Select Committee on Transport Minutes of Evidence


Memorandum submitted by Renaissance Trains Limited

  A request has been received from Annette Toft for a written submission from Renaissance Trains Limited to the inquiry into passenger rail franchises in the form of a description of open access passenger operations. Similar questions to those listed in the terms of reference have been used although some further information has been provided which it is hoped the Committee will find useful.

  Renaissance Trains is a promoter of open access passenger services, forming Hull Trains in partnership with GB Railways (later First Group), which commenced operations in 2000. Renaissance is currently promoting the operation of new train services between Wrexham, Shrewsbury, Telford and London in partnership with Laing Rail—the owners of the Chiltern railways franchise.

  Passenger open access operations have characteristics that offer a combination of better value for money in terms of operating the services and external economic value that can be higher than that achieved by the franchised operators.

CONTEXT

  The pattern of passenger train services continues to reflect operating strategies developed by British Rail, which focussed on high levels of resource utilisation rather than detailed product design to serve individual markets.

  Thus the product offered for long distance express passenger services was standardised around fixed coaching stock formations that typically offered 500 seats. A high service frequency was also operated to maximise the use and productivity of the rolling stock and traincrew, with services often running at times of the day when there were few takers.

  The result of running high capacity fixed formation trains and the belief that they should operate for as many service hours as practical meant that the rail product was deliberately concentrated on a relatively small number of point-to-point flows. At stations served large car parks were provided, and "rail-heading" as it is known (driving to the station) was the general shape of the product rather than relying on the use of local rail feeder services.

  This strategy appealed to the higher value market (first class and full fare) as feeder trains were often run with poor quality rolling stock and even though operating over quite long distances (50 miles plus) often did not have first class accommodation or catering services. As local trains the availability of space for luggage was also a problem.

HULL TRAINS

  Hull Trains is the first UK open access operator and it can be seen that the approach is quite different. Although Hull is a significant population centre it did not offer sufficient business to run regular 500 seater trains and so was discarded by BR as a core route to and from London. Passengers wishing to travel between Hull and London were encouraged to travel by road and "rail-head" to Doncaster to catch the regular services provided from that point. Passengers travelling from London faced the need to change trains and use unsuitable rolling stock.

  It is worth saying here that many population centres were similarly treated with examples such as Sunderland (where a new open access operation is now proposed), Blackpool, Bradford, Grimsby/Cleethorpes/Lincoln, and Telford/Shrewsbury (also subject to a new open access service proposal). In Scotland there has in the past been a similar debate within rail planning circles about removing through trains between London, Aberdeen and Inverness although in this case stakeholder objection has been strong enough to head-off the idea.

  Hull Trains operates without subsidy and is able to do for the following reasons:

    —  It runs 180 seater trains rather than 500 seater formations.

    —  Product quality matches that provided by other long distance express operators, and as a result encourages passengers to travel throughout by rail between London and Hull rather than "rail heading". Indeed full catering with hot meals and buffet services are operated at weekends, which is not generally the case for other operators.

    —  It only runs trains where there is demand and the six current daily services on weekdays have an average load factor of more than 80%. There is very little wasted capacity. This is achieved by a very different approach to sales channels with passengers buying tickets over the Internet and by telephone. An internal travel agency is also provided to allow an account management relationship to be developed with large organisations based in Hull. Tickets are sold for specific seats on specific services.

    —  The company is locally based and approximately 75 staff are employed at Hull. All staff are encouraged to provide the highest level of individual customer service and help to vulnerable passengers such as the disabled. An emphasis is given to training and development and a number of staff have progressed from the junior role of providing catering and hospitality to qualified train driver. A high loyalty factor and low turnover has been achieved with resultant high motivation.

    —  A strong relationship has been built up with local stakeholders to increase awareness of the services and contribute to the local economy.

    —  Marketing expenditure is high relative to turnover and many bespoke value for money travel offers are available to specific market segments such as families who would not normally be able to afford the fare.

    —  High standards of performance and safety have been achieved. The company has leased new rolling stock and is operating the newest trains on the East Coast Main Line (class 222 type).

    —  Passengers can use services with inter available tickets on a turn up and go basis and all national railcards are accepted. This is particularly important for the student market.

  The purpose of an open access operator is to attract new rail customers who have previously regarded the service offered on a given route to be poor in product terms. This particularly applies where this involves a change of train where the feeder service is not of sufficient quality to reflect expectations for the overall journey.

  In business case terms the margin of expected revenue over costs must be sufficient to attract investment to cover start-up costs and initial trading account losses as volume is built up by marketing action.

  In achieving this aim there are substantial external economic benefits that are of a great value in areas where local stakeholders are seeking to regenerate the population centres concerned.

  Open access operators are not eligible for direct operational subsidy although they may qualify for European or regional funding in terms of job creation. As the services are new the jobs created are not at the expense of others in the railway industry and there is also the opportunity for wider job creation by using locally sourced suppliers in areas such as catering, uniform, train cleaning and maintenance, and office services.

  The nature of the business risk is different from the franchises as independent companies are not able to relay on Government support if things go wrong, such as the severe effect on railway revenues after the Hatfield accident, and to a lesser extent after 7 July incident in London.

  Open access operators also carry the risk of adverse change to the track access charging regime, whereas franchises are indemnified from this risk.

  There is also less ability to influence policy that might affect operational costs and track access terms as the promoters of open access operations are outside many of the consultative processes.

How well does the process for gaining track access rights work?

  Renaissance Trains has recent experience of the process as it is seeking to operate a new service between Wrexham, Shrewsbury, Telford and London Marylebone, which is being backed by Laing Rail—the owners of the Chiltern Railways.

  It should be relatively straight forward to gain track access rights (provided all statutory licence conditions are met) under what is known as a "section 18" application. This works by proposing a timetable to Network Rail that fits with other services on the route without importing undue performance risk—although obviously any additional train services will mean there is some increase in this risk. Perfect performance would only be achieved if there were no trains.

  Once the terms of the access contract are agreed this is submitted to the Office of Rail Regulation who advises stakeholders of the intention to operate the service and provides the opportunity for comment on any factors considered appropriate. The most usual comments are in relation to concerns about revenue abstraction and the perceived threat to performance.

  The process is of course iterative and many meetings are held to satisfy the parties concerned.

  There is limited experience of actual open access operation as this is confined to Hull Trains but in this case the increase in new traffic and subsequent external economic value has outweighed any revenue abstraction issues, as the rail market as a whole has been increased at stations served so there are benefits to the franchised operators as well, who earn commission on ticket sales at stations and benefit from higher awareness of rail services in general as a result of marketing action.

  Where a timetable cannot be agreed with Network Rail the applicant has the option of making a "section 17" application to the Office of Rail Regulation. This is a more complex process, as the Regulator has to identify why Network Rail has refused the application, which may be due to competing claims for the available capacity. This is resolved by detailed analysis of the economic benefit of the various proposals.

Are track access contracts of the right length?

  The length of the access agreement needed reflects the commitment to leasing rolling stock and the length of time taken to build up the market until it becomes profitable.

  If rolling stock is new it is unlikely that a competitive lease can be secured for less than 10 years. If second hand rolling stock is used there are likely to be substantial refurbishment costs that need to be offset over a similar 10-year period, as otherwise undue costs will be faced in the early years of operation, which may well be unprofitable until the market builds up.

  Business models with which I am familiar indicate that a break-even on the profit and loss account is achieved by year three, with losses in the early years recouped by year five. Again the business case would require a 10-year access agreement to allow investors to earn a return from years six to 10.

COMPETITION AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION

  It is not the principal aim of the open access operator to compete with other passenger operators. Regulatory policy is to avoid undue revenue abstraction on existing flows and demonstrate that the new services generate additional travel from population centres that are poorly served by rail.

  Despite this open access operators have the potential to influence the behaviour of what might be described as monopoly franchises by setting high standards of product deliver that provide a benchmark for others in terms of the price/service mix. This might be seen to influence those operators where services are regarded as poor value for money which can be seen from the National Survey Statistics published by Passenger Focus to be directly related to fare levels and the standard of product and customer service provided.

  Close contact must be maintained with Network Rail in optimising network performance and a number of industry-wide mechanisms are in place to deliver this.

  The key issue for the open access operator is "fair" terms of access to the rail network, which is a crucial function of independent regulation.

14 July 2006



 
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