, and it is right and proper that co-operation with Home
Office Forces and the proposed Serious and Organised Crime Agency
take place. This, however, is the existing situation and so any
"refocusing" must mean the BTP doing less of what it
already does, to focus on a particular railway policing issue,
as yet undefined.
— Numerous reviews have confirmed that
the BTP is best placed to police the particular environment of
the railways. It is therefore not clear why a refocusing is necessary,
which operations are being considered for transfer to other forces,
or how this would be implemented or funded.
— Either disbandment or refocusing
would mean Home Office Forces taking over at least some of the
BTP's responsibilities—HMIC has already stated (and the
Transport Select Committee's 12th Report of 03/04 agreed) this
would lead to a dilution of its specialist service and fewer officers
on the network, whilst Police Authorities have shown little interest.
— Refocusing could also mean greater
in-house activities by the TOCs on lower-level activities. Although
clearly security staff and other measures are a useful resource,
the recent Public Accounts Committee Report on stations and the
London Assembly report on security at suburban stations demonstrate
the willingness of TOCs to invest significantly in and to prioritise
safety considerations.
— A variety of options exist for who
should take over the activities no longer dealt with by BTP under
this option. All of these would involve bringing the interface
between police forces within the railway network rather than outside
it.
— The changed roles involved in this
option would lead to an element of uncertainty, confusion and
increased management cost on the ground whilst the new arrangements
were "bedded down".
— If refocusing is a means of addressing
the limited resources of BTP, we would argue that the wrong solution
is being applied to the problem. Lack of resources is a consequence
of previous under-funding and is an argument for proper resourcing
of the BTP Force (something which is being addressed under the
current governance arrangements), not a reason for curtailing
the BTP's activities.
— Refocusing raises the probability
that, as the Force no longer covers a range of policing activity,
talented and high-performing police officers would no longer consider
the BTP a good career choice and consequently the BTP would be
unable to compete on an equal footing with other Forces for the
recruitment of officers. Pension contributions for BTP officers
are already far higher than their Home Office counterparts (16%
as opposed to 11%).
— It is possible that as the Force
becomes considered "second-rate" and is involved in
a restricted sphere of policing activity, that this would fuel
further arguments in the future for abolishing the BTP due to
its even smaller size—in effect an incremental, if unintended,
erosion of the Force. This option could easily become a first
step towards abolition, but without an explicit or intended policy
decision at this stage to do so, and without the full public debate
around abolition that would ensue were this done in one step.
The BTPA believes these issues, alongside the
acknowledged strengths of the BTP, make a strong case for the
preservation of the Force in its current, fully functional capacity.
We hope that the government will not rule out this option when
it concludes its review, and that if there is a further stage
of consultation this option is included. This need not be a "status
quo" option, but one which, as mentioned on funding, addresses
this core issue of who funds the BTP, rather than the merits or
otherwise of the BTP itself, which are well-established.
The BTPA also takes the view that these issues
are of considerable public interest and therefore that any proposals
not requiring legislative change should nevertheless be subject
to full parliamentary scrutiny.
6. IMPACT OF
REVIEW ON
BTP
The BTPA would like to point out that the doubts
over the future of the Force run the very real risk of becoming
a self-fulfilling prophecy as valued experienced officers will
look elsewhere to further their careers. This would have a consequently
detrimental effect on performance should it become pronounced.
After a period of change in which the BTPA was
created to address funding and accountability issues, we believe
that stability is important to allow the three-year strategic
plan to be fully implemented and for the full effects of increased
funding to be felt in terms of performance.
7. CONCLUSIONS
The BTPA believes that the case for preserving
the BTP as a fully functional force is overwhelming, and that
issues arising from restructuring, merging, abolishing or refocusing
are such that they should only be considered viable options if
a significant problem has been identified which can only be resolved
in this way. Any issues which need to be addressed should be clearly
identified and discussed with the BTP and BTPA, as well as other
stakeholders, so that a full range of proposals for improvement
can be put forward.
Whilst we recognise that there is always room
for improvement and are committed to raising performance, we believe
this should be pursued within the existing framework, leaving
the role of the BTP intact, rather than pursuing structural changes
which will cause considerable disruption and will not have given
the new arrangements enough time to prove their efficacy.
We therefore hope that the DfT review will remain
open to other proposals than those currently on the table, and
specifically that it will consider focusing upon resolving the
remaining tensions around the source of funding for the BTP.
Finally, we thank the Committee for the opportunity
to put forward our views on this issue, and are happy to provide
any additional documentation or comments which may be of assistance.
17 February 2006
http://www.dft.gov.uk/paragraph 4.6
2 DfT (2004): The Future of Rail: White Paper. Back
3
DfT (2004): Review of the British Transport Police. Back
4
DfT (2002) (2): Modernising the British Transport Police:
response, Back
5
House of Commons debate, 11 October 2005. Back
6
DfT (2006) Transport security: Response to the Transport Committee's
preliminary report. Back
7
ODPM (2005) The Greater London Authority: The Government's
proposals for additional powers and responsibilities for the Mayor
and Assembly. Back
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