Select Committee on Transport Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 300-319)

MS MARY BONAR, MR ROGER FORD AND PROFESSOR CHRIS NASH

12 JULY 2006

  Q300  Mr Goodwill: Does anybody else have a view on that?

  Mr Ford: Yes. I would have thought that the radical approach would be to consider vertical integration upwards from the rail rather than downwards from the train. As I say, Network Rail is extremely concerned about the trains that have been bought since privatisation which are heavy, chuck out lots more CO2, damage the track and so on. They have produced a timetable. Perhaps there might be a case for Network Rail acquiring trains and running a franchise themselves. That would give you a lot of continuity and it could have break points in it at which the Government could say, "You are doing a good job or a bad job", but the train operating companies seem to be getting a bit lukewarm on vertical integration. They were very keen on it some time back.

  Q301  Chairman: Is that because so many of them have got what are in effect management contracts?

  Ms Bonar: One of the problems is that the industry by my calculation has been through four restructurings, including privatisation, since 1994 and during the Rail Review the operators did make a number of suggestions around vertical integration and were interested at that stage. At the present time I think it is unrealistic to expect those organisations to be welcoming further radical change. If we are going to redesign something, which I believe and the view of the Institute is that the present system works and can be made to work, and there are arguments either way, I would argue that we should spend some time looking at a number of different models to work out where the benefits are and where the risks are in those models. We run a number of different models in this country already. London Underground is split on the basis that operations only are carried out by the operator and the provision of the rolling stock and the rail and the timetable comes from the InfraCos. Tram systems tend to be integrated. The DLR is separate in terms of the extensions. We have got lots of things we can look at. It would, I think, have been quite useful if we had allowed Merseytravel to go ahead and see whether on their bit of the network, which would not have interfered very much with other people, they could produce reductions in cost and meet what passengers were looking for. That experiment could have been going on and given us something to look in a UK context but I would argue very strongly against radically changing the system for the next few years.

  Q302  Mr Goodwill: So you think it might be useful for Mersey Rail or in Scotland, for example, to run a pilot and see how it worked?

  Ms Bonar: Yes, I do.

  Q303  Mr Goodwill: Based on Mr Ford said about Network Rail themselves bidding for franchises, do you really think it is appropriate for a company underwritten by the taxpayer to be competing with companies which are not in that fortunate position for the provision of services on the railway?

  Mr Ford: With respect, that is an entirely artificial constraint. We have management companies which are bidding to either take a subsidy or run a basic specification. As I say, they are mere shells with operating skills, management skills, customer service skills but they own no assets, they have no weight and they only stand to lose their bonds or whatever. Network Rail is an organisation strong on engineering, strong on operations. They are the engineers and as a former engineer myself I can see great merit in bringing both sides of the wheel and the rail together.

  Chairman: There's an old-fashioned idea!

  Q304  Clive Efford: Can I go back to something Professor Nash said earlier on? What did you envisage when you said that train operating companies should be given more freedom to exploit their knowledge of the industry? What did you envisage them being able to do?

  Professor Nash: Design timetables that are more attractive to the customer, balance those with fares policies that fill empty seats and do not over-fill full trains. If they had long franchises then concern about lifecycle costs would be a lot higher. I am also worried at what is happening with rolling stock. Why are we getting much heavier trains that cost much more to run but do not always give a better service?

  Q305  Chairman: Do we not know why that is, Professor Nash? Is it not in the interests of the ROSCOs to do what they want to do irrespective? They do not own any infrastructure.

  Professor Nash: But the train operating companies do not have to go to the ROSCOs to secure new rolling stock.

  Q306  Chairman: Have you explained that to them recently?

  Professor Nash: They have got to get finance from somewhere but they can go direct to manufacturers. The ROSCOs have managed to maintain their position but again I fear in the current climate nobody is looking closely enough at the long term implications of what we are investing in in rolling stock.

  Q307  Clive Efford: But if I were a train operating company with a seven to 10 year contract would I go straight to the manufacturers and buy rolling stock?

  Professor Nash: It would be a case of finding alternative leasing arrangements. Some of the manufacturers lease rolling stock themselves.

  Q308  Clive Efford: Can I pursue that for a minute? Is it the structure that is the problem? If you replace one rolling stock company with another rolling stock company, whether it is somebody who has bought from the manufacturer or it is the manufacturer themselves, is it the structure of the system that is wrong?

  Professor Nash: Maybe there just is not enough competition in the whole system, including amongst manufacturers. To my mind to a large extent the problem with the ROSCOs is more that to some extent they have a monopoly of the existing rolling stock rather than when you come buy new rolling stock. There are other ways of doing it when it comes to new rolling stock.

  Ms Bonar: From what I have seen of rolling stock leasing and in the context of franchise bidding, the franchise bidding process has had a large impact on the selection of rolling stock because bidders, particularly those who were acquiring Mark 1 replacement stock, were doing so in a time frame where the things that mattered to them about the choices they had to make amongst two or three European rolling stock manufacturers—and this is nothing to do with the ROSCOs—were to do with cost of the kit and the delivery schedule and the general performance of that manufacturer's trains. From those deals that I have seen the decisions were around those key factors. They were not around whole life cost. They were very much pushed by things which were to do with the pressure of the franchise bidding process. Again, we are a very small island in terms of the rolling stock market. We inevitably buy from manufacturers who manufacture stock for railways which do not run under the same constraints that we do, the railways in France and Germany particularly. We are not deliberately going out to buy heavier rolling stock and rolling stock that costs more to run. We are buying the rolling stock which is being designed and run in Europe, and the European passenger happens to expect to have air conditioning and so we have ended up with air conditioning and we have ended up with heavier trains, but these are to do with the market from which we are buying and I think they are very little to do with the ROSCOs.

  Mr Ford: On this subject, the air conditioned trains that were built at Derby in the 1980s are something like perhaps 17 tonnes less than the air conditioned German trains which are running even now on the Transpennine Express. Those vehicles each weigh over 50 tonnes and if you compare, as I did, the fuel needed to get up to 100 miles an hour, the German trains need about three litres of fuel more just to get up to 100 miles an hour. That is CO2 going in the air. When I say, "Why are these trains heavier?", the Germans say, "You will have to come and see what we put into them, but they are air conditioned". Crash-worthiness? Not really. I think it is just that no-one has had any incentive in Europe to keep trains light. As a result trains have got heavier and the railways are losing out in environmental terms to cars and planes.

  Chairman: That is very helpful.

  Q309  Graham Stringer: Just on that point, is not one of the reasons trains are heavier the requirement to have disabled access to toilets?

  Mr Ford: It is not a significant factor. If you look at, say, the Networker fleet, which are the shiny trains built in the late eighties, they have got disabled toilets, they have got various other features and they are significantly lighter than the trains being delivered today. Trains have just got heavier and there is no one particular reason in my view. What it needs is somebody, a really good engineer, to say, "We are going to have lighter trains and if you do not make them lighter they will not run".

  Q310  Graham Stringer: So you think in relation to the Pendalino trains on the West Coast mainline, which have very large disabled toilets that work from time to time it is just bad design that gives that extra weight?

  Mr Ford: No. It was a bad specification on the Pendalinos. Virgin thought they were going to have three classes. The Railway Vehicle Accessibility Regulations say you have to have a separate toilet per class, so therefore they had to have three toilets in a train, which obviously takes up a lot of space and puts up the weight per seat. The Pendolino per se is not that heavy a train. It is the weight per seat that is high and that is because they had to put in more disabled toilets than common sense would dictate.

  Q311  Chairman: Is that the same case with the same trains built by Rotem in Korea?

  Mr Ford: I would not know, Chairman.

  Q312  Chairman: Do you not know about the Hitachi trains either? Are they the same?

  Mr Ford: The Hitachi trains being built for Channel Tunnel Rail Link will weigh more per seat than the Electrostar trains built at Derby.

  Q313  Mr Martlew: Just on the issue of the weight of the trains and going back to yesterday when we had the Energy Review, is the reality not that the heavier the trains the more energy it takes to shift them and we should be going to lighter trains not just because of the wear on the track but also because the environment would benefit from it?

  Mr Ford: This morning I had a phone call from an engineer who ran a computer programme comparing what it would take to run one of the older air conditioned trains I mentioned and one of the new German air conditioned trains from London to Brighton. I think the additional energy consumption was something like 28%. If you are moving a lot of mass around, a lot of heavy weight, it takes fuel and energy to get it up to speed and unless you have got regenerative braking that just disappears into the atmosphere so in addition to CO2 giving you global warming you get disc brakes warming the air as well.

  Chairman: That is very helpful. Thank you very much.

  Q314  Clive Efford: Is it your argument that if you were the people who care for the track you would put more consideration into the design of the rolling stock than is currently the case under the franchises?

  Mr Ford: That is indeed happening. Network Rail is part of the working group responsible for the high speed train replacement and they are adamant that the replacement for the high speed train is going to be a lighter weight train rather than a heavyweight train as it might appear at the moment.

  Q315  Clive Efford: Can we ever really transfer risk from the railways, given the importance of the railway network to the economy et cetera? Is it ever going to be possible to transfer risk in reality to the private sector from the public sector?

  Ms Bonar: We had a very interesting example of this, did we not, with Government deciding to allow Railtrack to become insolvent, so we saw private investors lose money as a result of investing in a privatised railway? One of the ways the Government seems to measure risk in the private sector is if they lose money when things go wrong, so they did. We then went to administration during which Government was in a position where it basically had to pay what the administrators thought they needed in order to fund the infrastructure controller, and part of the cost base which Network Rail inherited had in fact been inflated as a result of that process in my view, and I think this is the problem, that public transport by railway tends to come back to being something which Government and politicians feel they are responsible for and therefore they are reluctant to both see it go wrong and stand back and have no provision for the public.

  Q316  Clive Efford: Is that a fair comment? Is it not that the public perceive it to be a public service and therefore with the amounts of subsidy going into it they would want some sort of accountability for that type of investment?

  Ms Bonar: I do not think that is the same as the question you asked. There is risk with the public sector. Perhaps the risk is with the public sector for that very reason. What I have been trying to think about is, do we feel the same way about buses? I think the scale and cost of railway operations tends to put them into a different position from public passenger vehicles running on the highway. We can see there that the bus companies could go bust and nobody would do anything about it and somebody would come along and another bus would appear, but it is very much cheaper to get that off the ground.

  Q317  Chairman: In fact, that does not happen though, does it? What happens now when private companies fail to provide a service is that a local authority will be almost forced to step in and replace it.

  Ms Bonar: That depends, Chairman, on whether we are talking about a bus company which is running a contracted service or whether we are talking about a non-regulated bus company which is simply running and decides that the competition is better than it is so it withdraws from the market.

  Q318  Chairman: I am just interested in this because in fact the experience is that that is a very nice distinction which is not obvious to the public. The public will simply say, "I require a bus service", and if a bus company has gone bust and that bus service is not there they will then require the state to provide one.

  Ms Bonar: They require a bus service and if the service which has gone bust is a non-regulated service then the first thing that is likely to happen is that the private sector takes up that route.

  Q319  Chairman: Would that it were so.

  Ms Bonar: Otherwise, because of the way that the obligations of local authorities work they are required to provide a service.



 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2006
Prepared 5 November 2006