Select Committee on Transport Minutes of Evidence


Memorandum submitted by Association of Transport Co-ordinating Officers

INTRODUCTION

  The Association of Transport Co-ordinating Officers (ATCO) represents those officers in local government responsible for the coordination of public transport. It has over 600 members from County, Metropolitan and Unitary Councils in England, Scotland and Wales as well as from Passenger Transport Executives and other transport related organisations. The Association exists to secure the association of persons directly concerned with the formulation and implementation of policies for the securing of public passenger transport services.

  ATCO has a number of special interest groups one of which concentrates on rail related issues and meets on a regular basis with Department for Transport and Network Rail. This response has been produced by this Rail Sub-Committee of ATCO.

  Our response to the questions contained in the consultation is set out below.

What should be the purpose of passenger rail franchising?

  The purpose of passenger rail franchising should be to deliver the appropriate level of rail services at agreed levels of quality, punctuality and reliability in a way that delivers value for money and gives the operator freedom to innovate and develop the product.

Is the current system achieving that purpose?

  It is felt that currently franchises are not putting passenger's interests first but are driven by the financial objectives of the owning group and are constrained severely by DfT specifications, both of which restrict innovative thinking.

How well does the process for awarding franchises work?

What input do operators, passengers and other interested parties have into the design of franchised services?

  The Association of Transport Co-ordinating Officers has a particular concern that local government transport coordination officers should have input into the design of franchised services. They have a responsibility for, or an opportunity to encourage:

    —  Co-ordination of public transport services.

    —  Publicity and marketing of public transport services.

    —  Provision of home to school/college transport.

    —  Obtaining funding for infrastructure improvements.

    —  Developing Community Rail Partnerships.

    —  Assisting dialogue between public transport operators.

  Transport Co-ordination Officers have local knowledge about travel patterns for work, education, leisure etc which can make a valuable contribution to the design of franchised services. This knowledge is often not available to people based outside the local area. Involvement of local government officers can help to ensure that a franchise is appropriate to the areas it serves.

  There is concern that franchising specifications sometimes conflict with regional and spatial planning aspirations and take no account of future housing allocation. An example is found in South Hampshire where proposals in the South West Trains franchise would halve the off-peak train service between Fareham and Eastleigh, a busy corridor paralleling the M27/M3 and which is earmarked for considerable housing development in the coming years, and discontinue through services between Winchester and Havant and beyond.

  It is important that the specification of franchises reflect the aspirations of local and regional development plans and Regional Transport Strategies and do not conflict with or ignore what is contained in them. Consultation with local authority officers is the best way to achieve this.

Has there been a smooth transition of franchising arrangements from the Strategic Rail Authority to the Department of Transport?

  The Department for Transport do appear to be much more restrictive in specifying franchise terms than SRA with limited scope for individual solutions to challenges and capacity constraints.

  Experience suggests that stakeholder consultation in the run up to franchises has been much more professionally organised and thorough under the DfT than it was under the SRA. There has been an openness and willingness to come out and meet local authorities.

Are franchise contracts the right size, type and length?

  Franchise lengths are too short to generate real passenger benefits. Rail investment takes a long time to deliver and to produce benefits and short term franchises do not give enough time for this to happen.

  It is felt that there is a strong argument for larger franchises including a spread of service types to enable "cross subsidy" between profitable and social railway lines and better integration at key stations.

  Consideration should be given in all franchise specifications to the provision of dedicated rail feeder bus services to assist in the delivery of integrated transport.

What criteria and processes are used to determine the nature and length of franchises?

  Problems can occur on the borders of franchises or where franchises overlap with a lack of consultation and cooperation between operators. An example is the lack of co-ordination between Arriva Trains Wales and Virgin West Coast services between Crewe and Holyhead and the poor connections at Crewe. Reducing the number of franchises can result in fewer opportunities for this to happen as has been done by concentrating services from London terminus stations in single franchises. However in very large organisations outlying areas can become remote from the centre.

What criteria and processes are used to evaluate franchise bids?

  The criteria and processes used to evaluate franchise bids must take into account all relevant factors and not just the subsidy/premium in the bids. The franchise should not be awarded to the most financially attractive bid if there are doubts about deliverability, or if other bidders are offering significantly better outputs for similar levels of subsidy.

  Following the award of a franchise, there should be a formal response mechanism to explain how stakeholders' aspirations have been dealt with. There is also a case for an appeals mechanism where there is serious concern about reductions in the level of service.

Do franchise holders deliver value for money to passengers and the government throughout the duration of their contracts?

  There have in the past been cases where franchise operators have been unable to continue with the franchise on the basis on which the bid was made. It can be argued that if this is because of over ambitious revenue estimates or cost cutting targets, the government should not be expected to "bail them out".

Are risks suitably apportioned between the government and franchise holders?

  It is felt that more risk should be placed on the franchisee but to offset this they should be allowed more freedom to innovate and develop the franchise.

What is the scope for improving services through franchise agreements?

  Currently it appears that franchisees are severely constrained by franchise specifications which restrict improvement and development of services if not contained in the franchise specification.

Do we need more competition and vertical integration?

Is franchising compatible with open access operations?

  There are differing views on this issue.

  Current experience suggests that there may be a conflict between franchising and open access operations. It is likely that future bidders will have to include a contingency in their bid in case an open access operator subsequently commences operation and abstracts revenue. However it is felt that bidders are aware of the possibility of open access operators entering the market and should cost this into their bid. Existing open access operations have developed new markets not provided by franchises and this should not be stifled.

Should train, rolling stock and track operation be more closely integrated?

  The separation of train and track operation should ensure that all train operators, passenger and freight, are treated fairly. It is important that Network Rail is able to exert its role as an impartial "honest broker" for train pathing and as overall infrastructure operator, it is able to maintain uniformity of standards across the network. It is important that the availability of freight paths is given appropriate importance and not excluded because of aspirations for increased passenger services.

  There is concern that the ROSCO's do control the availability of rolling stock and leasing costs of depreciated units are very high.

CONCLUSION

  ATCO welcomes the opportunity to be involved in this process and would be happy to provide additional information or explanation verbally or in writing.

20 June 2006



 
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