Memorandum submitted by Association of
Transport Co-ordinating Officers
INTRODUCTION
The Association of Transport Co-ordinating Officers
(ATCO) represents those officers in local government responsible
for the coordination of public transport. It has over 600 members
from County, Metropolitan and Unitary Councils in England, Scotland
and Wales as well as from Passenger Transport Executives and other
transport related organisations. The Association exists to secure
the association of persons directly concerned with the formulation
and implementation of policies for the securing of public passenger
transport services.
ATCO has a number of special interest groups
one of which concentrates on rail related issues and meets on
a regular basis with Department for Transport and Network Rail.
This response has been produced by this Rail Sub-Committee of
ATCO.
Our response to the questions contained in the
consultation is set out below.
What should be the purpose of passenger rail franchising?
The purpose of passenger rail franchising should
be to deliver the appropriate level of rail services at agreed
levels of quality, punctuality and reliability in a way that delivers
value for money and gives the operator freedom to innovate and
develop the product.
Is the current system achieving that purpose?
It is felt that currently franchises are not
putting passenger's interests first but are driven by the financial
objectives of the owning group and are constrained severely by
DfT specifications, both of which restrict innovative thinking.
How well does the process for awarding franchises
work?
What input do operators, passengers and other
interested parties have into the design of franchised services?
The Association of Transport Co-ordinating Officers
has a particular concern that local government transport coordination
officers should have input into the design of franchised services.
They have a responsibility for, or an opportunity to encourage:
Co-ordination of public transport
services.
Publicity and marketing of public
transport services.
Provision of home to school/college
transport.
Obtaining funding for infrastructure
improvements.
Developing Community Rail Partnerships.
Assisting dialogue between public
transport operators.
Transport Co-ordination Officers have local
knowledge about travel patterns for work, education, leisure etc
which can make a valuable contribution to the design of franchised
services. This knowledge is often not available to people based
outside the local area. Involvement of local government officers
can help to ensure that a franchise is appropriate to the areas
it serves.
There is concern that franchising specifications
sometimes conflict with regional and spatial planning aspirations
and take no account of future housing allocation. An example is
found in South Hampshire where proposals in the South West Trains
franchise would halve the off-peak train service between Fareham
and Eastleigh, a busy corridor paralleling the M27/M3 and which
is earmarked for considerable housing development in the coming
years, and discontinue through services between Winchester and
Havant and beyond.
It is important that the specification of franchises
reflect the aspirations of local and regional development plans
and Regional Transport Strategies and do not conflict with or
ignore what is contained in them. Consultation with local authority
officers is the best way to achieve this.
Has there been a smooth transition of franchising
arrangements from the Strategic Rail Authority to the Department
of Transport?
The Department for Transport do appear to be
much more restrictive in specifying franchise terms than SRA with
limited scope for individual solutions to challenges and capacity
constraints.
Experience suggests that stakeholder consultation
in the run up to franchises has been much more professionally
organised and thorough under the DfT than it was under the SRA.
There has been an openness and willingness to come out and meet
local authorities.
Are franchise contracts the right size, type and
length?
Franchise lengths are too short to generate
real passenger benefits. Rail investment takes a long time to
deliver and to produce benefits and short term franchises do not
give enough time for this to happen.
It is felt that there is a strong argument for
larger franchises including a spread of service types to enable
"cross subsidy" between profitable and social railway
lines and better integration at key stations.
Consideration should be given in all franchise
specifications to the provision of dedicated rail feeder bus services
to assist in the delivery of integrated transport.
What criteria and processes are used to determine
the nature and length of franchises?
Problems can occur on the borders of franchises
or where franchises overlap with a lack of consultation and cooperation
between operators. An example is the lack of co-ordination between
Arriva Trains Wales and Virgin West Coast services between Crewe
and Holyhead and the poor connections at Crewe. Reducing the number
of franchises can result in fewer opportunities for this to happen
as has been done by concentrating services from London terminus
stations in single franchises. However in very large organisations
outlying areas can become remote from the centre.
What criteria and processes are used to evaluate
franchise bids?
The criteria and processes used to evaluate
franchise bids must take into account all relevant factors and
not just the subsidy/premium in the bids. The franchise should
not be awarded to the most financially attractive bid if there
are doubts about deliverability, or if other bidders are offering
significantly better outputs for similar levels of subsidy.
Following the award of a franchise, there should
be a formal response mechanism to explain how stakeholders' aspirations
have been dealt with. There is also a case for an appeals mechanism
where there is serious concern about reductions in the level of
service.
Do franchise holders deliver value for money to
passengers and the government throughout the duration of their
contracts?
There have in the past been cases where franchise
operators have been unable to continue with the franchise on the
basis on which the bid was made. It can be argued that if this
is because of over ambitious revenue estimates or cost cutting
targets, the government should not be expected to "bail them
out".
Are risks suitably apportioned between the government
and franchise holders?
It is felt that more risk should be placed on
the franchisee but to offset this they should be allowed more
freedom to innovate and develop the franchise.
What is the scope for improving services through
franchise agreements?
Currently it appears that franchisees are severely
constrained by franchise specifications which restrict improvement
and development of services if not contained in the franchise
specification.
Do we need more competition and vertical integration?
Is franchising compatible with open access operations?
There are differing views on this issue.
Current experience suggests that there may be
a conflict between franchising and open access operations. It
is likely that future bidders will have to include a contingency
in their bid in case an open access operator subsequently commences
operation and abstracts revenue. However it is felt that bidders
are aware of the possibility of open access operators entering
the market and should cost this into their bid. Existing open
access operations have developed new markets not provided by franchises
and this should not be stifled.
Should train, rolling stock and track operation
be more closely integrated?
The separation of train and track operation
should ensure that all train operators, passenger and freight,
are treated fairly. It is important that Network Rail is able
to exert its role as an impartial "honest broker" for
train pathing and as overall infrastructure operator, it is able
to maintain uniformity of standards across the network. It is
important that the availability of freight paths is given appropriate
importance and not excluded because of aspirations for increased
passenger services.
There is concern that the ROSCO's do control
the availability of rolling stock and leasing costs of depreciated
units are very high.
CONCLUSION
ATCO welcomes the opportunity to be involved
in this process and would be happy to provide additional information
or explanation verbally or in writing.
20 June 2006
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