Select Committee on Transport Fourteenth Report


5  Vertical integration

98. In 2002, our predecessor Committee, the Transport, Local Government and the Regions Committee, concluded that "there is no evidence that vertical integration [of the railways] would work."[191] That Committee found that whilst vertical integration might be suitable in self-contained regional franchises, it would not be a realistic option for other, less self-contained franchises. We asked our witnesses to revisit this debate, but found that little has changed since 2002.

99. Our witnesses put forward a wide range of arguments rejecting the idea of vertical integration. Simon Norton argued that vertical integration is problematic because, in many cases, track is shared by a number of franchise operators.[192] The Railfuture Passenger Committee said that vertical integration was likely to be an obstacle to further competition on the network, not least in the freight sector. [193] The Department for Transport also cited competition as a key reason for rejecting vertical integration, stating that a vertically integrated network would consist of monopolies and therefore, additional regulation would be required to secure an adequate level of competition, particularly in terms of inter-regional and freight traffic.[194] The Association of Transport Coordinating Officers (ATCO) emphasised that:

    "it is important that Network Rail is able to exert its role as an impartial 'honest broker' for train pathing and as overall infrastructure operator, it is able to maintain uniformity of standards across the network. It is important that the availability of freight paths is given appropriate importance and not excluded because of aspirations for increased passenger services."[195]

100. The Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) embraced the view of our predecessor Committee that some measure of vertical integration might be an option for small and self-contained sections of the network. As for the wider network, both ATOC, Network Rail, and the Department for Transport (DfT) concurred that current projects to integrate operational management and planning between Network Rail and Train Operating Companies (TOCs) as well as the development of joint ventures are already increasing the level of integration and coherence between track and wheel.[196] The key objective of vertical integration, to control interfaces on the network, is being achieved through partnerships and integrated Control Centres.[197] The current consultation by the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) on a new incentives framework for Network Rail and its partners is an example of the efforts of the regulator to promote integration by proposing a formal structure in which incentives for Network Rail, franchise operators as well as other parts of the industry are interconnected and thoroughly aligned to the interests of passengers.[198]

101. Mr Ford dissented from the view that cooperation and partnerships have achieved as much as might be gained through vertical integration. He highlighted persistent failures of coordination, such as train operators leasing ever-heavier rolling stock which causes unnecessary and costly damage to tracks. Mr Ford said:

    "I would have thought that the radical approach would be to consider vertical integration upwards from the rail rather than downwards from the train. […] They have produced a timetable. Perhaps there might be a case for Network Rail acquiring trains and running a franchise themselves. That would give you a lot of continuity and it could have break points in it at which the Government could say, 'You are doing a good job or a bad job.'[199]

102. Professor Nash highlighted that "day-to-day operations, planning of the timetable, the flexibility to adjust things, and indeed perhaps planning investment" are more straightforward in a vertically integrated system, but also emphasised that such advantages have to be weighed up against the advantages of competition.[200]

103. Merseytravel and NedRailways, a Dutch passenger rail operator, strongly argued the case in favour of vertical integration at a regional level. Merseytravel took over the management of the self-contained "electric urban third rail system" on Merseyside from the SRA in 2003 and subsequently agreed a 25-year franchising contract with the joint venture Serco-NedRailways.[201] Merseytravel has actively sought to achieve full vertical integration on the Merseytravel network. Their proposal was for Merseytravel to set up:

    "a joint venture 'InfraCo' with Serco-NedRailways to maintain and renew the infrastructure. The aim is to replicate the success of our operating franchise. Network Rail's operational responsibilities for track and signals would pass to Merseyrail, enabling the InfraCo to work solely on maintenance and renewal, and the train operator to introduce more efficient integrated management."[202]

104. Merseytravel estimated they would save £33 million net over the 25-year franchise by integrating track and wheel. They also anticipated other benefits from vertical integration, for example improvements in reliability and punctuality; improved responsiveness of maintenance works; increased control, reliability, transparency and accountability; and more investment and refurbishment of assets. The Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport (CILT) agreed that there is a strong case for vertical integration on regional or local networks which do not form part of the national infrastructure, but that this argument cannot be transferred to the wider network.

105. Merseytravel suggested that an additional benefit of vertical integration on their network would be the ability for ORR to use the performance of a vertically integrated franchise as a benchmark against which the performance of Network Rail could be measured.[203] Network Rail, however, withdrew from discussions with Merseyrail, and the project therefore never came off the ground.

106. We did not receive any compelling evidence to determine whether vertical integration would improve passenger services. We believe that vertical integration across the entire network, and in conjunction with the current franchising model, would be a retrograde step. But we also believe that vertical integration may have some merit in self-contained regions, such as Merseyside. We therefore recommend that Network Rail and the Government, with advice from the ORR, design and carry out pilots of vertical integration on self-contained parts of the network, where a sound case for such pilots can be made. It is essential that Network Rail supports such pilots. We look to the ORR and the Government to ensure that pilots are encouraged and given the best possible conditions of success.


191   The Transport, Local Government and the Regions Committee, First Report of Session 2001-02, Passenger Rail Franchising and the Future of the Railway, HC239-I, para 56 Back

192   Ev 208 [Simon Norton] Back

193   Ev 39 [Railfuture] Back

194   Ev 142 [Department for Transport] Back

195   Ev 33 [ATCO] Back

196   Ev 1 [ATOC]  Back

197   Ev 142 [Department for Transport]; Ev 109 [Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport]; Ev 17 [Railway Forum]; Ev 64 [Network Rail] Back

198   Office of Rail Regulation press release: ORR consults on the incentives framework for Network Rail to apply from 2009 ORR/23/06, 31 July 2006  Back

199   Q 246 [Mr Ford] Back

200   Q 244 [Professor Nash] Back

201   Ev 59 [Merseytravel] Back

202   Ibid. Back

203   Ev 59 [Merseytravel] Back


 
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